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Summary of research 
 
 
The focus of this research is on the analysis of relations between Israel and India 
from 1948 to 2005. The State of Israel was established in 1948 but only on 18 
September 1950 did India recognise Israel.  Eventually, the two countries finally 
established full diplomatic relations on 29 January 1992. 
   
The research covers three specific timeframes and aims to clarify the factors that 
have affected and effected the relations between the two countries in terms of 
levels of analysis.   
 
The first timeframe (from 1948 to 1991) pertains to bilateral relations between the 
two countries before the establishment of diplomatic relations, including pre-
independence relations.  India's foreign policy towards Israel reflected its self-
interest in the Middle East as well as its traditional sympathy with the Arabs and 
had been influenced by India's commitment to the Non-aligned Movement and 
the sentiments of the Indian Muslims. Eventually it was transformed into an anti-
Israeli foreign policy.  
 
In the second timeframe, the change in bilateral relations between Israel and 
India in 1992 and the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two 
countries are analysed by the Aggregative Model of Bilateral Foreign Relations 
Strategic Change. This analysis deals with the operational environment within 
which the Indian systemic foreign policy changed towards Israel.  
 
In the third timeframe, the evolving bilateral relations between India and Israel 
from 1992 to 2005 are analysed in terms of the Oscillated Diplomacy Model.  
Consecutive Indian governments in power had an influence on the volume of 
Indian diplomacy towards Israel as well as the direction of the relations between 
the two countries. Furthermore, three types of mutual national strategic interests, 
namely, joint strategic interests, common strategic interests and discrepant 
strategic interests, influenced the operational diplomacy of both countries.   
 
 iii
In essence, Israeli-Indian relations from 1948 to 1991 were characterised by 
partial and consistent pro-Arab and anti-Israeli foreign policy.  In 1992, a 
significant diplomatic change occurred when India and Israel established full 
diplomatic relations.  Since then bilateral relations have evolved continually in a 
positive manner concentrating on the convergence of strategic interests of the 
two countries. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 iv 
Key terms 
 
Israeli - Indian relations, Transformation of foreign policy, Aggregative Model of 
Bilateral Foreign Relations Strategic Change,  Oscillated Diplomacy Model, 
Contextual change determinants, Evolving bilateral relations, Convergence of 
strategic interests, Joint strategic interest, Common strategic interest, Discrepant 
strategic interest. 
 v
Table of contents 
 
Chapter 1: Introduction  
 
1.1 Background of the research        1 
1.2  Focus of research            7 
1.3  Purpose of research         8 
1.4  Research questions          9 
1.5  Methodology           9 
1.6  Contents of study        14 
1.7  Summation of introduction       15 
 
Chapter 2: Theoretical framework  
 
2.1   Introduction         17 
2.2  Ultimate Decision Unit Model      19 
2.3   Levels of Analysis Model       20 
2.4   Model of Foreign Policy Change Decision Making    23 
2.5   Aggregative Model of Bilateral Foreign Relations Strategic Change 26 
2.6   Oscillated Diplomacy Model      29 
2.7  Theoretical framework and summation     32 
 
Chapter 3: India's relations with Israel Prior to January 1992 
  
3.1 Introduction         36 
3.2 Pre-independence India: Historical and political context of foreign 
policy towards Palestine and Zionism     40 
3.3   Pre-independence India: Ultimate decision unit    43 
3.4   Pre-independence India: The international system level of 
analysis         44 
       3.4.1   Britain as mandatory power in India and Palestine   49 
 vi 
     3.4.2   The Arab Jewish Conflict up to 1948    51 
3.5   Pre-independence India: The state and society level of analysis 53 
3.6   Pre-independence India: The individual level of analysis  59 
         3.6.1   Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi (the Mahatma)   59 
         3.6.2   Jawaharlal Nehru       68 
         3.6.3   Sardar Kayala M. Panikkar     72 
3.7   Post Independence India: Historical and political context of foreign  
        policy towards Israel       74 
3.8   Post Independence India: Ultimate decision unit   76 
      3.8.1   Predominant leaders: Jawaharlal Nehru    77 
3.8.2   Predominant leaders: Lal Bahadur Shastri   87 
3.8.3   Predominant leaders: Indira Gandhi    88 
3.8.4   Predominant leaders: Morarji Desai    90 
3.8.5   Predominant leaders: Charan Singh    93 
3.8.6   Predominant leaders: Rajiv Gandhi    94 
3.8.7   Predominant leaders: Vishvan Pratap Singh   97 
3.8.8   Predominant leaders: Chandra Shekhar    98 
3.8.9   Predominant leaders: Narasimha Rao    100 
3.9 Post independence India: The international system level of  
analysis          101 
  3.9.1   India and bilateral relations with Israel    101 
  3.9.1.1   Extension of recognition of Israel   102 
  3.9.1.2   India’s foreign policy towards Israel  
    (The period from 1947 to 1956)    103 
  3.9.1.3   India’s foreign policy towards Israel  
    (The period from 1956 to 1967)   106 
  3.9.1.4   India's foreign policy towards Israel  
    (The period extending from 1968  to 1991)  110 
3.9.2   India, Israel and multilateral relations    115 
  3.9.2.1   The Palestinians and the Arab-Israeli Conflict  120 
  3.9.2.2   India’s stance in the United Nations    124 
  3.9.2.3   India’s stance at the Afro-Asian Conference at  
   Bandung (18 – 24 April 1955) with regard to Israel 128 
  3.9.2.4   India’s Stance in the Non-Aligned Movement with  
 vii 
     regard to Israel      131 
   3.9.2.5   India, Israel and the Soviet Union   133 
   3.9.2.6   India, Israel and the US     134  
   3.9.2.7   India, Israel and the People’s Republic of China  
       (PRC)       137 
3.10  Post independence India: The state and society level of analysis 137 
3.10.1   The Indian Parliament      139 
3.10.2   The Indian Party system      141 
  3.10.2.1  Indian National Congress Party (INCP)  142 
  3.10.2.2  Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)    145 
  3.10.2.3  Paraja Socialist Party      147 
  3.10.2.4  Janata Party       149 
  3.10.2.5  Swatantra Party      152 
3.10.3   The Indian executive       152 
    3.10.3.1 The Cabinet, Prime Minister’s Secretariat and  
         the  Prime  Minister’s Inner Circle    153 
   3.10.3.2  Indian bureaucracy (Ministry of External Affairs) 157 
   3.10.3.3  India's intelligence service     160 
3.10.4    Media and public opinion in India    161  
3.10.5    Indian pressure groups       165 
   3.10.5.1  Indian Jewish community     165 
   3.10.5.2  Indian Muslim community     167 
   3.10.5.3  Indian business community     168 
 3.10.5.4  Shalom Alumni Club      169 
3.11  Summation         170 
 
Chapter 4: Israel's relations with India prior to January 1992 
  
4.1  Introduction         180 
4.2   Pre-independence Israel: Historical and political context of  
foreign policy towards India      182 
4.3  Pre-independence Israel: Ultimate decision unit   183 
4.4  Pre-independence Israel: The international system level of  
 viii
analysis         195 
4.4.1   Zionism’s self imposed international isolation from India 196 
4.4.2   The Jewish Palestine delegation to India   200 
4.5  Pre-independence Israel: The state and society level of analysis 203 
4.6  Pre-independence Israel: The individual level of analysis  206 
 4.6.1   Zionist leaders: Prof. Chaim Weizmann    206 
 4.6.2   Jewish legislators       208 
 4.6.3   Jewish intellectuals       210 
4.7  Post Independence Israel: Historical and political context of  
 foreign policy towards India      212 
4.8  Post Independence Israel: Ultimate decision unit   214 
4.8.1   Ministers of foreign affairs      216 
4.8.2   Israel’s international cooperation programme   224 
4.9  Post independence Israel: The international system level of  
analysis         227 
4.9.1    Israel and bilateral relations with India    227 
  4.9.1.1   Expectations and hope in Israel’s foreign policy 
     towards India      230 
   4.9.1.2   Afro-Asian Conference     234 
   4.9.1.3   Disappointment, anger and indifference in the  
    Israeli foreign policy towards India   236 
   4.9.1.4   Israeli- Indian and World Jewish organisations 245 
4.10  Post independence Israel: The state and society level of analysis 247 
4.10.1   The Israeli Parliament: The Knesset    248 
4.10.2   The Party System in Israel     249 
       4.10.3  The Israeli Executive      254 
      4.10.3.1 The Prime Minister and the Prime Minister’s  
                                Office       255 
  4.10.3.2 Ministry of Defence      255 
4.10.4   The Histadruth (The General Federation of Workers in  
              Israel)        256 
4.10.5   Pressure groups in Israel      258 
4.10.6    Media and public opinion in Israel    259 
4.11  Post independence Israel: The individual level of analysis  260 
 ix 
4.12  Summation         269 
 
Chapter 5: Transformation of India’s foreign policy towards Israel 
in January 1992 
  
5.1  Introduction         279 
5.1.1 Pre-feasibility stage       280 
5.1.2 Framing stage       280 
5.1.3 Cost and benefit stage      280 
5.1.4 Ripeness stage       280 
5.1.5 Reaching a focal point in foreign policy change   281 
5.1.6 Consolidation stage       281 
5.1.7 Assimilation and implementation stage    281 
5.2  The Eve of establishment of diplomatic relations between  
India and Israel        281 
5.3  Transformation of the Indian foreign policy towards  
Israel in Terms of Hermann's Model of Foreign Policy Change   283 
5.4  Aggregative Model of Bilateral Foreign Relations Strategic Change  
for analysis of transformation of the Indian foreign policy towards  
Israel           286 
5.4.1   Pre-feasibility stage       286 
5.4.2   Framing of foreign policy change      287 
5.4.3   Cost and benefit analysis       288 
5.4.3.1   Transformation of India’s foreign policy towards  
    Israel in terms of the international level of  
     analysis       289 
5.4.3.2   State and society (national) level of analysis  319 
5.4.3.3   Individual level of analysis    324 
5.4.3.4   Israel’s international image      326 
5.4.4   Growing ripe        327 
5.4.4.1   Economic liberalisation     327 
5.4.4.2   Re-establishment of diplomatic relations between  
   Israel and the Soviet Union     328 
 x
5.4.5   Focal point of change       328 
5.4.6   Consolidation stage of change      330 
5.4.6.1 The Arab states as a change impediment  331 
5.4.6.2 The Indian Muslim community    332 
5.4.6.3 The INCP’s conservative politicians   332 
5.4.7   Assimilation and implementation      333 
5.5  Summation         337 
 
 
Chapter 6: Evolving relations between Israel and India  between 
1992 and 2005  
 
6.1  Introduction         341 
6.2  Ultimate decision units       343 
6.2.1  Ultimate decision units in India      343 
6.2.2  Ultimate decision units in Israel      347 
6.3  Israeli- Indian relations analysis by international level of analysis  350 
6.3.1  Diplomatic relations as a joint strategic interest    351 
6.3.1.1  High level official visits     352 
6.3.1.2  Dialogues between foreign ministries   354 
6.3.1.3  Israel’s International Development Cooperation  
   Programme (Mashav)     355 
6.3.1.4   Israeli-Indian bilateral agreements   357 
6.3.2   Defence relations as joint strategic interest   357 
6.3.2.1   Military cooperation     363 
6.3.2.2   Counter-terrorism cooperation    370 
6.3.2.3   Intelligence cooperation      374 
6.3.3   Space cooperation as a joint strategic interest    375 
6.3.4   Nuclear power policy coordination as a joint strategic  
           interest        376 
6.3.5   Economic relations as a joint strategic interest   378 
6.3.6   Science and technology cooperation as a common  
strategic interest       381 
 xi 
6.3.7   Cultural relations as a common interest    383 
6.3.8   The United Nations as a discrepant strategic interest   384 
6.3.9   Superpowers as a common strategic interest   387 
 6.3.9.1  The United States      388 
 6.3.9.2   Russia       391 
           6.3.10   Geo- strategy as a common strategic interest   393 
          6.3.11   Energy as a discrepant strategic interest    394 
           6.3.12   The Non- Aligned Movement (NAM) as a  
  discrepant strategic  interest      396 
6.3.13   Asia as a common strategic interest    398 
6.3.14   People’s Republic of China (PRC) as a discrepant  
   strategic interest       398 
6.3.15   Central Asia as a common strategic interest    400 
6.3.16   Pakistan as a common strategic interest   401 
6.3.17   Iran as a discrepant strategic interest    403 
6.3.18   The Islamic World as a discrepant strategic interest   404 
6.3.19   The Arab World as a discrepant strategic interest   406 
6.3.20   The Palestinian Authority as a discrepant strategic  
   interest         408 
6.4  Israeli - Indian relations analysed by state and society level of  
analysis and individual level of analysis     411 
6.4.1   Indian political system       412 
6.4.2   Indian Ministry of External Affairs     414 
6.4.3   Pressure groups        416 
6.4.3.1  Friendship societies in India     417 
6.4.3.2  Jewish community in India     417 
6.4.3.3  The Indian community in Israel    418 
6.4.3.4   Muslim community in India    419 
6.4.3.5   Indian media      419 
6.4.3.6   US Jewish lobby      420 
6.4.4   Indian individuals       421 
6.4.4.1   National defence advisor     422 
6.4.4.2   President of the Indian National Congress Party 423 
6.5  Summation         424 
 xii 
 
 
Chapter 7: Conclusion 
 
7.1      Introduction   434  
7.2      Framework of the research           434 
7.2.1  First timeframe (1948-1991)     435 
 7.2.1.1   India's pre-independence attitude towards  
Palestine       436 
 7.2.1.2   India's post-independence foreign policy towards  
    Israel       437 
 7.2.1.3   Israel's pre-independence attitude towards India 444 
 7.2.1.4   Israel's post-independence foreign policy towards  
India       448 
7.2.2  Second timeframe (February 1992)    453 
7.2.2.1    Aggregative Model of Bilateral Relation Strategic  
Change       455 
7.2.3  Third  timeframe (1992-2005)     457 
7.2.3.1   Oscillated Diplomacy Model    459 
7.2.3.2    Joint strategic interests     460 
7.2.3.3    Common strategic interests    461 
7.2.3.4    Discrepant strategic interests    463 
7.3 Summation         467 
 
 
Bibliography   470 
Glossary   495  
Appendix   499 
 
 
 xiii
List of tables 
 
6.1    The Israeli-Indian International Development Programme 
          (1993-2004)   356 
6.2     Israeli-Indian Bilateral Trade (1992-2005)   380 
6.3     Indian voting regarding resolutions relating to the UN Assembly 
          and the Committees   386 
    
     
1 
 
Chapter 1 
Introduction  
1.1 Background of the research  
 
  In 1948, the newly born State of Israel gave full recognition to the Republic of 
India and since then has considered India a key player in the international 
system. India recognised Israel two years later, on 18 September 1950 and 
allowed the Government of Israel to open a consulate (that is, the lowest level 
of bilateral foreign relations) in Bombay (now Mumbai). Full diplomatic 
relations between the two countries were not established until 29 January 
1992.  
 
In the period between 1948 and 1992, international circumstances and 
events, domestic political constraints and diplomatic explanations were 
presented by various Indian governments to justify the absence of diplomatic 
relations between India and Israel, while consistently demonstrating distinct 
anti-Israeli as well as pro-Arab sentiments. Israel, on the other hand, made 
considerable efforts to improve its relationship with India throughout those 
years, but to no avail.  
  
After the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries in 
1992, bilateral relations, concentrating on mutual national interests, gradually 
evolved and reached its peak in the year 2003 when the prime minister of 
Israel paid an official visit to India and a joint statement of friendship and 
cooperation between the two countries was issued. However, relations 
between Israel and India have deteriorated since 2004 after the Indian 
National Congress Party (INCP) returned to power in India. 
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The absence of diplomatic relations prior to 1992 can partly explain why no 
books on Israeli–Indian relations in the discipline of international relations, 
were ever published by Israeli researchers. The most significant the 
information on the relations between the two countries is found in 
autobiographies, such as ‘Burmese Diary' (1953-1955), (1963) by David 
Hacohen, ‘The First Ten Years’ (1958) by Walter Eytan and ‘Destination 
Peace: Three Decades of Israeli Foreign Policy’ (1981) by Gideon Rafael, 
which include chapters referring to their personal diplomatic experiences with 
India. There were a few exceptions of papers and essays published in 
academic publications as well as chapters in books dealing with Israeli foreign 
affairs in general, which include references to Israeli-Indian relations in 
particular. Official archives such as the Archives of the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, the Zionist Archives, the Archives of the Israeli Labour Movement, the 
Archives of the Israeli Labour Party and Ben-Gurion Archives, are important 
sources of primary information. Official government publications as well as 
newspapers articles are another important source of information. 
 
Gideon Shimoni gives a detailed description of the visit of emissaries sent to 
India before independence to make contact with Mohandas Karamchand 
Gandhi (the Mahatma) and Jawaharlal Nehru. He also describes the 
frustration experienced by the Jewish leadership in Palestine because of 
India’s determination to avoid antagonising the Indian Muslim community as 
well as their consistent support of the Arab cause (Shimoni, 1977).  
 
Meron Medzini (1971, 1976), an expert on Israel’s foreign affairs, explains the 
Indian restrictive foreign policy towards Israel in terms of the constraints of the 
Indian political alignment with the Indian Muslim community and the Arab 
World. Israel on the other hand, according to him, did not regard relations with 
Asian countries in general and with India in particular, as a central component 
of its foreign policy. 
 
3 
 
Michael Brecher whose principal area of focus was international politics, pays 
attention in most of his books to Indian foreign policy with particular reference 
to the role of Prime Minister Nehru in general and India’s foreign policy 
towards Israel in particular (Brecher, 1957, 1959, 1960, 1963, 1968, 1972, 
1974). Brecher refers to the crucial aspects of Israeli-Indian relations pointing 
out that India’s foreign policy in general and towards Israel in particular, until 
the mid 1960s, was the product of Prime Minister Nehru who enjoyed the 
overwhelming support of the Indian public. His pro-Arab foreign policy was 
followed by his successors for many years up to the 1990s.  
 
Yaacov Shimoni, a veteran Israeli diplomat published, amongst other political 
dictionaries that include references to Israeli–Indian relations, an essay about 
the historical events that shaped the relations between Israel and India. 
According to him, the pro-Arab Indian foreign policy contributed to Israel’s 
failure to improve relations prior to 1992 and he refers to it as a sad tale of 
alienation that reveals a lack of empathy on India’s part. He also mentions the 
bitter disappointment experienced by Israel (Shimoni, 1991).  
 
Ran Kochan (1976), an expert on third world issues, David Kimche (1973), 
former Director General of the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Moshe 
Yegar, a veteran Israeli diplomat and an expert on Asia, all considered the 
Afro-Asian Conference in Bandung as a turning point in Israeli–Indian 
relations in particular and Israeli-Asian relations in general. Yegar attached a 
great deal of importance to India in the diplomatic history of Israel and 
dedicates a significant part of his book ‘The Long Journey to Asia’  (Yegar, 
2001) to the history of relations between Israel and India from an Israeli angle 
with emphasis on the traditional Indian hostility towards Israel. 
 
Stephen Cohen, an American expert on South Asia, in his assessment of 
Indian strategic and political power, points out that India regarded Israel as a 
religious state. Therefore, it was seen to be analogous to Pakistan and 
importantly, India did not want to offend Indian Muslims who were part of a 
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pro-Congress bloc and were troubled by the Arab-Israeli conflict (Cohen, 
2001). According to him, Indian foreign policy towards Israel was reversed in 
1992 because Prime Minister Rao realised that the threat posed by Islamic 
extremism was growing and calculated that it was worth risking domestic 
Muslim opposition to achieve cooperation regarding high technology defence 
and economic projects.  
 
Indian researchers, unlike their Israeli counterparts, made significant 
contributions to the body of research pertaining to Israeli-Indian relations. 
Official government publications as well as newspaper articles are also 
important sources of information despite the fact that the relevant documents 
on the bilateral relations between Israel and India housed in the official 
archives of India as well as the archives of the Ministry of External Affairs, are 
still not available for the public.  
 
In his book, ‘The Arab Israeli Conflict: The Indian View,’ dedicated to India’s 
relations with Israel and published in India, Sudha V. Rao blamed India for not 
being consistent in its pronouncements (Rao, 1972). He motivated his 
viewpoint by alluding to India’s deep-rooted commitment to Egypt and the 
complications resulting from the extension of the Cold War to the Middle East 
along with Pakistan’s role in the region.  
 
Kumaraswamy, one of the first Indian scholars to study Israeli-Indian relations, 
wrote several articles and essays on this topic (Kumaraswamy, 1996, 1997, 
1998, 1999, 2002, 2004). He describes the relations between India and Israel 
as humble beginnings with a bright future. At the same time, he stresses that 
the military cooperation between the two countries is the most significant 
element in the evolving strategic relations between two countries that both 
strive for technological independence and excellence. In addition, 
Kumaraswamy refers to the absence of diplomatic relations prior to 1992 as 
an anomaly and points out that India should have established diplomatic 
relations in the 1950s. According to him, the end of the Cold War contributed 
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to the establishment of diplomatic relations between India and Israel and 
influenced its attitude towards Israel, without renouncing its pro-Arab attitude. 
Following the establishment of diplomatic relations, both countries 
consolidated their cooperation in a wide array of military, political, economic 
and cultural fields; while taking care not to give the impression that the 
emerging relationship with Israel meant that they harboured anti-Islamic 
sentiments. The issue of diplomatic relations with Israel was no longer a 
contentious issue in domestic Indian politics and both countries diversified 
their military-security relations, which became a critical component of their 
bilateral relations. 
 
The books and memoirs of J.N. Dixit, India’s former Secretary of the Ministry 
of External Affairs (MEA), who played a significant role in the establishment of 
diplomatic relations with Israel, contributed a great deal to understanding the 
relations between the two countries (Dixit, 1996, 1998, 2004). He referred 
specifically to the host of factors that influenced their relations as well as the 
process that led to the Indian decision to establish diplomatic relations with 
Israel in 1992. In this regard, he referred to the establishment of relations with 
Israel as one of the two most significant developments in Indian foreign policy 
that had occurred during his tenure as Foreign Secretary. 
 
Papers, including historical descriptions of the relations between India and 
Israel were published by Subhash Kapila (2000, 2001, 2003, 2004), under the 
auspices of the South Asia Analysis Group (SAAG). In these publications, he 
indicates that India’s national interests are paramount and he stresses the 
crucial importance of the Israeli strategic cooperation with India, with special 
emphasis on defence, intelligence and internal security. 
                
In New Delhi, Farah Naaz (1999, 2000), associate fellow of the Indian Institute 
for Defence Study and Analysis (IDSA), , concentrated on the evolving 
relations between the two countries after the establishment of diplomatic 
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relations with each other, with special  emphasis on military cooperation and 
agriculture as well as on trade and economy. 
 
Dinesh Kumar (2001, 2003) asserts that the new world order of the 1990s 
tempered the Indian perception that closer diplomatic relations with Israel 
would constitute a conflict of interests. Their policies were no longer 
influenced to the same extent by the sentiments of the Indian Muslims and 
delicate aspects such as Arab sensitivities and non-alignment. The main 
reasons for the change in Indian foreign policy towards Israel, according to 
him, were the disintegration of the Soviet bloc, India’s economic situation, its 
defence needs and the beginning of the Middle East peace process, which 
made India realise that the continuation of the traditional negative policy 
towards Israel would undermine India’s national Interests. 
 
According to Mohan (2003), strategic affairs editor of the ‘Hindu’ newspaper, 
the non-aligned positions of India limited its strategic options and as a result, 
India had pressed for the isolation of Israel in the international sphere. 
However, by the beginning of the 1990s, India was compelled to look for a 
solution to the political impasse imposed on its foreign policy by its radicals as 
many felt that India’s national interests, including relations with Israel, had 
been sacrificed for the sake of meeting domestic political objectives. 
 
According to Harsh V. Pant (2005), India’s strategic interests converged with 
Israeli interests on a range of issues such as combating terrorism, defence 
collaboration, increasing trade and cooperation mainly in the field of 
agriculture while attempting to keep it out of public view. On the other hand, 
there are also factors that hamper these relations such as the Palestinian 
question on the one hand and India’s relations with Iran, a country that 
campaigns for the destruction of the State of Israel on the other hand. 
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The study contributes towards the literature on the Israeli-Indian relations by 
providing content validity and a detailed overview of the two countries’ 
bilateral relations based on the discipline of International Relations. 
 
1.2 Focus of research 
 
The focus of this research is on the analysis of the relations between Israel 
and India from 1948 up to 2005 from an Israeli perspective. Prior to 1992, 
India’s strained foreign policy regarding Israel, was seen by the State of Israel 
as a negative dogmatic foreign policy, which in the end proved to be 
detrimental to India’s own national interests, taking into consideration the 
traditional importance attached to India by Israel.1 Consequently, Israel 
experienced a wide spectrum of feelings ranging from high expectations, 
hope, great disappointment, dismay and anger to indifference regarding their 
relations with India.   
 
In January 1992, the transformation of Indian foreign policy towards Israel 
culminated in the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two 
countries. After the establishment of diplomatic relations, Israel, with the 
growing convergence of strategic interests between the two countries, 
experienced an increase in its expectations of the evolving bilateral relations 
with India. Bilateral relations concentrating on mutual national interests 
evolved gradually and reached its peak in 2003. One year later in 2004, after 
the INCP had returned to power in India, relations between the countries 
became less cordial and Israel’s expectations in terms of strategic relations 
with India declined concomitantly.  
 
The research problem therefore, focusses on the factors that have affected 
Israeli-Indian bilateral relations. 
                                                 
1
 National interest is defined as a basic determinant that guides the state's foreign policy of a 
sovereign state and presents the entire rationale of the exercise of state power in 
international relations in terms of national security (Evans and Newnham, 1998). 
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1.3 Purpose of research 
 
The purpose of this research is to provide a descriptive analysis of the various 
factors that have affected and influenced Israeli - Indian relations and in 
particular: 
 
• Bilateral relations between Israel and India from 1948 to1991.  
• Transformation of Indian foreign policy towards Israel that culminated in 
the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries in 
January 1992. 2 
• The potential for cooperation between Israel and India, as well as the 
evolving nature of their relations between 1992 and 2005.  
 
This research will contribute to the knowledge of relations between Israel and 
India in particular as well as to the study of International Relations and 
diplomacy in general. 3  A contribution is also made to international political 
theory by introducing the following two new models developed by the 
researcher for the analysis of international relations in general and Israeli-
Indian relations in particular, namely the Aggregative Model of Bilateral 
Foreign Relations Strategic Change4 as well as the Oscillated Diplomacy 
Model.5 In addition, the study contributes to the theoretical field of diplomacy 
as an instrument of foreign policy in general and diplomatic practice in 
particular.  
 
Based on the purpose of the research, the research questions can be defined 
as follows:  
                                                 
2
 Since the second timeframe of the diplomatic relations establishment relates to February 
1992, the few weeks prior to this event form part of the discussion.  
3
 Diplomacy is the management of relations between countries, is usually concerned with 
dialogues and negotiations and is an institution of the state system in itself making it an 
essential part of international relations (Evans and Newnham, 1998). 
4
 For details about the Aggregative Model of Bilateral Foreign Relations Strategic Change, 
see section 2.4.  
5
 For details about the Model of  Oscillated Diplomacy, see section 2.5 
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1.4 Research questions 
 
• With reference to a pattern of direct interaction between states as actors in 
international politics which factors influenced the relations between Israel 
and India prior to the establishment of diplomatic relations that is between 
1948 and 1991 and what effect did they have on the bilateral relations 
between the two countries up to 1991? 
 
• Which factors brought about the transformation of Indian foreign policy 
regarding Israel through a pattern of action, i.e. relationships where two 
actors are stimulated to respond to what the other is doing in a reactive 
way and in what way did they influence the establishment of full diplomatic 
relations between the two countries in January 1992? 
 
• Which factors contributed to the bilateral relations between the two 
countries between 1992 and 2005, how have they influenced the evolving 
relations between Israel and India since 1992 and what is the potential of 
prospective cooperation between the two countries?   
  
1.5 Methodology 
 
The focus of this research is on the relations between the State of Israel and 
the Republic of India.6 In terms of macro-level international politics7 with 
regard to structural realism,8  the change of Indian foreign policy towards Israel 
was motivated by Indian national interests. However, the challenge of this 
research is to analyse the complex bilateral relations between the two 
                                                 
6
 India, although not considered a nation-state, is a legal entity with a population, a defined 
territory and a democratically elected government, which maintains effective control over its 
territory and population while conducting independent international relations. 
7
 ‘Macro level international politics’ is a term used for the study of international politics, which 
focuses on the international environment and looks at world politics as a system with global 
patterns of interaction among its various parts. 
8
 ‘Structural realism’ is a term that views the structure of the international system as a 
principle determinant of the behaviour of the states as actors in international politics. 
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countries and the strategic change in their relations in terms of micro-level 
international politics9 with regard to agent-structure relationships10 with an 
emphasis on contextual factors.   
 
This is a qualitative study in which both primary and secondary sources from 
Israel and India are used.11 In all the chapters of the research, possible 
variables affecting the bilateral relations are identified, examined and 
analysed, taking into consideration the complex web and the comparative 
weight of these variables, the diversity of their characteristics and the linkages 
among them. Both external variables (such as India’s need to move closer to 
the West after the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet bloc) 
and internal variables (such as the role played by Indian Muslims and their 
sentiments towards Israel in the context of India’s domestic politics) are 
considered. 
 
The study is based on a diachronic analysis of Israeli - Indian relations and 
the following three timeframes spanning the years 1948 to 2005 are used for 
this purpose: 
 
• The period 1948 – 1991 - the focus is on bilateral foreign relations   from 
1948 to 1991. Reference is also made to pre-independence relations 
between both countries as an integral part of their mutual foreign relations 
because it would be difficult to understand the complex nature of Israeli-
Indian relations without taking the historical context into account.  
 
                                                 
9
 ‘Micro level international politics’ is a term used for the study of international politics, which 
concentrates on individuals and/or several parts of international politics while dwelling on 
particular events.  
10
 The agent-structure issue in international relations refers to interrelations between human   
beings and their organisations (as agents) and the structure of the international system. 
11Primary sources include original documents, official reports, statements, addresses, 
interviews and personal knowledge as a participant observer. Secondary sources include: 
academic publications, research papers, seminars and conferences' reports, books, 
memoirs, newspapers, and other publications (yearbooks, official publications, web-sites, 
etc). 
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• January 1992 (change of bilateral relations) - the focus is on the 
transformation of bilateral relations and the establishment of diplomatic 
relations. 
 
• The period 1992 – 2005 - the focus is on the evolving bilateral foreign 
relations from 1992 to 2005.  
 
In order to identify and analyse the factors that played a role in these phases 
of Israeli-Indian relations, it is important to pay attention to the various 
decision units and entities involved, as a unit of action, in both Israel and India 
with regard to the bilateral relations between the two countries, in terms of key 
ultimate decision units.12  
 
A Levels of Analysis Model, using three levels, is applied in the analysis 
throughout the research in order to explain and analyse the bilateral relations 
between Israel and India,  namely the international system level of analysis, 
the state and society level of analysis and the individual level of analysis.13 
The international system level is subdivided into two types of international 
foreign relations, namely bilateral relations and multilateral relations,14 in terms 
of international politics. 
 
 
The following two new models used in this research contribute to a better 
analysis of the research as well as the theoretical field of international 
relations and diplomacy:  
 
 
 
                                                 
12
 For details about the Ultimate Decision Unit Model (including an answer to the question 
why it was found suitable for the purpose of this study) see section 2.1.  
13
 For details about the Levels of Analysis Model, see section 2.2. 
14
 For details of the definition of bilateral and multilateral relations see section 2.2. 
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• The Aggregative Model of Bilateral Foreign Relations Strategic  
Change 
 
          This model deals with the operational environment of the systemic 
foreign policy change process and is used as an analytical and 
explanatory tool in order to analyse the transformation of India’s foreign 
policy towards Israel in 1992 and is applied to international relations as 
a theoretical model that helps to explore and guide research 
concerning changes in bilateral relations.15 
 
• The Model of Oscillated Diplomacy   
      
           This model deals with diplomacy oscillating between delimited opposite 
lines, illustrated by a ‘diplomatic vector’.16 The delimited lines function 
as guiding parameters of foreign policy, influenced by units of analysis 
in terms of levels of analysis while the ‘diplomatic vector’ is influenced 
by three types of national strategic interests.17 The model is used as an 
analytical and explanatory tool concerning the evolving bilateral 
relations between Israel and India from 1992 to 2005. It is applied as a 
theoretical model of international relations, which helps to explain 
operational diplomacy with the help of three types of national strategic 
interests and to direct research pertaining to bilateral foreign relations 
and diplomacy.18  
                       
                      
 
                                                 
15
 For details about the Aggregative   Model of Bilateral Foreign Relations Strategic Change, 
see section 2.4. 
16
 ‘Diplomatic vector’ refers to the operational management of bilateral relations in terms of 
volume and direction. 
17
 For details about the types of national strategic interest, see section 2.5. 
18
 For details about the Model of Oscillated Diplomacy, see section 2.5. 
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A Model of Foreign Policy Change Decision-Making19 is utilised as a second 
model dealing with the analysis of the change of foreign relations in order to 
provide external validity20 to the Aggregative Model of Bilateral Foreign 
Relations Strategic Change. The former model that is the key model 
pertaining to the analysis of the transfer of the bilateral relations between 
Israel and India in 1992 is used to provide a better generalisability and to 
utilise the model as an analytical tool applied to the analysis of bilateral 
foreign policy change. The external validity of the Aggregative  Model of 
Bilateral Foreign Relations Strategic Change is based on the theoretical 
perception that external validity of a new model can be achieved by 
comparing points of similarity and points of variance with other models in the 
same field (Fielding, 1993:166).  
 
Furthermore, the examination of the change in bilateral relations between 
Israel and India strengthens the internal validity21 of the analysis of the change 
in bilateral foreign relations between the two countries. This is achieved with 
the help of the above mentioned models of foreign policy change and the 
additional reviews made by various Israeli and Indian scholars regarding the 
Indian foreign policy change towards Israel in 1992.  
 
In order to obtain a more comprehensive analysis of each segment of this 
diachronic research between 1948 and 2005, the pertinent theories and 
models used in this research are organised into a coherent theoretical 
framework. An eclectic approach is used which helps to both simplify and 
                                                 
19
 For details about the Model of Foreign Policy Change Decision-Making, see section 2.3. 
20
 External validity of a model refers to the degree to which the resolution can be generalised 
beyond the research setting and sample, namely, when the results of the research hold 
across different experimental setting procedures and participants.  
21
 Internal validity refers to the ability to test the research hypothesis adequately by showing 
that variation in the dependent variable is caused only by variation in the independent 
variable. Internal validity means that changes in the value of the criterion variable are solely 
related to changes in the value of the predicator variable. 
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represent the complex relations between Israel and India within a changing 
international environment, as will become evident in the research.22  
 
1.6 Contents of study 
 
Following the introductory chapter, the theoretical framework of this research 
is specified and discussed in the second chapter.23 
 
The focus of the third chapter is on the description, narration and analysis of 
India's relations with Israel before the establishment of diplomatic relations 
from 1948 to 1991 from an Israeli perspective. This includes pre-
independence relations from a historical perspective.24 The Ultimate Decision 
Unit and the Levels of Analysis Models are applied as analytical tools in the 
analysis throughout the chapter.25 
 
In chapter four, a description, an account and the analysis of Israel's bilateral 
relations with India during this same period, that is prior to the establishment 
of diplomatic relations, are provided, including references to the pre-
independence relations between the two countries. Similar to the previous 
chapter, this chapter includes pre-independence relations from a historical 
perspective in conjunction with the use of the Ultimate Decision Unit and 
Levels of Analysis Models respectively in the analysis throughout the chapter. 
 
The focus in chapter five is on the analysis of the transformation of India's 
foreign policy regarding Israel in January 1992 and the establishment of full 
diplomatic relations between the two countries. The key analysis in this 
                                                 
22
 For details about the theoretical framework, see section 2.7 
23
 For details about the theoretical framework, including elaborations on pertinent theories and 
models, see chapter two.  
24
 For details about the relationship between historical analysis in accordance with 
International Relations theories and models, see section 2.1. 
25
 For details of the Ultimate Decision Unit Model, see section 2.1 and for details about the 
Levels of Analysis Model, see section 2.2. 
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chapter is based on the original model of the Aggregative  Model of Bilateral 
Foreign Relations Strategic Change.26 
 
Chapter six presents an analysis of the evolving relations between Israel and 
India in terms of oscillated operational diplomacy with an emphasis on the 
mutual national strategic interests of the two countries, including references to 
their prospective cooperation. The analysis is based on the original Oscillated 
Diplomacy Model.27 
 
Chapter seven, with the help of a theoretical framework, concludes this 
research with an overview, an analysis and a summary of the complex 
bilateral relations between Israel and India. In addition, it contributes to the 
analysis and understanding of the relations between Israel and India.28 
1.7 Summary of introduction 
 
The Republic of India recognised the State of Israel on 18 September 1950, 
but the two countries established full diplomatic relations only on 29 January 
1992. The focus of this research is on the analysis of the bilateral relations 
between the two countries from 1948, when the State of Israel was born, up to 
2005, in terms of an Israeli perspective. 
 
In order to gain a better understanding of the relations between Israel and 
India, the research provides a descriptive analysis of Israeli–Indian relations. It 
aims to clarify the factors (in terms of external and internal variables) that 
have affected and effected Israeli-Indian relations, in accordance with the 
research questions. These factors are the bilateral relations between the two 
countries prior to the establishment of diplomatic relations (1948-1991) 
including pre-independence relations, the bilateral strategic change that 
                                                 
26
 For details of the Aggregative   Model of Bilateral Foreign Relations Strategic Change, see 
section 2.4. 
27
 For details about the Oscillated Diplomacy Model, see section 2.5. 
28
 For details about the theoretical framework, see section 2.6. 
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paved the way for full diplomatic relations in 1992 and the evolving bilateral 
relations between Israel and India that followed (1992-2005). 
 
The analysis itself, following the introductory chapter and the theoretical 
framework in chapter two, which introduces the pertinent theories and models 
used in the study, including two original models (developed by the 
researcher), is a diachronic type of research divided into three timeframes that 
are commensurate with the research questions. 
 
Chapters three and four concentrate on the analysis of the Israeli-Indian 
relations before the establishment of diplomatic relations while chapter five 
deals with the analysis of the transformation of India’s foreign relations 
towards Israel and the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two 
countries. Chapter six presents the analysis of their evolving relations with 
reference to their prospective cooperation. 
 
Chapter seven concludes the research with an overview as well as a 
comprehensive analysis and a summary of the bilateral relations between 
Israel and India with reference to the contribution of this study, in the form of a 
generalisation, to the theoretical field of international politics and diplomacy. 
Recommendations are also included for future study regarding Israeli-Indian 
foreign relations in general and the systemic process involved in their bilateral 
relations with special reference to various informal dimensions of multi-faceted 
bilateral relations in particular, as well as the structural relationship between 
foreign policy and diplomacy.29 
 
 
                                                 
29
 For details about the contribution to the study of international politics and diplomacy, see 
chapters two and seven.  
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Chapter 2 
 Theoretical framework 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
Various theories deal with the conducting of bilateral relations in general and 
foreign policy in particular. Therefore, the objective of this chapter is to 
provide a theoretical framework for the analysis of this research on the 
bilateral relations between Israel and India. For the analysis of Israeli-Indian 
bilateral foreign relations, it is necessary to make use of various International 
Relations’ theories in line with historical description and narration in order to 
understand the various dimensions and phases of their relations. For this 
reason, attention will be paid to the following theoretical frameworks:  
  
• The Ultimate Decision Unit Model 
• Levels of Analysis Model 
• Model of Foreign Policy Change Decision-Making  
• Aggregative Model of Bilateral Foreign Relations Strategic Change 
• Oscillated Diplomacy Model 
 
The Ultimate Decision Unit Model was chosen as the basic analytic and 
explanatory tool in this research.1 The reason for this choice is that foreign 
policy and bilateral foreign relations are decided and implemented 
respectively by different entities and are therefore not attributable to a single 
political source. 
 
The making of foreign policy, as well as international behaviour in which 
different entities engage, often changes over time depending on given issues 
in terms of the ultimate decision units. Thus, they are influenced by different 
interests and as such, are traced and examined throughout this research by 
making use of the Levels of Analysis Model as an analytic tool.2  
                                            
1
 For further information on the Ultimate Decision Unit Model, see section 2.2. 
2
 See section 2.3, for more information on the Levels of Analysis Model.  
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As mentioned in chapter 1, the research is divided into three timeframes. The 
analysis in the first timeframe (1948-1991) is based on a historical description 
that explains the development and gives a narrative of the Israeli-Indian 
relations grounded in the Levels of Analysis Model. The historical analysis 
within the area of international politics is carried out in accordance with 
theories and models pertaining to international relations in order to improve 
the significance of the analysis.3 
 
In the second timeframe (February 1992), the analysis is based on a new 
model, namely the Aggregative Model of Bilateral Relations Strategic Change, 
in an attempt to overcome the shortcomings of some of the other theories and 
models applicable to a topic of this nature, combined with a new 
methodological approach to the contextual determinants and It is used as an 
analytic and explanatory tool to clarify the process of change in bilateral 
foreign relations.4 In addition, the Foreign Policy Change Decision Making 
Model5  is used in the research to provide external validity to the Aggregative 
Model of Bilateral Relations Strategic Change. It is also utilised as an 
additional analytic tool regarding bilateral foreign policy change.  
 
 The analysis of bilateral foreign relations in the third timeframe (1992-2005) is 
based on another new model, developed by the researcher, namely the 
Oscillated Diplomacy Model. It is applied as an analytic tool of bilateral foreign 
policy focussing on operational diplomacy as a key element in foreign policy in 
an attempt to realise the relationship as well as the structural tension between 
them.6 
 
                                            
3
 The term “history” is used to describe a systemic discipline intended for providing cumulative 
increments to increase the knowledge of the past by narration and description. The historical 
analyst should be aware of the ways in which chosen theories and models represent realities 
(Sills, 1968:378). 
4
 For further information on the Aggregative Model of Bilateral Relations Strategic Change, 
see section 2.5. 
5
 For further information on the Foreign Policy Change Decision Making Model, see section 
2.4. 
6
 For further information on the Oscillated Diplomacy Model, see section 2.6. 
 19 
The theories and models applied in this research are incorporated into a 
holistic framework composed of an eclectic, but coherent and mutually 
supportive set of theories and models, which contributes to a comprehensive 
understanding of Israeli-Indian bilateral relations.  
 
2.2   Ultimate Decision Unit Model 
 
The Ultimate Decision Unit Model deals with the decision-makers in foreign 
policy. Foreign policy making and behaviour is carried out and engaged in 
respectively by different entities and within any government; the pertinent 
decision units often change over time as well as with regard to foreign policy 
on a particular issue. According to this model, the ultimate decision units 
shape the government’s foreign policy and are defined as sets of authorities 
(entities such as individuals, group of individuals or multiple actors) within a 
political structure of a government (or a non-state actor policy decision making 
unit). These sets of authorities identify, decide, influence and carry out foreign 
policy at a particular time or have the ability to commit or withhold the 
resources of the government pertaining to foreign affairs. Alternatively, the 
ultimate decision units have the power and authority to prevent other entities 
within the government from overtly reversing their position about foreign 
policy, which could lead to significant costs and negative consequences.  
 
With reference to this theory, Hermann and Hermann (1989) point out that it is 
unlikely that there is only one recurrent set of policy makers handling all 
problems in the same manner and in this regard, they identify three types of 
ultimate decision units, namely predominant leaders, single groups and multi-
autonomous actors. According to the Ultimate Decision Unit Model, the 
predominant leader type is a single individual that has the power to make 
choices on behalf of the government and is a key actor as far as foreign policy 
change is concerned. The leader’s traits shape his initial inclinations and 
determine whether and how he will regard advice from others, react to 
information from the international environment and assess the political risks 
associated with various political activities. Of particular relevance is 
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knowledge about the leader’s orientation in terms of foreign relations, his 
composite set of views about how his government should act in the foreign 
policy arena and his sensitivity to information emanating from the political 
environment with specific emphasis on the operational level. 
 
In this research, the ultimate decision units, as analytical and explanatory 
tools, are identified and analysed in terms of pertinent entities and authorities, 
including leaders, within the Israeli and Indian governments, that were 
important actors with regard to the shaping of bilateral relations between 
Israel and India between the years 1948 and 2005. The Ultimate Decision 
Units Model was found to be more suitable than the Decision Making theory 
for the purpose of this analysis. The reason is that the former model refers not 
only to the decision making process underlying and driving the practice of 
foreign policy, such as the implementation of a new foreign policy by different 
entities as a set of authorities, but it also refers to operational diplomacy.  
 
2.3   Levels of Analysis Model 
 
The Levels of Analysis Model underscores the need to trace changes in world 
politics back to different groups of actors, their attributes, activities as well as 
their interaction. Simultaneously, emphasis is placed on political power 
brokers and their input regarding foreign relations, which includes both 
bilateral relations and their influence on individuals (political leaders in 
particular) who play a role in the foreign policy decision-making process, as 
well as international behaviour. Waltz (1959) identifies three levels of analysis 
employed in the field of international relations, namely the international system 
level, the state and society level and the individual level. These three levels of 
analysis, as discussed in Waltz’s model, are incorporated throughout the 
research as pertinent and analytical tools and are used to describe and 
analyse the bilateral relations between Israel and India with emphasis on both 
the operational environment and diplomacy. 
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• International system level of analysis   
The international system level of analysis refers to the global environment 
and the behaviour of states in the international system. It is utilised in 
relation to the conditions that result from the interaction of states and non-
state actors with one another. This level functions as a unit of analysis, 
provides an analytical explanation of the relevant international factors that 
have influenced the relations between Israel and India and which includes 
the transformation of the Indian foreign policy towards Israel in 1991. The 
international system level is sub-divided into two types of foreign relations, 
namely bilateral and multilateral relations.7 
 
The variation between these two types of foreign relations can explain how 
it happened that bilateral relations between Israel and India were at a low 
level from that time up to the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1991 
and even up to 1992. This was the case notwithstanding India’s 
recognition of Israel in 1950 and the existence of an Israeli Consulate in 
Bombay. However, on the other hand, India played a significant role in 
international affairs pertaining to Israel. as a prominent leader of the Non-
Aligned Movement (NAM), at the multilateral level. 
 
• State and society level of analysis  
The state and society level of analysis (also known as the national level) is 
utilised as a unit of analysis in relation to authoritative state decision-
making units that influence and shape as well as constrain foreign policy. 
Domestic factors, such as national politics, economy, bureaucracy and 
organisational behaviour all have an influence on foreign policy and as 
such are analysed accordingly.  
 
The state and society level of analysis as a unit of analysis is utilised as an 
analytic tool applied to the domestic factors that have influenced the 
                                            
7
 Bilateral relations are defined as a pattern of interaction between two states, while 
multilateral relations are defined as a web of relations among players within the international 
system (Brecher, 1972). 
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bilateral relations between Israel and India in general and the 
establishment of diplomatic relations between them in particular. 
 
• Individual level of analysis. 
The individual level of analysis refers to the characteristics of individuals 
as well as to the role of leaders who influence world politics on behalf of 
their states. In this research, the individual level of analysis, as a unit of 
analysis, contributes to the identification and analytical explanations of the 
personal factors that influenced the bilateral relations between Israel and 
India. 
 
As international actors (as well as variables) relate to one another across 
levels of analysis and over time, it is important to assess the direct and 
indirect interaction among the different levels of analysis.  
 
It should be pointed out that there is a methodological variation between 
leaders in terms of the Ultimate Decision Units Model and leadership at the 
individual level of analysis. The individual level of analysis refers to individual 
characteristics that influence the foreign policy process in terms of analytical 
values; while the individual level unit influences foreign policy in terms of 
guiding parameters.  
 
The ultimate decision unit refers to predominant leaders, other pertinent 
entities such as political parties and state level groups that influence the 
diachronic operational process of foreign policy as well as diplomacy in terms 
of volume and direction actively. The differentiation of the various levels of 
analysis implies that foreign policy cannot be attributed to a single source 
only. In fact, foreign policy making and international behaviour are influenced 
by different interests with regard to particular issues and such implications are 
commensurate with the Ultimate Decision Unit Model. 
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2.4 Model of Foreign Policy Change Decision Making  
 
The Model of Foreign Policy Change Decision Making (Hermann, 1990) is 
utilised as an additional model in order to achieve external validity8 for the key 
model used for the analysis of the transformation of bilateral relations 
between Israel and India in 1992. In addition to the external validity provided 
to the Aggregative Model of Bilateral Foreign Relations Strategic Change,9 the 
Model of Foreign Policy Change Decision Making is utilised as a tool that has 
explanatory and analytical values with regard to the bilateral foreign relations 
between Israel and India. The latter model provides an additional perspective 
on the transformation of India’s foreign policy regarding Israel. 
 
Foreign policy change in Hermann’s model includes four types of change in 
terms of means, ends and overall orientation, namely adjustment changes, 
programme changes, problem or goal changes and international orientation 
changes. The first type of change refers to adjustment changes, which include 
the level of effort and/or the scope of recipients, such as the level of 
refinement in the class of targets and answers the question what and how 
they are done while the purposes for which they are done, remain unchanged. 
The second type refers to programme changes, which are made to the 
methods or means through which the goal is addressed.  
 
Programme changes are qualitative and involve new statecraft. Instruments. 
The third type refers to problem or goal changes, which means that purposes 
themselves are replaced. The fourth type refers to international orientation 
changes and is the most extreme form of foreign policy change. These 
changes occur when a redirection or a basic shift of the actor’s entire 
orientation towards world politics takes place (Hermann, 1990).  
 
                                            
8
 According to Jane Fielding, external validity of a model can be achieved by comparing 
points of similarity and points of variance with other models (Fielding, 1993:166).   
9
 For further information regarding the Aggregative Model of Bilateral Foreign Relations 
Strategic Change, see section 2.4. 
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Hermann (1990) suggests that there are four different sources of foreign 
policy change:  
 
• Leader driven change, resulting from the determined efforts of authoritarian 
policy makers.  
• Bureaucratic advocacy as an agent of change. 
• Domestic restructuring that refers to the pertinent segment of society 
whose political support is needed as a change agent. 
• External shock as a source of foreign policy change derived from particular 
international events.  
 
The Model of Foreign Policy Change Decision Making presents the conditions 
and possibilities in foreign affairs that can promote a major change in foreign 
policy, through a decision making process, in seven stages:  
 
• Initial policy expectations   
Expectations concerning the effects of foreign policy have to be 
produced by the existing policy; while creating standards for 
subsequent judgments of success or failure. The potential new policy 
should solve the problem or reduce its effects. 
 
• External actor responses and environmental stimuli  
      The international environment produces an external stimulus for 
examining or affecting an existing foreign policy. 
 
• Recognition of discrepant information 
When an external development generates external information that is 
inconsistent with the existing policy expectations or offers new 
evidence about the nature of the problem in the foreign policy or no 
longer accommodates information received from the international 
environment, it becomes a signal to the policymakers about the need 
to change foreign policy. 
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• Postulation of a connection between problem and policy.  
    The connection between an existing foreign policy and a problem has 
to be identified while the policymakers must conclude that their 
government's foreign policy is either ineffective, exacerbates the 
problem, generates new problems of substantial concern or costs 
much more than anticipated. 
 
• Development of alternatives  
Alternative solutions for foreign policy change can be generated after 
redefinition of the programme by examining already existing options or 
developing new options.  
 
• Achieving authoritative consensus for new options 
Consensus is needed in order to produce new options in foreign policy 
(in fact, such a policy cannot proceed or be implemented until 
authoritative consensus is reached). 
 
• Implementation of new measures   
The foreign policy change process does not end with a selection of 
some new policy and it is important to attain the wholehearted 
commitment of all those charged with carrying out the selected new 
policy. A clear definition of the objective of the new foreign policy and 
a clarification of the expectations regarding the foreign policy change 
are needed in order to ensure that the measures concerning the new 
foreign policy are implemented as effectively as possible. 
 
According to Rosati, Hagan and Sampson (1994:12), Hermann’s model 
places too much emphasis on the role of the decision-making process for 
foreign policy change, includes more minor shifts in means and 
instruments in the conducting of day-to-day foreign policy and he limits his 
analysis to self-corrective change by existing governments. Nonetheless, 
the above-mentioned criticism of the model does not prevent it from being 
 26 
utilised in a unique way for the purpose of this research as discussed in 
this sub-section.  
 
2.5 Aggregative Model of Bilateral Foreign Relations Strategic Change 
 
The first of the two newly devised models that is applied for the purpose of this 
research is the Aggregative Model of Bilateral Foreign Relations Strategic 
Change. This model refers to the process of change in the bilateral relations 
between Israel and India, including its operational environment, with emphasis 
on the convergence of relevant fundamental factors, in terms of strategic and 
national interests with pertinent contextual determinants.   
   
The Aggregative Model of Bilateral Foreign Relations Strategic Change is used 
as a key model of the research to achieve a better analytical and explanatory 
tool. It will enable an improved analysis of the aggregative multiple factors that 
influence the complex process of change of the Indian foreign policy regarding 
Israel. The aim is to provide an answer to the research question regarding the 
transformation of Indian foreign policy in connection with Israel in 1992.  
 
This model also contributes to an improved understanding of the dynamics of 
change in bilateral comprehensive foreign relations and bilateral diplomacy. In 
fact, relatively little attention was given to the foreign policy change theory in 
micro-level terms and traditionally, the issue was considered to be part of the 
decision-making and negotiation theories respectively.10  
 
The aggregative multiple factors are divided into two groups, namely causative 
factors and contextual determinants. In an operational environment, the 
causative factors, which are the relevant fundamental and strategic national 
interest-oriented factors, converge with pertinent contextual determinants, in a 
systemic and diachronic process of foreign policy change. They are described 
as follows,  
                                            
10
 With the exception of Hermann’s model of foreign policy change decision making. For 
details about Hermann’s model and an explanation why the new model is more applicable for 
the purpose of this research, see section 2.4. 
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• Pre-feasibility stage   
An early stage of the bilateral foreign policy change process is the pre-
feasibility stage. In fact, it is the incubating stage of foreign policy change, 
which is brought about and influenced by pertinent particular circumstantial 
formative change determinants, particularly when the status quo in bilateral 
relations appears to have a negative effect.  
 
• Framing stage 
During the framing stage, change determinants are generated in terms 
of the pertinent circumstances that initiate and determine the bilateral 
foreign policy. 
 
• Cost-benefit analysis stage   
The cost-benefit analysis stage entails not only the review and 
evaluation of relevant fundamental and national security oriented 
factors, but also includes the revision of alternatives and new options. 
This is carried out in conjunction with contextual and situational change 
determinants, as part of the selective process, thereby setting the 
stage for the development of optimal conditions within the operational 
environment for a change in bilateral foreign relations.  
 
• Ripeness stage 
A pre-requisite for the ripeness stage, a preliminary stage in foreign 
policy change, is when two actors in the international system are ripe 
for a bilateral foreign policy change. This change is accelerated by 
particular events and circumstances, in the form of accelerating 
change determinants that set off the foreign policy change in terms of 
the international operational environment.   
 
• Reaching a focal point in the foreign policy change stage   
A feasible stage in terms of the international operational environment is 
the reaching of a focal point in foreign policy change. Strategic and 
national interest-oriented factors adjusted to suit the specific conditions 
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and situation in line with the contextual adjustment determinants and 
synchronised with certain components, set the bilateral foreign policy 
change in motion.  
 
• Consolidation stage 
In order to achieve political consensus and/or tackle international as 
well as domestic political impediments to the systemic process of 
change, in reaction to shifts in foreign policy, a consolidation stage 
becomes essential so that changes in bilateral foreign policy can be 
effected. This stage can be achieved with the help of the particular 
consolidating determinants in terms of coordination and control, 
especially in the case of an extensive and far-reaching foreign policy 
transformation and/or when the previous bilateral foreign policy had 
strong support in the domestic political system.  
 
• Assimilation and implementation 
Stabilising change determinants, in terms of the consolidation of 
bilateral foreign policy change, affecting both the international and 
domestic political sectors, set the systemic foreign policy change 
process in motion and redefine foreign policy. These change 
determinants create new patterns of interdependence and direct 
diplomacy, with the aim of substantiating the far-reaching change in 
bilateral relations.  
 
The use of the Aggregative Model of Bilateral Foreign Relations Strategic 
Change as an analytical and explanatory tool provides a better understanding 
of the transformation of the Indian foreign policy regarding Israel. It also 
enables an analysis of the multiple factors that influence the systemic process 
of this foreign policy change either directly or indirectly together with certain 
contextual determinants. In addition, the model also provides a 
methodological answer to the question of how to refer to the weight and 
importance of both circumstantial events and causal connections in the 
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international operational environment by using a multilevel contextual 
determinant. 
2.6 Oscillated Diplomacy Model 
The second of the two new models is the Oscillated Diplomacy Model, which 
is used as an analytical and explanatory tool to analyse the evolving bilateral 
relations between Israel and India from 1992 up to 2005 and provides an 
answer to the relevant research question regarding this particular topic.   
 
‘Foreign policy,’ 'foreign relations' and ‘diplomacy’ are often used as 
synonyms in international politics, however, ‘foreign policy’ refers to the goals 
and attitudes of a state’s affairs within the international system, while 'foreign 
relations' refers to the substance of international politics. ‘Diplomacy,’ on the 
other hand, is an operational and practical instrument employed in a systemic 
and diachronic process, in order to put international aims into effect.11 By 
using diplomacy as an instrument in international politics while influencing the 
international environment, states pursue mutually exclusive or incompatible 
strategic goals and national interests (Evans & Newnham, 1998:129, 181). 12  
 
Strategic national interests are generally used in two senses in International 
Politics. In the first place, it is used as an analytical tool identifying the goals of 
foreign policy and secondly, it is used in political discourse specifically to 
justify particular international foreign policy. However, attempts, which have 
been made to develop models of the varying levels of intensity that national 
interest may be expected to generate, have floundered because of 
subjectivism. (Evans & Newnham, 1998:  344, 346).  
 
Furthermore, the term 'national interest' refers to matters of importance to a 
state and has mostly been related to realism. Realists take the national 
interest for granted, but do not explain how states come to define this term or 
                                            
11
 Diplomacy is the management of relations between countries and is usually concerned with 
dialogues and negotiations and is also an institution of the state system. It is regarded as an 
essential part of international relations (Evans and Newnham, 1998). 
12
 For further information regarding diplomacy and diplomatic relations between Israel and 
India as joint strategic interests, see section 6.3.1 (pp.375-381). 
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the processes by means of which those interests are redefined (Viotti & 
Kauppi, 1998:86, 482).  
 
The Oscillated Diplomacy Model, in terms of bilateral diplomacy between two 
countries, is characterised as operational vectorial diplomacy. The term 
‘diplomatic vector’ refers to the operational management of bilateral relations 
in terms of volume and direction, which oscillates in a systemic and diachronic 
process, between two opposite delimited lines of foreign policy as guiding 
parameters.13 The oscillated diplomacy, in terms of the convergent strategic 
interest is influenced both directly and indirectly by three types of mutual 
national strategic interests, namely, joint strategic interests, common strategic 
interests and discrepant strategic interests. 
 
• Joint strategic interests.  
The goals that two states pursue in order to maximise the overlapping 
inter-related strategic interests shared by the collaborating countries 
are known as joint strategic interests. The degree of overlapping of the 
joint strategic interests in terms of strength and intensity, directly 
affects their bilateral relations. 14 
 
• Common strategic interests.  
The goals that two states pursue in order to achieve complementary 
strategic interests by bilateral cooperation are called common strategic 
interests. The range of compatibility of the complementary strategic 
interests influences their bilateral relations in terms of their scope, both 
directly and indirectly. 15 
 
                                            
13
 For information about the state and society level of analysis and the individual level of 
analysis as guiding parameters of the Israeli-Indian relations and India's oscillated diplomacy 
towards Israel, see section 6.4 (pp.435-447). 
14
 For information about bilateral joint strategic interests between Israel and India, see -
sections 6.3.1 (diplomatic relations, pp.375-381), 6.3.2 (defence relations, pp.381-399), 6.3.3 
(space cooperation, pp.399-400), 6.3.4 (nuclear power policy coordination, pp.400-402) and 
6.3.5 (economic relations, pp.402-406). 
15
 For information about bilateral common strategic interests between Israel and India, see 
sections 6.3.6 (science and technology cooperation, pp.406-407), 6.3.7 (cultural relations, 
pp.407-409), 6.3.9 (the superpowers, pp.411-417), 6.3.10 (geo-strategy, pp.417-418), 6.3.13 
(Asia, pp.422), 6.3.15 (Central Asia, pp.424-425) and 6.3.16 (Pakistan, pp.425-427). 
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• Discrepant strategic interests.  
Discrepant strategic interests are opposite strategic interests of two 
countries due to incompatible goals and have a contradictory impact 
on their bilateral relations. The level of contradictions, in terms of 
counter power, negatively affects the mutual interests of the two 
countries.16 A high level of contradictions in their environment can 
cause a strategic conflict between the two countries.17 
 
Table 2.1:  A framework for the analysis of bilateral relations 
 Type of national 
interests 
Characteristics Effects 
Joint national 
interest 
Degree of 
overlapping 
Strength and 
intensity 
Common national 
interest 
Range  of 
complement 
Scope 
Fo
re
ig
n
 
re
la
tio
n
s 
Sy
st
em
 
Discrepant 
national interest 
Level of 
contradiction 
Counter 
power 
D
ip
lo
m
ac
y 
Pr
o
ce
ss
 
Convergence of 
national interests 
National 
interests matrix 
Volume and 
direction 
 
The Oscillated Diplomacy Model is used as a key model in this research with 
analytical and explanatory values for the analysis of the evolving bilateral 
relations between Israel and India during the period stretching from 1992 to 
2005. This model enables a better analysis of a web of pertinent strategic 
interests with a high degree of variance. It also provides a methodological 
                                            
16
 For further information about the bilateral joint strategic interests between Israel and India, 
see sections 6.3.8 (the United Nations, pp.409-411), 6.3.11 (energy, pp.418-420), 6.3.12 (non 
aligned movement, pp.420-421), 6.3.14 (People's Republic of China, pp.422-424), 6.3.17 
(Iran, pp.427-428),6.3.18 (The Islamic World, pp.428-429), 6.3.19 (The Arab World, pp.430-
431) and 6.3.20 (The Palestinian Authority, pp.431-435). 
17
 Strategic conflict is a condition that arises when two actors pursue mutually exclusive or 
mutually incompatible strategic goals (Evans & Newnham, 1998).  
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answer to the question regarding the subjectivism of national strategic 
interests and contributes to a better understanding of the operational level of 
diplomacy in bilateral foreign relations as well as international politics. 
 
2.7 Theoretical framework and summation 
 
In the absence of a grand theory, which can contribute to the analysis of the 
complex set of Israeli-Indian relations in a valid and effective manner, the 
main theories and models, as well as the historical description and narrative 
accounts used in this research, are incorporated into an eclectic theoretical 
framework.  
 
The aim is to construct a coherent framework that ensures better 
comprehension of the composite bilateral foreign relations between Israel and 
India. Importantly, the framework helps to simplify and analyse the complexity 
of Israeli-Indian relations, which are influenced by a web of diverse causal 
factors in terms of both external and internal variables in conjunction with 
contextual determinants.  
 
However, the inherent complexity resulting from such a theoretical framework 
is not detrimental to the efficiency, reliability and validity of this research as 
the framework provides a comprehensive and coherent picture of the 
research. At the same time, the use of various theories and models 
contributes to a thorough and precise understanding of the relationship 
among the large number of research variables within the different timeframes. 
A representation of this framework is provided in table 2.1 on the following 
page. 
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Table 2.2: Israel and India – A framework for the analysis of bilateral 
relations 
1992-2005 Feb. 1992 1948-1991 Time Frames 
Evolving 
relations 
Change of 
relations 
Historical 
relations 
Type of  
relations 
Ultimate Decision Unit Unit 
Bilateral relations 
Multilateral relations 
         International system          
                                 level 
                 State and society level                                             
                       Individual level                                                         
Levels of 
analysis 
                
Oscillated 
Diplomacy  
Model               
  
  
Aggregative  
Model of Bilateral 
Relations Strategic 
Change 
_ 
Model of Foreign 
Policy Change 
Decision Making 
  
In-depth 
description and 
narration 
 
  
  
Models 
 
As illustrated in the above table, this research refers to the bilateral foreign 
relations of Israel and India within the specified three timeframes, while using 
pertinent and applicable theories and models of international relations.  
 
Bilateral foreign relations between the two countries, with special reference to 
pre-independence relations during the first timeframe, namely in the period 
stretching from 1948 to 1992, are analysed with the help of the Ultimate 
Decision Unit Model and the Model of Levels of Analysis, as part of an implicit 
historical description as well as an in-depth explanation and a narrative 
account of Israeli-Indian bilateral relations. The reference to the pre- 
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independence relations of the two countries is an integral part of their bilateral 
relations situated within the broader historical context of their complex 
bilateral relations. 
 
The changes in bilateral relations between Israel and India in 1992 and the 
establishment of diplomatic relations between them during the second 
timeframe are analysed in terms of the systemic change of the foreign policy 
process. For this purpose, the Aggregative Model of Bilateral Foreign 
Relations Strategic Change is used as a key model of analysis of the 
transformation of the Indian foreign policy regarding Israel as well as the 
Ultimate Decision Unit Model and the Levels of Analysis Model. In addition, 
for better validity of the analysis, the Model of Foreign Policy Change Decision 
Making is utilised in this timeframe as well. 
 
Regarding the third timeframe (1992-2005), the evolving bilateral relations 
between Israel and India are analysed in the light of the Ultimate Decision 
Unit Model and the Model of Levels of Analysis; while using the Model of 
Oscillated Diplomacy as the key model of analysis of the evolving relations 
between the two countries.  
 
The two newly devised models applied in this research are used in 
conjunction with other complementary pertinent theories and models as 
demonstrated in the theoretical framework. These models are utilised as 
analytical tools with explanatory values, which help to provide a broader 
picture and a comprehensive understanding of the bilateral foreign relations 
between Israel and India. In addition, they contribute to the theoretical field of 
international relations and diplomacy as well as to diplomatic practice. As 
indicated by James Dougherty and Robert Pfaltzgraff Jr. (2001:625), no single 
theory can explain the full range of phenomena that constitute bilateral 
relations between two countries adequately. The greater the complexity and 
quantity of issues that have an international or global dimension, the greater 
will be the need for a multiplicity of theories and models in order to produce 
answers based on the integration of approaches, findings and insights. 
Therefore, the inherent complexity resulting from the theoretical framework is 
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not detrimental to the efficiency of the research; as the framework provides a 
comprehensive and coherent picture of the research.  At the same time, the 
separate models contribute to a thorough and precise understanding of the 
relationship among the variables of the research within the different 
timeframes.  
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Chapter 3  
India's relations with Israel prior to January  
3.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, the focus is on India's relations with Israel, particularly, 
India’s foreign policy towards Israel before the establishment of full 
diplomatic relations between the two states.  The main objective is 
therefore to describe, examine and analyse India’s foreign policy towards 
Israel before the establishment of full diplomatic relations between the two 
states on 29 January 1992.1 This analysis also gives a comprehensive 
background, which lays the foundation for the analysis of the 
transformation of India’s foreign policy towards Israel.2 
 
The objective of this chapter is realised by an analysis of the factors that 
influenced India's relations with Israel and India’s foreign policy towards 
Israel prior to the establishment of full diplomatic relations.  From an Israeli 
perspective, this analysis takes the comparative weight and complexity of 
the pertinent factors into consideration, while applying the theories 
discussed in chapter 2 as a means for analysing the comprehensive 
bilateral relations between the two states.   
 
India as an international actor is the unit of analysis in this chapter.  The 
historical and international political context of this chapter is India’s 
attainment of independence on 15 August 1947 and the birth of Israel as 
an independent state nine months later, on 14 May 1948.  However, the 
analysis of Indian foreign policy towards Israel is divided from a historical 
                                            
1
 Israel’s bilateral relations with India and its foreign policy towards India are analysed in 
the next chapter (chapter four). 
2
 The transformation of India's foreign policy towards Israel in 1992 and the establishment 
of fully-fledged diplomatic relations are analysed in chapter five. 
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and political perspective, into two stages, namely pre-independent India 
(1922-1947) and post-independent India (1947-1991).3 The pre-
independence stage is relevant to this research because India's foreign 
policy towards Israel and the Middle East has its roots in the formative 
years of pre-independent India.  Pre-independence events had a direct 
influence on post independence bilateral relations between the two states.  
Thus, the pre-independence phase is an important starting point in this 
diachronic study of Israeli-Indian relations.   
 
The external and the internal variables that influenced Indian foreign policy 
towards Israel are identified and explained with reference to their 
international as well as contextual determinants. This includes their 
influence on the process of India’s foreign policy decision-making. The 
pertinent ultimate decision units, as dominant players in India’s foreign 
policy towards Israel before and after the establishment of diplomatic 
relations between the two countries, are identified and analysed.4 The 
Indian National Congress Movement (INCM) is identified and examined as 
a pre-independence ultimate decision unit that influenced India's thinking 
and frame of mind on bilateral relations with Israel.5 Furthermore, the 
Indian ultimate decision unit in the post-independence stage, namely the 
post-independence prime ministers of India that determined India's foreign 
policy towards Israel until the establishment of full diplomatic relations, are 
identified and analysed.6 
                                            
3
 The State of Israel was born on 15 May 1948 nine months after India's independence 
and therefore, the Indian pre-independence stage regarding Israel in this research, refers 
to the period between 1922 and 1948. 
4
 For a definition of an ultimate decision unit as well as the Ultimate Decision Model, see 
section 2.1. 
5
 Post-independence ultimate decision units were already in the making during the pre-
independent stage on both sides as described in this chapter as well as the following 
chapter, Gandhi and Nehru’s roles are discussed separately in sections 3.6.1 and 3.6.2 in 
terms of the individual level of analysis. 
6
 The role of the Indian National Congress Party (INCP) is discussed separately in terms 
of the individual level of analysis and in terms of the state and society level of analysis in 
section 3.10.2.1 
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The three levels of analysis identified in chapter 2 are used in this chapter 
to analyse the bilateral relations between India and Israel.7 
 
International system level of analysis 
 
This entails an analysis of the international factors that influenced the 
foreign policy of the Republic of India regarding the State of Israel after its 
independence. The analysis is made with India as a unitary actor with 
national self-interest in the international system.  Indian foreign relations 
with Israel are divided into two types, namely bilateral and multilateral 
relations.  Important, in particular, in this regard are India’s multilateral 
relations with the United Nations Organisation (UNO).  
 
State and society level of analysis 
 
At this level, an analysis is made of the domestic factors in general and 
the political factors in particular, which influenced the Indian foreign policy 
towards Israel.  Attention will be paid to ruling parties such as the INCP as 
well as government coalitions. 
 
Individual level of analysis 
 
An analysis is made of the individual factors that influenced the Indian 
leadership as an ultimate decision unit as well as other individuals who 
played a role in the decision-making process of the Indian foreign policy 
towards Israel such as Prime Minister Rao. 
 
In the analysis in this chapter, the historical and international political 
context of the independence of these two states and their recognition of 
each other are important as has already been implied.  The State of Israel 
                                            
7
 For details on the theory of level of analysis, see section 2.3. 
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gave immediate and formal de-jure recognition8 to the Republic of India, 
while India postponed its recognition of Israel until 17 September 1950.  
The Indian recognition was made known by a short and cryptic statement: 
“The Government of India has decided to accord recognition to the 
government of Israel” (Padmanbahan, 1975:11). This was cryptic 
recognition in the sense that it did not specify the type of recognition 
granted, neither did it refer to the possibility of establishing diplomatic 
relations, nor the possible exchange of diplomatic missions. However,  
recognition was accorded to the Government of Israel following pressure 
from American Jewry.9 
 
On 1 September 1951, India allowed Israel to appoint a Trade 
Commissioner and Honorary Consular Agent in Bombay and F.W. Pollack 
was nominated.  On 30 December 1952 he was nominated Honorary 
Consul of Israel.  In August 1953 three years after India's recognition of 
the State of Israel, Israel was permitted to open a consulate in Bombay, 
which was marked by an exchange of diplomatic notes between the 
embassies of the two countries in the United States (US).10   
 
However, at a press conference in New Delhi on 7 August 1958, Nehru 
the Indian Prime Minister, stated: 
  
After careful thought, we felt that while recognising Israel as an entity, 
we need not at this stage exchange diplomatic personnel (India’s 
Foreign Policy/Selected Speeches, 1961:415).11  
                                            
8
 There are two types of basic international recognition in international law and 
diplomacy: De-jure and de-facto. De-jure recognition implies complete diplomatic 
acceptance of a new state or government while de-facto recognition normally refers to 
provisional recognition of a particular government indicates factual sovereignty (Evans & 
Newnham, 1998).   
9
   For details about India’s recognition of the State of Israel, see section 3.8.1 and for the 
Israeli response see section 4.8.1. 
10
 For details about the opening of the Israeli Consulate in Bombay, see sections 3.9.1.2 
and 4.1. 
11
 Diplomacy is one of the essential instruments employed in international relations.  
Among other functions, diplomacy is concerned with establishing and renewing rules and 
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The official Indian reason given for taking this political step was: 
 
Continuing non-recognition of the State of Israel was not only 
inconsistent with the overall relationship (of India) but limited the 
effectiveness of the Government of India’s role as a possible 
intermediary between Israel and the Arab states (Rao, 1972:40). 
 
 
India continued with its consistent, but distinctly pro-Arab and anti-Israeli 
foreign policy. This became the blueprint for the Indian Middle-East policy 
until 1992, despite constant efforts made by Israel to improve relations.  
Israel, which considered India an important key player in the international 
system and wished to promote bilateral relations between the two 
countries tried to exert considerable effort to change the Indian foreign 
policy towards Israel, but a substantial change in Indian foreign policy 
pertaining to Israel had to wait up to 29 January 1992, when fully-fledged 
diplomatic relations between the two countries were established. 
 
  3.2 Pre-independence India: Historical and political context of foreign 
policy towards Palestine and Zionism  
 
Pre-independence Indian foreign policy had its roots in the history of India, 
Palestine and Zionism.12  Palestine is the historical name of a geographical 
area along the Mediterranean in the Middle East. The growth of national 
consciousness within the intellectual elite of the Arabs in Palestine took 
place as part of the Arab national awakening in the Fertile Crescent 
districts of the Ottoman Empire toward the end of the 19th century and the 
                                                                                                                       
procedures, which regulate the international system including reference to the exchange 
of diplomatic personnel (Evans & Newnham, 1998). 
12
 Zionism was the movement for national revival and independence of the Jewish people                   
in the Holy Land (Palestine).  The name was derived from the word “Zion,” one of the 
biblical names for Jerusalem (Shimoni, 1987).  For additional details about Zionism, 
including details about the Jewish Agency, see section 4.3. 
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beginning of the 20th century.  At the same time, new Jewish immigration, 
as part of the Zionist practice of national movement, moved to Palestine.13 
 
During World War I (1917-1918), the British forces conquered Palestine, 
which had been part of the Ottoman Empire since 1516.14  From 1922, 
Palestine had been a territory under the British Mandate, which was 
ratified by the League of Nations15  and contained two national movements 
seeking statehood (Rolef 1993:235).16 The British government in Palestine 
based its policy on the Balfour Declaration, which was committed to a 
Jewish national homeland in Palestine.17 The Palestinian Arabs, on the 
other hand, were not willing to accept the declaration and expressed their 
anger and frustration in this regard.18   
 
In 1937, the British Peel Commission (1936-1937), formally known as the 
Palestine Royal Commission, recommended that Palestine should be 
partitioned between the Jews and the Arabs but the Palestinian Arabs 
rejected their recommendation.  Two years later, in 1939, following the 
deadlock of the St. James Conference, the British published a White 
Paper, announcing that Palestine would become an independent state 
with an Arab majority after a transition period of 10 years, but the paper 
was rejected by the Arabs.  After the end of World War II, there was 
pressure by the US and Europe on Britain to allow the entrance of Jews to 
Palestine, in particular the remnants of the European Jewry that had 
survived the Holocaust.   
                                            
13
 For details about the theory of Zionism and Jewish immigration to Palestine as well as 
the Jewish Agency, see section 4.3. 
14
 The name Palestina was first used by the Roman replacing the name Judea after the 
suppression of the Jewish rebellion of 132 - 135 BC.  There has never been an 
independent state by the name of Palestine.  
15
 For details about the League of Nation’s ratification of the British Mandate, see section 
3.4.2. 
16
 For details about the British policy as the mandatory power in India and Palestine, see 
section 3.4.1. 
17
 For details about the Balfour declaration, see sections 3.4.1, 4.3. 
18
 For details about the Arabs Jewish conflict until 1948, see section 3.4.2. 
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In the summer of 1947, the United Nations (UN) Special Committee on 
Palestine (UNSCOP) recommended the partition of Palestine into two 
states.  Although the Arabs rejected it, the UN accepted the Partition Plan 
and on 15 May 1948, the State of Israel was established after the 
unofficial Arab war effort to prevent it had failed.19 
 
Before August 1947, India did not have an independent foreign policy and 
the British, who ruled the country, linked India to their global strategy.  
Britain was a colonial and mandatory power in India and Palestine and as 
non-sovereign "states" neither of them could conduct independent foreign 
policies.20  Nevertheless, international events as well as the concept of the 
future role of an independent India in the international system,21 laid the 
foundation for the general foreign policy attitude of the leaders of the 
INCM and towards Palestine in particular.  The INCM, which constituted 
the ruling party as well as the government of India after independence, 
was rooted deeply in pre-independence Indian politics.22 It had followed a 
distinct pro-Arab line since 1922, when the ratification of the British 
Mandate (based on the Sykes-Picot Agreement)23 by the League of 
Nations took place engendered a legacy of Indian hostility towards the 
Zionist Movement in Palestine.   
 
 
                                            
19
 For details about post-independence India’s foreign policy towards Israel, see sub-
section 3.7 and about the Indian representative to the committee as well his attitude, see 
section 3.9.2.2.  
20
 For details about Britain as a mandatory power in India and Palestine, see section 
3.4.1. 
21
 After World War II. 
22
 After independence, the INCM was transformed into a political party: The Indian 
National Congress Party (popularly known as Congress).  The Indian National Congress 
Party (INCP) was a dominant force in the Indian politics and formed governments 
between 1947 and 1977, 1980 to 1989 and 1991 to 1996.  For additional details about 
the INCM, see next section 3.3 and for details about the INCM's attitude towards Zionism, 
see section 3.4. 
23
 For details about the Sykes-Picot Agreement, see section 3.4.2. 
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3.3   Pre-independence India: Ultimate decision unit  
 
The INCM has been identified as the pertinent ultimate decision unit of the 
Indian pre-independence foreign policy towards Palestine. The 
understanding of the relevant decision-making processes of this policy 
provides a better tool for understanding the Indian historical relations with 
Palestine (as analysed at the state and society level of analysis), as well 
as its operational orientation.  At the same time, the emphasis will be on 
the INCM leadership and its ability to mobilise the Indian masses, 
including the Muslims in India in their struggle for independence.24 
 
From a historical viewpoint, India’s foreign policy towards the Middle East 
had its roots in the formative years of India's pre-independence. This was 
the time when the INCM shaped its pro-Arab policy in the region at the 
state and society level as well as the individual level of analysis.25  The 
INCM was founded in 1885 in Bombay and was originally conceptualised 
as a lobbying group.  After 1900, it became the leading organisation within 
the broad-based freedom struggle against Britain.  It was Mohandas 
Karamchand Gandhi (Mahatma), after his return from South Africa in 
1914, which changed the Congress structure from an elite political club 
into a mass organisation in which his influence rested on the power of 
popular appeal.  Eventually, the INCM established its control over the 
Indian masses while trying to mobilise the Indian population against British 
rule.26 The INCM, headed by Mahatma Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru,27 
was undoubtedly the ultimate decision unit of the Indian pre-independence 
foreign policy towards Palestine.  Nevertheless, despite the INCM’s 
supportive attitude towards the Arabs in Palestine, it was confined in terms 
                                            
24
 For details about pre independence India in terms of state and society level of analysis, 
see section 3.5. 
25
 For details about the INCM's attitude towards Palestine, see section 3.4. 
26
 For details about Mahatma Gandhi, see section 3.6.1. 
27
 For details about Gandhi and Nehru, see section 3.6.1 and 3.6.2. 
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of its external pre-independence policy, as Britain was the Mandatory 
power in India.28 Naaz (1999:241) describes the attitudes of the INCM’s 
leaders as follows: “While sympathetic to the plight of Jews in Europe, 
were unresponsive to the idea of Israel.”  In fact, the INCM tried to 
mobilise the Muslims in India to participate in the struggle for 
independence and the ongoing rivalry between the INCM and the Muslim 
League29 forced the INCM to look at the Arab-Jewish controversy in 
Palestine through an Islamic prism.  Kumaraswamy describes this 
situation as follows: 
 
 
Vehemently articulating a pro-Arab stand, the nationalists argued 
that the consent of the Arab inhabitants was a prerequisite for the 
realization of a Jewish national home in Palestine…National 
Congress leaders were unable to divorce themselves from 
resorting to Islamic interpretations of Jewish history and claims 
(Kumaraswamy, 1999:134). 
 
3.4   Pre-independence India: The international system level of 
analysis  
 
India’s pre-independence policy towards Palestine as well as India’s 
historical relations with Palestine is key factors that laid the foundation for 
the relations between India and Israel after India’s independence and is 
analysed in terms of the international level of analysis.  
 
Since the early 1920s the Indian nationalists had been vociferous 
supporters of the Arab national positions in the Middle East.  The historical 
context of this supportive attitude was the support of the INCM (and 
Mahatma Gandhi in particular) of the Khilafat Movement30 in order to 
                                            
28
 For details about Britain as a mandatory power in India and Palestine, see section 
3.4.1. 
29
 For details about the Indian Muslim League, see sections 3.4.1 and 3.4.2. 
30The conclusion of First World War led to dismemberment of the Turkish empire placing 
the Arab territories under allied mandates. The Khilafat Movement was created in India in 
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appease the Indian Muslims who were offended by Britain’s Turkish policy 
after World War I and as a common bond between the Hindus and 
Muslims in India that would lead the two communities to join forces to work 
for self-government.31  The INCM started following a distinctly pro-Arab 
approach after the Balfour Declaration and the ratification of the Sykes-
Picot Agreement by the League of Nations.32 In 1922 and 1923 the 
movement called for the removal of all alien control from Arab lands and 
passed resolutions in sympathy with the aspirations for independence of 
the Arabs in Palestine, Iraq, Syria and Egypt (Rao, 1972:6). 
 
The INCM, as an ultimate decision unit, was influenced by the substantial 
minority of Muslims in India, whose sentiments were with their fellow 
Muslims in the Middle East.33  Under the leadership of Mahatma Gandhi, 
the INCM attempted to secure the allegiance of the Muslims of India by 
aligning the movement with causes that were of importance to the Indian 
Muslim masses, such as the Arab-Palestinian question.34 The INCM made 
an ongoing effort to involve the Muslims in India in the struggle against the 
British and the political weight of the Muslim minority was considered as 
an important factor in the struggle for independence.  This should be 
understood in the context of the 1930s and 1940s when active Muslim 
cooperation and participation were essential in the struggle against the 
British and the loss of cooperation of the Muslim community could cause a 
great deal of damage to the Indian liberation struggle.  
                                                                                                                       
1919 by the Indian Muslim League of India and demanded that Muslim holy places 
situated within Arab areas would remain under the direct sovereignty of the Caliph as the 
head of the Muslim community,. The abolition of the Caliph, however, came from 
Turkey's nationalists in March 1924 and in fact since then calls for the re-establishment of  
the Caliph diminished (Shimoni, 1987:133).     
31
 About the visit of Shaukat Ali, one of the founders of the Khilatat Movement, in 
Jerusalem, see section 3.4.2.  
32
 For details about the Balfour Declaration and the Sykes-Picot Agreement, see section 
3.2. 
33
 For more details about the Arab Jewish conflict, see section 3.4.2. 
34
 There were 95 million Muslims in pre-independence India (before partition) out of a 
total population of about 450 million. 
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The INCM was afraid that grievances of the Muslim minority could lead to 
the development of a separatist movement.  They could base their claim 
on the fact that the Muslims of India constituted a separate nation and 
were therefore entitled to a separate state, contrary to the INCM ideology 
of one secular Indian state based on the territorial integrity of India. By 
resisting a partition in Palestine and a separate independent Jewish state, 
the INCM was promoting India’s resistance to a partition indirectly as a 
political option on the Indian subcontinent. The INCM persisted with its 
political belief that questions of minorities, including the Muslim question in 
India and the Jewish question in Palestine, had to be settled within the 
framework of a pluralistic order and not by partition.  
 
An All India Conference on Palestine Affairs was held in Bombay on 19 
April 1930 and was followed by Palestine Day demonstrations.  Similar 
rallies took place in other parts of India as well.  27 September 1936 was 
observed by the INCM as Palestine Day and the movement expressed its 
sympathy for the Arab struggle for freedom.  In fact, the INCM's pro-Arab 
foreign policy in the Arab-Israeli conflict in Palestine was the outcome of a 
strong feeling of solidarity of the Indian Muslims with the Palestinian 
Arabs.  This feeling of solidarity was driven by the political need to gain the 
Indian Muslim support in the Indian struggle for national freedom and was 
intensified by the rivalry with the Muslim League  
 
In 1928, the INCM joined the International League against Imperialism and 
established a foreign department that intensified calls for support for the 
Arabs of Palestine (Swamy, 1982:19).  In October 1937, the INCM 
adopted a resolution protesting against the partition proposal related to 
Palestine, recommended by the Peel Commission,35 while assuring the 
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Arabs of the solidarity of the Indian people (Shimoni, 1977:31).  In 
February 1938, the INCM once again condemned the decision of Britain 
(as a mandatory power) to bring about the partition of Palestine (Rao, 
1972:21). 
 
The Indian opposition to any partition plan in Palestine (Peel's 
Commission Partition Plan in 1937 as well as the Partition Plan adopted 
by the UNSCOP in 1947) was maintained up to the creation of the State of 
Israel in 1948.36 On 22 September 1948, an All-Palestine Government was 
proclaimed unilaterally and sought India's recognition, but because of legal 
implications, India refrained from formal granting of the Palestinian request 
(Kumaraswamy, 2004:259). 
 
The INCM, under leadership of Mahatma Gandhi, made a special political 
effort to involve the Muslims in India in the struggle for independence.  It 
attempted to secure the allegiances of the Muslims of India by identifying 
itself (and Gandhi in person) with causes that moved the Muslim masses.  
In addition, since the Palestine question was considered to be amongst 
the more important issues for the Muslims in India (whose sympathies 
were with their fellow Muslims in the Middle East), the INCM supported the 
Arabs completely in general and the Palestinian-Arabs in particular: 
“Palestine is an Arab country and Arab interest must prevail there since 
the Arab claim is incontestable” (Padmanbahan, 1975:13). 
 
According to Subramaniam Swamy (1982:19), the tendency of the INCM 
to empathise with the Arabs of the Middle East and the Arabs in Palestine 
was based on the feeling of solidarity that existed during the first part of 
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the twentieth century between the various Arab national liberation 
movements in the Middle East.  
On the other hand, the Jewish National Movement (the Zionist Movement), 
with its struggle for a separate independent state in Palestine, was never 
regarded by the INCM as a national liberation movement but was equated 
with European colonialism.  The fact that the Zionist Movement for the 
establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine drew its support from 
European and Western sources, did not engender Indian sympathy and 
the leaders of the INCM viewed Zionism as a movement that was under 
the protection of British power (Rao, 1972:16).  
 
In India, Jewish and Christian communities were considered to be part of 
the Indian nation, but according to Shimoni, the Indian leaders in the 
INCM, in the Pre-independence era, knew very little about Judaism as a 
religion.  They knew even less about Zionism as a Jewish National 
Movement; neither did they understand the Jewish efforts and aspirations 
in Palestine.  Importantly, they lacked familiarity with the Bible (Old 
Testament) that provided the Christian nations with background 
knowledge about the Jewish heritage and its relationship with the Land of 
Israel (Shimoni, 1991:E4). 
 
The INCM pro-Arab approach towards the Arab-Israeli conflict stemmed 
from their strong ties with the national liberation movements in the Arab 
countries of the Middle East.  A feeling of solidarity existed in India and in 
the INCM in particular, during the first half of the 20th century, for the Arab 
liberation movements.  Zionism, on the other hand, was identified with 
European colonialism and was not seen as a national liberation 
movement.  The fact that Western powers, such as Europe and the US, 
supported Zionism was another reason for the Indian pro-Arab approach. 
 
The INCM's political endorsement of the Arab National Movements and 
Palestinian in particular, started a legacy of Indian hostility towards the 
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Zionist Movement.  Since then, not only the Muslim community and the 
Muslim League of India,37 but also the predominantly Hindu community, 
and in particular the INCM and its political elite had sided with the Arabs 
against the Jewish claims in Palestine.  As Ephraim Broida (1949:7) points 
out, the INCM had never discussed the Jewish question as such or the 
question of Palestine.   
3.4.1 Britain as mandatory power in India and Palestine 
 
Britain as a mandatory power in India and Palestine, played an important 
role in the pre-independence era regarding future relations between India 
and Israel and the INCM ability to conduct pre-independence policy, was 
in fact confined by the British mandate in terms of the international system 
level of analysis.  
 
In November 1939, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, the leader of the Muslim 
League of India, addressed the British government requesting their 
reassurance that: “His Majesty's Government would try to meet all 
reasonable national demands of the Arabs in Palestine“(Menon, 1957:70). 
  
The Viceroy in India, in turn, sent him a conciliatory reply on 23 December 
1939, in which he stated: 
 
His Majesty's Government was alive to the importance of the position of 
the Muslim community in India and full weight would be given to their 
views.  In framing its policy for Palestine  His Majesty's Government had 
endeavoured to meet all reasonable Arab demands (Menon, 1957:70).  
 
 
Jinnah did not accept the reply and in February 1940 he informed the 
Viceroy that the working committee of the Muslim League, while 
appreciating the sentiments expressed in his response, insisted that a 
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solution with regard to Palestine should be found to the satisfaction of the 
Arabs.  
 
The British Cabinet Committee on Palestine kept vacillating as far as its 
policy on Palestine was concerned by stating that:  
 
We have, in fact, to choose between the possibility of localized trouble 
with the Jews in Palestine and the virtual certainty of widespread 
disturbances among the Arabs throughout the Middle East and possibly 
among the Muslims in India…the latter represents a military commitment 
twice or three times as great as does the former (Cohen, 1982:23). 
 
 
Although the Indian opinion during the British decision-making process 
regarding the Palestine question was not regarded as a decisive factor, it 
undoubtedly did carry some weight with them. The British were 
concerned that if the Muslim countries and the Muslim community in 
India in particular, rejected their policy on Palestine they might become 
alienated, if not actively hostile, with consequent grave dangers for 
British security in India (Bethell, 1979; Yegar, 2004:31). 
 
Based on Viceroy Wavell's reports from India in the 1940s, the British 
Foreign Office insisted that only adherence to a restricted policy of 
Jewish immigration to Palestine would prevent criticism and agitation in 
India.  The British Foreign Office also used the potentially adverse effect 
on Muslim opinion in India regarding the Palestine question as a useful 
tactic in the Cabinet, especially during World War II (Cohen, 1982:23). 
 
In a joint memorandum released in London on 19 November 1940, by 
the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and the Secretary of 
State for the Colonies, concern was expressed about the influence of 
local disturbances in the Middle East on the British control over the 
Muslims in India (Sofer, 1998:521). 
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3.4.2 The Arab-Jewish conflict up to 1948 
 
The Arabs in Palestine together with the Arab countries and the Muslim 
world saw the Arab-Zionist conflict as a struggle for national liberation. In 
fact, the Arab national struggle became a unifying feature as well as a 
consensual factor regarding inter-Arab and inter-Muslim political matters.  
The combination of Arab nationalism, Islam and the identification of 
Zionism with British colonialism were all factors in the Pan-Arab collective 
consciousness, which intensified opposition to the Jewish National 
Movement in Palestine. In this context, the Palestinian Arabs' national 
struggle inspired religious sentiments and won the sympathy of the Indian 
Muslims with their fellow Muslims in Palestine (Rolef, 1993:24)38. 
 
In the summer of 1888, an increasing number of Jews began settling in 
Palestine, but up to 1908, the issue of the Jewish newcomers had been 
viewed by the Arab inhabitants in Palestine as an immigration issue, and 
did not see it as a national movement. From 1909 onwards, the Arabs 
started to regard Zionism as a movement that had the aim of establishing 
its national home in Palestine and as such, posed a direct threat to them.  
In 1912, two additional aspects added to the negative Arab approach 
towards Zionism: Muslim unity and Arab nationalism.  After World War I, in 
fact, Arab antagonism towards Zionism became a central factor in building 
up a separate Palestinian collective identity. After the occupation of 
Palestine by the British forces in 1917-18 and the Balfour Declaration, 
which was published on 2 November 1917, the conflict between the Arabs 
and the Jews became institutionalised.  The struggle of the Palestinian 
Arabs against Zionism was sporadic and ineffective, but Arab opposition to 
Zionism continued on the political declaratory level (Shimoni, 1987:42). 
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In April 1920 and May 1921, local disturbances occurred as a result of the 
incitement of the Mufti of Jerusalem who instigated Arab riots against the 
Jews because of the Palestinian opposition to Jewish immigration.  In 
1922, the Sykes-Picot Agreement was ratified by 52 countries belonging to 
the League of Nations which placed Palestine (and Iraq), under British 
Mandate after World War I.39 The Arabs in Palestine felt betrayed by the 
Sykes-Picot Agreement; especially because the Balfour Declaration and 
the Sykes-Picot Agreement resulted in a third wave of Jewish immigration 
to Palestine, which doubled the Jewish population (Price, 2003:31).  
 
The intensification of the Arab-Jewish conflict in Palestine led to efforts by 
the Palestinian Arab leaders to mobilise the support of the Arabs and 
Muslim world for its national struggle against Zionism, including the Indian 
Muslims.40 In 1929, a wave of violence instigated by the Arabs broke out 
against the Jews in Palestine. Growing Arab extremism that marked the 
second half of the 1930s, was also seen in the struggle against both 
Zionism and British rule,  
 
In April 1936, the Arabs revolted against the British and the Zionists. The 
subsequent general unrest and revolting lasted six months.  In 1937, the 
Peel Commission, headed by Lord Peel, recommended that the country 
should be partitioned between the Jews and the Arabs.  The Palestinian 
Arabs leaders, headed by the Husseini family, rejected the 
recommendation and forced Britain to abandon it (Shimoni, 1987:14-15). 
 
In 1939, the St. James Conference was convened in London in an effort to 
find a solution agreeable to all parties in the Arab-Jewish conflict in 
Palestine, but it ended in a deadlock.  Following the conference, the British 
published a White Paper, which declared that Palestine would become an 
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independent state with an Arab majority after a transition period of 10 
years, but the paper was rejected by the higher Arab committee in exile, 
as well as by the Arabs of Palestine (Bethell, 1979:64). 
 
After the end of World War II there was pressure on Britain by the US and 
Europe to allow the entry of Jews into Palestine, particularly the remnants 
of European Jewry that had survived the Holocaust.  Meanwhile, the 
Jewish armed struggle and terror campaign aimed at Britain in Palestine, 
intensified.  When Britain's efforts to reach an agreeable solution to the 
Palestinian problem failed, it appealed to the UN Organisation to make a 
decision. UNSCOP recommended the partition of Palestine into two 
states,41 which the Arab countries rejected subsequently. On 29 November 
1947, the UN accepted the decision regarding the Partition Plan.  The 
unofficial Arab war effort failed and Palestinian refugees escaped to 
neighbouring Arab countries.42 Later, on 15 May 1948, the State of Israel 
was established (Yakobson & Rubinstein, 2003:20, 43). 
 
3.5 Pre-Independence India: The state and society level of analysis  
 
The state and society (national) level of analysis explains the pre-
independence Indian foreign policy towards Palestine, with emphasis on 
the INCM, as the ultimate decision unit43 and the Muslim League of India.  
The INCM was faced with the political challenge of the linkage between 
the issue of the Arab Jewish conflict in Palestine and the sentiments of the 
Muslims in India continuously.44 In support of the Arab stand on Palestine, 
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the INCM wanted to enlist Indian Muslim involvement and support for the 
Indian national struggle.45 
 
By 1914 the INCM had established itself as a permanent and significant 
element in Indian political life despite the fact that it had no power to force 
the government to bow to its wishes. On the other hand, there was no 
strong Muslim political presence that claimed to speak for India (Brown, 
1994:190). However, the Muslims in India became aware of the threat to 
their local position and elite provincial culture, which had been moulded by 
them over centuries and consequently generated new Muslim movements 
as well as demands for special representation in provincial elected bodies.  
The All-Muslim League of India was founded in Dacca in December 1906, 
following Hindu revivalism, as a new all-Indian body and provided a focal 
point for Muslim political aspirations (Manorama, 1993:467). 
 
The Muslims in India (although a sizeable minority) could look back to the 
period in which their forebears were the rulers of India.  At the beginning of 
the eleventh century, Muslim raiders from Afghanistan invaded India with a 
series of incursions that culminated in Muslim control of most of the 
subcontinent.  In 1526, Baber established the Mughal Empire.  Even with 
the decline of the Mughal Empire after the death of Aurangzeb (1659 – 
1707) and the arrival of the Europeans at various coastal points, Muslims 
continued to dominate much of the interior of India.  
 
In 1757, the British initiated an expansionist policy (Pilasi Battle), which 
resulted in British control of virtually the entire subcontinent.  In 1857 the 
British East India Company, was faced with a major revolt (the Sepoy 
Mutiny) in Northern India. The British carried out the administration of 
Northern India on behalf of Bahadur ll, the symbolic Mughal ruler.  After 
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the mutiny had been quelled, he was exiled to Burma.  Subsequently, the 
Mughal Empire was formally terminated and power was transferred to the 
British Crown.  For local assistance in administering their new dominions, 
the British used Hindus at the expense of the Muslims (Stein, 1998:167-
200). 
 
In 1910 when the first elections were held (under the Morley-Minto 
Reforms), the Muslim League failed to act as an organisation and did not 
have an all-India appeal or platform. In 1916, the INCM and the Muslim 
League formed an alliance at Lucknow, which proposed a constitutional 
reform scheme.  The INCM gained token Muslim backing while the Muslim 
League gained the acceptance of their claims to separate political status, 
which was safeguarded by separate electorates for the provincial and all-
India legislators.  
 
The violent upsurge of hostilities that ensued between the Hindus and 
Muslims in the early 1920s resulted in the leaders of both communities 
making an appeal for peace.  Mahatma Gandhi, in particular, adopted the 
Khilafat (Caliphate) issue as a common theme, which could unite the 
Hindus and Muslims in a joint peaceful alliance and would encourage the 
two communities to work together for self-government (Kulke & 
Rothermund, 1998:267).46  Pan-Islamism had been propagated in India 
since World War I by the Ali brothers and Gandhi made a special effort to 
ally himself with them, hoping to further Hindu-Muslim unity in India. In 
July 1931, Shaukat Ali, one of the two Ali brothers who founded the 
Khilafat Movement, visited Jerusalem and met with the Mufti of Jerusalem 
and the President of the Supreme Muslim Council Amin al Husseini 
(Yegar, 2004:23). 
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The outcome of the second Round Table Conference in London was the 
Act of 1931 and elections were held in the winter of 1936 under this new 
act.  Subsequently, the INCM swept to a large victory in most provinces.47  
The Muslim League, on the other hand, won Muslim reserved seats in 
Muslim minority provinces but performed poorly in Muslim majority 
provinces where other Muslim Parties did better.  Possible coalition talks 
between the INCM and the Muslim League failed after the INCM 
demanded that the League's legislature members should resign from the 
League and subject themselves unreservedly to INCM discipline.  
 
The INCM proceeded to form ministries of its own, occasionally filling 
Muslim Cabinet seats with deserters from the League.  Muhammad Ali 
Jinnah, the leader of the Muslim League, used the INCM rejection to 
rebuild the Muslim League as a national organisation while resorting to 
mass tactics, claiming to be a leader of the Muslims of India.  In addition, 
the Muslim League initiated a programme of political expansion and 
Jinnah turned to the two-nation theory on a geographic basis (although at 
this stage only as a bargaining chip). In November 1936, an All-Muslim 
Conference devoted to Palestine, took place in New Delhi and passed a 
resolution threatening to boycott British goods combined with a non-
cooperation campaign against the British, if Britain did not satisfy Arab 
demands in Palestine (Shimoni, 1977:31). 
 
In a resolution adopted at the Muslim League session in Lucknow in 
October 1937, the Muslim League warned that out of solidarity with the 
rest of the Islamic world, the Indian Muslims would treat the British as an 
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enemy of Islam if the latter failed to alter its pro-Jewish policy in 
Palestine.48 In 1937 the rivalry between the two organisations reached a 
head (Manorama, 1993:467). At the Lahore session of the Muslim League 
in March 1940, Jinnah introduced a resolution, which included the demand 
for Pakistan (Kulke & Rothermund, 1998:285). 
 
The Muslim League designated 16 August 1945 as Direct Action Day and 
on that day and over the next two days general rioting broke out in 
Calcutta. After World War II and the victory of the Labour Party in Britain, 
elections took place in India (in December 1945 and January 1946) and 
the INCM swept to victory in all the Hindu majority provinces, while the 
Muslim League won in only two provinces with a Muslim majority.  
However the Muslim League was unable to establish provisional ministries 
anywhere except in the Sind province, because the INCM negotiated 
coalition ministries to exclude the Muslim League in several other 
provinces (Stein, 1998:361). 
 
A Cabinet mission from Britain arrived in India in March 1946 and tried to 
negotiate a political plan that would be acceptable to both the INCM and 
the Muslim League.  The plan was based on a three-tiered system for a 
new government of the Indian Union.  On 6 June 1946, the Muslim League 
accepted the plan and so did the INCM, but after Nehru’s statement, on 7 
July 1946, that the INCM was not bound by this plan, Jinnah called this 
statement a complete repudiation of the basic form upon which the long-
term scheme rested and negotiations between the two parties were 
terminated.  Shortly after this, the Muslim League withdrew its acceptance 
of the Cabinet mission plan. In 1946, communal rioting spread in Bengal 
and from there to the neighbouring provinces.  In December 1946, the 
Constituent Assembly met in New Delhi but the Muslim League members 
refused to attend it (Stein, 1998:362). 
                                            
48
 For details about the British policy in Palestine, see section 3.4.1. 
58  
'  
On 20 February 1947, Prime Minister Attlee announced in the House of 
Commons that Britain intended to transfer power and to leave India not 
later than June 1948.  The new Viceroy, Lord Mountbatten, convinced the 
INCM leadership (except Mahatma Gandhi) that partition was the only 
solution.  The British Government and the Viceroy made statements, on 3 
June 1947, which announced the plan to partition India.  Violence 
increased in India, particularly against Muslims who were intending to 
depart for the new Muslim homeland, and refugees, both Muslims and 
Hindus, were streaming across the new border.  On 15 August 1947, India 
and Pakistan became independent new dominions.  It should be noted 
that after the partitioning as many as 45 million Muslims remained in India 
and acquired significant political power, which was mostly channelled, 
after independence, to the INCP that succeeded the INCM (Manorama, 
1993:467)49. 
 
The Muslim community in India attached a great deal of importance to the 
Palestinian issue and there was a high degree of solidarity with the 
Palestinian Arabs amongst them as well as concern about the holy places 
placed under non-Muslim rule.  The Muslim League criticised the struggle 
for a Jewish homeland as well as the Partition Plan in Palestine sharply 
and according to the Muslim League, Palestine could not be placed under 
non-Muslim rule, let alone, handed over to non-Muslims.  For this reason, 
Mohammed Ali Jinnah, the leader of the Muslim League, opposed the 
Balfour Declaration and called for its annulment.50  
 
In addition, he called for the end of the British Mandate over Palestine and 
used Islamism to nationalise the League's opposition to the Jewish 
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national movement in Palestine and as a political tool against the INCM.51 
Jinna’s telegram to Prime Minister Attlee in November 1945 makes his 
feelings clear in this regard: "It is my duty to inform you that any surrender 
to appease Jewry at the sacrifice of Arabs would be deeply resented and 
vehemently resisted by Moslem (sic) world and Moslem India" (Bethell, 
1979:220). 
3.6. Pre-independence India: The individual level of analysis  
 
The individual level of analysis is a key factor in the research of the Indian 
historical relations with Palestine.  Two predominant political leaders of the 
INCM, Mahatma Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru were mostly responsible 
for initiating and carrying out the pre-independence Indian foreign policy 
towards Palestine. In addition, reference is made in this chapter to Sardar 
K.M. Panikkar, an Indian diplomat who played an important role in India's 
pre-independence foreign policy towards the Zionist Movement.52  
 
3.6.1 Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi (the Mahatma)  
 
Mahatma Gandhi (1869-1948)  was a renowned Hindu with unique moral 
authority and was the distinguished and undisputed leader of the INCM 
and the Indian masses.53 In July 1914, Gandhi returned to India from 
South Africa.  Between 1915 and 1917, he participated in peasant 
movements and in February 1918 he started his first three-day fast, which 
led to the strike of milk-workers at Ahmedabad that ended in arbitration.  
   
When Gandhi was approached for advice on addressing the resentment of 
the Indian Muslims over the breaking out of the Khilafat (Caliphate) after 
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World War I, he worked out a strategy to combine the anger of the 
Muslims with the national outrage over the atrocities committed by the 
British (Silveira, 1992:116).  The support of the Khilafat movement gave 
Gandhi the opportunity to demonstrate his principle of unity between the 
Hindus and Muslims by declaring it the touchstone of true Hindu Muslim 
goodwill and subsequently, in November 1919 he presided over the All-
India Khilafat Conference in India.54  
 
This was also the time when Gandhi started engaging in his erratic 
political cooperation with the Pan-Islamic Ali brothers, which was 
significant for Gandhi and for the course of INCM politics.  Judith M. Brown 
comments as follows: 
 
It gave Gandhi the personal sense of leading and championing Muslims, 
as he had done in Africa:  This was to be a persistent pattern throughout 
his Indian career - seeking for Muslims who could to some extent 
represent and interpret Muslim aspirations and fears to him, and enable 
him to be a leader across religious boundaries, enacting that unity he 
considered essential for 'swaraj' (self-rule). The  alliance also gave 
Gandhi leverage in Congress politics because he appeared to be a 
lynchpin between Hindu politicians and those Muslims who because of 
their Pan-Islamic concerns would be most likely to join across communal 
barriers in an anti-government alliance. It also gave this small group of 
Muslims a hold over Gandhi, as he sought occasions and issues to unite 
Muslims and Hindus (Brown 1994:218). 
 
 
In 1920, Gandhi initiated the Non-Cooperation Movement, which 
established Gandhi in turn, as the leader of the Freedom Movement.55 
Gandhi’s first public statement on the Zionist National Movement took 
place in March 1921 in his newspaper Young India  where he pointed out 
that the Zionist Movement must revise its ideal about Palestine since the 
Muslim opinion in India would not tolerate any non-Muslim influence direct 
or indirect one over the holy places of Islam (Young India, 23/3/1921). In a 
follow-up article (one month later) Gandhi referred to Palestine as a 
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country bound to be retained by Muslim custody because the country had 
been ruled for centuries by Muslims and by right of their religious and 
military conquests. However, according to him: "That does not mean that 
the Jews and Christians cannot freely go to Palestine, or even reside there 
and own property. What non-Muslims cannot do is to acquire sovereign 
jurisdiction" (Young India, 6/4/1921).  
 
In 1924 Gandhi was elected the INCM's president.  His fame also began to 
spread throughout the world as he became known as a person with unique 
moral standards and as the epitome of moral political conduct.  Gandhi 
was widely regarded as a unique moral authority and the leader of Indian 
masses and therefore the Jewish Agency made a special effort to engage 
him in dialogue in order to change his attitude towards the Jewish National 
Movement (Zionism) and the Arab-Jewish conflict in Palestine.56 His 
Jewish associates from South Africa were involved in this effort, as well as 
the Jewish intellectuals who were trying to explain the special relationship 
between the Jews as a nation and their relationship with the land of Israel 
to him.   
 
During the 21 years that Gandhi stayed in South Africa (1893–1914) two 
Jews were described by Gandhi himself as his intimate friends. They were 
Hermann Kallenbach, who was a dedicated follower of his and Harry S.L. 
Polak, who became his right hand man (both considered to be Gandhi’s 
most intimate non-Indian helpers in South Africa).57  Gideon Shimoni 
(1977:20) indicates that Gandhi did not accept the explanation of the 
unique inextricable relationship between the Jewish religion and the 
Jewish people; therefore, he regarded Judaism as nothing more than a 
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religion and did not see the Jews as a nation, in spite of the efforts made 
by his Jewish associates and other Jewish intellectuals.    
 
In December 1929, the INCM declared independence to be its goal and 
launched the Civil Disobedience Movement (Satyagraha) with Gandhi at 
the helm.58 In March 1930, Gandhi chose to break the unpopular Salt Law 
imposed by the British, with his long march to the sea in Tamil Nadu, 
which grew into a nationwide movement against the British Government. 
 
On 15 October 1931, Gandhi, who came to London to participate in the 
second Round Table Conference on India, met Nachum Sokolow (the 
newly-elected President of the World Jewish Congress) and Zelig 
Brodetsky at a meeting organised by Kallenbach..59  In an interview with 
the Jewish Chronicle during his visit to London, he asserted that in his 
opinion, Zionism was associated with the reoccupation of Palestine, and 
held no attraction for him and that: "Zion lies in the hearts and thus 
Zionism can be realized in any part of the world" (Jewish Chronicle, 
2/10/1931).  
 
Kallenbach himself arrived in India in May 1937, upon the request of 
Moshe Shertok (Sharett) the Head of the Political Department of the 
Jewish Agency. He made a personal effort to gain Gandhi’s understanding 
and sympathy for the Zionist Movement, but with little success, except for 
the fact that Gandhi stopped referring to the issue in his writing.60  In fact, 
in his articles between 1931 and 1938, Gandhi there is no mention of the 
Palestinian issue.  
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Based on Kallenbach’s report to Shertok (Sharett), Gandhi revised his 
position and accepted Jewish aspirations to find a home in Palestine. 
However, he insisted that the realisation of this goal was wholly dependent 
upon Arab and Islamic approval and not on British power because of 
ethical and moral considerations (Shimoni, 1977:33, Sarid & Bartolf, 
1997:75).  Afterwards, Kallenbach returned to Israel with a statement 
made by Gandhi, but the statement was never published by Gandhi 
himself. In the note Gandhi indicated the following: 
 
Assuming that Zionism is not a material movement but represents the 
spiritual aspirations of the Jewry, the introduction of Jews in Palestine 
under the protection of British or other arms is wholly inconsistent with 
spirituality. Neither the mandate nor the Balfour Declaration can therefore 
be used in support of sustaining Jewish immigration into Palestine in the 
teeth of Arab opposition. In my opinion the Jews should disclaim any 
intention of realising their aspiration under the protection of arms and 
should rely wholly on the goodwill of Arabs. No exception can possibly be 
taken to the natural desire of the Jews to found a home in Palestine. But 
they must wait for its fulfilment till Arab opinion is ripe for it. And the best 
way to enlist that opinion is to rely wholly upon the moral justice of the 
desire and therefore the moral sense of the Arabs and the Islamic world 
(CZA S25/3587, July 1937). 
 
 
On 26 November 1938, Gandhi published an article in the “Harijen” 
newspaper in which he called the Jews "the untouchables of Christianity.” 
However, he continued to reject Jewish claims for a national homeland as 
well as their need for national self-fulfilment.  He suggested they advocate 
the use of Satyagraha (Gandhi’s philosophy of non-violence) and 
encourage the Arabs in Palestine to adopt this philosophy:61  
 
My sympathies are with the Jews, I have known them intimately in South 
Africa, but my sympathy does not blind me to the requirements of Justice. 
The cry for a national home for the Jews does not make much of an 
appeal to me. The sanction for it is sought in the Bible and the tenacity 
with which the Jews have hankered after Palestine Why should they not, 
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like other people of the earth, make that country their home where they 
are born and where they have made their livelihood? Palestine belongs to 
the Arabs in the same sense that England belongs to the English, or 
France to the French. It is wrong and inhuman to impose the Jews on the 
Arabs.  What is going on in Palestine today cannot be justified by any 
moral code of conduct.  Surely it would be a crime against humanity to 
reduce the proud Arabs so that Palestine can be restored to the Jews, 
partly or wholly, as their national home.  The nobler cause would be to 
insist on just treatment of the Jews wherever they are born and bred….  
And now a word to the Jews in Palestine.  I have no doubt that they are 
going about it in the wrong way.  The Palestine in the Biblical conception 
is not a geographical tract.  It is in their hearts.  But if they must look to the 
Palestine of geography as their national home, it is wrong to enter it under 
the shadow of the British gun.  A religious act cannot be performed with 
the aid of the bayonet or the bomb.  They can settle in Palestine only by 
the goodness of the Arabs.  They should seek to convert the Arab heart.  
The same God rules the Arab’s heart who rules the Jewish heart.  I am 
not defending the Arab excesses.  I wish they had chosen the way of non-
violence in resisting what they rightly regard as an unwarrantable 
encroachment upon their country.  But according to the accepted canons 
of right and wrong nothing can be said against the Arab resistance in the 
face of overwhelming odds.  Let the Jews who claim to be the chosen 
race prove their title by choosing the way of non-violence for vindicating 
their position on earth (Harijen, 26/11/1938).  
  
 
Gandhi met Kallenbach once again in March 1939 and he was urged by 
him to declare his views on the Arab-Jewish question in Palestine and the 
persecution of the Jews in Germany publicly, but Gandhi was reluctant to 
do so.62 On 22 March 1939, Gandhi met with Joseph Nedivi the 
representative of the political department of the Jewish Agency in 
Palestine.  Although Gandhi was cordial, the meeting did not change his 
views and he rejected Nedivi's suggestion about making a public 
statement on the Jewish-Arab conflict in Palestine.   He said that he did 
not see what he could do or how he could help the Jews in Palestine.  
According to Gideon Shimoni (1977:51),  Nedivi asserted that the Muslims 
in India were fomenting hostility towards the Jews, but that he could 
influence Indian public opinion to be more positive towards the Jews. In his 
reply, Gandhi contended that the negative attitudes of the Muslims in India 
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towards the Jews had been developed artificially and said the Jews had 
nothing to fear in this regard. He added that in any case, any 
condemnation uttered by him regarding anti-Jewish propaganda in India, 
would not serve any useful purpose for the Jews.  The report regarding the 
meeting was subsequently sent to the Jewish Agency.  One of the 
interesting points it contained indicated that Gandhi had intimated that he 
considered the real object of the Muslim League propaganda to be the 
INCM.63  
 
The outbreak of World War II and the Holocaust did not change Gandhi’s 
opinion of the Jewish-Arab controversy. In 1942, although he condemned 
the persecution of the Jews in Europe in strong terms, he insisted that 
restoring Palestine to the Jews, partly or wholly as their national home 
would be a crime against humanity, as well as against the Muslims 
(Shimoni, 1977:51).    
 
In 1942, the INCM adopted the Quit India Resolution that launched the 
Quit India Movement and called for a struggle for freedom and as a result, 
Congress leaders went to jail.  Gandhi himself was released from prison in 
1944. 
 
In March 1946, Gandhi met with the British Member of Parliament, Sidney 
Silverman, a Jew and veteran advocate of the cause of Indian 
independence.  In the conversation between them, he condemned the 
violent methods, which were used in Palestine by the Jews, while asking 
Silverman if there were not enough uninhabited places in the world to 
receive the Jewish people (Shimoni. 1977:58).  
 
The last time Gandhi discussed the Jewish-Arab conflict in Palestine was 
in June 1946, with his Jewish American biographer, Louis Fischer, but 
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Gandhi's attitude towards the issue of Palestine remained unchanged.  
According to Gideon Shimoni:  
 
Gandhi was functioning within a field of political forces which 
constrained him in respect of the Jewish Question.  His 
overriding concern for Hindu-Muslim amity precluded any 
expression of support for Zionism.  Indicative of this bias is the 
discrepancy between his intimation in private and his 
statements in public (Shimoni, 1977:60).  
 
 
In July 1946, he made his last statement on this issue, which is indicative 
that he did not change his old attitude, but he did add a new reason for his 
reservations regarding Zionism. This time he referred to the violent 
methods used by the Jewish underground movement in Palestine, which 
in his opinion, were in complete contradiction with his non-violence 
philosophy (Harijen, 21/7/46). 
 
In March 1947, a delegation headed by Prof. Hugo Bergman from the 
Hebrew University in Jerusalem participated in the first Inter-Asian 
Relations Conference in New Delhi, where he met Mahatma Gandhi.64 
David Hacohen, a member of the delegation, appealed to him to raise his 
voice in favour of the persecuted Jewish people, but Gandhi responded by 
expressing his wish to remain neutral and uninvolved in the Arab-Jewish 
conflict.  It was a short meeting and Gandhi pointed out that if they insisted 
that he say something about the Palestinian question, his words would be 
directed mainly against terrorism in Palestine. 
 
In June 1947, the Viceroy, Lord Mountbatten, proposed a partition plan for 
India, which Gandhi opposed.  Gandhi encouraged the civil disobedience 
movement to be launched against the partition, but the other leaders of the 
INCM did not share his views and ultimately it was accepted by mutual 
consent.  
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Subsequently, a Hindu fanatic, Vinayak N. Godse, who was opposed to 
his efforts to bring about Hindu-Muslim amity, assassinated Gandhi on 30 
January 1948, at a prayer meeting in New Delhi. 
 
According to Sudha Rao (1972:42), the four factors that influenced 
Gandhi’s attitude towards Jewish nationalism in pre-independent Israel, 
can be summed up as follows:  
 
• First, he was sensitive to the sentiments of the Indian Muslims who 
were anti-Zionist.   
 
• Second, he objected to any Zionist methods, which were inconsistent 
with his principle of non-violence.   
 
• Third, he found Zionism contrary to his pluralistic nationalism, which 
excludes the establishment of any state, based on one religion.  
 
• Lastly, he believed it was politically imprudent for him to compromise 
his relations with the British, who held the mandate in Palestine, by 
supporting the Zionist Movement that sought independence from the 
British.  
 
Gandhi's pro-Arab attitude was shaped by his concept of India’s major 
aim, namely, the independence of a unified India and his moral 
philosophy.65 Gandhi attached a great deal of importance to the Indian 
Muslims and his overriding sense of political interdependence with the 
Muslims of India conditioned his attitude towards the Arab-Israeli conflict.  
He insisted on Arab goodwill as a prerequisite to any solution in Palestine.  
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Gandhi was consistent throughout, in condemning Jewish reliance on 
British imperialism in Palestine and the Jews resorting to violence.  
Gandhi’s view on Jewish nationalism was commensurate with the 
importance he attached to the Islamic world, political interdependence with 
the Indian Muslims and his philosophy of non-violence.  In fact, the Jewish 
National Movement and the Jewish Agency, despite all their efforts, failed 
to change Mahatma Gandhi's attitude towards Zionism, as well as the 
Jewish claim for an independent homeland in Palestine. 
 
3.6.2 Jawaharlal Nehru 
 
 
From the mid-1930s onwards, Nehru (1889-1964) was the prominent 
leader and the acknowledged spokesperson regarding the foreign policy of 
the INCM. In 1936, Nehru was elected the president of the INCM and 
caught the attention of the Jewish Agency that decided to try and establish 
direct contact with him.  Nehru's autobiography, which was translated into 
Hebrew in 1936 was widely read and was admired by many Jews in 
Palestine (Shimoni, 1991:E3).  
 
According to Michael Brecher (1974:11), Nehru sided with the Arabs 
against the Jewish claims in Palestine and viewed the Arabs of Palestine 
as a national movement.  On the other hand, he viewed Zionism as an 
idea that had been conceived by British imperialists in the same way that 
the idea of Muslim nationalism in India, in his mind, had been fabricated 
under influence of British encouragement in order to promote their policy 
of divide and rule.  Clearly, Nehru was driven by strong anti-British 
imperialist feelings, also shared by the political elite of the INCM.   
 
In Nehru’s view, events in Palestine, after the issuing of the Balfour 
Declaration (on a Jewish national homeland in Palestine) represented 
69  
'  
British betrayal of the Arabs, in that they did not take the fact into account 
that the area was also sacred to Muslims and Christians.66  
 
Nehru's comment on the Balfour Declaration was that the declaration 
overlooked the fact that Palestine was not a wilderness or an empty 
uninhabited place, but was already somebody else's home, namely that of 
the Palestinian Arabs. 
 
On the other hand, Nehru believed that the British were also guilty of 
exploiting  the Jews in the interest of British Imperialism and that the 
proposal for a federal state in Palestine was not only a fair and equitable 
solution of the problem, but the only real resolution.  In his view, the Arabs 
and the Jews, should, cooperate for the advancement of the country within 
the framework of one pluralistic Arab state (Rao, 1972:17-19). 
 
In May 1933 Nehru wrote to his daughter Indira: 
 
They (the Jews) had no home or nation, and everywhere they went they 
were treated as unwelcome and undesirable strangers…and yet these 
amazing people did not only survive all this but mange to keep their racial 
and cultural characteristics and prospered and produced a host of great 
men…These people without home or country…have never ceased to 
dream of old Jerusalem, which appears to their imaginations greater and 
more magnificent than it ever was, in fact (Nehru, 1987:762). 
 
 
In 1936, Moshe Shertok (Sharett) head of the Political Department of the 
Jewish Agency decided to send Immanuel Olsvanger to meet Nehru in 
India.  Olsvanger, who was a Doctor of Philology with some knowledge of 
Sanskrit and an official of the South African Zionist Federation, was an 
acquaintance of Hermann Kallenbach, Gandhi's close friend from South 
Africa.67 In August 1936, Immanuel Olsvanger met with Nehru twice, as 
well as with other Indian political leaders, including Mahatma Gandhi.  
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Olsvanger found Nehru to be ill informed and biased against Zionism in 
the interest of good relations with Indian Muslims (Shimoni, 1977:30).  
 
After his visit, he exchanged a number of letters with Nehru concerning the 
Zionist Movement in Palestine.  After receiving the first letter of protest 
from Olsvanger, in which he blamed him for not distinguishing between 
morality and politics, Nehru replied harshly on 25 September 1936, by 
pointing out that as far as he was concerned, he had tried to act publicly 
regarding the issue of Palestine with his conception of morality:68 
 
We approach the question from different viewpoints…. Politics and morals 
have seldom drifted far apart and I have tried to act publicly in the 
Congress with my conception of morality…It is impossible to understand 
any problem, whether that of India or Palestine without reference to that 
larger situation and I hold that the Arab Movement is essentially a 
nationalist movement (CZA S25/3585, 25/9/1936). 
 
  
On 27 September 1936, Nehru, in an INCM conference, dedicated to 
Palestine (Palestine Day), referred to Zionism as an artificial phenomenon 
(Rao, 1972:19).  Nehru linked the situation in Palestine to India by saying:  
 
We are trying at present to explain to the Muslims here that the fight in 
Palestine is not between Jews and Arabs but between both and British 
imperialism and they should not protest against the Jews but against the 
British Government who hinders the development of peaceful resolution 
(Shimoni, 1977:30).69 
 
 
On 26 August 1937, Nehru rejected the offer to write about the Palestinian 
problem in a Jewish newspaper in Bombay, the Jewish Advocate, 
however, he openly expressed his view about it in his reply to the editor of 
the newspaper, A.E. Shohet:70 
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It seems to me clear that the proposed partition is utterly bad and is bound 
to create more trouble in the future.  It is certainly not a solution of the 
problem.  A real solution must be based on the following factors: 1) 
Independence of Palestine 2) Recognition of the fact that Palestine is an 
Arab country and therefore Arabs must have a predominant voice in it.  3) 
Recognition of the fact that the Jews in Palestine are an integral factor and 
their rights should be protected.  I feel sure that there is no inherent conflict 
between the Arabs and the Jews and that if the matter is approached in a 
spirit of cooperation a mutually satisfactory solution can be found.  That 
solution cannot be based on the interests of British imperialism (CZA 
S25/6312, 26/8/1937). 
 
 
On 20 July 1938, Nehru met with Prof. Chaim Weizmann, the President of 
the World Zionist Organisation, in London, after Weizmann, who had an 
interest in India, initiated the meeting with him for an exchange of views.71 
Nehru considered Arab activities directed against British imperialism in 
general and Palestinian Arab activities in particular, as national 
movements and maintained a line of personal communications with Arab 
nationalists, particularly with the Egyptian ones. In 1939, Nehru stopped at 
Alexandria, at the invitation of the Wafd Party,72 where he addressed a 
meeting of young Wafdists and met with the Egyptian leader, Mustafa 
Nahas Pasha, with whom he held discussions on coordinating their efforts 
in the international arena.  In the same year, a Wafd Party delegation 
visited India and participated in the INCM annual session in Tripuri.   
 
On 20 March 1939, Nehru met Joseph Nedivi, a town clerk of the city of 
Tel-Aviv, who was sent by the Political Department of the Jewish Agency 
to meet him and Gandhi.  The meeting was cordial, but Nehru did not 
change his pro-Arab attitude (Shimoni, 1977:50). 73 
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The persecution of Jews in Europe during World War II did not change 
Nehru’s mind, he was still of the opinion that just treatment of the 
displaced Jews should take place in the countries where they were born 
and not necessarily in Palestine.  On the other hand, he, together with 
Gandhi, supported the possibility of admitting entry to Jewish refugees 
from Germany in India (Rao, 1972:4; Yegar, 2004:33). 74  
 
In March 1947, a Jewish delegation from Palestine arrived in India to 
participate in the first Inter-Asian Conference in New Delhi convened by 
Nehru, on the eve of Indian independence.  The delegation also met with 
Nehru, but although he was cordial he was consistent in his pro- 
Palestinian attitude.  In the closing speech of the conference, Nehru 
expressed the sympathy of the Indian people with the suffering of the 
Jewish people in Europe, as well as other places.  However, he went on to 
point out that India had always held that Palestine was mainly an Arab 
country and that no decision in Palestine should be taken without the 
Arabs’ consent (The New Delhi Conference Report, 1947).75 
 
Despite all the efforts made by the Jewish Agency to associate itself with 
Nehru, he remained a staunch supporter of the Palestinian Arabs and his 
emotional allegiance lay with their cause.76  
3.6.3 Sardar Kayala M. Panikkar 
 
Dr. Sardar Kayala M. Panikkar was an Indian diplomat and an intellectual 
who was a staunch supporter of the Zionist cause.77  In fact, he was the 
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only member of Nehru’s inner circle who was a supporter of a Jewish 
national home in Israel  
 
In 1926, he had already met Prof. Chaim Weizmann in London, where he 
served as an Indian Maharaja's Representative, who introduced him to the 
Zionist cause.  In London, on 1 July 1937, Panikkar met David Ben-
Gurion, the Chairman of the Jewish Agency and the Zionist Executive in 
Palestine.78  In 1943 he met Weizmann again in New York.79 
  
In April 1947, Panikkar participated in the New Delhi Conference of the 
Asian Relations Organisation (as an Indian delegate) and after the 
conference wrote “A memorandum of Hindu-Zionist relations" outlining his 
perception regarding future relations between the two countries.  Panikkar 
pointed out that there was widespread sympathy in India for the Jews of 
Palestine, which would come to the surface after the establishment of a 
Muslim state in India, namely Pakistan.  
 
According to Panikkar, the Zionists had failed to create understanding for 
their claims in India and they had to accept the importance of India’s future 
role in Asia.  Panikkar suggested the following guidelines: establishment of 
a Hebrew chair at a Hindu University and similarly, the establishment of a 
chair for Sanskrit and Indology at the Hebrew University.  The aim was to 
bring Hindus and Zionists closer, by supplying India with technical and 
scientific expertise and by opening an unofficial Jewish Agency liaison 
office in New Delhi (CZA S25/7486, 8/4/1947).80 
 
In September 1947, Nehru sent Panikkar to join the Indian Delegation to 
the UN during the UN General Assembly.  In New York, Panikkar met 
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Weizmann several times (the last meeting took place on 24 November 
1947 to discuss the Partition Plan of Palestine).  During the UN General 
Assembly Panikkar met Moshe Shertok (Sharett) and Eliyahu Epstein 
(Eilat) and maintained friendly relations with the other members of the 
Zionist delegation, assisting them whenever possible (Yegar, 1991:31).81  
 
Panikkar was an Indian friend of the Jewish National Movement and made 
zealous efforts to improve the relations of, what he called, Hindu-Zionist 
relations, but with marginal success.  
 
Other efforts to enlist Indian dignitaries as agents of change for the Zionist 
cause prior to the independence of India by the Jewish National 
Movement and the Jewish Agency, were to no avail and except in the 
case of Panikkar, these efforts were fruitless. 
 
3.7 Post independence India: Historical and political context of 
foreign policy towards Israel 
 
In 1949, India opposed Israel’s UN membership application and only on 17 
September 1950 did it recognise the State of Israel.82  Five years later, in 
April 1955, at the Afro-Asian Conference in Indonesia, Nehru expressed 
India’s sympathy with the Arab refugees in Palestine.83  In July 1956, India 
accepted the nationalisation of the Suez Canal by Egypt and in October 
1957, after the Suez Canal military operations, India condemned Israel for 
launching and conducting a premeditated attack on Egypt.84  In 1962, after 
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the Indo-Chinese war, military equipment was sold to India by Israel; 
however this collaboration was terminated and denied by the Indian 
government following a leak to the Indian press.85 Officially, India became 
more restrictive and negative towards Israel after Nehru’s death in 1964.  
Nonetheless, during the Indo-Pakistani war in 1965, India acquired military 
equipment from Israel.86  India’s attitude towards Israel hardened after the 
Six-Day War in June 1967,87 but during the second Indo-Pakistani war in 
1971, India procured artillery weapons from Israel.88 After the Arab-Israeli 
war in 1973 and the oil crisis that followed, India expressed its support for 
Egypt and Syria and intensified its anti-Israeli rhetoric in the UN and at 
other international forums.89  
 
In 1974, India endorsed the Palestine Liberation Organisation’s (PLO’s) 
bid for observer status at the UN. In January 1975, India recognised the 
PLO.90 In January 1979, the Janata Government in India invited the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs of Israel, Moshe Dayan, to a secret meeting in 
New Delhi but the meeting did not yield any political benefits.91 India was 
the first non-Arab state to grant full diplomatic status to the PLO in March 
1980. In June 1981, India denounced the Israeli air force attack on the 
nuclear reactor in Iraq and one year later, in the summer of 1982, the 
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Israeli Consul in Bombay was expelled from India after criticising the 
government’s approach towards Israel in the Indian press.92  
 
 During the tenure of Rajiv Gandhi as the Prime Minister of India (1984-
1989), there was a shift in Indian foreign policy towards Israel;93 however,  
India was one of the first countries to recognise the State of Palestine, 
which had been proclaimed by the Palestine National Council (PNC) in 
Algiers in November 1988.94 Following the Madrid Conference that took 
place in October 1991, India supported the repeal of the UN General 
Assembly resolution of 1975 that equated Zionism with racism (from 
December 1991) 95 and on 29 January 1992 fully-fledged diplomatic 
relations were established between India and Israel. 96 
 
3.8 Post independence India: Ultimate decision unit  
 
After independence, India became an important actor in the international 
system.  The identification of the pertinent ultimate decision unit of India’s 
foreign policy towards the State of Israel after independence, namely the 
prime ministers of India between the years 1947 and 1991 and the 
understanding of the relevant decision-making process regarding this 
policy, provide a methodological means for the analysis of Indian bilateral 
relations with Israel. 97  After independence, Prime Minister Nehru shaped 
India’s foreign policy until 1964 and established a political tradition that 
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prime ministers of India are the ultimate decision units in the field of 
foreign relations. 
 
3.8.1 Predominant leaders: Jawaharlal Nehru   
 
Nehru was elected as the first Prime Minister of India after independence 
(15.8.47-27.5.64).  He was the main architect of India’s foreign policy and 
during most of his tenure as the Prime Minister of India, Nehru was his 
own minister of external affairs and practically all decisions concerning 
foreign affairs were taken by him personally, although he was assisted by 
the infrastructure support of the Ministry of External Affairs (Kapur, 
1994:180; Cohen, 2001:38-39).   
 
According to Subhash Kapila (2000), the official line regarding India’s 
foreign policy in the Middle East taken by Nehru after independence was 
directed by the political situation in India that held the INCP98 captive to 
the domestic compulsion to appease the Muslim minorities and the quest 
for Indian Muslim votes.  It led to the support of the Arab causes in the 
Middle East and the Palestinian cause in particular.99 
 
In October 1949, Eliyahu Eilat, then serving as the Israeli Ambassador in 
Washington, accompanied by Emanuel Celler, met with Prime Minister 
Nehru, who paid a visit to the US and brought up the subject of the non-
recognition of the State of Israel by India.100 In his response, Nehru started 
by pointing out that Israel was an important factor in the Middle East and 
although it was a small country it was bound to develop. In addition, he 
indicated that India could learn much from Israel's achievements in 
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science and agriculture. Nehru went on to explain the non-recognition of 
Israel as an Indian national interest in terms of the Muslim community in 
India that had to be treated carefully. However, he did concede that 
recognition of Israel could not be postponed indefinitely (Avimor, 
1991:172). In Ambassador Eilat’s report about the meeting, he pointed out 
that Nehru had mentioned that people in India had never been anti-
Semitic and many Indians admired the Zionist’s work in Palestine and had 
considerable sympathy for Israel. However, according to Nehru: 
 
 
Indian partition was [the] most painful operation to prevent bloodshed. 
Pakistan became theocratic state preventing national assimilation (of) 
Muslims of India. Hence Indian Government must treat its thirty million 
Muslims most carefully. Palestine was (a) source (of) constant agitation 
and made deep impression (on) Muslims everywhere. He had to choose 
slow, long, way toward recognition (in) order (to) justify it objectively and 
minimize internal opposition (ISA 93.01/2181/7, 14/10/1949). 
 
 
India's recognition of Israel was delayed until 17 September 1950.  One 
day later, Prime Minister Nehru sent a cable to Sharett stating: 
 
  
In conveying to Your Excellency the decision of the Government of India to 
accord recognition to the Government of Israel as of September 18 of this 
year, I send the greetings of the Government and the people of India to the 
Government and the people of Israel (Jerusalem Post, 18/9/1950). 
 
 
In fact, Nehru had contemplated the idea of de-facto recognition of Israel 
but because of pressure from the American Jewry a last minute adjustment 
was made and the Indian recognition was eventually granted in a cryptic 
version without specifying the type of recognition.101 
 
On the same day, Sharett replied in an official note expressing his 
satisfaction with the state of affairs.102 The Israeli newspapers published 
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the news that the Indian Ambassador to the US had informed the Israeli 
Ambassador that the Indian Government was prepared to exchange 
diplomatic representatives with Israel, however, nothing tangible 
happened (Jerusalem Post, 18/9/1950). 
 
Subsequently, Maulana Azad rebuked Nehru for the recognition of Israel 
and intimated that dire consequences could be expected from the Arabs 
and from Indian Muslim reaction103 (Swamy, 1982:20).  A similar viewpoint 
was expressed by Michael Brecher (1963:130) who pointed out that 
Nehru was convinced by Azad that diplomatic relations with Israel would 
have a negative impact on the loyalty of the Muslim minority in India and 
would be used by Pakistan against India. In January 1951 Nehru met the 
Israeli Ambassador in London Eliyahu Eilat and told him that it was wise 
for Israel to wait patiently for India’s delayed recognition; however there 
were some procedures that would have to be followed prior to establishing 
full diplomatic relations (ISA 30.09/2318/8, 16/01/1951). In fact, the 
establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries would 
have to wait until January 1992.104 
 
In reply to a question at a press conference, Nehru in New Delhi why 
diplomatic representatives with Israel had not been exchanged, his 
answer was:  
 
This attitude was adopted after a careful consideration of the balance of 
factors.  It is not a matter of high principle, but it is based on how we could 
best serve and be helpful in the area.  We should like the problem between 
Israel and the Arab countries to be settled peacefully.  After careful thought 
we felt that while recognising Israel as an entity, we need not, at this stage, 
exchange diplomatic personal.  As I said, it is not a matter of principle and it 
is not a matter on which two opinions cannot be held.  That, in the balance, 
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is the decision we arrived at, and we think it is a correct decision (India’s 
Foreign Policy Selected Speeches, 1961:415-416). 
 
 
According to Yaacov Shimoni (1991:E7), a few years after the recognition 
of Israel, Nehru regretted that he had not established full diplomatic 
relations with Israel immediately after the act of recognition. On 2 June 
1953, at a press conference during his visit to Cairo in Egypt, Nehru 
declared that Israel was an undeniable fact (Ben Asher, 1955:218).  
 
At the conference of African and Asian states (the Bandung Conference) 
in Indonesia from 8 to 24 April 1955,105 Nehru made a pro-Arab speech 
and expressed sympathy for the Arab refugees in Palestine.106  On the 
other hand, he did insist in his speech that a solution to the problem could 
only be achieved through peace talks between the parties in contrast to 
the Arab approach (Haaretz, 21/4/1955).  
  
Nehru agreed with the nationalisation of the Suez Canal by Egypt on 26 
July 1956.  In a statement Nehru made in the Lower House of the 
parliament (Lok Sabha)107 on 8 August 1956, he stated that the Egyptian 
nationalisation decision complied with the terms of laws of Egypt (India's 
Foreign Policy/Selected Speeches, 1961:530,534-537).  After the Suez 
Canal military operation and upon Nehru’s instructions, India co-
sponsored UN resolutions urging the withdrawal of French, British and 
Israeli troops from Egypt.108 
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The opening of the Suez Canal military operation surprised the former -
Foreign Minister of Israel, Moshe Sharett, in New Delhi, on the eve of his 
scheduled meeting with Prime Minister Nehru.  The meeting took place on 
29 October 1957 and Nehru felt free to express his criticism of Israel’s 
policy in general and the military action in particular.  As Rafael (1981:88) 
points out in his book, Sharett explained the Israeli defence orientation to 
him, but it did not change Nehru’s mind on the issue.109  Nehru, in 
response, emphasised that sentiments in India regarding Israel were 
positive and many people were kindly disposed towards Israel because of 
its achievements.  Nevertheless, India had had historic ties with the Arabs 
and the trouble was that there could have been a strong Arab reaction to 
the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries.  It 
was also mutually agreed that India and Israel should increase their 
cooperation in the field of technology and science (Nehru commended the 
success of Israeli experts in the development of water resources in the 
Rajasthan desert). In Rafael's opinion, Nehru’s compliments regarding 
Israel were no more than mere courtesies and his expression of interest in 
cooperating with Israel was like a worthless cheque that bounced when 
presented for payment.110  
 
Nehru condemned the Suez Canal military operation while accusing Israel 
of launching a sudden and premeditated attack on Egypt and referred to it 
in his speech in the parliament on 16 November 1956:  
 
 
The Prime Minister of Israel has continued to insist that he will not 
evacuate Gaza.  If the foreign forces are not wholly removed from Egyptian 
territory, this will amount to a clear violation of the UN resolution… If there 
is any attempt not to withdraw, there is likely to be a resumption of 
hostilities which, I think will be on a bigger scale than earlier.  I should like 
the House to look below the surface of this conflict and into the deeper 
issues involved.  First of all, we see this brutal exercise of violence and 
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armed might against weaker countries.  Every country in Asia and Africa 
must particularly feel this danger (India's Foreign Policy / Selected 
Speeches, 1961:536, 538). 
 
 
Michael Brecher explains that despite calls from the press and leading 
politicians in India, it seemed highly unlikely that Nehru would change 
India's foreign policy towards Israel: 
 
 
Firstly, domestic pressures and assumed national interests, i.e., disquiet 
about the possible effects on India's 40 million Muslims and rivalry with 
Pakistan for Arab support on the Kashmir problem; secondly, an 
unconscious or sub-conscious feeling that Israel is a part of the 'colonialist' 
world, a legacy of the assumed attachment between Zionism and British 
imperialism; and thirdly, an oft-stated belief that he can play a beneficial 
role in the Arab-Israel conflict by not having full relations with Israel 
(Brecher, 1963:137-138). 
 
  
Nehru met Nachum Goldman, the President of the Jewish World 
Congress, on 27 June 1957.111 According to Goldman, Nehru told him 
that: 
 
He had tried before it, together with U Nu to get Israel invited (to the Afro- 
Asian Conference) but had to face the threat of the Arab States to boycott 
the conference and had, therefore, to give up (CZA Z6/1452, 27/6/1957). 
 
 
Despite the friendly meeting, Goldman did not succeed in getting his point 
across to Nehru regarding diplomatic relations with Israel.   
 
In February 1958, Egypt and Syria merged to form the United Arab 
Republic (UAR)112 and Nehru, in a speech in the Indian Parliament (Lok 
Sabha), referred to the UAR as the legitimate will of two Arab nations. In 
contrast, he referred to the Israeli criticism of the UAR as ominous and 
could signify the precipitation of action by Israel (Asian Recorder, 7-
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13/7/1958). In his two speeches in the Lok Sabha, on 14 and 19 August 
1958, Nehru made a direct reference to Israel and the Arab countries:  
 
Ever since Israel came into existence, it has been a source of constant 
irritation to the Arab countries. The invasion of Egypt by Israel two years 
ago is fresh in our memory. Apart from this, there is the big problem of the 
old Palestine refugees. The Arab countries have looked upon Israel as an 
outpost from which their freedom might, at any time, be threatened.  Israel, 
on the other hand, fears the Arab counties which surround it... Inevitably 
our sympathies are with the Arab countries and with Arab nationalism, 
which represent today the urge of the people…The growth of Arab 
nationalism is a very powerful, resurgent way. Egypt took the lead in this 
matter and under the wise leadership of President Nasser has played a 
very important part. Nasser in fact, became the most prominent symbol of 
Arab nationalism (India's Foreign Policy / Selected Speeches, 
1961:281,283). 
 
 
On 11 February, 1959, Nehru met with Yigal Allon, a member of the 
Knesset (Representative of the Achdut Haavoda Party), following a 
recommendation received by him from Aneurin Bevan, who was one of 
the leaders of the Labour Party in England.113 Ever since his meeting with 
Nehru, Allon had been under the impression that Nehru had changed his 
previous opinion about Israel in view of the tragic persecution and 
genocide of the Jews in Europe and the subsequent successful 
establishment of the State of Israel.  According to Allon, Nehru realised 
that the State of Israel was a reality; therefore it was a political fact that 
could not be ignored.  Furthermore, Israel was a member of the UN and 
Nehru recognised that the Jews had a right to their own country.  He also 
reported that Nehru acceded that India should have established ties with 
Israel in 1950 and admitted that the question of diplomatic relations had 
caused difficulties for both countries.  Nehru also pointed out that his 
advisors had misled him and that Pakistan had taken advantage of the 
problems between India and Pakistan with the aim of inciting aggressive 
behaviour by the Indian Muslims (Yegar, 2004:149).    
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On 10 April 1960, Egypt's President Nasser visited India and the following 
joint statement was published in New Delhi:  
 
The Egyptian President and the Indian Prime Minister reiterated their view 
that the question of Palestine should be solved in conformity with the 
provision of the UN charter, the resolutions of the UN and the principles 
unanimously adopted at the Bandung Conference of 1955 for the peaceful 
settlement of the Palestinian question (Middle East Records, 1960:182-
183). 
   
On 19 May 1960, an Israeli jet fighter nearly intercepted a UN plane, one 
mile inside Israel’s territory, with Nehru onboard en route to Gaza to visit 
Indian soldiers posted with the UN’s emergency forces.  This created a 
diplomatic incident between the two countries.114   
 
Nehru was well aware of the power of the Jewish lobby in the US and 
therefore, during his visit to New York in 1960, he agreed to meet Abba 
Eban, the Israeli Ambassador to the UN, but all he did was offer vague 
promises (Swamy, 1982:20).115  In August 1960, Nehru rejected an 
invitation sent to him by Prime Minister Ben-Gurion to visit Israel.116  
 
On 22 December 1960, during question time in the Upper House of the 
Parliament (Rajya Sabha) Nehru asserted the following: 
 
As regards Israel, we have not built up diplomatic missions there as the 
whole position is very much entangled in important and rather dangerous 
international issues (ISA 93.42/309/11, 20/12/1960). 
 
 
In fact, Nehru was under constant heavy pressure from all the Arab 
countries that considered India a key player in the international arena, to 
downgrade India’s relations with Israel. His answer insinuated that he had 
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assessed that establishment of diplomatic relations with Israel would have 
had a negative influence on the international stability in the Middle East. 
 
On 15 February 1961, Gideon Rafael, the Director General of the Israeli 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, participated in an annual conference of the 
World Health Organisation (WHO) assembled in Delhi.  He met with 
Nehru on the day that he informed the Indian Parliament of the incursion 
of Chinese forces into Indian territory in the Himalayan region.117 After he 
had listened to Rafael's presentation about the international arena from an 
Israeli perspective Nehru stated:  
 
India had recognized Israel in 1950 and indeed should have at that time 
established diplomatic relations. The sentiments in India towards Israel 
were good.  Many people were keenly interested in its achievement.  Of 
course, India had historic ties with the Arabs and in recent years they had 
become closer. The trouble was that there was strong Arab reaction to the 
establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries (Rafael, 
1981:89). 
 
   
Nehru agreed that the two countries should intensify their cooperation in 
the field of technology and science and he commended the success of 
Israeli experts in the development of water resources in the Rajasthan 
desert.118  He added that:  
 
He had probed again and again in his talks with Arab leaders and 
especially with Nasser, into whether there was an opening for reconciliation 
with Israel, but he had always come up against a wall of steel.  The Arabs 
had repeatedly said to him that the time was not ripe for a settlement 
(Rafael, 1981:88).  
 
 
At a press conference in London, on 12 March 1961, Prime Minister 
Nehru reportedly said that: "India recognized Israel in 1950 but had no 
mission in Israel, it was not logical but it was practical" (Times, 
18/3/1961).  
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During the Belgrade Conference of the Non-Aligned Movement (1-6 
September 1961), Nehru declared at a press conference that it was 
extremely difficult for India to establish diplomatic relations with Israel and 
that: “After Suez I personally felt terribly frustrated by the event and it is 
utterly difficult to lend any recognition whatsoever now” (Jerusalem Post, 
5/9/1961).  
 
During the closing session of the Belgrade Conference, on 5 September 
1961, Nehru agreed with Egyptian President Nasser that Israel was a 
threat to the Arabs in the Middle East and that there was an awareness of 
Israel's imperialist role in Africa (Maariv, 6/9/1961).  On the other hand, 
during the conference Nehru insisted that in his view, the conference in 
Belgrade should not deal with local quarrels and he refused to support any 
documents that included the condemnation of Israel and the 
condemnation of other countries.  Nehru added that beside Israel, other 
countries were also involved in imperialistic behaviour; however, they were 
not condemned. His advice to the Belgrade Conference was to be 
practical and to call upon Israel to implement the UN resolution regarding 
the Arab refugees (Author, 6/9/1961).119  
 
On 22 December 1961, Prime Minister Nehru told the Indian Lower House 
of the Parliament120 (Lok Sabha) that India had decided against 
establishing diplomatic relations with Israel: "Obviously it is very much 
entangled in important and rather dangerous international issues" 
(Jerusalem Post, 23/12/1961). 
 
In 1962, after the Indo-Chinese war, Nehru sent written communications 
to a large number of leaders including the Israeli Prime Minister David 
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Ben-Gurion, explaining the Indian position.  Israel, in response, 
dispatched a shipload of arms to India.  This load of arms was a starting 
point for intelligence and military cooperation between the two countries, 
but after it was leaked to the Indian press it was played down, denied and 
called off by the Indian government.  Nehru did not show any sign of 
gratitude towards Israel and India continued with its anti-Israeli and pro-
Arab approach (Shimoni, 1991:E9; Swamy, 1982:20).121 
 
Before independence, Nehru regarded the return of the Jewish people to 
Palestine as a colonialist and imperialist enterprise and disregarded the 
national aspirations of the Jews in Israel.122 After the independence of 
Israel, Nehru came to terms with the State of Israel as an international 
political fact but he continued supporting the close relations of India with 
the Arab countries. On a personal level, he appreciated Israel's 
achievements in general and in science and agriculture in particular, but 
his emotional sympathy was with the Arab leadership in the Middle East 
as well as with the Palestinian cause.123    
3.8.2 Predominant leaders: Lal Bahadur Shastri  
 
Prime Minister Shastri hardly had any grounding in India’s foreign affairs 
and most of the foreign affairs declarations that he made were a repetition 
of what Nehru had said before and his whole political career centred on 
domestic politics (Silveira, 1992:124).  Dixit, on the other hand pointed out 
that Prime Minister Shastri “brought the important principles of realism 
and practicality in foreign policy and defence planning” (Dixit, 2004:115). 
 
Unlike Nehru, Shastri's first major decision was to appoint a full time 
Foreign Minister (Sardar Swaran Singh) and during his tenure (9/6/1964 – 
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11/1/1966) the emergence of international realism in Indian foreign policy 
became noticeable; although India’s foreign policy towards Israel 
remained unchanged.124 In 1965, during the Indian-Pakistani war, the 
Indian Army, with Shastri's approval, acquired heavy mortar and 
ammunitions from Israel.  Although he continued with the pro-Arab foreign 
policy introduced by Nehru, he personally approved of the visit of R.S. 
Panjhazri to Israel in July 1965, in order to learn about Israel’s security, 
prison service and agriculture.  He was the former Secretary General of 
the INCP, Member of Parliament on behalf of the ruling party and a 
member of the Foreign Affairs and Security Committee (Archives of 
Labour Party, A219 IV, 21/7 - 1/8/1965).  
 
In an interview with an Israeli journalist, which took place in 1965, but was 
published in Israel only one year later, Prime Minister Shastri reportedly 
spoke highly about Israel's achievements and he did not rule out the 
possibility of Israeli technical cooperation with India in agricultural 
development (Jerusalem Post, 14/1/1966).  
 
Despite the emergence of international realism in India’s foreign policy 
during Shastri's tenure, India’s foreign policy towards Israel was 
unchanged.  Shastri did not have the will, political power or the time, to 
bring about a change in India's foreign policy with Israel.125  
 
3.8.3 Predominant leaders: Indira Gandhi 
 
Indira Gandhi served two terms as a Prime Minister (24/1/1966–
23/3/1977 and 14/1/1980–31/10/1984) (Silveira, 1992:125).126  During her 
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first tenure, India’s foreign policy dealt mostly with Bangladesh (East 
Pakistan) and the acquisition of nuclear weapons capability.  During her 
second tenure, her major concerns were the Afghanistan crisis, 
Pakistan’s involvement in Jammu and Kashmir and the superpowers.127 
 
Mrs. Gandhi pursued a hostile anti-Israeli foreign policy and was a 
staunch supporter of the Arab world.  At the beginning of her tenure she 
stated: 
 
Our support is not only due to our traditional friendship toward the Arab 
people but also to our belief in and commitment to socialism and the 
principle that states should not be carved out or created on the basis of 
religion (Jansen, 1971:302).   
 
 
Her attitude towards Israel became more negative after the Six-Day War 
in 1967.128  After the Six-Day War, Indira Gandhi visited Cairo from 19 to 
21 October 1967 and a joint communiqué was issued in which the two 
sides reaffirmed their adherence to the principle that the use of force to 
achieve territorial or political gains was impermissible:  
 
The Egyptian President and the Indian Prime Minister expressed their 
particular concern over the grave situation in the Middle East pointing out 
the urgent importance of finding a just solution…particularly concerning the 
withdrawal of the Israeli forces from the territories they have occupied since 
5 July 1967 (BBC, 23/10/1967).   
 
  
Despite Mrs. Gandhi’s negative attitude towards Israel, during the 1971 
war with Pakistan in the critical hour of need, she reluctantly agreed to 
purchase artillery weapons (160mm mortars and ammunition) 
manufactured exclusively by Israel.  Mrs. Gandhi, who had divided the 
Indian intelligence service into two parts and had entrusted external 
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intelligence to the newly formed agency: the Research and Analysis Wing 
(RAW). During her first tenure she had already allowed the RAW to 
cooperate with its Israeli intelligence counterpart.129 After the Arab-Israeli 
war in 1973, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi continued her traditionally 
negative foreign policy towards Israel.130 However, in 1974 Mrs. Gandhi 
rejected the demands by Saudi Arabia for the closure of the Israeli 
Consulate in Bombay (The Pioneer, 21/6/2004). 
 
It was also Mrs. Gandhi who decided to grant full diplomatic status to the 
PLO Mission in New Delhi in January 1975, (the first non-Arab state to 
extend such accreditation to the PLO) and in March 1980, she granted full 
diplomatic recognition to the PLO.  On 7 June 1981, Prime Minister Indira 
Gandhi denounced the Israel Air Force attack on the nearly completed 
nuclear reactor Osiraq, near Baghdad in Iraq. 
 
In the summer of 1982, the Israeli Consul in Bombay was indeed expelled 
from India after criticising Gandhi's Government’s approach towards Israel 
in the Indian press.  Officially, the expulsion of the Israeli Consul took 
place as a result of his criticism of Gandhi's Government. Undoubtedly, the 
atmosphere in the Middle East in the 1980, which eventually led to the 
Israeli invasion of Lebanon that began at the beginning of June 1982, 
played a significant role in the Indian decision to expel the Israeli Consul 
from India.131 According to Subramaniam Swamy, Member of the Indian 
Parliament (Swamy, 1982:21), Prime Minister Indira Gandhi was infuriated 
by the Israeli Military Operation in Lebanon and labelled Israel an 
“international brigand.” 
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In 1980, after Prime Minister Indira Gandhi returned to power (following a 
dramatic victory in the election) her control over the foreign policy of India 
became total and she continued with an Indian anti-Israeli foreign policy. 
In 1984, however, she allowed the Indian Intelligence service132 to seek the 
advice of Israel on security and intelligence systems (Swamy, 1982:22; 
Kumaraswamy, 1998:5).   
 
Mrs. Gandhi was considered to be the most anti-Israeli and pro-Arab 
Indian Prime Minister ever and she constantly displayed strong 
identification with the Arabs and rejected Israel’s occupation of the West 
Bank, Gaza and the Golan Heights in no uncertain terms.  During her 
tenure, bilateral relations between India and Israel reached their lowest 
point ever.133 
3.8.4 Predominant leaders: Morarji Desai  
 
Prime Minister Morarji Desai (24/3/1977 – 26/7/1979) did not have a 
profound impact on Indian foreign policy, however he took the initiative to 
establish covert foreign relations with China and expressed the need for a 
balanced and open policy towards the US as well as a willingness to 
normalise relations with Pakistan (Dixit, 2004).  After Desai had defeated 
Indira Gandhi in the general elections in March 1977, many observers 
both in India and abroad believed that he would revitalise India's non-
alignment policies.  During the pre-election debate, Desai unequivocally 
declared that if elected, his administration would return India to "true non-
alignment" and referred to Mrs. Gandhi’s non-alignment policies as anti-
Western and spurious and hinted at forthcoming changes.  His new 
Minister of External Affairs Atal B. Vajpayee, also reaffirmed the country's 
need for a revitalised non-aligned foreign policy (Larus, 1981:51).   
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It was the first coalition government during the Post-independence era. It 
was difficult heading such a new government and consequently it left 
Desai with little leverage for a change in foreign policy.  The framework of 
India’s foreign policy continued along the same traditional Nehruvian lines. 
Internal political battles between his government and Indira Gandhi left 
him with hardly any scope for designing a visible foreign policy (Silveira, 
1992:127; Kapur, 1994:187).  Despite the international openness of the 
Janata Party led by Desai and the pro-Israeli Jana Sangh Party in the 
Janata Coalition Government (1977-1979), no significant change was 
made by India regarding Israel.  
 
Desai was prudent in his policy towards Israel and his meeting with the 
Israeli Foreign Minister, Moshe Dayan, in August 1977, who arrived at 
New Delhi as an incognito visitor; however, it did not lead to any new 
mutual political understanding.  Desai told Dayan that diplomatic relations 
between the two countries could not be established unless Israel withdrew 
from the captured Arab lands, a demand with which Dayan could not 
comply (Swamy, 1982:21).   
 
Following the Camp David Accord, signed in September 1978 between 
Israel and Egypt, India's attitude towards Israel improved and Prime 
Minister Desai met in London with Israeli Defence Minister, Ezer 
Weizmann, who offered India Israeli technology.  In order to explore that 
possibility further, Desai’s principal private secretary V. Shankar visited 
Israel in early 1979, but before an understanding could be reached, the 
Janata government collapsed in July 1979.  Nevertheless, a very limited 
number of arms and ammunition were bought from Israel as a result of 
Shankar's visit, through a third country (Cyprus), during the term of office 
of the successor government (Swamy, 1982). 
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India's foreign policy towards Israel during the tenure of Prime Minister 
Desai was more open than before and there was a short period 
characterised by realism in the two countries' bilateral relations.  Desai's 
assumption was that an improvement in relations with Israel needed 
greater political consensus in general and within the INCP in particular. 
However, there was no change of relations with Israel in the end134 for a 
number of reasons such as Desai's short tenure, and the fact that he 
concentrated on domestic issues and was less interested in foreign affairs.  
Consequently, the traditional Nehruvian pro-Arab foreign policy position in 
the Ministry of External Affairs was strengthened during Desai's tenure. 
3.8.5 Predominant leaders: Charan Singh 
 
Charan Singh was Prime Minister of India for a short period of time, 
namely between 28 July 1979 and 14 January 1979.  During this time, he 
headed an interim coalition government pending the election.  However, 
he was less interested in foreign policy than his predecessor and did not 
have any specific viewpoints about international politics except for his 
critical approach to Soviet intervention in Afghanistan (Kapur, 1994:189).  
 
There was no real indication of his foreign policy attitude towards Israel 
and during his short tenure there was no sign of change in the Indian anti-
Israeli and pro-Arab foreign policy, which was carried out mainly by pro-
Arab foreign policy bureaucrats.135 
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3.8.6 Predominant leaders: Rajiv Gandhi  
 
Rajiv Gandhi was introduced to politics after the death of his brother 
Sanjay Gandhi in 1980.136 In fact, his mother Indira Gandhi pressed Rajiv 
Gandhi to step into his brother’s political shoes137 and later on, after his 
mother’s assassination in October 1984, he was pushed into the role of 
prime minister of India 
   
As Prime Minister from 24 December 1984 to sixteen October 1985, he 
left his mark on Indian foreign policy (compared with domestic affairs 
where he was constricted).138 While conducting India’s foreign policy, 
Gandhi mostly made personal decisions (assisted by the Indian 
Intelligence Service,139 his own secretariat and close personal political 
advisors).140 The reason was that he had little confidence in bureaucracy in 
general and the Indian Ministry of External Affairs in particular, which he 
perceived as an institution that was slow and laborious regarding the 
making of changes (Kapur, 1994:193; Cohen, 2001:89)141. 
 
Gandhi, open-minded and educated at Cambridge University, signalled a 
fresh Indian approach towards Israel and though unable to reverse the 
traditional Indian pro-Arab foreign policy completely, initiated a number of 
moves in favour of Israel.  On the other hand, during his tenure, on 16 
November 1988, India accorded full recognition to the virtual State of 
Palestine.  Nevertheless, unlike his predecessors, he met openly with 
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Israeli high-level officials as well as pro-Israeli political leaders in the US.  
The issue regarding the normalisation of relations with Israel was 
prominent in his discussions with American officials and US Jewish 
organisations.   
 
Despite American pressure and the fact that he took a number of 
significant steps vis-à-vis Israel and appeared to have good intentions in 
this regard, Rajiv Gandhi was unable to bring about a complete reversal of 
India’s foreign policy towards Israel. The reason was that he was 
hampered by domestic political constraints, including pressure from his 
own party, the INCP, and the Palestinian Intifada of 1987 (the Palestinian 
uprising in the West Bank and Gaza). All this contributed to Israel’s 
international isolation and curtailed Rajiv’s freedom of action regarding the 
possible normalisation of relations between the two countries. In addition, 
Israeli involvement in the Sri Lankan ethnic conflict also generated 
suspicion and anger in India.142  
 
Notwithstanding his domestic political constraints, certain steps were also 
taken regarding Israel by Rajiv Gandhi's government (Kumaraswamy, 
2002:6 and Yegar, 2001:162). In addition, Rajiv Gandhi met with his Israeli 
counterpart, Prime Minister Shimon Peres, during the 40th Annual Session 
of the UN in 1985.  It was the first time that the prime ministers of the two 
countries had met.  Following that meeting, India allowed an Israeli 
diplomat to be stationed in Bombay as Vice-Consul.143 In July 1987, 
following pressure from the US Congress and the American Jewish 
protest, India allowed an Israeli tennis team to participate in the Davis Cup 
Tennis Tournament in New Delhi.  On 8 June 1988, Rajiv Gandhi had a 
high profile meeting with US based pro-Israeli groups in New York upon 
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the request of Congressman Stephen J. Solarz, who was then the head of 
the Asian and Pacific Sub-Committee in the US Congress.  This eventually 
led to the appointment of an Israeli Consul in Bombay in August 1988.144  
 
Following these meetings, the Government of India confirmed the formal 
extension of Israeli consular jurisdiction to the southern Indian state of 
Kerala, which had a relatively significant Jewish population.  
Subsequently, the State of Maharashtra (in which Bombay is located) was 
instructed by the Government of India to invite the Israeli Consul to all 
state functions.145  Relaxation of visa procedures for Israelis of Indian 
origin and the gradual liberalisation of visa procedures for individuals and 
tourist groups from Israel followed as well.146 
 
It is significant that Rajiv Gandhi referred publicly to the Pakistani nuclear 
programme as an “Islamic bomb,” bringing the threat that this programme 
posed to other countries in the entire region into the open. 
 
Despite Gandhi's new approach towards Israel and the fact that during his 
tenure the Indian Ministry of External Affairs lost its importance and ability 
to design and influence India's foreign policy in general and towards Israel 
in particular, he was limited politically as far as any significant 
improvement in India’s bilateral relations with Israel was concerned.  One 
of the limitations emanated from international events such as the Israeli 
entrance into Lebanon by force in 1982.  Another limiting factor was the 
UN resolution in December 1988, which declared that Israel was not a 
peace-loving country and called upon all members to sever diplomatic, 
trade and cultural ties with Israel.  In addition, his own party’s anti-Israeli 
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approach and the rapid decline of his personal popularity limited his 
political ability to carry out any diplomatic improvement with Israel.147 
3.8.7 Predominant leaders: Vishvan Pratap Singh  
 
Prime Minister V. P. Singh who was in power from 2 December 1989 to 7 
November 1990, was the leader of the Janata Dal Party, a party that had 
some historical political connections with the Israeli Labour Party.  
Likewise, the Foreign Minister of his coalition government was A. B. 
Vajpayee, the leader of the right-wing Baharatya Janata Party, traditionally 
a pro-Israeli party.  A high level of expectation was therefore generated in 
Israel during V. P. Singh's tenure as Prime Minister of India and it was 
hoped that a possible change in India’s foreign policy towards Israel could 
ensue.   
 
V. P. Singh, who was the leader of the new Janata Dal Party that had its 
roots in the INCP and Congress school of political thought.  He served 
under Indira Gandhi as Commerce Minister (1983-1984) and Finance 
Minister (1985 – 1987) and was Defence Minister for one year in Rajiv 
Gandhi's Cabinet in 1987 before being removed by him (Silveira, 
1992:132; Kapur, 1994:198-199).  
 
Prime Minister Singh was busy leading a coalition government with 
different political perceptions of the parties and individuals who had joined 
his government in order to forestall the return of Rajiv Gandhi to power.  
He was reluctant to deal with foreign policy in general and with any 
possible change of the Indian policy towards Israel in particular, thereby 
continuing India’s traditional pro-Arab foreign policy.  
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During his tenure, the anti-Israeli Indian Ministry of External Affairs148 was 
a dominant power and actually conducted the foreign policy of India.  It is 
important to note that Singh had no interest in foreign affairs (although 
during the Gulf crisis did take place during his tenure and he had to deal 
with it).  In addition, certain factors such as his political roots in the INCP,   
the strong support of his party, Janata Dal from the Muslim community in 
the elections and the dominance of the Ministry of External Affairs, 
rendered a change in India's foreign policy towards Israel during his tenure 
impossible. Accordingly, the Israeli expectations regarding his government 
were not fulfilled and India continued with its pro-Arab foreign policy. 149 
3.8.8 Predominant leaders: Chandra Shekhar  
 
Prime Minister Shekhar ran a caretaker minority government from 10 
November 1990 to 13 March 1991; while Rajiv Gandhi was waiting for the 
right moment before announcing a general election (Silveira, 1992:135).  
Shekhar was mostly concerned with Indian domestic politics and as prime 
minister of a caretaker government; he was very much at the mercy of 
political circumstances and uncertainty; while fighting for his political 
survival.  Under such political circumstances and considering the fact that 
his interest in foreign policy was marginal, it was hardly possible for 
Shekhar to take an interest or become actively involved in the field of 
foreign policy and the Ministry of External Affairs played a key role in 
Indian policy-making (Kapur, 1994:201).  
 
Shekhar did not institute any active changes in foreign policy in general 
and towards Israel in particular, with the exception of his condemnation of 
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Iraq regarding Kuwait and his public expression that there was  no 
connection whatsoever between the Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait and the 
Palestinian problem.  The Minister of State in the Ministries of Commerce 
and Law, Subramaniam Swamy, tried to convince Shekhar of the need to 
establish diplomatic relations with Israel or to transfer the Israeli Consulate 
from Bombay to New Delhi at least, but to no avail.  It is noteworthy that 
Swamy met openly with the Israeli Minister of Trade and Commerce 
Moshe Nissim, during an international economic conference in Brussels 
(Yegar, Govrin & Oded: 2002:545). Swamy, an experienced Indian 
politician and an old friend of Israel in India, went ahead with the meeting 
despite objections from the Ministry of External Affairs of India, but 
because of objections to the meeting, it was declared an unofficial 
meeting.  Swamy also suggested that the Indian government should 
transfer the Israeli Consulate to New Delhi, but Prime Minister Shekhar 
was reluctant to deal with the Israeli issue.  Shekhar's public remark that 
there was no connection between the Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait and the 
solution of the Palestinian problem was criticised severely by politicians 
from all spectrums of Indian political parties in general and the INCP in 
particular as well as Arab diplomats in New Delhi (Becher, 2002:546; 
Kapur, 1994:201). 
 
However, there were two conciliatory gestures that Prime Minister 
Shekhar made towards Israel during his tenure.  He allowed the Young 
Israeli National Tennis team to participate in a tennis tournament in India 
in April 1991. (The Israeli-Indian tennis match was even broadcast by the 
Indian National Television 'Doorsarshan') and he conducted a meeting 
with the Israeli Consul in July 1991, which did not result in any positive 
political developments. Therefore, despite the two diplomatic gestures that 
Prime Minister Shekhar made towards Israel, no significant changes 
regarding the bilateral relations between the two countries were made 
during his tenure, as he was not particularly interested in foreign policy 
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and let the Ministry of External Affairs play a key role in the foreign policy-
making process while continuing India's pro-Arab foreign policy.150  
3.8.9 Predominant leaders: Narasimha Rao 
 
Narasimha Rao was sworn in as the Prime Minister of India on 21 June 
1991 and served as Prime Minister between the years 1991 and 1996.  He 
also served as Minister of External Affairs under Indira Gandhi and Rajiv 
Gandhi (Kapur, 1994:201).  
 
On 21 November 1991, Isi J. Leibler, the Australian co-chairman of the 
governing board of the World Jewish Congress (WJC), headed a mission 
of the WJC to New Delhi to meet Rao.  The question of establishing 
diplomatic relations between Israel and India was brought up in the 
meeting, in addition to other bilateral issues concerning Israel and Rao 
promised a change in India’s foreign policy regarding Israel, but without 
any time commitment.   Rao also was also sympathetic about the lack of 
reciprocity by the Indians regarding consular ties with Israel and also 
about the absence of direct international calls between the two countries 
(Leibler, 1991).151  
 
During the third week of January 1992, Rao invited Yasser Arafat, the 
chairman of the PLO, to New Delhi in order to gauge his reaction 
regarding the possibility of establishing diplomatic relations with Israel.152 
Eventually it was Prime Minister Rao who made the decision to establish 
fully-fledged diplomatic relations with Israel about two months later.153 
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 3.9 Post independence India: The international system level of 
analysis  
 
The international level of analysis is an essential factor in the 
understanding and analysis of foreign policy and is utilised in order to 
explain India's foreign relations with Israel between the years 1947 and 
1991.   
 
India's post-independence foreign policy towards Israel was a continuation 
of pre-independence policy, but gradually certain international 
developments based on external factors combined with contextual 
determinants emerged and influenced India's relations with Israel in terms 
of bilateral and multilateral relations. These developments, factors and 
determinants are discussed below.  
 
3.9.1 India and bilateral relations with Israel 
 
Bilateral relations between India and Israel between 1947 and 1991, 
namely the relations which were defined by the pattern of interaction 
between the two countries, were passive in nature during which period, 
India maintained a consistent pro-Arab foreign policy towards Israel as 
described and analysed in this chapter. 
 
India considered Israel to be a country that was born with the backing of 
imperialist powers and was supported by them.  India’s attitude gained 
political momentum after the Suez crisis in 1956, when the Israeli invasion 
of Sinai was denounced by India as a flagrant violation of the UN charter.  
It continued in 1967 when India denounced Israel after the Six-Day War 
and the war of 1973.  India also saw the newly-born State of Israel as a 
theocratic state (and thus an analogue to Pakistan) (Naaz, 1999:241). 
India, on the other hand, was a secular state ratified by a constitution 
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amendment and the INCP, in particular, was opposed to the idea of 
religion being the basis for nationality (Shimoni, 1991:E4).  
 
India viewed its relations with Israel as well as its relations with the Arab 
countries and the Arab-Israeli dispute in particular, in terms of a zero-sum 
game.  India's foreign policy towards Israel was one- sided, restrictive and 
anti-Israeli.  Economic factors played no role in influencing Indian foreign 
policy towards Israel as reflected in the low volume of trade between the 
two countries at the time.  On the other hand, India's economic relations 
with the Arab world in general and Indian dependency on the Arab region 
for oil in particular, played a significant role in India's attitude towards 
Israel.154  
3.9.1.1. Extension of recognition of Israel  
 
On 23 May 1948, the Government of India received a request from   the 
President of Israel to recognise the State of Israel, but the Indian 
Government, under heavy pressure from the Arab countries, withheld its 
recognition.  As declared by Prime Minister Nehru:  
 
The Government of India has received a request from this 
State of Israel for recognition.  We propose to take no action in 
this matter at present.  India can play no effective part in this 
conflict at the present stage either diplomatically or otherwise 
(Parthasarthy, 1985:126). 
 
However Prime Minister Nehru did not rule out the possibility of such 
recognition in future pending changed circumstances (Naaz, 1999:241).155 
Although India opposed UN membership for the State of Israel in 1949, 
eventually on 17 September 1950, India accorded de-jure recognition to 
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Israel after it had assured the Arab countries that such an act would not 
affect its friendship with them. Part of the official reason given by the 
Government of India for this step was that non-recognition of Israel limited 
its effectiveness as a possible intermediary between Israel and the Arab 
states. It was also emphasised in the Indian press that recognition of Israel 
did not change the Indian attitude towards the question of the Arab 
refugees, the status of Jerusalem and the question of the frontiers of 
Israel.  Contrary to common diplomatic practice, recognition of Israel did 
not lead to the establishment of full diplomatic relations between the two 
countries (Padmanbahan, 1975:12 and Rao, 1972:5). 
 
3.9.1.2 India’s foreign policy towards Israel (The period   
from 1947 to 1956) 
 
India’s foreign policy towards Israel following the establishment of the 
State of Israel as well as after India's recognition of Israel was influenced 
by Indian political need to respect the feelings of Indian Muslims, to 
improve relations with the Arab world and to counter Pakistan diplomatic 
activity in the Middle East as well as South Asia.  India, which was 
established as a secular state, did not subscribe to the notion that the 
loyalty of Indian Muslims was to the Indian State.  Israel, the newly born 
state with a Jewish religious orientation, served as a negative political 
example for India, especially considering the fact that the partition of India 
had left India with considerable communal tensions.  The negative attitude 
towards Israel was also a political way of demonstrating to the Indian 
Muslims that the Government of India was not anti-Muslim or anti-Arab.156 
Following the recognition of the State of Israel by India on 7 June 1951, F. 
W. Pollack was appointed Honorary Consular Agent of Israel in Bombay, 
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as well as the Trade Commissioner of Israel for India (Avimor, 
1991:382)157.  
 
Between 27 February and 9 March 1952, bilateral negotiations concerning 
formal diplomatic relations were conducted by the Director General of the 
Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Walter Eytan, who was sent to New 
Delhi on the instructions of the Israeli Prime Minister, David Ben-Gurion.158  
Eytan received a firm pledge from Prime Minister Nehru himself that full 
diplomatic relations would be established, but the pledge was not 
honoured with no official explanation given to Israel (Eytan, 1958:169).  In 
his memoirs, Eytan points out that Prime Minister Nehru agreed that the 
question of diplomatic relations with Israel should be reconsidered and 
had no doubts about it:  
 
India had recognized Israel over a year before, and it was not logical to 
balk at diplomatic relations. He was not, at that time, greatly affected by 
Arab opposition to Israel…Diplomatic relations with Israel had been held 
up, though the government's consideration for India's Muslim minority. The 
problem was presented as one of domestic politics, at least in the main.  
Indian Muslims had suffered a profound shock by partition.  Most of their 
leaders had left them and gone to Pakistan.  Individual Muslims occupied 
influential positions in India, but the community, as a whole was depressed 
and fearful of the future. The Government had always shown 
understanding for their situation and had not wanted to heap shock upon 
shock if it were not absolutely necessary (Eytan, 1958:169). 
  
Eytan stated that nothing came of his talks in New Delhi in general and 
with Nehru in particular; however, the Indian party offered no convincing 
explanation:   
 
So many explanations have been made that it is impossible to tell which, if 
any is correct.  But there seems little doubt that Muslim hostility to Israel is 
still the stumbling block with a shift of emphasis from India's own Muslim 
minority, which had shown no sign of shock when Nehru recognized Israel 
in 1950, to Pakistan and the Arab states.  Throughout these years Kashmir 
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has affected Indian policy in every field.  Mr. Nehru may have feared at 
one time that if he established relations with Israel, he would throw the 
Arab states into the arms of Pakistan, their sister in Islam.  They might be 
kept neutral if they believed that their support of Pakistan on Kashmir 
would lead to India's establishing diplomatic relations with Israel.  Such a 
development would give Israel the entree to the society of Asian nations, 
and this they were determined at all costs to prevent.  If this was, indeed, 
Mr. Nehru's calculation, he may feel that events have proved him right.  
The Arab states, more concerned with power than with religious affinities, 
have in fact never lent Pakistan their full support.  Neutralism or Non-
Alignment held a powerful appeal for the whole Arab world and Egypt in 
particular, was happy to be drawn into India's orbit.  Mr. Nehru, for his part, 
was prepared to appease Arab susceptibilities by keeping away from 
Israel (Eytan, 1958:170-171).  
         
Only in February 1953, was an official reply sent from the Ministry of 
External Affairs of India to the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs informing it 
that a decision regarding the exchange of diplomatic missions had not yet 
been made and that they would be informed in due course when such a 
decision was made (ISA 130.02/2414/1, 19/2/1952). According to Michael 
Brecher (1963:10) and Yaacov Shimoni, (1991:E7), Nehru who had hoped 
to get the unanimous endorsement of his Cabinet (as he did in 1950 for 
the recognition of Israel) met the opposition of his Muslim ministers, in 
particular, Maulana Azad and was not prepared to overrule them by a 
majority decision.159  Following pressure applied by the American Jewry160 
as well as American Congressmen, Israel was permitted to open a 
Consulate in Bombay on 3 August 1953 and Gavriel Doron was nominated 
as the first Israeli Consul (Yegar, 2004:141 and Avimor, 1991:18).161  
 
It was also during this time that relations between India and Egypt 
gradually grew stronger and the two countries found similarities in their 
attitudes towards the international politics of the Cold War, the role of the 
Western powers in the less developed areas of the world and the common 
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rejections of international blocs.  India, which had committed itself to 
friendship and support of Egypt, found itself conducting an anti-Israeli 
foreign policy and Nehru developed friendly personal relations with Egypt's 
President Nasser.  He was the embodiment of the Egyptian social 
revolution (following the success of the Egyptian revolution in 1952) and 
set himself up as a leader of the Arab struggle against Israel and by 
association, against anti-colonialism.  Nasser had become a trusted ally of 
India; he was considered secular, interested in espousing the doctrine of 
Non-Alignment and keeping Asia and Africa free of superpower alliances 
(Naaz, 1999:242).  Nehru made Cairo a constant stopover on his trips 
abroad.  In April 1955, Nasser stopped at New Delhi on his way to the 
Afro-Asian Conference and was honoured by being asked to make a 
speech to the Indian Parliament.162  During his visit, a friendship 
agreement was signed between India and Egypt.  At that time, Indian 
foreign policy towards Israel was neutral in nature as most of the Indian 
criticism about the political situation in the Middle East was directed more 
at the Western powers than against Israel (Rao, 1972:44-45).  
  
3.9.1.3 India’s foreign policy towards Israel (The period 1956 
to 1967) 
 
After Israel’s participation in the invasion of Egypt during the Suez crisis in 
1956, India viewed Israel, even more than before as the outpost of 
Western interests and Indian hostility towards Israel continued (although 
some of the Indian opposition press openly called for an exchange of 
diplomatic envoys with Israel).163 On 16 November 1956, Prime Minister 
Nehru accused Israel directly of launching an attack on Egypt (Avimor, 
1991:15)164. Later India denounced Israel’s attack on the Suez Canal zone 
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as a flagrant violation of the UN Charter and Israeli-Indian relations 
reached an extremely low point (Naaz, 1999:242).  According to Brecher, 
at this stage and despite the fact that Israel had broadened its diplomatic 
relations with Asian states, following the opening of the eastern sea route 
after the Suez crisis, improvement of bilateral relations between India and 
Israel seemed unlikely as long as Nehru remained in power (Brecher, 
1963:137).  
 
Nehru’s negative approach towards Israel was endorsed and supported by 
the INCP leadership and the Indian intelligentsia.  On various occasions 
when the issue of diplomatic relations with Israel was raised, the Indian 
explanation given for not embarking on diplomatic relations with Israel was 
that the time was not ripe, unlike in the 1950s, when budget restrictions 
was the reason given. 
 
During the Indo-China War in 1962, Prime Minister Nehru circulated a 
letter to leaders around the world soliciting urgent support and included 
Ben-Gurion, the Prime Minister of Israel among the recipients of his letter.  
The tone of Ben-Gurion’s reply was polite but non-committal.165  
Nonetheless, it did not stop India from seeking military help from Israel 
during its war with China and subsequently, Israel supplied India with 
artillery weapons.  The following stage involved military and intelligence 
cooperation between the two countries, which included high-ranking 
officers’ visits on both sides.  However, when the information about military 
cooperation was leaked to the Indian press, it was played down and later 
denied by the Government of India and was eventually called off (Shimoni, 
1991:E9; Yodphat, 1983:45).166 In 1998, the weekly “India Today” 
acknowledged Israel's military arms supply to India in the Indo-China war 
and revealed that as a token of gratitude for Israeli assistance in the Indo–
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China war, India had secretly sent spare parts for Oragan aircraft and 
AMX13 tanks to Israel, before the Six-Day War in 1967,(India Today, 
6/4/1998).  In 1962, the Arab countries endorsed Pakistan’s stance on 
Kashmir at the UN and even Egypt’s President Nasser did not voice his 
support for India’s standpoint in the UN debate about the Indo–Chinese 
war, as his role was rather to serve as an intermediary and as such, he 
advocated an immediate ceasefire.  
 
During the Indo-Pakistani war in 1965, India approached Israel and was 
supplied with heavy mortars and ammunition (The Statesman, 17-23/12 
1970)167.  The Arab countries continued to endorse the Pakistani stance on 
Kashmir, in 1965, at the Arab Conference of Islamic leaders in 
Casablanca.  Despite the Israeli arms support in the Indo-Pakistani war 
and although frustrated by the Arab approach, India's pro-Arab foreign 
policy did not change.  
 
From the mid-1960s there was a steady deterioration in the bilateral 
relations between India and Israel and during that period, India even 
refused to issue visas to Israeli delegations to attend various international 
conferences and sport events (Yegar, 2004:152). 
 
In March 1966, the Government of India ignored a stopover of the 
President of the State of Israel at that time, Zalman Shazar, in Calcutta, on 
his way to a state visit in Nepal.  India refused to let him stay in New Delhi 
overnight, while allowing pro-Arab demonstrators to demonstrate against 
Israel in front of his hotel in Calcutta.  
 
India supported the Arab position wholeheartedly during the Six-Day War 
in June 1967, during which time the Israelis occupied the West Bank of 
Jordan, the Sinai Peninsula, Gaza Strip and the Golan Heights and India’s 
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attitude towards Israel became more negative and censorious.168  Under 
the leadership of Nehru’s daughter, Indira Gandhi, India adopted a hostile 
anti-Israeli foreign policy.169 However, some of the opposition parties and 
particularly the right-wing parties, Jana Sangh Party170 and Swatantra 
Party,171 with the exception of the communist parties and the Muslim 
League,172  supported the Israeli position.  The growing disillusionment in 
the Indian Parliament had two sources: a feeling that India was backing 
the wrong horse and fear of the growth of a strong and hostile Muslim 
block, which would join forces with Pakistan (Times, 19/7/1967).  
 
On 21 June 1967, sixteen days after the Six-Day War broke out, Indian 
Minister of External Affairs, M. C. Chagla, in his speech in the Fifth 
Emergency Special Session of the General Assembly at the UN, pointed 
out that India had voiced its sincere and wholehearted sympathy as well 
as its solidarity with the Arab peoples in their hour of trial and tribulation 
and put the blame squarely on Israel’s shoulders (Naaz, 1999:242).173 In a 
stormy parliamentary debate, on 17 and18 July 1967, Chagla defended 
India's policy:   
 
 
As corresponding to the justice of the Arab cause and India's 
interest...India needed friendly relations with the Middle East 
because the area was important to her trade and because it was a 
supplier of oil and because it contained the strategic Suez Canal 
(Dishon, 1967:70). 
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After the Six-Day War, India stressed, as it had done since the Bandung 
conference, that the principle of positive neutralism bound India closely to 
the Arab states.   
 
      3.9.1.4 India’s foreign policy towards Israel (The period extending                  
from 1968 to 1991) 
 
On 23 September 1969, an Indian delegation that attended the Arab 
conference of Islamic leaders in Rabat, which was convened in order to 
condemn Israel, was prevented from official participation because of 
Pakistani pressure.  The embarrassment caused to India (as well as 
criticism by members of the Indian Parliament) did not stop the Indian 
Government from following its pro-Arab policy; while Arab indifference 
towards India continued in particular during the Bangladesh crisis.  In May 
1969, Dinesh Singh, the Minister of External Affairs reaffirmed India’s 
continuation of its pro-Arab policy and pointed out that India had not 
established diplomatic relations with Israel because Israel had followed 
injudicious policies against the Arabs, particularly the Palestinians.  
Consequently, until there was a revision of that Israel policy it would be 
difficult for India to revise its foreign policy towards Israel (Naaz, 
1999:242).  On the other hand, Singh met the Israeli Minister of Foreign 
Affairs Abba Eban five months later, in October 1969, during the General 
Assembly at the UN and tried to convince him that India was not hostile to 
Israel (Yegar, 2004:73). 
 
During the Indo-Pakistani war (known as the Bangladesh War) in 1971, 
ammunition and weaponry suitable for the Indian Army were imported 
from Israel through a third party, with Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's 
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approval (Swamy, 1982:22).174  On the other hand, the Arab countries 
were indifferent towards India during the Bangladesh War and many 
members of the Indian Parliament criticised this indifferent Arab attitude.  
After the Arab-Israeli war in 1973 and in continuation of its traditional anti-
Israeli foreign policy, India expressed its support for Egypt and Syria 
(despite the fact that these two countries had launched a coordinated 
military attack against Israel). Instead, they asserted that Israel was to 
blame for the attacks as the Arab attacks had been precipitated by Israel’s 
refusal to vacate the territories occupied in the Six-Day War.175  In his 
speech in the Lower House of the Parliament (Rajya Sabha) on 6 
December 1973, the Minister of External Affairs, Swaran Singh, revealed 
that India had also offered some material support to the Arab countries 
and that medicine and doctors were sent to both Egypt and Syria (Naaz, 
1999:242).  
 
In 1974, India strongly supported participation of the PLO in the 
international arena and endorsed its bid for observer status at the UN.176  
In January 1975, India became the first non-Arab government to extend 
formal accreditation to the PLO representative in New Delhi and 
recognised the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the 
Palestinian people.  In November 1975, India co-sponsored the General 
Assembly Resolution 3379 that equated Zionism with racism and sought 
sanctions against Israel (which did not materialise).  
 
The Janata Government, with its pro-Israel Jana Sangh Party component 
that ruled from 1977 to 1980, tried to explore the option of improving 
foreign relations with Israel in particular.  After the Camp David Accord 
between Israel and Egypt in September 1978 and the current Prime 
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Minister Morarji Desai177 together with his Minister of External Affairs 
Vajpayee178 invited the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Israel, Moshe Dayan, 
secretly to New Delhi, in January 1979, to avoid antagonising the Arab 
countries. The negotiations were unsuccessful because of political 
disagreement between the two parties.179  
 
When Congress returned to power in 1980 with Indira Gandhi as Prime 
Minister, it once again reverted to its anti-Israeli policy and renewed its 
staunch support for the Arabs.  In March 1980, India became the first 
country in the world to grant full diplomatic status to the PLO mission in 
New Delhi (Manorama, 1993:479).   
 
In July 1982, the Israeli Consul in Bombay was declared a “persona non 
grata” and was expelled from India after criticising the policy of the 
Government of India towards Israel.  In a newspaper interview he criticised 
the Government of India and hinted that India was under the influence of 
the Arabs.  The Government's fear of the Muslim lobby in New Delhi and 
India's concern regarding its economic interests in the Middle East and oil 
in particular was the reasons for India's negative attitude towards Israel 
(Naaz, 1999:243). 
 
The deputy leader of the opposition party Janata at that time, 
Subramaniam Swamy, not only opposed the expulsion, a harsh diplomatic 
move, but also pleaded with the Government of India to establish 
diplomatic relations with Israel, but to no avail.  His plea was turned down 
by the Minister of External Affairs at that time, Narasimha Rao, and the 
Indian anti-Israeli and pro-Arab policy continued through the 1980s 
(Swamy, 1982:21).  
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The first shift in Indian foreign policy towards Israel took place in 1985, 
when the request that was made for a new nominee to the post of the 
Vice-Consul of Israel in Bombay (after being vacant for political reasons 
for some time) was accepted by India.  This followed a meeting between 
Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and Israel’s Prime Minister Shimon Peres 
during a UN session in New York and pressure by the Anti-Defamation 
League (ADL) Jewish organisation (Kumaraswamy, 2002:6).180  
 
In July 1987, India allowed Israeli tennis players to participate in the Davis 
Cup Tennis Tournament that took place in New Delhi.  Following a 
meeting between Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and US based pro-Israeli 
Jewish groups in New York and Congressman Stephen Solarz, who was 
particularly instrumental in efforts to upgrade the relations between India 
and Israel, on 8 June 1988, the position of Vice-Consul of Israel in 
Bombay was upgraded to the level of Consul (Yegar, 2004:162).181  
 
In September 1988, Yasser Arafat, Chairman of the PLO, was nominated 
in New Delhi for the 1988 Jawaharlal Nehru Award for International 
Understanding (Manorama, 1993:478).  In December 1988, during a 
special session of the General Assembly of the UN convened in Geneva, 
India’s Minister of State for External Affairs K.K. Tiwari, refrained from 
denouncing Israel while recognising Israel’s right to live in peace and 
security within internationally recognised borders, side-by-side with the 
Palestinian state, as well as other Arab neighbouring countries  (Naaz, 
1999:242).  This was despite the Palestinian Intifada and the fact that the 
US refused to grant an entry visa to the PLO Chairman, Yasser Arafat.  
The Deputy Director General for Asia in the Israeli Foreign Affairs 
Ministry, Joseph Hadas, was invited to visit India In December 1988.  
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During his visit, he met with the Minister of External Affairs Narasimha 
Rao,182 but his visit was described by the Indian government as a tourist 
visit (Yegar, Govrin & Oded, 2002:543).183 
 
In January 1989, a delegation from the Anti-Defamation League (ADL) and 
Congressman Solarz visited New Delhi and met with Prime Minister Rajiv 
Gandhi and Indian senior officials, including the Minister of External Affairs 
Narasimha Rao.  Following the meeting, a formal extension of the Israeli 
Consulate jurisdiction was granted by the Government of India to the 
southern State of Kerala (a state with a small Jewish population).184  This 
same extension was granted to the State of Maharashtra in which the 
Consulate in Bombay was located. The State of Maharashtra was also 
instructed by New Delhi to invite the Israeli Consul to all state functions. 
The gradual liberalisation of visa procedures for tourist groups and 
individuals from Israel started taking place (Yegar, 2004:162).185  
 
In September 1990, before the Gulf War in Iraq, some news was 
published by the Indian media about the possibility that Indian workers in 
Jordan would be airlifted home through an Israeli Airport. Although this did 
not happen (the Indian workers were eventually flown directly to India), the 
Israeli willingness to assist, received positive coverage in the Indian press 
(Yegar, Govrin & Oded, 2002:544).   
 
In 1991, the Indian Minister of Trade and Justice, Subramaniam Swamy, 
met the Israeli Minister of Trade and Commerce, Moshe Nissim, 
unofficially during an international economic conference in Brussels.186   
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During the kidnapping of a group of Israeli tourists in the State of Jammu 
and Kashmir in June 1991, the Government of India facilitated the visit of 
Deputy Director General for Asia of the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
Moshe Yegar, to New Delhi.  Subsequently, he conducted indirect 
negotiations and coordinated the release efforts of the remaining hostage 
(Yegar, 2004:164).187  
 
On 21 November 1991, a World Jewish Congress (WJC) delegation met 
Prime Minister Narasimha Rao in New Delhi and raised the issue of 
diplomatic relations with Israel.  However, it did not bring any immediate 
results, although Rao promised Isi Leibler, the co-chairman of the Jewish 
Organisation, direct dialling from India to Israel and that a Jewish 
colloquium would be held in India.188 
 
On 29 January 1992, after diplomatic consultations took place in 
Washington DC, fully-fledged diplomatic relations between India and Israel 
were established.189 Other factors that brought this about included a 
meeting by the Indian Deputy Chief of Mission with Joseph Hadas, the 
Director General of the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as well as 
pressure from various Jewish organisations in the US.   
 
 3.9.2 India, Israel and multilateral relations  
 
Multilateral relations, as part of international relations between India and 
Israel, have played a significant role in India’s foreign policy towards 
Israel.  After the achievement of independence, India's relations with 
Israel, in terms of multilateral relations, were first and foremost aimed at 
neutralising Pakistan’s efforts in seeking a balance of power with India.   
A further aim was to secure international support with regard to the 
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dispute between the two countries over Kashmir in the international 
arena, in general and in the Arab world, in particular.  Regarding the 
dispute, Pakistan tried to depict the Kashmir conflict as a pan-Islamic 
issue and the numerical asymmetry between the Arab states and Israel 
in the UN played a role in India's in foreign policy calculations on the 
Kashmiri issue.  
 
India was a consistent supporter of the Arabs and the Palestinian cause 
in particular on every available international forum.  On the other hand, 
the one-sided pro-Arab and anti-Israeli approach prevented India from 
playing an active political role in the Middle East (up to October 1991 
India maintained its policy of non-normalisation of bilateral relations 
between India and Israel). 
  
The main external factors that influenced India’s foreign policy in the 
Middle East after independence were the following:  
 
The political concept that taking sides with the Arabs could be 
used as a spanner between the Arabs and Pakistan and the 
political assumption that supporting the Arabs could prevent 
them from actively taking sides with Pakistan, since Pakistan 
was trying to project India as an anti-Islamic country and was 
trying to forge a pan-Islamic alliance (Padmanbahan, 1975:12). 
 
 
Following the creation of Pakistan, India had a powerful Islamic rival 
competing for the same access, influence and resources.  India 
considered the need for winning friends in the Arab world to be of 
national interest in the context of the international arena and tried to elicit 
Arab sympathy by giving political support to the Arab countries, in 
general and in the Arab-Israeli dispute, in particular. 
 
Dixit published an article in the leading Indian newspaper Indian Express 
(11/12/1997) in which he discussed the following factors that influenced 
India's foreign policy towards Israel:  
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• The geographical proximity and the fact that the Arabs and other 
Muslim countries in the Middle East and in the Maghreb190 could pose 
a geo-strategic threat to India or could adopt a hostile attitude, in 
terms of the national security of India, was a geo-strategic factor to 
be considered.  India had been a link between the Mediterranean 
Sea, Black Sea, Atlantic Ocean and the Indian Ocean.  Arab sea-
lanes and air space was of vital economic and strategic interest to 
India.   
 
• The economic factor also had a great influence on India’s foreign 
policy, since the Arab world was a growing market for India and a 
large number of Indians were working in the Gulf, as well as other 
Muslim countries, contributing directly to the Indian economy and 
Indian foreign exchange reserves.   
 
• Historical and cultural affinities with the Arab world added another 
dimension to the relations.   
 
One year later, Dixit (1998:93) emphasises that in addition to the Indian 
support of the Palestinians and the Arabs: friendship with the Islamic 
countries was cultivated by India for the following reasons: 
 
To counter Pakistani hostility, to be responsive to the religious, 
emotional and psychological feelings of the large Muslim 
citizenry of India.  India's economic interests (as well as trade 
routes) were dependent on friendship with the Arab countries, 
which included India's dependence on the energy resources of 
the West Asian and Gulf regions.   
 
Dixit did not consider the Cold War to be a factor in India’s relations with 
Israel.  However, during the Cold War, New Delhi had established close 
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ties with Arab countries, which were considered enemies of Israel 
(notably Iraq and Egypt, which were more secular than other Arab 
states).  In fact, India supplied Iraq and Iran with technical military 
assistance.  Iraq was a major source of oil for India and the Indian Air 
Force provided training to the Iraqi Air Force.  India’s relations with Iran 
were cordial as Iran was a market for Indian finished products and India 
supplied Iran with a small research reactor.  The Indian-Egypt relations 
were close and cordial and the two countries cooperated in the joint 
venture of assembling a jet fighter.  The Non-Aligned Movement was 
another factor that brought about close relations between Prime Minister 
Nehru and Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, with the Egyptian President 
Gamal Abdul Nasser becoming India’s trusted ally.191 
 
In contrast with Dixit, Cohen (2001:247) stresses that the bipolar world 
was an important factor that influenced India’s foreign policy.  During the 
Cold War, Moscow and Washington competed with each other and while 
the US, which was also an ally of Pakistan supported Israel; India, 
developed close relations with the Soviet Union.  Following the Arab-
Israeli war in 1967 the US emerged as the dominant power in the Middle 
East; consequently, American and Indian interests frequently clashed.  
Washington was critical of India’s attempts at building a relationship with 
the revolutionary Iranian regime and also of its military relations with 
Iraq; while Israel supported the US foreign policy against India.192 In turn, 
India was critical of the Middle East peace process sponsored by the 
US; while remaining a staunch supporter of the Palestinians. 
 
Baljit Singh (1976:17) points out that the ideological and political 
framework of India’s foreign policy was underpinned by Nehru's strong 
convictions in this regard and firm intentions, driven by his strong 
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principles. These principles, involved taking a stand against anti-
colonialism, exploitation and racism, and later on, Non-Alignment and 
the importance that India attached to the UN.  
 
Nehru's government proved to be extremely sympathetic towards the 
Palestinian Arabs and to their right to self-determination. Nehru 
incorporated this sympathy into his ideology of anti-colonialism, which 
was adopted later and pursued by the Non-Aligned Movement as well as 
its pro-Arab foreign policy.  The growing importance of the Arab world in 
the international arena and in particular in the Non-Aligned Movement 
and the UN made the Arab countries an important international actor 
from the Indian point of view and influenced the Indian foreign policy 
towards Israel.  
 
Ali Khan (1992:214-215) notes that the following international factors 
influenced India’s foreign policy in the Middle East: India was not self-
sufficient as far as energy resources were concerned and was 
dependent on the Arab region for oil.  India was concerned with the 
possible politically adverse reaction from the Islamic world and/or Arab 
countries in the event of a change in foreign policy towards Israel.   India 
did not want to take any political steps that would antagonise the Arab 
world.  India’s close relations with the former Soviet Union throughout 
the Cold War restricted its freedom in the sphere of international 
operations.193 
 
As clearly demonstrated in this sub-section, it is quite obvious that the 
web of external factors, in terms of multilateral relations, played a 
significant role in India's foreign policy towards Israel. 
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3.9.2.1 The Palestinians and the Arab- Israeli conflict  
 
As the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians was a key factor in 
India's relations with Israel and had a direct influence on India’s foreign 
policy towards Israel between 1947 and 1991, it is essential to review 
them.   
 
The State of Israel was established after the War of Independence, on 15 
May 1948. Subsequently, the newly-born state was invaded by 
neighbouring Arab armies and Israeli forces stopped the invasion and 
struck back at each of the Arab fronts, followed by armistice agreements.  
A UN conciliation committee was convened in Lausanne (Switzerland) in 
May 1949 but to no avail and Jordan subsequently annexed the West 
Bank officially, while Egypt was left in control of the Gaza Strip.  Eventually 
the Arab States adopted a comprehensive struggle strategy against Israel, 
including undermining Israel's legitimacy in the international arena and 
conducting economic warfare against them, as well as the closure of the 
Suez Canal by Egypt to Israeli vessels.  Later on, Egypt also imposed a 
blockade on shipping to the Israeli port of Eilat and on 29 October 1956, 
Israel embarked on a military operation with Britain and France, known as 
the Suez Canal Military Operation (Shaham, 1998:30)194. 
 
In May 1964, the PLO was established and in June 1967, The Six-Day 
War broke out between Israel and Egypt, Jordan and Syria.  The Arab 
armies were defeated and the return of the territories, which Israel had 
occupied during the Six-Day War, became the highest priority for the Arab 
countries, while the old question of Palestine was relegated to second 
place in the international arena (Price, 2003:95).195 
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From mid-1968 up to August 1970, the neighbouring Arab countries 
engaged in static fighting against Israel's post Six-Day War lines. Since 
the 1970s, Lebanon had become the main basis from which PLO attacks 
were launched against Israel along its northern border. On 6 October 
1973, the war that broke out between Israel, Egypt and Syria ended on 24 
October 1973.  Israel managed to stop the coordinated Egyptian-Syrian 
attack, but the war ushered in a new era in the history of the Israeli-Arab 
conflict.196 On 21 December 1973, a regional peace conference together 
with the UN Security General was convened in Geneva. Although Israel, 
Egypt, Jordan, the Soviet Union and the US all participated, Syria refused 
to participate in the conference.  Despite the conference breaking up after 
the opening session, it served as a basis for reaching disengagement 
agreements between Israel, Egypt and Syria (Shimoni, 1987:358). 
 
In October 1974, the Rabat Arab summit decided that the PLO was the 
only legal representative of the Palestinian people and King Hussein of 
Jordan lost his status on the West Bank.  In November 1974, Yasser 
Arafat, the chairperson of the PLO, was invited to address the UN General 
Assembly and his organisation was granted observer status.  In 1975, the 
General Assembly adopted a resolution in which Zionism was equated 
with racism and in the same year, an interim agreement was signed 
between Egypt and Israel (Rolef, 1993:256). 
 
In November 1977, the Egyptian President, Anwar Sadat, arrived in 
Jerusalem for an official visit; a political move that constituted a historic 
breakthrough in the relations between Israel and the neighbouring Arab 
countries. Only sixteen months later, a peace treaty was signed between 
Israel and Egypt (the Camp David Accords); personally aided by US 
President Carter (Raviv, 2001:222-235). 
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In March 1978, Israel responded to the PLO attacks on Israeli settlements 
with a military operation in the course of which the Israeli Defence Forces 
(IDF) occupied the area up to the Litani River in Northern Lebanon.  In 
August 1980, the Autonomy Plan talks between Egypt and Israel regarding 
the Palestinians were suspended.197 In July 1981, a military confrontation 
broke out between Israel and the PLO in South Lebanon and was 
followed, one year later in June 1982, by an Israeli large-scale military 
operation known as the Lebanese War in order to eliminate the armed 
Palestinian presence in south Lebanon.  At the end of the war, the PLO 
was eventually forced out of Beirut to Tunis (Shimoni, 1987:63). 
 
In March 1986, King Hussein announced the end of the collaboration 
between Jordan and the PLO.  In November 1987, after the Amman Arab 
Summit Conference, all the Arab states, except Syria, renewed their 
diplomatic relations with Egypt.  On 9 December 1987, the Palestinian 
uprising, known as the Palestinian Intifada, broke out.  Civil disobedience 
on the West Bank and Gaza Strip was organised by active supporters of 
the PLO and continued until 1992.  
 
In July 1988, King Hussein declared that his country no longer claimed the 
West Bank, that he was cutting Jordanian ties with the West Bank and that 
he accepted the claims of the PLO to secede from Jordan as an 
independent state.  On 15 December 1988, the Palestinian National 
Council (PNC) adopted a resolution that announced the establishment of a 
Palestinian independent state, furthermore that the PLO was willing to 
accept the UN resolution regarding the Israeli-Arab conflict, to recognise 
the State of Israel and to desist from its terrorist activities. On 14 May 
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1989, the National Unity Government in Israel adopted an Israeli peace 
initiative, but the government was dissolved in March 1990.  During the 
first Gulf War, in August 1990, the PLO, unlike South Arabia, Egypt and 
Syria, supported the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.  Israel was attacked by about 
40 Iraqi Scud missiles, but in order not to endanger the American coalition 
with the Arab countries it remained neutral and did not participate in the 
military attack against Iraq (Raviv, 2001:264-265). 
 
In March 1991, after seven months of shuttle diplomacy in the Middle 
East, the Secretary of State, James Baker, obtained an agreement from all 
the parties directly involved in the Arab-Israeli conflict, to participate in an 
international conference in Madrid.  The PLO was excluded from the 
Madrid Conference and the Palestinians were included in a Jordan-
Palestinian delegation composed of Palestinian local leaders.198 
 
The Madrid Conference was followed by bilateral talks, which commenced 
in Washington on 10 December 1991 and the Palestinians were 
represented by individuals from the West Bank and Gaza who were not 
associated with the PLO.199 Multilateral talks on regional issues opened in 
Moscow on 28 January1992.200 The Palestinians did not participate in the 
Moscow meeting because they insisted that the PLO should participate 
formally; a demand that was rejected by Israel (Shaham, 1998:513-514). 
 
The Israeli-Arab conflict and the Palestinian issue are essential factors 
that need to be considered in the analysis of India's relations with Israel 
between the years 1948 and1991.  This is  clearly demonstrated by the 
fact that Prime Minister Rao of India found it necessary to consult with the 
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Chairman of the PLO, Yasser Arafat  regarding the establishment of 
diplomatic relations with the State of Israel.201  
 
3.9.2.2 India’s stance in the United Nations  
 
Since independence, India had attached considerable importance to the 
UN as an international forum.  Nehru was a staunch supporter of the UN 
and Indian cooperation with international organisations is mandated in the 
Indian constitution.  India's record in the UN is extensive, including the 
traditional anti-Israeli sponsoring of UN resolutions, as well as pro-Arab 
voting. As described by Sudha Rao (1972), the Indian conduct and voting 
in the UN demonstrate India's pro-Arab stance on issues related to Israel. 
This will be discussed below:  
 
The Partition Plan and the establishment of the State of Israel - On 28 
April 1947, the UN General Assembly was convened to handle the 
question of Palestine and as a result, an ad hoc investigating board known 
as UNSCOP was established. India was one of the members of the 
committee, which was given broad powers to investigate the question of 
Palestine. Earlier, a joint Russian–Indian proposal requesting a democratic 
independent state in the whole of Palestine without delay, had been 
defeated.  Instead, the majority of the committee recommended that 
Palestine should be partitioned, whereas the minority report proposed that 
an independent federal state of Palestine should be created, which India 
supported.  
   
Subsequently, on 29 November 1947, following the UNSCOP report, the 
General Assembly adopted an amended Partition Plan in Palestine.  India 
was one of thirteen delegations that voted against the Partition Plan and 
after the resolution had been passed, India, Pakistan and the Arab 
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delegates declared that they did not feel bound by the decision and 
reserved the right to take whatever decision they thought fit (Rao, 
1972:27).202 
 
The head of the Indian delegation to the UN was Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit, 
Nehru's sister, who had the following to say on the Palestinian question in 
her speech in the committee: 
 
Palestine is a predominantly Arab country and in any solution we may find 
this position of predominance should not be altered to the disadvantage of 
the Arabs. Secondly, we should recognize the existence of Palestine of a 
vigorous active and politically conscious Jewish community, which within 
the framework of the state should not only be entitled to citizenship rights 
but to lead a life of its own. Clearly therefore a solution of the Palestine 
question can only be on the basis of an Arab state, in which the Jewish in 
the areas where they are in a majority will enjoy wide powers of authority.  
Such a solution also satisfies the claim of the people of Palestine to 
independence, which in the view of the Indian delegation is a matter of 
urgency (CZA S25/5469, 11/10/1947). 
 
 
The admission of Israel to the UN – on 14 May 1948, the new State of 
Israel was born formally as an independent state and one year later, in 
May 1949, the UN General Assembly admitted Israel to the organisation 
as the 59th member (with a vote of thirty seven in favour of admitting Israel 
to twelve against the move and with nine abstentions). India voted against 
Israel’s application to become a member of the UN. The Indian 
representative explained India’s negative vote by arguing that this stand 
was completely consistent with India’s past political views on that matter.  
He also added that the Indian government could not recognise Israel as it 
had achieved its objectives through armed force (Rao, 1972:68). 
 
The Suez Canal operation (Suez crisis) - India supported Egypt 
throughout the deterioration of relations between Egypt and the Western 
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powers during the Suez crisis (after the Suez Canal had been nationalised 
by Egypt).  India’s main concern regarding the Suez Canal was influenced 
by its economic importance and therefore the Indian government strongly 
emphasised the need for a solution achieved by means of negotiations 
and avoidance of any actions that might affect the flow of shipping through 
the canal.203  India even tried to solve the crisis by offering Egypt 
sovereignty over the Suez Canal, while making it accessible to all other 
countries.  The issue, however, continued to be deadlocked until 29 
October 1956, when Israel, launched a military attack on Egypt jointly with 
Britain and France. On 31 October 1956, Prime Minister Nehru issued an 
official Indian statement denouncing the Israeli aggression and in which he 
also condemned the military operation.204  
 
At the Special Emergency Session at the UN, India continued to condemn 
the invasion of Egypt by the armed forces of Great Britain, France and 
Israel and on 2 November 1956, the General Assembly adopted a 
resolution that urged an immediate cease-fire by all parties and the 
withdrawal of troops behind the armistice line.  In addition, on 4 November 
1956, the General Assembly passed a UN resolution, sponsored by India, 
which indicated that all the parties had not complied with the previous 
resolution and urged the assembly to take effective measures to ensure 
the implementation of the resolution.  On the same day, India supported a 
Canadian sponsored resolution requesting the Secretary General to 
submit a plea for setting up a UN emergency force for supervising peace 
and a cease-fire. On 5 November 1956, after a cease-fire had been 
accepted the General Assembly established a UN Command for a UN 
emergency force.   Subsequently, India became a member of the Advisory 
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Committee, which was established to advise the UN Secretary General 
regarding the establishment and supervision of the force. On 7 November 
1956, India co-sponsored the resolution of nineteen Afro-Asian countries, 
pressing for the withdrawal of foreign troops from Egypt and co-sponsored 
a similar resolution, again, on 24 November 1956 (Rao, 1972:55). 
 
On 16 November 1956, at the Lok Sabha, India aggressively condemned 
Israel and accused the Government of Israel of launching a sudden and 
premeditated attack on Egypt.  They indicated that the aggression against 
Egypt should be stopped and the foreign troops withdrawn (India's Foreign 
Policy/Selected Speeches, 1961:534-538).  
 
The Anglo-French troops completed their withdrawal on 22 December 
1956 and Israel followed with the same military move and withdrew its 
forces behind the armistice line in March 1957.  The time lag gave India an 
opportunity to co-sponsor two further anti-Israeli resolutions on 19 January 
1957 and on 2 February 1957, deploring the Israeli non-compliance with 
the UN withdrawal resolution.  Nevertheless, India’s anti-Israeli attitude in 
the UN continued after the full Israeli withdrawal to the armistice line. 
 
Six-Day War - the Six-Day War between Israel and Egypt, Syria and 
Jordan broke out on 5 June 1967 and left Israel in occupation of the Sinai 
Peninsula and the Gaza Strip, the Golan Heights and the West Bank of 
Jordan.  India’s support of the Arab position during the Six-Day War was 
demonstrated by the Minister of External Affairs of India, M. C. Chagla, in 
his speech in the fifth Emergency Special Session of the General 
Assembly on 21 June 1967:  
 
Israel struck a lighting blow against its Arab neighbours it is also a matter 
of record and deep regret to us that Israel has through violations of 
general armistice agreements strengthened its positions, added territory 
to its areas, and used its modern powerful military machine to expel Arabs 
from their lands and homes (Naaz, 1999:242).  
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After the adoption of the UN Security Council Resolution 242, which called 
for Israel’s withdrawal from the occupied territories on 22 November 1967, 
the Indian representative to the UN, G. Parthasarathi, pointed out that his 
country understood the resolution to mean that Israeli forces were to 
withdraw from all the territories occupied by Israel during the war in 1967 
(Dishon, 1967:70).205 
 
Repeal of UN Resolution that equated Zionism with racism - on 16 
December 1991, India voted with the majority, to repeal the General 
Assembly Resolution of 1975 that equated Zionism with racism.  India had 
been one of the sponsors of that resolution in 1975 and India's vote 
signalled a change in India's foreign policy towards Israel in terms of 
multilateral relations (Ali Khan, 1992:215).  
 
The importance attached by India to the UN as an international forum, 
combined with its ideology of Non-Alignment and the special traditionally 
friendly relations of India with the Arab world were the main  reasons for a 
conduct of Indian anti-Israeli foreign policy in the UN arena, including the 
sponsoring of anti Israeli resolutions during the years from 1948 to 1991.  
Not least of all, was the factor of the growing Arab political weight in the 
UN. 
 
3.9.2.3 India’s stance at the Afro-Asian Conference at Bandung   (18 – 
24 April 1955) with regard to Israel 
 
Israel was excluded from the Afro-Asian Conference at Bandung, 
Indonesia from 18 to 24 April 1955, even though the State of Israel was 
recognised by three of the five conference sponsors.  According to Ran 
Kochan (1976:250-254), Nehru and U Nu of Burma, favoured the inclusion 
of Israel and the five sponsors of the Afro-Asian Conference had declared 
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that all independent states in the region would be invited, but Pakistan and 
Indonesia opposed it, while Ceylon (Sri Lanka) chose to remain neutral on 
the issue.  
 
The preparatory meeting of the Afro-Asian Conference took place in 
Colombo, Ceylon, in April 1954.  This was also the first Third World 
Governmental forum to express a collective opinion on the Middle East.  In 
that forum, the Pakistani Prime Minister proposed an anti-Israeli 
resolution.  However, the Indian Prime Minister Nehru and the Burmese 
Premier U Nu made it obvious that they would not support the resolution.  
The resolution was modified but was still unacceptable to both, Nehru and 
U Nu.  Eventually, the final statement was very different from the original 
Pakistani proposal.  It expressed concern for the sufferings of Arab 
refugees in Palestine and called for their rehabilitation in their original 
homes.  Nonetheless, it contained no direct condemnation of Israel, nor 
did it specifically refer to it by name.  
 
When the five heads of states, who were the sponsors of the Afro-Asian 
Conference (India, Burma, Ceylon, Indonesia and Pakistan) met at Bogor 
in Indonesia, in December 1954, as a preparatory meeting.  The aim was 
to work out an agenda and to determine the list of countries to be invited 
for the proposed Afro-Asian Conference in Bandung. The Middle East 
question was raised and it was evident that the question of Israel’s 
invitation would raise difficulties.  
  
The Arab countries and the Arab League council threatened to boycott the 
conference if Israel were invited.206 Consequently, both Nehru and U Nu 
yielded to Arab pressure.  Nehru explained his stance as follows:  
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We felt that logically Israel should be invited but when we saw that the 
consequences of that invitation would be that many others would not be 
able to come then we agreed (to exclude Israel) (Brecher, 1961:133).  
 
 
On another occasion Nehru explained his attitude in writing to his four 
conference's colleagues: “In the final analysis it is better not to include 
Israel if that is likely to lead to the Arab countries keeping away 
(Kochan, 1976:251).” 
 
 
At the Afro-Asian Conference itself, it appeared from the outset that the 
Israeli-Arab conflict would top the agenda. Despite the Israeli absence 
from the Afro-Asian Conference at Bandung, it took the participants three 
days to agree on the Middle East resolution.  The Arabs were determined 
to ignore Nehru’s advice that they could not end the controversy without 
engaging in talks or negotiations and it was only after realising that the 
voting procedure required a unanimous agreement that they agreed on a 
compromised resolution.  
 
The Joint Statement of the Afro-Asian Conference endorsed the following 
principles: respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all nations, 
abstention from acts or threats of aggression or the use of force against 
the territorial integrity or political independence of any country and a 
settlement of all international disputes by peaceful means.   
 
The Joint Statement also contained a section referring to the Middle East: 
 
In view of the existing tension in the Middle East caused by the situation in 
Palestine and of the danger of that tension to world peace, the Asian-
African Conference declared its support of the rights of the Arab people of 
Palestine and called for the implementation of the United Nations’ 
resolutions on Palestine and the achievement of a peaceful settlement of 
the Palestine question (Eytan, 1958:174). 
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Most seriously for Israel, when the Afro-Asian Conference convened, 
Nehru accepted Hajj Amin al Husseini, the former grand Mufti of 
Jerusalem and Palestinian leader in the 1948 war as a member of the 
Yemeni delegation. During the conference, no statesmen dared to 
contradict him and his numerous Arab supporters (Goldstein, 2004:240).207 
The relevant part of the Joint Statement of the Afro-Asian Conference 
concerning the Israeli-Arab conflict was in favour of the Arabs and viewed 
the tension in the Middle East as a danger to world peace. It also declared 
its support for the rights of the Arab people of Palestine, called for 
implementation of the UN resolutions on Palestine and called for a 
peaceful settlement of the Palestinian question. On the other hand, 
nowhere in the joint statement of the Afro-Asian Conference was Israel 
mentioned by name (Rao, 1972).208   
 
3.9.2.4 India’s stance in the Non-Aligned Movement with regard to 
Israel 
 
A group of twenty-five heads of states met in Belgrade in September 1961 
and established the NAM.  Six years had elapsed between the Afro-Asian 
Conference at Bandung and the next grand meeting of the Belgrade 
Conference. The fact that President Nasser of Egypt was one of the 
conveners of the conference in Belgrade explained why Israel was 
excluded. It also meant the inclusion of the Middle East conflict on the 
agenda, despite India’s suggestion that local and bilateral conflicts should 
be eliminated from the conference agenda.  Nehru even supported U Nu, 
the Burmese Prime Minister, who opposed the notion and threatened to 
disassociate himself from the conference should a strong anti-Israeli 
resolution suggested by Egypt be passed, on behalf of the other Arab 
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participants. Because of Burma’s stand and the support of Nehru as well 
as other leaders, the original draft, which condemned the creation of the 
State of Israel strongly, failed to receive wide support and a milder 
Burmese-Yugoslav (the host country) draft was proposed and eventually 
passed (Kochan, 1976:256-257).209  Part II section 10 of the final 
resolution of the Belgrade conference declared:  
 
The participants in the conference condemned the imperialist policies 
persuaded in the Middle East and declare their support for the full 
restoration of all the rights of the Arab people of Palestine in conformity with 
the charter and resolutions of the United Nations (Oron, 1961:191-192). 
 
 
In October 1964, the second NAM summit took place in Cairo, Egypt.  In 
spite of persistent efforts by the Arabs, the conference adopted a 
resolution similar to the one in Belgrade, with an additional reference to 
the inalienable right of the Palestinians to self-determination.  They also 
referred to support for the Arab people of Palestine in their struggle for 
liberation from colonialism and racism, but without mentioning Israel's 
name.  In September 1970, the NAM was convened in Lusaka, Zambia 
and it adopted a tougher and more censorious stance in its resolution on 
the Middle East conflict.  It stated that the continued Israeli presence in the 
occupied territories (territories occupied during the Six-Day War in 1967) 
constituted a violation of UN principles, a challenge to the aims of non-
alignment and a grave threat to peace.  The Middle East issue became a 
frequently discussed item on the NAM agenda, while the only change was 
reflected in the growing harshness and severity with which Israel was 
treated.  The fourth conference of the heads of states of the NAM met in 
Algiers in September 1973.  Subsequently, a nine-point resolution on the 
Middle East situation and the Palestinian issue went far beyond any text 
previously presented against Israel.  The explicit anti-Israeli tone since 
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then had become the normal procedure in the ongoing NAM conferences 
(Kochan, 1976:256-258).   
 
India as a prominent leader and a founder of the NAM became an active 
anti-Israeli force in the movement, especially under leadership of Indira 
Gandhi.210 She blamed Israel for adopting a policy of force against the 
Arabs, with the support of the Indian Ministry of External Affairs.  She 
demanded immediate withdrawal from the occupied territories, pledged 
support for the Palestinians in their struggle for a homeland and 
recommended adequate international measures, including sanctions, 
against Israel. 
 
3.9.2.5 India, Israel and the Soviet Union 
 
The relations between India and the Soviet Union were based on mutual 
national self-interest.  The Cold War resulted in India forming closer ties 
with the Soviet Union based on the convergence of Indian and Soviet 
interests (Hewitt, 1997:100). Although India could rely on the Soviet Union 
for diplomatic and military aid, its non-alignment policy enabled it to accept 
Soviet support without subscribing to Soviet global policies.  The Soviet 
leaders endorsed the entire range of Indian foreign policy and offered 
India new avenues for trade and economic assistance.  It needs to be 
pointed out that Indian acquisition of Soviet military equipment was 
especially important because purchases were made against Indian rupee 
payments and provisions were made for the licensed manufacture and 
modification of arms in India.  
 
In August 1971, a twenty-year Treaty of Peace and Cooperation was 
signed between the two countries. After the Soviet intervention in 
Afghanistan, in the 1980s, India did not censure the Soviet actions openly 
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and labelled UN resolutions as useless Cold War exercises.  However, in 
private meetings India did pressurise the Soviets to withdraw from 
Afghanistan (Heitzman & Worden, 1996:544-505).  
 
India had cooperated with the Soviet Union against Israel in the 
international organisations as well as in the NAM and both countries 
pursued an anti-Israeli and pro-Arab foreign policy as their long-term 
strategic interest.211 In contrast, Israel had sided with the US that 
supported Pakistan and China, India’s rivals in that part of South Asia.  In 
the two decades preceding the establishment of diplomatic relations 
between Israel and India and before the end of the Cold War, India’s 
foreign policy became complementary to the Soviet Union’s foreign policy.  
At the same time, Israel’s foreign policy became complementary to the 
foreign policy of the US.212  In 1988, the Soviet Union informed New Delhi 
through its Deputy Foreign Minister, Vladimir Petrovsky, that Moscow 
would initiate the process of normalising relations with Israel as well as 
diplomatic relations as soon as the international peace conference was 
convened (National Herald, 18/12/1988). 
 
3.9.2.6 India, Israel and the US 
 
After independence, India declined joining any of the American sponsored 
regional alliances pursuing a non-aligned foreign policy influenced by 
Nehru’s vision of India as a peace promoting Asian state.  India saw the 
US and its foreign policy in South Asia as the factor that drew the Soviet 
Union into the region.  India devoted its foreign policy to the reduction of 
the American presence in Asia, while maintaining its ties with both 
superpowers using its good relations with Moscow to balance American 
power in South Asia.  
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During the Cold War, India gradually found itself on the Soviet side despite 
its non-aligned foreign policy.213  In addition, the absence of economic and 
cultural ties with US, the hostility of many Indian leaders, the American aid 
to Pakistan and the Cold War prevented the US from playing a 
constructive role in the region and developing close bilateral relations.  In 
the eyes of India, the Pakistan alliance with the US was another 
consequence of the Cold War and India’s mistrust of the US, as a military 
power, remained up to the 1990s (Hewitt, 1997:91).  India suspected that 
the US was India’s strategic opponent and strongly objected to the 
growing military relations between America and Pakistan.  The greatest 
concern of the US, on the other hand, was not to be dragged into a 
regional crisis between India and Pakistan, as long as no American 
strategic interests were at stake.  America left the role of regional conflict 
manager to the Soviet Union, while concentrating on non-proliferation as a 
centrepiece of its regional foreign policy, a policy that was considered a 
threat to vital Indian interests (Cohen, 2001:271).214  
 
The Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989 had led the US to re-
assess its bilateral relations with Pakistan and Washington followed a 
more even-handed approach, urging India and Pakistan to settle their 
disputes peacefully.  On the other hand, in the late 1980s, India and the 
US had differences over the issue of the legal protection of intellectual 
property rights.  Until 1991, India and the US had divergent views on a 
wide range of international issues including the Middle East in general and 
the Israeli-Arab conflict in particular.  
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Considering the unstable and frustrating relations between India and the 
US, in particular during the Cold War when India had relied on the Soviet 
Union, the US political ability to promote full diplomatic relations between 
Israel and India was limited.  Since independence, India regarded Israel 
as a state that had been set up with the support of imperialist powers in 
general and the US in particular.  Prime Minister Nehru pointed out that in 
his view, the US government had handled the Palestine question 
extremely ineptly and opportunistically (Parthasarthy, 1985:126).215 In 
1987 the Minister of Finance at that time, N. D. Tiwari, stated that India 
was not going to change its policy towards Israel despite threats of a cut in 
US assistance (Patriot, 28/8/1987).  After the Gulf War, the US pursued its 
regional interests and used its Cold War alliances to entrench itself as the 
Gulf police force without showing any sign that it would withdraw from 
India’s periphery.   
 
Over the years, the US ability to exert a positive influence on India’s 
relations with Israel remained limited.   During this time there was no real 
effort by America in this regard, with the exception of the American Jewish 
Organisations and Congressman Solarz.216 The US influence regarding 
India had increased after the first Gulf War when India realised that it was 
in its interest to come to terms with the American power.  The fact that 
India became more vulnerable to US pressure due to the American 
influence in the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank 
could clear the way for closer economic cooperation of India with the US 
(Naaz, 1999:244).217 
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3.9.2.7 India, Israel and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) 
 
From 1949, when the Communists seized power in China, up to 1992, 
Israel was isolated from China.  Israel had been the first Middle Eastern 
country to recognise the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in the 1950s. It 
was followed later by only a handful of Arab states (Egypt, Iraq, Syria and 
Yemen).  The hostility of the PRC towards Israel at that time was an 
expression of the Afro-Asian solidarity following the Afro-Asian conference 
at Bandung in 1955.218 The Bandung Conference improved Indo-China 
relations, but at the same time, it froze any embryonic Israel-PRC 
relations.  This was the case despite the fact that the Indo-Chinese war in 
1962 contributed to the temporary improvement of bilateral relations 
between India and Israel.  The decades after the Afro-Asian conference 
saw India and China moving closer to the Arab world and both used anti-
Israeli rhetoric on international forums.219   From the 1970s up to 1991, 
there was unofficial military contact and cooperation between Israel and 
the PRC and Offices of Interest were opened in Beijing and Tel-Aviv 
(Goldstein, 2004:239).  Israel’s policy towards China posed some 
problems regarding India and Israel’s military cooperation with China was 
watched closely and monitored by India in order to make sure it did not 
threaten India’s strategic interests. 
 
           3.10   Post Independence India: The state and society level of 
analysis 
 
The state and society level of analysis underscores the influence of 
national factors on foreign policy, concentrating on the foreign policy 
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processes carried out by ultimate decision units.220 As part of India's 
foreign policy planning and foreign policy-making regarding Israel, the 
following national factors are analysed: The political factors, namely the 
Indian parliament, the Indian party system, the cabinet, the Prime Minister 
secretariat as well as his inner circle, the Ministry of External Affairs as a 
representative of the Indian bureaucracy, the Indian Intelligence service, 
media and public opinion, are analysed as key units in the state and 
society level of analysis. The Jewish and Muslim communities in India, the 
business community and India's Shalom Alumni Club, are analysed as 
pertinent pressure groups. 
 
India had embraced democracy since its independence, but although it 
was a parliamentary democracy, it was a democracy with a paternal face 
on the one hand and with Third World characteristics combined with 
socialism on the other, orchestrated by Prime Minister Nehru.221 India’s 
foreign policy after independence was based on policy also shaped 
directly by Nehru.  The long duration of the INCP's rule created 
generations of Indian politicians as well as bureaucrats, particularly in the 
Ministry of External Affairs, committed to Nehruvian internationalism.  The 
political map in India after Nehru – the Gandhi dynasty's domination until 
1991, was unstable.  As a result, political attention was focussed on 
domestic politics mainly and erosion of the Nehruvian framework of the 
international role played by India, gradually took place (Heitzman & 
Worden, 1996:463).  Indian diplomacy started to concentrate on South 
Asia but tried to maintain some degree of formal continuation of Nehruvian 
internationalism including its pro-Arab and anti-Israeli foreign policy. 
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3.10.1. The Indian Parliament  
 
 
The Indian Parliament was expected to be an important factor in foreign 
policy-making, based on article no. 246 of the Indian Constitution, which 
empowered it to legislate on all matters concerning India’s relations with 
any foreign country.  In reality, the Parliament had limited input in the 
conduct of foreign policy and the guiding principle was that the Prime 
Minister of India, who was also the leader of the majority party had the 
most power to make decisions and therefore traditionally, parliamentary 
votes on foreign policy subjects were redundant.  The executive 
dominance of the Parliament was almost total during Nehru’s time (namely 
form 1947 to 1964) even though he encouraged debates on foreign policy 
issues (about half a dozen debates on foreign relations a year, apart from 
calls to attention, motions and weekly Question Hours) (Cohen, 
2001:69).222  In the light of political reality, the Parliament played a very 
limited role in shaping Indian’s foreign policy during Nehru’s tenure, as is 
explained by Harish Kapur:  
 
 
Even in the Parliament Consultative Committee especially established for 
foreign affairs, the Members of Parliament listened to Nehru with a mixture 
of awe and admiration and hardly contributed anything by way of an input to 
foreign policy (Kapur, 1994:168). 
 
 
Under the leadership of Indira and Rajiv Gandhi, the Parliament lost 
whatever role in foreign relations Nehru allowed it, although the two 
leaders kept insisting that national consensus on foreign policy based on 
Nehruvian principles was attained, in fact it was fully controlled by them 
(Cohen, 2001:70; Schaffer & Saigal-Arora,1999:144).  With the emergence 
of coalition and minority governments (Desai in 1977, Singh in 1989 and 
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Shekhar in 1992) 223 the parliament began to occupy a more important role 
in India's foreign relations; however it did not affect India's foreign policy 
towards Israel (Kapur, 1994:164). Through debates between the 
government and opposition or through consensus regarding what was 
politically feasible, the Parliament acquired an increasing role in foreign 
policy.  However, there was a strong anti-Israeli attitude within the INCP; 
consequently, it was easy to raise support for the Government’s anti-Israeli 
and pro-Arab policy in the Parliament during the INCP’s term of office. 
 
Nevertheless, there was some criticism of that policy by the opposition 
bench, particularly by the Jana Sangh Party and later on by the BJP 
members.224  In addition, objections to India’s foreign policy towards Israel 
were also made by other opposition parties such as the Janata Party,225 
the Paraja Socialist Party226 and the Swatantra Party227 before it.  
Furthermore, there were some exceptional Members of Parliament and 
politicians, such as Subramaniam Swamy of the Janata Party, who took 
their objections to the Indian policy towards Israel one step further, but it 
did not help to change India’s policy.  Swamy (1982:20) makes the 
following cynical remark: 
 
Recently I had asked the Minister of state of external affairs, Mr. A.A. 
Rahim, during Question Hour in the Lok Sabha a straight question: does 
India recognize De Jure the State of Israel? The Minister fumbled, looked 
pathetically towards the official gallery for guidance, then mumbled “I don’t 
know” and sat down.  
 
  
Following that event, Swamy published a statement (under rule 377) that 
India should honour its commitment towards Israel made 32 years earlier, 
namely on 18 September 1950. He also added that India should dispatch 
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an ambassador to Israel; however, no official response from the Indian 
Government was forthcoming.   
The anti-Israeli consensus group within the Indian Parliament was 
weakened following its criticism of the Arab countries that had failed to 
support India in its hour of need in the wars against China and Pakistan.  
In 1967, the Minister of External Affairs, M.C. Chagla was singled out by 
members of the Parliament and was accused of being more pro-Arab (as 
a Muslim) than the Arabs themselves (Singh, 1976:57).228  Consequently, 
the anti-Israeli consensus in the Parliament was weakened (although not 
amongst INCP members), but it did not have any political impact.  Only in 
November 1991, did the first real political debate take place in the Upper 
House of the Parliament (Rajya Sabha). On this occasion, various 
opposition members, led by Parmod Mahajan and Ram Jethmalani from 
the BJP, Subramaniam Swamy from the Janata Party and Yashwant 
Sinha from the Samajwadi Janata Party attacked the official Indian foreign 
policy towards Israel, calling for the establishment of fully-fledged 
diplomatic relations between the two countries (Yegar, Govrin & Oded, 
2002:545). 
3.10.2. The Indian party system 
 
Since independence, India had developed a multi-party system. The 
attention of all the political parties in India as well as India’s elite, 
particularly during the time of unstable coalitions, was focussed on 
domestic politics.  The political system in India was a key factor as far as 
India's foreign relations with Israel prior to 1991 were concerned.  
Importantly, diplomatic relations with Israel were unacceptable to the INCP 
in Nehru’s time as well as during Indira’s two tenures in power.  The 
Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), the Janata Party, the Swatantra Party and 
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the Paraja Socialist Party, as well as the Jana Sangh and Paraja Parties 
before it were considered to be adherents of the idea of having full 
diplomatic relations with Israel, but lacked the political power to implement 
it.  Several politicians, mostly from the opposition (but also a few low-rank 
politicians from the INCP) also supported the establishment of diplomatic 
relations with Israel, but to no political avail (Park, 1962:295; Shimoni, 
1991:E10).  The following political parties are studied with regard to India's 
foreign policy towards Israel:  
 
3.10.2.1 Indian National Congress Party (INCP)  
 
The foreign policy and the strategic political perspective of the INCP were 
dominated after independence by Nehru's view of the world (Cohen, 
2001:37-40).229  Even when the INCP departed from Nehruvian principles, 
the party insisted on a national consensus on foreign policy, based on 
Nehruvian principles.  In fact, it was India’s Nehruvian foreign policy and 
politics that kept India and Israel politically apart (Kapila, 2000).   
 
During his tenure as Prime Minister and Minister of External Affairs (1947-
1964), Nehru kept the members of the INCP well informed, since he 
regarded it an essential part of the democratic process.  He was rarely 
challenged on foreign policy matters and year after year the INCP passed 
resolutions in the Parliament, almost invariably framed by Nehru himself, 
which gave full support to the government’s foreign policy; namely Nehru’s 
politics (Brecher, 1957:11).  The open-minded approach of Nehru about 
the political need to update the members of the INCP on Indian foreign 
issues was not applied in the case of Israel.  Relations with Israel were 
rarely brought up by him in the INCP's meetings, contrary to his practice 
regarding other international matters.  David Hacohen, who was an Israeli 
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diplomat in Burma and a veteran Labour Party leader, met his Indian 
friends in Bombay during a visit to India in 1956.  They informed him that 
the question of relations with Israel had never been brought up by Nehru 
at party meetings (Hacohen, 1974: 266). 
 
Indian foreign policy matters were supported by the INCP members by 
consensus, which was easy to achieve in the case of Israel, considering 
the traditional pro-Arab approach and the anti-Israeli atmosphere in the 
INCP in general and among the elite of the party in particular.  The INCP 
had opposed the creation of the State of Israel as a separate independent 
Jewish homeland.230 In fact, Israel was considered a product of Western 
powers and was seen to align itself with them (the Western powers); while 
the INCP traditionally supported national movements in the Arab world.  
After independence, the INCP did not want to offend the Muslim bloc 
within the party or the Muslim population in India by improving bilateral 
relations with Israel.231 Close relations with the Arab world were 
considered to be in the national interest of India and were strongly 
encouraged by the INCP. The predominantly passive anti-Israeli attitude 
and climate in the INCP, which prevailed in the party, were particularly 
strong among the elite of the party.  
 
In September 1950, following recognition of the State of Israel by India, 
the Foreign Affairs Department of the INCP sent a diplomatic circular to 
Israel.  The circular welcomed the recognition of the State of Israel and 
declared that it would be followed by the exchange of diplomatic 
representatives between the two countries (Swamy, 1982:22).  During the 
following years, there were some pro-Israeli supporters within the INCP, 
such as Mrs Saro Naidu and K.M. Panikkar232 and middle ranking 
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politicians, such as S. Bux Singh and Ragunath Singh, but this was the 
exception that proved the rule of the anti-Israel consensus in Congress 
(Shimoni, 1991:E5).   
 
Under Indira Gandhi and Rajiv Gandhi, the INCP became an extension of 
their personal rule and India's foreign policy was controlled directly by 
them (Schaffer & Saigal-Arora, 1999:144).  Mrs. Gandhi, and later her 
son, Rajiv Gandhi, sharply curtailed political as well as international 
dissent within the party, but there was no disagreement about Israel in the 
INCP as far as the anti-Israeli and pro-Arab policy was concerned.233   
During his tenure, Rajiv Gandhi tried to introduce steps to improve India's 
relations with Israel, but he had limited opportunities to do much, given the 
domestic political constraints, in particular, in his own party.234 
 
The pro-Arab INCP foreign policy continued until 1991 and the party was 
even critical (in favour of the Arab parties) of the Middle East peace 
process, since it was sponsored by the US (Cohen, 2001:247).  In 
December 1991, India voted with the majority at the UN to repeal the 
General Assembly Resolution of 1975 that equated Zionism with racism.235  
The Indian voting provoked some INCP members, who saw it as a 
betrayal of Indian traditional policy towards the Arabs.  Furthermore, they 
saw it as an unprincipled move against the Nehruvian tradition and 
principles, but the leaders of the party stood firm on the decision (Yegar, 
Govrin & Oded, 2002:547; Kumaraswamy, 2002:10).  
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3.10.2.2 Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)  
 
The BJP was a right-wing party that started its political path with secular 
values (compared with the INCP that strove for communal policies). 236  
Many of the BJP founding members were originally members of and 
activists within the Jana Sangh Party, a party that operated within the 
parameters of the majority of Hindu principles and maintained that most 
Arab states did not deserve special treatment by India at the expense of 
Israel. They questioned the decision by India to maintain diplomatic 
relations with hostile states such as China and Pakistan, but not with 
Israel (Naaz, 1999:242).  Leaders, such as L.K. Advani and A.B. 
Vajpayee, of the Jana Sangh Party, which was later transformed into the 
BJP while in opposition, frequently called for full diplomatic relations with 
Israel openly. They criticised the Government of India on that point but 
with little effect on India’s foreign policy (Warzverger, 1977:22).  In the Lok 
Sabha (Lower House) elections in 1977, the Jana Sangh Party won 87 
seats and was part of the new government headed by the political Janata 
coalition (Seshia, 1998; Shimoni, 1959:166).  
 
 After being in power between 1977 and 1979, with Vajpayee as Minister 
of External Affairs, the Janata government, as stated by Vajpayee himself, 
continued with the pro-Arab foreign policy of their predecessors237 
(Vajpayee, 1979:64).  Nevertheless, two meetings by the Prime Minister of 
India at the time, Morarji Desai with Israeli high ranking officials took place 
in 1977.  The first meeting with the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Israel, 
Moshe Dayan, was an extremely disappointing encounter yielded no 
political results.  The second meeting with the Israeli Minister of Defence, 
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Ezer Weizmann in London in June 1978, led to negotiations regarding a 
military arms deal through Cyprus (Swamy, 1982:22).238 
 
The leaders of the Jana Sangh Party concentrated on the domestic 
political battle with Indira Gandhi and this left them with very little scope for 
any active foreign policy.  In fact, most of the foreign policy issues were 
passed on to the Ministry of External Affairs, which traditionally held an 
anti-Israeli attitude.  As a result, until the end of the Janata tenure no 
change was made in the Indian foreign policy towards Israel.239   
 
In April 1980, the constitution of the newly born BJP, which consisted of 
the Jana Sangh Party and other right-wing groups, was drafted, but it 
contained very few Hindu ideological principles that could reach a larger 
Indian electorate.  In 1984, the BJP won only two of the 545 seats in the 
Lower House in the ninth Lok Sabha elections and was forced for 
purposes of survival to seek its roots in the communal principles of Indian 
politics.  Gradually the BJP increased its political power, which was 
situated in the Hindu middle classes and the urban areas.  By 1992, after 
a series of ethnic religious secessionist uprisings (which had started in the 
1980s), the Indian electorate that had lost faith in Congress secularism, 
looked to the BJP for a response to internal disturbances.  The BJP, which 
mobilised the masses on religious grounds and economic issues, won 119 
seats in the 1992 election and claimed to be the national alternative party 
(Seshia, 1998; Misra, 1999:48-50).   
 
The BJP, like the Jana Sangh Party, was traditionally considered to be a 
political supporter of Israel in Indian politics. However, when  it was part of 
V.P. Singh’s coalition government, (headed by the Janata Dal Party from 2 
December 1989  up to 7 November 1990), the BJP did not try to play an 
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active role in changing India’s foreign policy towards Israel.  Both parties 
joined hands, principally to forestall the return of Rajiv Gandhi to power 
(Kapur, 1994:198-200).  The coalition of forces made it vulnerable to 
political and foreign policy criticism.  Under such political circumstances, 
the Ministry of External Affairs re-emerged, after more than a decade of 
centralised and personalised foreign policy during the tenures of Indira 
Gandhi and Rajiv Gandhi.  It operated as a leading element in India’s 
foreign policy-making, while continuing with its pro-Arab foreign policy.  
The Indian pro-Arab approach became more prominent during the Gulf 
War in 1991 when India tried unsuccessfully to mediate the crisis while 
concluding that the major second-tier state (such as India) could become 
the object of American aggression (Cohen, 2001:295).240 
 
When the decision to establish fully-fledged diplomatic relations with Israel 
was formulated by Rao’s government he was strongly supported by the 
BJP.  Three months earlier, in October 1991, the BJP All India National 
Conference officially endorsed the establishment of diplomatic relations 
with Israel and made it part of the BJP’s platform (Yegar, Govrin & Oded, 
2002:547).  Traditionally, the BJP was considered a staunch political 
supporter of Israel in the Indian political arena and it consistently 
demanded the establishment of full diplomatic relations with Israel.  In 
addition, its support of Israel included visits of the party’s leaders to Israel, 
debates in Parliament (particularly questions on the issue), political 
protests and criticism of India’s foreign policy towards Israel. 
3.10.2.3 Paraja Socialist Party  
 
The Paraja Socialist Party had a long history of relations with Israel in 
general and friendly relations with the Mapai Party (the Israeli Labour 
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Party), in particular.241 Already in 1950, the Indian United Socialist 
Organisation (USO) passed a resolution, which deplored the fact that the 
Government of India had not recognised the State of Israel: 
 
The USO notes with deepest regret that Government of India has not seen 
her way yet to recognize the State of Israel.  Israel is being considered by 
US a democratic force in Asia.  It is a secular state based on progressive 
socialist principles and our cooperation with Israel appears to be long 
overdue (Archives of Labour Party, 101-50, 2/3/1950). 
 
 
The Secretary General of the Paraja Socialist Party, Ashok Mehta, visited 
Israel in April 1953 and friendly relations developed between the Paraja 
Socialist Party and the Mapai Party, the ruling party in Israel, at the Asian 
Socialist International Conference, which took place in Bombay in 1956 
(Hacohen, 1974:263-265).242 Jaya Prakash Narayan, the party leader, 
visited Israel in September 1958 and due to his interest in the Israeli 
experience in nation building, cooperation and the national aid system, 
another visit followed.  A delegation of five members of the Budhan 
Movement (a movement for a voluntary grass-roots land reform connected 
with the party, which was established by Narayan after his retirement from 
politics), visited Israel between 16 December 1959 and 20 January 1960 
for a study tour.  Another special seminar between 29 February 1960 and 
1 June 1960 was organised by Israel for a delegation of 28 members of 
the Budhan Movement, including high ranking officials of the Paraja 
Socialist Party.  Party members also participated in training courses in 
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Israel, particularly at the Afro-Asia Institute for Trade Unions and 
Cooperation Activities.  Their aim was to study various Israeli development 
settlement cooperations (such as the “Kibbutz” and the “Moshav”) 243 as 
well as advanced agriculture (Aynor & Avimor, 1990:308-309).  During 
Narayan’s visit, in 1958, the Political Department of the Israel Trade Union 
Histadruth (affiliated to the Mapai Party), explored the option with the 
Paraja Socialist Party of opening an Israeli liaison office in New Delhi.  
This was supposed to take place with the support of the Labour Movement 
of Asia, in collaboration with the Indian National Trade Union Congress, 
but in the end it did not materialise.  In April 1960, a delegation headed by 
Ashok Mahath represented the Paraja Socialist Party at the International 
Socialist Conference in Haifa (Aynor, Avimor & Kaminer, 1989:42-43). 
 
The Paraja Socialist Party won only sixteen seats in the Lok Sabha In the 
parliamentary elections in 1967 following the resignation of its leadership.  
Ten years later, it held only two seats, having lost most of its political 
power and was eventually superseded in 1977 by the Janata coalition.244 
Throughout the years up to 1977 the Paraja Socialist Party maintained 
contact with the Labour Party in Israel but made no significant contribution 
to the bilateral relations between India and Israel. This contact did not help 
to change India’s foreign policy towards Israel; instead it was a source of 
controversy within the Paraja Socialist Party itself, which had a large 
number of Muslim members (Shimoni, 1959:168).  
3.10.2.4 Janata Party  
 
In January 1977, the newly established Janata Party consisted of the 
Congress (O) Party, the Jana Sangh Party, the Paraja Socialist Party and 
other opposition parties based on ideological as well as on programmatic 
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consensus.245 Together with some regional parties, the Janata Party 
formed a government in March 1977, but its inability to consolidate 
political rivalries among the leadership led to the demise of the Janata 
Government in 1979 that allowed the INCP to return to power in 1980.  
 
Pro-Arab traditional policy was demonstrated during the tenure of the 
Janata Coalition Government in the years 1977 – 1979, headed by Morarji 
Desai with Vajpayee as Minister of External Affairs.  Despite a secret 
meeting with the Israeli Minister of Foreign Affairs in New Delhi and a 
meeting with the Israeli Defence Minister in London (that included talks on 
an arms deal and technology sales to India);246 no progress was made.   It 
was made clear that the Janata Government would not establish 
diplomatic relations with Israel, unless it withdrew from the captured Arab 
land (Swamy, 1982:21). The Janata Government foreign policy was 
demonstrated clearly by the Minister of External Affairs Vajpayee's 
speech:  
 
The Janata government has continued the country’s traditional policy on 
West Asia and our policy remains a principled one.  Israel’s aggressive 
acquisitions and claims, arising from the mists of biblical history are 
untenable there can be no durable peace, less so for Israel itself, without 
the complete withdrawal by it from all occupied Arab territories and without 
recognition of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people, including the 
right to form their own national state (Vajpayee, 1979:64).247  
 
 
V.P. Singh's defection from the INCP in 1987 enabled opposition factions 
from the Janata Party and Bharatiya Lok Dal Party to form the Janata Dal 
Party.  The Janata Dal Party together with some regional parties formed 
the National Front Government, which defeated the INCP in the 
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parliamentary elections in 1989.  Following the BJP's withdrawal of 
support from the National Front Government, the government lost a 
parliamentary vote of confidence on 7 November 1990. Significantly, two 
days prior to the vote, Chandra Shekhar, the former Janata Party 
president, formed a minority government with the backing of the INCP that 
lasted four months (Heitzman & Worden, 1996:476-478).  
 
The Janata Government headed by V.P. Singh did not change the Indian 
traditional pro-Arab foreign policy towards Israel either.248 Chandra 
Shekhar’s minority government that had succeeded Singh's government 
was not interested in international politics in general and in Israel in 
particular.  Furthermore, the government was busy trying to survive 
politically (the party had only 68 supporters in the Lok Sabha, which 
consisted of 473 members).  However, two conciliatory gestures were 
actually made towards Israel, namely the meeting of Prime Minister 
Shekhar with the Israeli Consul and permitting the National Young Tennis 
Team of Israel to participate in an international tennis tournament in India.   
A year earlier, a similar request by an Israeli tennis team was refused by 
India (Yegar, Govrin & Oded, 2002:545).249. 
 
The Janata Party was considered a pro-Israeli party, but political instability 
together with local political circumstances and a lack of political strength, 
prevented the party from effecting any significant change to foreign policy 
towards Israel.  Political issues, including foreign policy and particularly 
sensitive issues, such as establishing diplomatic relations with Israel, 
which could topple the short-lived governments, were sidestepped.   
Consequently, the anti-Israeli climate of alienation, including 
administrative and bureaucratic restrictions, continued as before with no 
change, to the disappointment of the Israeli Government. 
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3.10.2.5 Swatantra Party  
 
The Swatantra  Party was a right-wing party that stressed the need for 
privatisation and opening up of the Indian market as well as the need for 
bilateral diplomatic relations and economic ties with Israel and one of the 
party leaders, Rajah Hutheesing, visited Israel in 1960 (ISA 93.42/309/12, 
25/10/1960).  This contradicted the official policy propagated by Nehru 
regarding socialism in general and his negative attitude towards Israel in 
particular.  The party’s political power was limited (it only had eight seats 
in the Lok Sabha in 1971) and it was eventually superseded by the Janata 
Coalition in 1977 (Shimoni, 1959:165; Reuveni, 1977:10).250 
 
3.10.3 The Indian executive  
    
Constitutionally, the Cabinet has been the real executive power centre in 
the Indian parliamentary democracy.  Because of the closed door nature 
of India's bureaucracy (which discouraged foreign debates on foreign 
policy issues), India had developed unofficial centres that were 
increasingly influential. An example was the kitchen Cabinet in the Nehru-
Indira-Rajiv's years, as well as personal advisors such as retired military 
officers and diplomats (Cohen, 2001:81-83).  It is therefore, essential to 
study the pertinent decision-making executive centres and their roles in 
establishing India’s foreign policy towards Israel until 1992.  
 
The following executive centres are studied with regard to India's   foreign 
policy towards Israel: 
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      3.10.3.1 The Cabinet, the Prime Minister, the Secretariat and the 
Prime Minister’s inner circle 
                                                                                                                 
The Cabinet (formally called the Council of Ministers) which had  been the 
real executive power centre in India, traditionally showed  minimal interest 
in foreign affairs and concentrated mostly on domestic affairs.251  A special 
committee of the Cabinet for Foreign Affairs had been in existence since 
independence and foreign policy matters were addressed by the 
committee and reported to the entire Cabinet at a later stage.  However, 
increasingly, external affairs decisions were taken by the Prime Minister 
and announced to the public without the committee and the Cabinet being 
informed of them (Kapur, 1994:89).  
 
The subject of establishing diplomatic relations with Israel was not raised 
in the Indian Cabinet until 1991.  The only exception was in 1961 when 
Nehru expressed his readiness to establish diplomatic relations with Israel 
as well as the exchange of diplomatic missions pending the consensus of 
the Indian Cabinet.252 This event was reported by Gideon Rafael, the 
Israeli Director General of the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, after he 
had met Nehru in New Delhi.  As it happened, Nehru did not obtain the 
conditional consensus and in fact, the issue was not even raised in the 
Cabinet after the objection of Maulana Azad and other Muslim ministers 
(Rafael, 1981; Swamy, 1982; Brecher, 1957 & 1982; Shimoni, 1957 & 
1991).  
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In addition to the Cabinet, in particular during Nehru’s tenure, the inner 
circle described by Michael Brecher (1957:12; 1963:50) played a 
significant role as ultimate decision makers through its influence on Indian 
Prime Ministers. A number of personal advisors who played a key role 
with regard to India’s foreign policy towards Israel in the 1950s will be 
discussed next. 
 
Maulana Azad - Michael Brecher (1957:13), points out that a selected 
group of seven people formed Nehru’s inner circle.  One of the important 
members of this circle was Maulana Azad.  He was the Dean of the INCM 
before independence and later a Minister of Education in Nehru's Cabinet 
from 1947 to 1958.  Moreover, he was a close friend and a political 
colleague of Nehru for more than three decades:   
 
If there was one man whose position approximated to Gandhi's as the 
recipient of Nehru's complete confidence it was Azad.  For thirty-five years 
they were intimately associated in the Congress.  Others could match that 
record.   But Nehru and Azad were intellectually akin, even though one was 
a Western-type agnostic and the other a Muslim divine.  At the basis of 
their relationship was genuine affection and mutual respect which ripened 
into a mature friendship.  Of all the Congress leaders, Azad was the most 
detached after Independence, free of the struggle for power and prestige, 
both of which he had by virtue of his earlier contributions and as dean of 
the nationalist Muslims.  As a result Nehru used to consult him frequently 
about all manner of decisions.  With Azad he could open his heart to an old 
comrade.  While it is difficult to estimate Azad's influence on any particular 
decision, his overall effect on Indian politics was very great during the first 
decade of independence.  Nor was it confined to domestic politics.  The 
Maulana had the unique distinction of being a member of all but one of the 
Prime Minister's elite groups: his was a powerful voice in the party's High 
Command; on internal Indian politics; his views were sought by Nehru, so 
too in foreign affairs, where he played a key role in shaping India's policies 
towards Pakistan and the Middle East (Brecher, 1959:610). 
 
 
Although Azad opposed diplomatic relations with Israel, from a report 
received from Eliyahu Sasson, it appears an Israeli diplomat in Ankara, 
who was introduced to Azad by an Indian friend on 1 July 1951 that he 
was not against India’s recognition of Israel.  Azad told Sasson that he 
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would like to see the resolution of Israel's conflict with its Arab neighbours 
and the establishment of cooperation between all countries in the Orient 
region.  During their meetings, Azad pointed out that he had tried to 
explain to Arab leaders that Israel was a factual reality and it was in the 
interest of their countries that Israel should be recognised by them.  
According to Sasson, it was Azad’s support of Nehru's suggestion to the 
Indian Government to recognise Israel that enabled him to enforce the 
Indian Government’s decision to recognise Israel without any hostile 
reaction from Indian Muslims (Avimor, 1991:207).253  
 
According to Brecher (1957:14), Maulana Azad exerted great influence on 
India's Middle East foreign policy and the fact that India did not establish 
diplomatic relations with Israel can be attributed directly to him.  Brecher 
claimed that senior officials and cabinet ministers in New Delhi had 
informed him personally of the role played by Maulana in this particular 
case:  
 
The sudden change of mind (of Nehru) in the spring of 1952 was due to 
the forceful intervention of Maulana Azad, intimate friend of Nehru, 
respected leader of India’s forty million Muslims, and Minister of 
Education in the Indian Government...  He firmly argued against 
diplomatic relations with Israel and was fearful of the consequences of 
such relations on India’s position in the Arab world.  He was concerned 
about the possible impact of such diplomatic action on Indian Muslim 
minority and their loyalty to India, in particular, following the partition riots.  
He also raised the option that Pakistan would probably use it as a political 
tool against India and would fan the flames of communal hatred in India.  
Nehru, convinced by the terms of India’s national interests, particularly 
considering the fact that bitter rivalry with Pakistan for Arab support on the 
Kashmir dispute was then at its height and that India’s policy on Kashmir 
was under attack in the UN, yielded to Azad’s advice…Until his death in 
1958, the Maulana exerted great influence on India’s Middle East policy, 
as well as on domestic and party affairs.  As a Muslim, Azad was naturally 
pro-Arab.  He was also fearful of the consequences of diplomatic relations 
with Israel on India’s position in the Arab world.  An unstated (sic.) but 
bitter rivalry with Pakistan for Arab support on the Kashmir dispute was 
then at its height, for India’s policy on that issue was under severe attack 
in the United Nations and elsewhere.  Azad (and Nehru) was also 
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concerned about the possible impact of a welcoming gesture to Israel on 
India’s large and insecure Muslim minority, Pakistan would probably have 
fanned the flames of communal hatred in India by reference to Israel.  
This might have affected the loyalty of India’s Muslims and would, in any 
event, have been a shock to their already bewildered state of mind 
following the partition riots and mass migration with the aftermath of 
distrust among many Hindus.  Was an exchange of diplomatic missions 
with Israel worth all these risks?  Azad firmly argued against the proposal.  
Nehru may have been convinced, for the case was strong in terms of 
India’s national interests.  At any rate, he yielded to Azad’s advice 
(Brecher, 1963:130). 
 
   
Yaacov Shimoni (1991:E7) gave a similar explanation when he  asserted 
that Nehru was not prepared to overrule Azad and other Muslim Ministers 
in his Cabinet's objection to the idea of establishing diplomatic relations 
with Israel.254  Subramaniam Swamy argued along the same lines:  
 
Nehru was scared of Maulana Azad and this prevented him from 
implementing what he kept promising the Israelis in private.  By the time 
Maulana departed, Nehru had been sufficiently committed to a public 
rejection of Israel from which he could later never extricate himself 
(Swamy, 1982:20).255 
 
 
V.K. Krishna Menon - Menon was Prime Minister Nehru's chief foreign 
policy advisor as well as a key member of his inner circle (Brecher, 
1957:15). In 1952, Menon, while serving as the Indian Ambassador in 
Moscow, wrote a letter to Walter Eytan, the Director General of the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Israel, in which he expressed his regret that 
no exchange of diplomatic delegates had been made to date between 
India and Israel (ISA 130.02/2413/29, 03/12/1952).  In 1953 he started 
establishing his international reputation as India’s Representative at the 
UN and Nehru’s personal Ambassador to International Conferences and 
subsequently, he was nominated as a Minister without portfolio.  While 
serving at the UN, in New York, Menon met the Israeli Ministers of Foreign 
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Affairs, Golda Meir and Abba Eban respectively, as well as other senior 
Israeli diplomats.   However, these meetings did not have any effect on his 
anti-Israeli attitude, nor did it change his hostility towards Israel and his 
support of India’s friendly relations with the Arab countries.  Menon’s 
strident speeches in the UN consistently reflected his anti-Israeli opinions. 
In 1957 he became the Minister of Defence of India.  Unsurprisingly, he 
exhibited his undisguised hostility towards Israel in an interview with 
Michael Brecher:  
 
Israel's title is made to rest on occupation as a result of war…I think the 
Israelis lost by joining the French and British.  The invasion (of the Suez 
Canal) angered Asia and Africa, it placed them in the role of allied and 
abettors of imperialism...We are in a difficult position because of Pakistan 
and our own anti imperialist views…The Israelis, if I may say so, are 
maladroit.  Despite opposition, I was not against their Consulate in 
Bombay, but should a Consul come to make political speeches here as the 
Israeli Consul did in Delhi in November 1964? They are propagandists 
temperamentally, the same as the Arabs…There will be no "normal" 
relations between Israel and India until the world situation changes 
(Brecher, 1968:78, 80-81).  
  
3.10.3.2 Indian bureaucracy (Ministry of External Affairs)  
 
Since India’s independence, bureaucracy, namely the Ministry of External 
Affairs (MEA) had been the key element in Indian foreign policy-making.  
In this respect, the MEA had the task of providing the executive with the 
required input to define foreign policy and to implement the policy after it 
had been defined.  However, the Ministry’s power in actual foreign policy-
making had declined throughout the years (Kapur, 1994:154-158).  
Inherently, the MEA was conservative and had difficulty in adjusting to 
rapid changes in the international system because of strong memories of 
the past, when the civilian bureaucracy dominated foreign policy 
processes (Cohen, 2001:72-75). The conservative approach of the MEA 
regarding its relations with Israel in the years prior to 1992 was 
imperceptible.  
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Significantly, the gradual adjustment of the MEA started during the visit of 
the Deputy Director General for Asia of the Foreign Affairs of Israel, 
Moshe Yegar, to New Delhi in June 1991.  Yegar had gone to India to 
coordinate the release efforts of an Israeli hostage after a group of Israeli 
tourists had been kidnapped in the State of Jammu and Kashmir.  He 
received permission to coordinate his activities with the Consular 
Department of the MEA only. However, he managed to meet unofficially256 
with Indian high officials, including the Secretary of the Cabinet through 
the assistance of Professor M. L. Sondhi. In September 1991, the Minister 
of External Affairs, M. Solanki, acknowledged the possibility of 
establishing bilateral diplomatic relations with Israel by referring to the fact 
that India had recognised the State of Israel in 1950.  However, he added 
that as far as the exchange of diplomatic missions was concerned, this 
issue would be discussed in due time (Yegar, Govrin & Oded, 2002:547).   
 
In October 1991, the MEA still maintained that Indian foreign policy 
towards Israel would be contingent on substantial progress in the 
settlement of the West Asian problem (Ali Khan, 1992:215). Nevertheless, 
a few weeks later, on 16 December 1991, the MEA had to comply with 
Prime Minister Rao’s instruction to vote in favour of the resolution that 
repealed the UN General Assembly resolution of 1975 that equated 
Zionism with racism.257 In December 1991, the Israeli Consul in Bombay 
was allowed to meet the Head of the Consular Department of the MEA 
officially in New Delhi.  In addition, two weeks later he was informed that 
henceforth, he would be allowed to meet the Head of the West Asian 
Department of the MEA (the Political Department in the MEA in charge of 
the Middle East). As it turned out, even after the establishment of 
diplomatic relations between the two countries, normalisation with Israel 
was seen by many officials in the MEA as premature and in conflict with 
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the traditional Indian pro-Arab foreign policy. Eventually, however, the 
MEA officials had to come to terms with the political fact that the two 
states had established fully-fledged diplomatic relations with diplomatic 
missions.258   
 
In addition to the Indian Ministers of External Affairs whose attitudes and 
statements reflected the official foreign policy towards Israel,259 several 
permanent foreign secretaries of MEA played an instrumental role in the 
foreign policy-making of India regarding Israel in particular.  For example, 
G.S. Bajapai, who was Nehru's valued counsellor, exerted a major 
influence on the conduct of foreign policy, not least of all on the policy 
towards Israel (Brecher, 1957:12).  Although appointed by Indira Gandhi 
to lead the secretariat during her term in office, P.N. Haksar was 
described as a de facto Minister of External Affairs, and was considered 
the architect of Indian pro-Arab and anti-Israeli policy (Korany, 1986:176 
and Kapur, 1994:185-187).  On the other hand, J.N. Dixit was the architect 
of the bilateral relations between the two countries and was instrumental 
in establishing diplomatic relations between India and Israel (Dixit, 
1996).260 
 
Traditionally, the MEA approach was consistently pro-Arab and anti-
Israeli.  The inflexible and conservative approach of the MEA towards 
Israel can be explained partly by the fact that contemporary senior Indian 
officials of the MEA received their training and international experience 
under the INCP. Nehruvian internationalism was the dominating factor and 
major formative influence on their international perceptions and 
indoctrinated them against Israel.261 
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3.10.3.3. India's intelligence service  
 
The Indian intelligence service, namely the RAW was established on 1 
October 1968 and was assigned to monitor all aspects of foreign 
intelligence.  The RAW has been under the control of the Prime Minister’s 
Secretariat and the directors of the RAW have had an input in the 
decision-making process of India in the international arena as well as easy 
access to the Indian Prime Ministers. However, there were exceptions 
such as Prime Minister Desai who curtailed the RAW’s powers during his 
tenure since the agency had interfered in India’s domestic affairs during 
the state of emergency imposed by Mrs. Gandhi from 1975 to 1977.  
Throughout the years, the RAW had been recognised and accepted as a 
legitimate national agency indispensable for India’s continued existence 
by the mainstream political parties in India (Kapur, 1994:171-172).   
 
Accordingly, India embarked on covert relations with its Israeli counterpart, 
Mossad (The Agency for Intelligence and Special Foreign Operations) in 
the early 1970s and cooperation between the RAW and its Israeli 
counterpart existed even during the premiership of Indira Gandhi, between 
the years 1996 and 1997, as well as 1980 and 1984 (Kapila, 2000; Naaz, 
2000:969).  
  
Since then, the RAW had maintained its links with Israel and in 1977 it 
engineered the visit of the Israeli Foreign Minister, Moshe Dayan, to 
India.262  The RAW also played an important role in trying to gain a 
foothold in India for the Israeli Defence Industry. In the 1980s, RAW sent 
its personnel to Israel for special training and sought Israeli expertise on 
security systems as well as on electronic equipment (Kumaraswamy, 
1998:5).  In this regard, Kumaraswamy points out that with reference to 
military and intelligence matters, cooperation played a significant role in 
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Prime Minister Rao’s decision to diverge from India’s traditional policy. 
Moreover, the Indian military establishment: had been: “harping on 
establishing a closer and more cooperative relationship with its Israeli 
counterpart” (Kumaraswamy, 1999:144). 
 
According to Kumar (2001:10), after Prime Minister Indira Gandhi’s 
assassination in October, 1987 India sought Israel’s assistance with 
improving the protection of its VIPs through the RAW. In addition, Israeli 
security specialists had been responsible for devising Rajiv Gandhi’s 
personal security measures when he was Prime Minister and 
subsequently, India purchased Israeli intelligence equipment. 
Furthermore, India and Israel were also engaged in a secret dialogue over 
the Pakistani nuclear facility in Kahuta.  Despite the RAW's direct access 
to the Prime Ministers of India and its assignment to monitor foreign 
intelligence and its constructive links with its Israeli counterpart, the RAW 
did not play any significant role in terms of changing the official foreign 
policy towards Israel. This state of affairs can be attributed to a certain 
extent to the RAW’s reluctance to become involved in India’s internal 
political conflicts and the fact that the anti-Israeli foreign policy had a 
political consensus.  
3.10.4. Media and public opinion in India 
 
India, as a democracy with a pluralistic political system permitted the open 
expression of opinions. In the past, public opinion in India regarding 
domestic issues had been formed mostly by Indian intellectuals and a 
small group of journalists in the written media that were controlled by 
political leaders. In addition, the extremely large size of its territory and the 
specific geographical characteristics of India resulted in technical 
difficulties in reaching the vast Indian population. In addition, India was 
confronted by the cultural challenge of how to spark the interest of the 
diversified Indian population in complex foreign affairs issues.  This 
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remained the state of affairs up to the global information revolution, which 
has since changed the face of the Indian media with greater access to the 
media and pertinent information (Kapur, 1994:166-170).  
 
Between the years 1948 and 1991, some leading intellectuals supported 
the establishment of diplomatic relations with Israel, such as the poet and 
nationalist leader Saro Naidu, the journalists and writers Khushwant 
Singh, Frank Moraes and his son Dom Moraes, Shanta Ram Rao and 
Nirad Chaudhuri as well as the historians Romila Thapar, Sarvepalli Gopal 
and M.L. Sondhi (Shimoni, 1991:E9). Although the support of the Indian 
intellectuals was appreciated in Israel, they did not have any influence on 
the shaping of India’s foreign policy towards Israel. 
 
All-India Radio, the most important mass medium in India until the end of 
the 1980s, was nationalised and did not have much editorial influence on 
Indian foreign policy.  The electronic media were state controlled and fell 
under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting.  
Satellite television with international channels (including world news 
networks) was only launched in 1991.  Most of the press in India was 
privately owned, but there was a legal demand for registration with the 
Registrar of Newspapers and most of the newspapers agreed with India’s 
official foreign policy.263 
 
During Nehru’s tenure his world affairs initiatives received widespread 
approval from the Indian media, with the exception of the opposition 
party’s journals and a few independent national dailies, such as the Times 
of India and The Statesman.  Even though they did not criticise the 
principles of India’s foreign policy and concentrated mostly on Nehru’s 
criticism of the West, the media mostly supported Nehru and his foreign 
policy, including the policy regarding Israel (Brecher, 1957:30).  However, 
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there were exceptions regarding the Indian media’s attitudes towards 
Israel. In 1960, following the participation of more than one hundred 
Indians in courses presented as part of Israel’s international cooperation 
programme, leading Indian newspapers openly called for the exchange of 
diplomatic envoys with Israel (The Indian Express, 9/4/1960, The Times of 
India, 10/5/1960, 22/4/962; The Hindustan Standard, 23/4/1961).264 
 
On the whole, after Nehru, the media continued to support official Indian 
pro-Arab foreign policy.  This remarkable consistency in public expression 
regarding Indian foreign policy can be traced to Nehru’s leadership and 
the long reign of the INCP.  These aspects led to increased public support 
for the Government of India’s stance on world affairs, particularly since 
this stance resulted in the growth of India’s prestige in the eyes of the 
world (Park, 1962:302).265  
 
The Indian media (with some exceptions) supported traditional Indian pro-
Arab and anti-Israeli policy.  The Indian media as well as the anti-Israeli 
public opinion were particularly negative during Indira Gandhi’s first 
tenure.  However, after the Arab-Israeli war in 1973, public opinion 
towards Israel appeared to change despite the fact that India, including 
the media clearly sided with the Arabs.266  This change of public opinion 
regarding Israel, which started in 1973, can partly be attributed to the Arab 
response to the Indian wars in 1962, 1965 and 1971. This was when India 
fought against China and Pakistan and the Arab countries did not provide 
a satisfactory return on the heavy political investment made by India in the 
Arab world (Singh, 1976:57). 
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During Indira Gandhi's second tenure, the Indian press became almost 
uniformly unfriendly and even hostile towards the State of Israel.267  The 
Gulf War and the fact that surface-to-surface missiles were launched 
against Israel, brought about frenzied Indian coverage of Israel.  However, 
this coverage was mostly sympathetic unlike the negative media coverage 
received by the US as a superpower that had harmed Iraqi citizens.  After 
the Gulf War, Israel was continually in the news in the Indian media, 
particularly in the printed media, especially after the release of the Israeli 
hostages in Jammu and Kashmir in the summer of 1991.  This was also 
the case after the Deputy Director General for Asia in the Israeli Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs visited New Delhi openly and coordinated the release 
efforts.268 Importantly, the Indian printed media, which covered the event, 
started supporting full diplomatic relations with Israel (Yegar, Govrin & 
Oded, 2002:545).  
 
In November 1991, the Indian Television Network “Doordarshan” (which 
reached 87% of the Indian population) devoted the entire programme to 
the peace process in the Middle East and Israeli- Indian relations.  Most of 
the participants in the programme (mainly from the opposition to the INCP) 
supported the establishment of full diplomatic relations with Israel.  From a 
historical perspective, this programme can be considered the first 
meaningful public opinion pressure on the Government of India regarding 
bilateral relations with Israel.  Nevertheless, most public opinion  regarding 
Israel and in particular the opinion of a large section of India’s urban 
intelligentsia as well as a large number of INCP members continued to be 
anti-Israeli until 1991.  It was only after the establishment of diplomatic 
relations and the normalisation that followed, that the Indian media moved 
away from its erstwhile anti-Israeli rhetoric to a more balanced approach 
(Kumaraswamy, 2002:10).  
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3.10.5 Indian pressure groups  
 
Pressure groups did not play a definitive role in shaping India’s foreign 
policy (the law in India bars them from exerting direct pressure on the 
government).  However, their interest could be passed on more effectively 
through recognised political channels (Park, 1962:302).  As far as 
relations between India and Israel were concerned, there was no effective 
pressure group that promoted the establishment of diplomatic relations 
between the two countries. The only political pressure on the Indian 
government in that regard came from the opposition benches in the 
Parliament.269  
 
 
3.10.5.1 Indian Jewish community  
 
The Jewish community in India, which included the Bene Israel community 
in Bombay, the Cochin Jews of Kerela and the Baghdadi Jews in Bombay 
and Calcutta, had little interest in Indian politics and Indian foreign policy 
(Sampemane, 1994:20-23).  
   
The Bene Israel community was the largest of the three Jewish 
communities in India and for generations they lived in rural villages 
throughout the Kolaba district of the Maharashtra State.  After 1948, many 
of the Jews from this community emigrated to Israel (the estimated total 
number of Jews remaining in the Bene Israel community in India is around 
4,500).  The Cochini Jews lived for two millennia on the Malabar Coast of 
the State of Kerela in Southwest India. From the early 1950s up to the 
1980s, the majority of them emigrated to Israel (scarcely more than 60 
Cochini Jews remained in India). 
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The Baghdadi Jewish community in Bombay dates back to about the 16th 
century, when they arrived from Iraq and settled in Bombay.  Later on, 
Jews from all over the Ottoman Empire joined that community.  The 
Baghdadi Jews confined themselves to trade, finance and industry, but the 
majority of them remained aloof from Zionism and many of them 
emigrated to the US after 1947 and Britain; consequently, only about 200 
Baghdadi Jews remained in India (Naaz, 1999:901). 
 
In the past, the Indian Jews had shown little interest in Indian politics, 
although some of the Baghdadi and Bene Israel Jews were active in public 
affairs in Bombay.  In fact, certain Baghdadi Jews were appointed 
members of the Legislative Council of Maharashtra, members of the 
Municipal Corporation of Bombay and Sheriffs as well as others who 
served in the police service and Indian army. In addition, the most 
prominent figure in the Jewish community in India was Nissim Ezekiel, a 
poet, who was considered to be one of the leading poets in India.  
 
In Bombay, there were two Jewish organisations: the Israeli-Indian 
Friendship League and the Bombay Zionist Association.  In the late 1980s, 
the latter split into two Jewish organisations, namely the All- India Jewish 
Federation and the Council of Indian Jewry.  In New Delhi, there was only 
one Jewish organisation in addition to the Indo-Israeli Cultural Society.  In 
1969 Prime Minister Indira Gandhi celebrated the quarter centenary of the 
Jewish Paradesi Synagogue in Cochin and honoured the Jewish 
community by issuing a commemorative stamp on the occasion (Weil, 
2002:62). In 1985 Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, sent a message during the 
centenary celebrations of Kenesset Eliyahu Synagogue in Bombay in 
which he stated that the Jewish community in India had made a special 
contribution to Indian national life throughout the centuries (Malekar, 
2002:64).  However, the Jewish community and Jewish organisations in 
India were not active in national politics and in effect, the Jewish 
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community in India did not constitute an influential pressure group that 
could have an affect India’s foreign policy towards Israel and neither did it 
become involved in direct lobbying in favour of Israel. 
 
 
3.10.5.2 Indian Muslim community 
 
 
The political power of the Muslim community in India emanated from the 
assumption of the ruling parties and their leaders, from independence to 
1991 and the INCP in particular, that the Muslims of India should be 
appeased by siding with the Arabs in the Arab-Israeli conflict. In effect, the 
Muslim community in India was an effective pressure group against any 
improvement in bilateral relations with the State of Israel.  The majority of 
the Muslims in India traditionally voted for the INCP as the ruling party, 
which in turn made a constant effort to attract the Muslim electorate.  
Moreover, many Indian Muslims were active politicians in the INCP and 
they formed a strong pressure group in Parliament and vis-à-vis the 
Government of India, while combining forces with the elite and the old 
guard of the INCP, in order to shape Indian foreign policy against Israel.  
In addition to the INCP, Muslim politicians were active in other political 
parties such as the Paraja Socialist Party270 as well as the Muslim 
League271 and influenced their parties’ attitudes towards the State of Israel 
(Shimoni, 1959:168).  
 
Various Muslim groups and organisations in India, such as the Jamiat-ul-
Ulema, clearly identified strongly with the Arab world and their anti-Israeli 
attitudes were reinforced by the Palestinian Intifada in particular.272 Those 
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pro-Arab feelings permeated the Indian political system and were 
instrumental in influencing and shaping India's foreign policy towards 
Israel in general. They lobbied for cultural and trade restrictions on Israel 
specifically, in collaboration with Arab embassies in New Delhi.  
 
3.10.5.3 Indian business community  
 
Israel had comparative advantages in certain fields of interest to India 
such as agriculture, telecommunications, electronics, machinery and 
medical equipment.  Despite this fact, the business community and the 
private sector in India did not exert any political pressure on the Indian 
Government to change its foreign policy towards Israel in general and its 
foreign trade policy in particular.  Prior to the establishment of diplomatic 
relations between the two countries in 1992, the monetary value of the 
trade between India and Israel was US $111 million. The trade 
concentrated on the diamond and chemical industries, based on the 
private sector and businesspersons such as the Hinduja brothers who 
maintained business relations with Israeli companies through third 
countries (Gerberg, 1996:36).  
 
Israel was a small market for the Indian industry and the Government of 
India officially prohibited the government sector in India from having direct 
trade relations with Israel.  During the tenure of Subramaniam Swamy as 
Minister of Commerce and Law (from November 1990 to March 1991), he 
met his Israeli counterpart at an international economic conference in 
Belgium.  However, that meeting took place because of his longstanding 
supportive attitude towards Israel (which included a private visit to Israel in 
October 1982) and not as a result of any pressure from the Indian 
industrial private sector. The meeting did not bring about any change in 
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India’s trade policy towards Israel.273 In October 1991, India allowed the 
Israeli Trade Attaché in Singapore, Samuel Offri, to visit India, for the first 
time, in his official capacity and with a working visa, in order to promote 
trade relations between the two countries (Yegar, Govrin & Oded, 
2002:372). 
  
3.10.5.4. Shalom Alumni Club  
 
At the end of 1957, a special unit was set up in the Israeli Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs to coordinate the activities of international aid and 
cooperation.  The State of Israel saw its assistance programme as an 
outcome of the social ethics of the Biblical Prophets and the socialist ideas 
of the Zionist pioneers.  However, it also related to this programme as a 
helpful instrument that could support one of Israel’s foreign policy goals, 
namely, to end its political isolation in general and in Asia in particular 
(Aynor & Avimor, 1990:E17-E20; Neuberger, 1992:506). 
 
Between the years 1958 and 1971, four special courses were presented 
by Israeli experts in several Asian countries and 631 participants from 
Asia took part in international courses and seminars in Israel, including 
101 participants from India, mostly in courses in the field of trade unions 
and corporations at the Afro-Asian Institute (Mashav's 40th Anniversary, 
1997).274  
 
All the Indian participants in Israel's International Cooperation Programme 
had become members of the Alumni club of the programme, the Shalom 
Club, and could function as a pro-Israeli pressure group in principle.  
However, the Indian Shalom Club never functioned as a pressure group 
except in the 1960s, when it helped to put the issue of bilateral relations 
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with Israel on the political agenda in India.  That particular political 
pressure led to criticism of the Indian Government in Parliament and was 
supported by some journalists who held the opinion that India was cutting 
itself off from a useful source of technical systems and cooperation 
(Laufer, 1967:205).275  In fact, this was an exception as it was evident that 
the Shalom Alumni Club in particular and other pressure groups in 
general, did not have any political influence on the Indian Government as 
far as India’s foreign relations with Israel were concerned.  
 
3.11 Summation 
 
The focus of this chapter was on the analysis of the historical relations 
between the Republic of India and the State of Israel from 1948 to 1991.  
The development of India’s foreign policy towards Israel as a political 
process was described in terms of a historical analysis that was carried 
out with the help of pertinent international relations theories based on 
historical perceptions.  The aim was to determine which factors had 
influenced bilateral relations between the two countries before diplomatic 
relations were established and to determine the effect they had on bilateral 
relations between the two countries until 1991. 
 
The historical description of relations between India and Israel and the 
Indian pro-Arab narrative accounted for its traditional foreign policy 
towards Israel until the establishment of diplomatic relations between the 
two countries.  Both the description and narrative provide the foundation, 
in terms of the historical database accumulation and depth of knowledge, 
throughout the period up to 1991, for a dynamic analysis of the bilateral 
relations between India and Israel.   
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Because of the importance and relevance of the pre-independence 
relations to India's foreign policy towards the State of Israel, Indian pre-
independence policy towards Palestine prior to Israel’s independence was 
discussed in detail. The dominant actors in India's historical relations with 
Israel were identified and analysed in terms of the ultimate decision unit, 
which enabled the analysis of entities and authorities, including leaders 
within the Indian governments that were important to the shaping of Indian 
foreign policy towards Israel. In turn, India's foreign policy towards Israel 
was analysed in terms of three levels of analysis: the international level, 
the state and society (national) level and the individual level.  The 
international level was divided into two types of relations: bilateral and 
multilateral relations.  The three levels of analysis, in terms of the units of 
analysis of India as a unitary actor in the international system, enabled the 
identification, examination and analysis of the external and internal factors 
regarding India's historical relations with Israel until 1991.  At the same 
time, the complexity level of the web of variables, the political process and 
the contextual determinants were taken into consideration as well.  
 
The main objective of the INCM, as an ultimate decision unit before 1947, 
was to achieve independence.  The major objectives of the Government of 
India after independence, led by its prime ministers as an Ultimate 
Decision Unit, were the political consolidation of independence, the 
promotion of economic development and the pursuit of foreign policy goals 
that enhanced Indian national interests.   
 
In terms of the international level of analysis, although India officially had 
no foreign policy, prior to its achievement of independence, it was 
essential to examine the factors that shaped the attitudes of the leadership 
of the INCM regarding events in Palestine.  The Indian pro-Arab approach 
towards the Arab-Israeli conflict stemmed from the strong ties between the 
INCM and the national liberation movements in the Arab countries of the 
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Middle East.  A feeling of solidarity existed in India and in the INCM in 
particular, during the first half of the twentieth century with the Arab’s 
liberation movements.  Zionism, on the other hand, was identified with 
European colonialism and was not regarded as a national liberation 
movement.  The fact that Zionism was supported by Western powers, 
such as European and Western governments later, particularly the USA, 
was another reason for the INCM’s pro-Arab approach before the 
independence of Israel and the pro-Arab and anti-Israeli approach 
following it.   
 
In terms of the state and society level of analysis, Mahatma Gandhi, as the 
leader of the INCM, made a clear distinction between the historical 
problem of the Jewish people as a persecuted nation and their search for 
a home and the way in which that problem could be resolved. According to 
him, the Jewish claim for an independent state as well as the Partition 
Plan was in direct opposition to the INCM’s political perception, which was 
that a demand for a separate state, in India or in Palestine, should be 
prevented.  Accordingly, Gandhi and the INCM leaders were consistent in 
their support of the idea of a secular state in India, as well as a Palestine 
based upon territorial integrity.  India, therefore, supported the 
establishment of one single state in Palestine based on federal principles. 
The presence of a very substantial minority of Muslims (whose sentiments 
were with their fellow Muslims in the Middle East) was taken into political 
consideration by the INCM, which needed their active cooperation in the 
national struggle for independence.  
 
The factors that shaped the attitude of the Indian leadership towards the 
State of Israel after independence, as an ultimate decision unit, namely 
the prime ministers of India, subject to the requirements of India’s national 
interests, were examined and analysed.  In terms of the international level 
of analysis, in the bilateral arena, India recognised the State of Israel and 
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the political reality of Israel after 1948, but its foreign policy towards Israel 
reflected its self-interest in the Middle East as well as its traditional 
sympathy with the Arabs.  The ability of the State of Israel to play a 
constructive role in achieving the major national objectives of India was 
practically marginal.  As a matter of fact, the non-existing diplomatic 
relations were considered by India to be a strategic advantage within the 
international arena, vis-à-vis the Arab world in particular. This tactical 
policy revolved around Pakistan and the Kashmir conflict in particular, 
which had become a major item on India’s major foreign policy agenda, as 
India was serious about enlisting the neutrality if not support of Arab 
countries.     
 
India regarded Israel as a colonial state that was identified with colonial 
forces, against which national movements in Asia, including the INCP, had 
struggled in the past.  The collaboration between Israel, England and 
France (two previous major colonial powers) in 1956, during the Suez 
Canal crisis and the military operation against Egypt, only tended to 
confirm its attitude that Israel was an outpost of Europe in the Middle East.  
In addition, India, as a secular state according to its constitution, saw 
Israel as a theocratic state with a resemblance to Pakistan.  The Israeli 
military assistance to India during its wars with China and Pakistan did not 
have an effect on bilateral relations between the two countries.   
 
The Six-Day War in 1967 added an entirely new dimension to the Indian 
anti-Israeli approach, namely strong condemnation combined with moral 
righteousness (headed by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi).  The following 
factors strengthened the Indian pro-Arab policy: 
 
• The emergence of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC) in 
1969. 
•  India’s strong economic interests in the Arab world, in particular the : 
174  
'  
o Growing dependence of India on Middle East energy. 
o Economic potential of the Arab market. 
o Importance of the trade routes in the Middle East to the West. 
o  Indian overseas workers in the Gulf countries.  
 
Israel. on the other hand, was considered to be a small and negligible 
market as far as India was concerned in economic terms. After the Arab-
Israeli war in 1973 and the oil crisis that followed, India expressed its 
support for Egypt and Syria and intensified its anti-Israeli rhetoric in the 
UN as well as other international forums. Two years later in 1975 India 
officially recognised the PLO and was the sponsor of the UN General 
Assembly resolution that equated Zionism with racism. In March 1980 
India granted full diplomatic recognition to the PLO. 
 
In June 1981, India denounced the Israeli air force attack on the nuclear 
reactor in Iraq and one year later, in the summer of 1982, it strongly 
condemned the Israeli Military Operation in Lebanon and also expelled the 
Israeli Consul in Bombay from India after he had criticised the 
government’s approach towards Israel in the Indian press.  In November 
1988, India was one of the first countries to recognise the State of 
Palestine. In December 1991, following the Madrid Conference, India 
supported the repeal of the UN General Assembly resolution that equated 
Zionism with racism and on 29 January 1992, fully-fledged diplomatic 
relations were established between the two countries. 
 
In the multilateral arena, India’s hostile relations with Pakistan, the 
emergence of the Arab group in the international system and the UN in 
particular and the Arab states’ numerical asymmetry  with Israel in terms 
of voting power, were important formative factors in India’s foreign policy.  
India expected political support from the Arab countries in the Indo-
Pakistani conflict over Kashmir in return for its anti-Israeli policy.  
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However, India’s efforts, which included an anti-Israeli foreign policy in 
order to keep the Islamic and Arab states from supporting Pakistan in the 
international arena, proved to be ineffective, while Pakistan continued to 
present the Kashmir conflict as a pan-Islamic issue.  The close relations 
between India and Egypt, as well as India's relations with the Arab world, 
including economic relations, ensured a mild Arab approach in the 
international arena.  This also applied to conferences of the Arab heads of 
states.  Nevertheless, it did not change the fact that the Arab nations 
continued their support of Pakistan, which was a disappointment to India, 
yet it did not change its pro-Arab foreign policy.   
 
The rivalries between superpowers during the Cold War affected both 
South Asia and the Middle East adversely.  Israel was associated with the 
Western powers, while India gradually aligned itself with the Soviet side.  
In fact, Indian opposition to military blocs, its active membership of the 
Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) as well as its  concurrence with the Afro-
Asian countries’ criticism  of both the Western powers and the US, brought 
India closer to the Eastern bloc, in general and the Soviet Union, in 
particular, with its antagonistic approach towards Israel.  New Delhi’s view 
was that the State of Israel was acting in collaboration with the Western 
powers and the US, in particular.  On the other hand, India had regarded 
the Soviet Union as an ally, in particular since 1971 when an Indo-Soviet 
treaty of peace, friendship and cooperation was signed between the two 
countries.  India had sided with the Soviet Union against Israel in the 
international arena, in general and international organisations, as well as 
the NAM, in particular.  Furthermore, both countries pursued an anti-Israeli 
and pro-Arab foreign policy as part of their long-term strategic plans.  The 
absence of economic and cultural ties with the US, the hostility of many 
Indian leaders towards it, American aid to Pakistan and the Cold War, 
prevented the US from playing a significant role in the South-Asian region, 
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or playing a constructive role in promoting bilateral relations between India 
and Israel.  
 
The decades after the Afro-Asian conference at Bandung found India and 
China closer to the Arab world and both used anti-Israeli rhetoric in 
international forums.  India was a founder and prominent leader of the 
NAM and as such, had a direct influence on its pro-Arab and anti-Israeli 
foreign policy.  Friendly relations were growing between India and Egypt 
especially, which included personal friendships between Prime Minster 
Nehru and President Nasser of Egypt. Consequently, India became more 
and more politically committed to Egypt in the international arena. 
Traditionally, India had attached a great deal of importance to the UN as 
an international forum and Its history with the organisation was extensive 
and included the sponsoring of anti-Israeli resolutions that demonstrated 
India’s consistent pro-Arab stance .. 
 
In terms of the state and society level of analysis,  a number of factors 
caused Indian opposition parties, academics, journalists and the Indian 
public opinion, to call for a revision of India’s foreign policy towards Israel, 
claiming it could be more rewarding for India’s national interest, but to no 
avail.  The factors included Israel’s military assistance to India during its 
wars with China and Pakistan, an awareness of the Israeli victories in the 
Arab-Israeli wars and the advanced Israeli technology, which could be of 
interest to India. 
 
It should be noted that India’s foreign policy towards Israel in terms of 
bilateral relations between 1948 and 1991, although negative, was passive 
in nature (more reactive than activating), while a consistently pro-Arab 
foreign policy was followed.  Many Indians had felt a great deal of 
admiration and respect for Israel and its military, social, scientific and 
agricultural achievements and began to question India’s foreign policy 
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towards Israel.  That anti-Israel and pro-Arab stance was also criticised by 
various opposition parties, which pleaded with the government to establish 
diplomatic relations with Israel, but to no avail.   The only exceptions were 
the relatively low-level intelligence collaboration and some quiet behind- 
the-scenes diplomacy, as well as a low degree of trade between the 
private sectors of both countries.  
  
In terms of the individual level of analysis, Nehru’s pre-independence 
support of the Arabs was transformed into an anti-Israeli doctrine based 
on his view of Israel as a product of Western imperialism. India’s foreign 
policy towards Israel became more restrictive after Nehru’s death and the 
Indian leaders that followed him, in particular his daughter, Indira Gandhi 
who was a staunch supporter of the Arab cause, went on with his pro-Arab 
and anti-Israeli policy (considered by them as part of Nehru’s heritage). 
Even opposition leaders called for full diplomatic relations and closer 
relations with Israel, while heading coalition governments (without the 
INCP) the Indian anti-Israeli attitudes of their predecessors. A gradual 
diplomatic change in bilateral relations between India and Israel began 
when Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, more open- minded regarding the West 
than his predecessors, came to power in 1984.  The Gulf War in 1991, in 
which Israel did not retaliate to attacks by Iraqi Scud missiles and the 
Madrid conference that followed, significantly improved Israel’s position 
and status in the international system and was one of the important factors 
that paved the way  for the breakthrough in Israeli-Indian relations.  Prior 
to 1991, India had not redefined its national interest in the Middle East in a 
selective way, in general and vis-à-vis the State of Israel, in particular. The 
redefinition of its foreign policy was eventually made in 1992. The first 
significant indication of that redefinition was in 1991 when India voted in 
favour of repealing the General Assembly Resolution that equated Zionism 
with racism.  
 
178  
'  
A historical analysis reveals that up to 1991, India had failed to adjust its 
dogmatic foreign policy towards Israel. It is important to point out that 
India’s foreign policy towards Israel was actually a type of an idée fixe, 
which included a reluctance to deviate from Nehru’s foreign relations 
legacy and Mahatma Gandhi’s idealism.  Added to this were aspects such 
as the conservatism regarding foreign affairs, dogmatic diplomacy and an 
anti-Israeli traditional approach.  Throughout the years preceding 1991, 
the governments of India overestimated the possible political response of 
the Indian Muslims to a change in Indian foreign policy towards Israel.  
India also miscalculated the Arab world’s response to such a step, while 
choosing to ignore the fact that most of the Arab countries had full 
diplomatic relations with countries that maintained diplomatic relations with 
Israel. India persisted with its dogmatic foreign policy regarding Israel, 
even after peace agreements had been signed between Israel and Egypt 
in 1978 and Israel and Jordan in 1994.   
 
In addition, India read the Arab world map correctly with regard to their 
relations with Pakistan, as the Arab countries continued their support of 
Pakistan, despite the Indian pro-Arab and anti-Israeli foreign policy.  
Moreover, India failed to realise that establishing diplomatic relations with 
Israel could be a useful counteractive measure in response to the Arab 
world’s support of Pakistan in general and the conflict over Kashmir in 
particular.  India clung to the erroneous belief that diplomatic relations with 
Israel would harm its international status in the Middle East and its 
relations with the Arab countries and persisted in singling out the State of 
Israel in international forums in terms of moral and political grounds.   
 
India not only failed to adjust its dogmatic foreign policy towards Israel but 
also failed to recognise the common national interests between India and 
Israel. Neither did they realise the potential value of mutual cooperation 
between the two countries, particularly in agriculture, high technology 
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transfer and arm sales.  In addition, India did not fully realise the potential 
common interests of the two countries in the multilateral arena and also 
failed to see the potential of trilateral cooperation between India, Israel and 
other countries in general and with the US as a superpower in particular.  
India's pro-Arab foreign policy did not deliver the expected political 
dividends in the international arena or the Arab world and had prevented it 
from taking an active part in the Middle East.  Regional events and wars in 
the Middle East alienated India from Israel even further and the possibility 
that an alternative foreign policy towards Israel that could be more 
rewarding in terms of India's national interest was not really examined until 
1991.  As a matter of fact, since gaining its independence, India had not 
redefined its strategic interests in the Middle East and failed to adjust its 
foreign policy towards Israel. The advantage of such a redefinition and 
adjustment of India’s foreign policy towards Israel, which was eventually 
made in 1991 and the advantages of having diplomatic relations with 
Israel are analysed and discussed in the following chapters. 
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Chapter 4  
Israel's relations with India prior to January 1992  
4.1 Introduction 
 
In this chapter, the focus is on Israel’s relations with India and Israel’s foreign 
policy towards India before the establishment of diplomatic relations between the 
two states.  The main objective is to describe, examine and analyse Israel's 
foreign policy towards India before the establishment of full diplomatic relations 
between the two states, which took place on 29 January 1992.1  In due course, 
the objective of this chapter is realised by an analysis of the factors that 
influenced Israel’s relations with India and Israel’s foreign policy towards India 
and the effect these factors had on the relations between the two countries prior 
to the establishment of full diplomatic relations.  
 
From an Israeli perspective, this analysis takes into consideration the 
comparative weight and complexity of the pertinent factors and concentrates on 
the historical relations between Israel and India in the first timeframe of the 
research that deals with the period from 1948 to 1991 and includes a reference to 
pre-independence relations.  The emphasis in this chapter is on the ultimate 
decision units that shaped Israeli foreign policy regarding India as well as the 
conduct of diplomacy as a unit of action.  The three Levels of Analysis Model 
provides a conceptual basis in terms of international relations for a historical in-
depth description in this particular phase, as well as an analysis of the Israeli 
foreign policy towards India.  In addition, it helps to broaden the database and the 
informative background from which the analysis in the following chapter is made, 
as a theory can be understood better in social science when it is linked to and 
built upon the enduring insights of the past (Dougherty & Pfaltzgraff, 2001: xiii).  
 
Israel as an international actor is the unit of analysis in this chapter and the 
historical and international political context of this chapter is Israel’s attainment of 
                                            
1
 India’s bilateral relations with Israel and its foreign policy towards Israel were analysed in the 
previous chapter (chapter three). 
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independence on 14 May 1948.  After independence, Israel gave de jure 
recognition to India, while India postponed its recognition of Israel to 17 
September 1950.2  On 7 June 1951 a local resident of German Jewish origin 
named F.W. Pollack was designated by Israel designated as an Honorary 
Consular Agent and a Trade Commissioner for Bombay. On 20 October 1952, he 
was subsequently nominated as an Honorary Consul of Israel. On 3 August 1953, 
Gavriel Doron was nominated as the first Consul of Israel in Bombay. In the 
absence of an Israeli Embassy, the Consulate in Bombay was mainly engaged in 
information and public relations efforts as well as political contacts (Shimoni, 
1991:E6 and 382). 
 
The analysis of Israel’s foreign policy towards India is divided, into two stages 
from a historical and political perspective, namely pre-independent Israel (1929-
1948) and post-independent Israel (1948-1991). The pre-independence stage 
analysis in particular, is relevant to this research, because Israel's foreign policy 
towards India had its roots in the formative years of pre-independent Israel. 
 
Pre-independence events had a direct influence on post- independence bilateral 
relations between the two states.  Thus, the pre-independence phase is an 
important starting point in this diachronic study of Israeli-Indian relations.  The 
external and internal variables that influenced Israel’s foreign policy towards India 
are identified and explained in terms of their international as well as their 
contextual determinants.  This includes their influence on Israel’s foreign policy 
decision-making process. 
 
The pertinent ultimate decision units are identified and analysed as dominant 
players of the Israeli foreign policy towards India before and after the 
establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries.3 The Israeli pre-
independence ultimate decision unit that influenced Israel's relations, as well as 
Israel’s thinking and frame of mind on bilateral relations with India, namely the 
Jewish Agency, is identified and examined.4  Furthermore, the Israeli ultimate 
                                            
2
 For details about India’s recognition of the State of Israel, see section 3.8.1. 
3
 For definition of an ultimate decision unit as well as the Ultimate Decision Model, see section 
2.1. 
4
 For details about the Jewish Agency, see section 4.3. 
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decision unit in the post-independence stage that determined the Israeli foreign 
policy towards India until the establishment of full diplomatic relations in 1991, is 
identified and analysed, namely the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the State of 
Israel, ,. In addition, the three levels of analysis identified in chapter 2 are used in 
this chapter to analyse the bilateral relations between Israel and India.5   
 
International system level of analysis – This type of analysis refers to an 
analysis of the international factors that influenced the foreign policy of the State 
of Israel towards the Republic of India after its independence.  The analysis is 
carried out with Israel as a unitary actor with self-national interests in the 
international system. In this regard, the Israeli foreign relations with India are 
divided into two types, namely, bilateral and multilateral relations. 
 
State and society level of analysis – At this level an analysis is done of the 
national factors in Israel in general and the political factors in particular, which 
influenced the Israeli foreign policy towards India.  Attention will be paid to ruling 
parties such as the Labour Party as well as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 
Israel. 
 
Individual level of analysis – An analysis is done of the individual factors, which 
influenced the Israeli leadership as an ultimate decision unit as well as other 
individuals who played a role in the decision-making process of the Israeli foreign 
policy towards India such as Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion. In the analysis in 
this chapter, the historical and international political context of the independence 
of these two states is important.  It is important to note that Israel’s main aim was 
the establishment of full diplomatic relations with India; especially in Israel’s first 
years when India aspired to lead the non-aligned nations.  
4.2 Pre-independence Israel: Historical and political context of the foreign 
policy towards India 
 
Pre-independence Israeli foreign policy had its roots in the history of Israel, India 
and the INCM.  During the British colonial period, India was a large political entity.  
                                            
5
 For details on the Level of Analysis Model, see section 2.3. 
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The withdrawal of the British and partition in 1947, which created India and 
Pakistan, resulted in geographical boundaries that cut across regional religious, 
social, ethnic and linguistic groups, while challenging the leaders of India to 
attempt to build a secular state with a national identity.  In due course, internal 
security and domestic political considerations such as anti-Muslim communal 
violence and the Kashmir policy influenced the perceived goals of building 
national identity and preserving national unity and permeated India’s relations with 
its neighbours in general, while maintaining a pro-Arab policy regarding the Arab-
Israeli conflict.  
 
Before 1948, as part of the British Mandate in Palestine, Israel was linked to its 
global strategy; therefore, it did not have an independent foreign policy. 
Nonetheless, international events as well as the concept of the future role of 
independent Israel as a Jewish state surrounded by hostile Arab countries, laid 
the foundation of the Israeli foreign policy in general and towards India in 
particular.  Even prior to independence, the Jewish Agency realised that India was 
a key player among the newly independent countries and aspired to lead them as 
was demonstrated in the first Inter-Asian Conference at New Delhi in March 
1947.6 It is noteworthy that there was a great deal of sympathy towards India, its 
national struggle and its quest for independence. 
 
4.3 Pre-independence Israel: Ultimate decision unit 
 
The identification of the Jewish Agency as a pertinent ultimate decision unit of the 
Israeli pre-independence foreign policy towards India and the understanding of 
the relevant decision-making process of this policy are important.  The ultimate 
decision unit provides a better tool in terms of its operational orientation for the 
understanding of the Israeli historical relations with India (as analysed by the state 
and society level of analysis) while concentrating on the Jewish Agency 
leadership in Palestine until 1948.  The Jewish Agency, which was established in 
1929, represented the Jewish community of Palestine and the Zionist 
                                            
6
 For details about the first Inter-Asian Conference at New Delhi see section 4.3. 
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Organisation in Palestine7 vis-à-vis the British Government,8 the Palestine 
administration and the League of Nations. 9  The political department of the 
Jewish Agency therefore handled matters pertaining to foreign relations.  From a 
historical viewpoint, Israel’s foreign policy towards India had its roots in the 
formative years of Israel’s pre-independence.   
 
The Khilafat Movement in India,10  which was founded during World War I, left a 
legacy of hostility regarding Zionism and from that point onwards, not only the 
Muslim League11 but also the predominantly Hindu INCM, followed a pro-Arab 
line.12  
 
The wave of violence and disturbances in Palestine between Arabs and Jews in 
August 1929 resulted in an intensified rallying of Indian support for the Arabs of 
Palestine and in April 1930, an All India Conference on Palestine Affairs was held 
in Bombay. This was followed by a Palestine Day demonstration as well as 
protests against the Balfour Declaration13 in other cities all around India.14   
 
The Jewish Agency in Palestine was informed about the Indian pro-Arab 
demonstrations and according to Gideon Shimoni at this stage, the leadership of 
the Jewish Agency began to show an awareness of the importance of India and 
in April 1930, Gershon Agronsky (Agron), a journalist, was sent to Bombay on 
                                            
7
 The Zionist Organisation, namely Zionism was the movement for national revival and 
independence of the Jewish people in the Holy Land (Palestine). The name was derived from the 
word Zion, one of the biblical names for Jerusalem. Until 1929, the Jewish Agency was a part of 
the World Zionist Organisation (WZO). The latter was established in 1897 with the goal of 
translating the theory of Zionism into political practice (Political Dictionary of the State of Israel, 
1987). For more details about the conflict between the Zionist movement and the Arab Palestinian 
national movement, see section 3.3.2. 
8
 For details about Britain as mandatory power, see section 3.4.1. 
9Article 4 of the mandate of Palestine, granted to Britain by the League of Nations in 1922, 
provided for the establishment of an appropriate Jewish Agency to be recognised as a public 
body for the purpose of advising and cooperating with the administration of Palestine in such 
matters as may affect the establishment of the Jewish national home and the interests of the 
Jewish population in Palestine. 
10
 For details about the Khilafat Movement, see sections 3.4.  
11
 For details about the Muslim League, see sections 3.4.1, 3.4.2 and 3.5. 
12
 For details about the INCM and its pro-Arab line, see sections 3.4 and 3.5. 
13
 Balfour Declaration was a statement of British policy conveyed by Foreign Secretary Arthur J. 
Balfour on 2 November 1917 to Lord Rothschild.  The statement promised to facilitate the 
foundation of a Jewish national home for the Jewish people in Palestine: “His Majesty’s 
government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish 
people.” The declaration was recognised by all allies after World War I and was incorporated into 
the text of the mandate for Palestine granted to Britain in 1922. 
14
 For details about pre-independence India, see section 3.5. 
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behalf of the Jewish Agency (Shimoni, 1977:27).15  In his report on the visit, 
Agronsky urged the Jewish Agency to introduce the Zionist cause to India:  
 
The relation of the Muslims of India to the Arabs of Palestine must not be 
omitted from any consideration of the  Islamic problem confronting the 
Zionist Movement…The time has come for the Zionist Organization to 
consider without delay what measures can be taken that Zionism may 
turn its face, so to speak, to the East (CZA Z4/4129, 1930). 
 
 
In July 1931, Shaukat Ali, one of the founders of the Khilafat movement visited 
Jerusalem and the Mufti of Jerusalem (Yegar, 2004:23).16  The first political 
contact between the Jewish Agency and an Indian leader took place in London, 
where Nahum Sokolow and Zelig Brodetsky, representatives of the Jewish 
Agency, met Mahatma Gandhi on 15 October 1931 (Avimor, 1977:24-26).  The 
meeting with Gandhi was organised with the help of Henry S. L. Polak17 and took 
place following Gandhi’s interview with the Jewish Chronicle on 2 October 1931 
in London during his visit to Britain for the Round Table Conference on India, in 
which he referred directly to the question of Zionism.18  The two representatives of 
the Jewish Agency gave him a brief account of the Zionist cause in which they 
underlined the idea of a Jewish national homeland and emphasised the 
economic, political and social goals achieved by the Jews in Palestine. In his 
reply, Gandhi referred to similar problems experienced in both India and 
Palestine although on a different scale.  
 
Sokolow and Brodetsky seized the opportunity to request that Palestine should 
be kept out of the Indian communal problems and the Round Table discussions.  
They explained to Gandhi that the leaders of the Muslim community in India, 
particularly Shaukat Ali, which had met with the Mufti of Jerusalem three months 
                                            
15
 In August 1929, a wave of violent disturbances by Arab against Jews broke out in Palestine and 
constituted a turning point in the development of the Palestinian problem from a local issue to a 
Pan Muslim one.  
16
 For more details about the visit and the Khilafat movement, see section 3.5. 
17
 A Jewish journalist, Gandhi’s right-hand man in South Africa together his close friend, Polak’s 
sister, was one of the Mahatma’s secretaries in Britain.  
18
  In the interview with the Jewish Chronicle, Gandhi referred to the idea of Zionism in its spiritual 
sense saying that Zion lies in the heart and could thus be realised in any part of the world (The 
Jewish Chronicle, 1931). For more details about Gandhi, see section 3.6.1.   
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earlier,19 were trying to draw Palestine into the Indian communal problem and 
they requested that the subject of Palestine should not be brought into the Round 
Table Conference discussions.  
 
Gandhi was sympathetic and said he would not approve such a move and that it 
would neither be in Palestine nor in India’s interest to introduce the internal 
politics of Palestine into the internal politics of India.  Gandhi also mentioned his 
intention to visit Palestine on his way back to India, but requested that his 
intention of going to Palestine should not be advertised in any way.  Accordingly, 
a hearty welcome was assured to him on behalf of the Jewish people of Palestine 
(CZA S25/6652, 16/3/1937). However, that intended visit by Gandhi never took 
place.   
 
 In fact, it was not until the Arab riots in Palestine in 1936, that the Jewish Agency 
took political action directed at India. 20 It happened only after some prominent 
Hindu leaders, including Jawaharlal Nehru and Mahatma Gandhi, openly spoke 
out in favour of the Arabs in Palestine.21 Moshe Shertok (Sharett), the head of the 
Political Department of the Jewish Agency, decided to send an emissary of 
intellectual calibre to India.   
 
The idea was to establish friendly contacts with some of the Hindu political 
figures in India in order to present the Zionist cause to them. Shertok’s choice fell 
upon Dr. Immanuel Olsvanger.22 It was suggested that Olsvanger would be asked 
to go to India accompanied by Kallenbach.23 Shertok (Sharett) wrote a letter to 
Kallenbach in South Africa and asked him to accompany Olsvanger and to 
introduce him to Gandhi so that he could present the Zionist cause to Gandhi.  
Kallenbach accepted the challenge, however he could not undertake the trip 
immediately as Shertok’s letter arrived on the eve of his departure to London on 
                                            
19
 One of the two brothers-founders of the Khilafat Movement in India. For details about the 
movement see sections 3.5 and 3.6.1. 
20
 For details about India's policy regarding Palestine, see section 3.4. 
21
 For details about the Palestinian Arabs and the Arab Jewish conflict, see section 3.4.2. 
22
 An official of the South African Zionist Federation, Dr. of philology with knowledge of Sanskrit, 
who was acquainted with Hermann Kallenbach.  Kallenbach was an associate and a dedicated 
follower of Gandhi in South Africa.  Gandhi came to South Africa in 1893 to serve for some years 
as a legal assistant to an Indian firm. He became involved in activities against the disabilities from 
which Indians suffered and stayed on in South Africa as the leader of the struggle, until 1914.  
23
 About Kallenbach’s relations with Mahatma Gandhi, see section 3.6.1. 
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business matters. He urged Olsvanger not to wait for him; but to go to India on 
his own.   
 
Olsvanger arrived in Bombay on 12 August 1936 and met with leading Hindu 
political and cultural figures.  He met Sarojini Naidu,24 Mahatma Gandhi and 
Jawaharlal Nehru (he met Nehru twice and later on also exchanged a number of 
letters regarding Zionism with him).  Olsvanger found Nehru biased against 
Zionism in the interest of good relations with Indian Muslims and tried to convince 
him that Zionism was the national movement of the Jews, but to no avail.  
 
Nehru was not willing to recognise more than one legitimate nationalist 
movement in Palestine.  He held the view that the Arab movement was a genuine 
nationalist movement; while the idea of Zionism had been fabricated by British 
imperialism in Palestine in order to divide and rule the Arabs and Jews and no 
argument of Olsvanger could make him change his pro-Arab stance (Shimoni, 
1977:30). 25  Olsvanger sent Nehru a letter of protest, on 25 September 1936, in 
which he accused him of not distinguishing between morality and politics.  Nehru 
replied harshly and quickly pointed out that he believed in every word he had 
uttered with regard to Palestine and insisted that the Arab movement was 
essentially a nationalist movement.26 
 
After meeting Nehru, Olsvanger, met Mahatma Gandhi in his Ashram near 
Wardha.27 The meeting was very short since the Mahatma was weak after an 
illness.  They exchanged a few remarks about Kallenbach’s proposed visit to 
India, but after Gandhi’s short cryptic response to Olsvanger’s comment about 
the fact that Kallenbach was a Zionist, Olsvanger decided not to bring up the 
subject of Zionism at all but rather to leave it entirely to Kallenbach himself.28  
 
While in New Delhi, Olsvanger met with Sydney Jacobson, a Jewish journalist of 
the Statesmen newspaper in Calcutta.  Following their meeting, Jacobson 
                                            
24
 Mrs. Sarojini Naidu was a prominent leader of the INCM, a known poetess, a leader of the 
Indian women’s organisation and a friend and a disciple of Gandhi. 
25
 For details about Nehru's opinion on Zionism, see also section 3.6.2.  
26
 For details about Nehru’s response, see section 3.6.2. 
27
 Ashram is an Indian term for a place of seclusion and meditation. 
28
 For details about Gandhi’s opinion on Zionism, see section 3.6.1. 
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informed the Jewish Agency in Palestine of his impressions regarding the Indian 
attitude about the Palestine situation, namely that his impression was that the 
general attitude of both India and the Indian press was pro-Arab.  This pro-Arab 
attitude had developed for three main reasons, the first being the disturbances in 
Palestine, which had received wide publicity in the newspapers in India.  In the 
second place, the INCM had tried to enlist the support of the Indian Muslims by 
professing sympathy with the Arabs in Palestine. The third fact was that it had 
been a convenient weapon with which the INCM could attack the British 
Government.  According to Jacobson, the use of the Palestinian situation as a 
weapon against the British was largely due to Jawaharlal Nehru, the President of 
the INCM (CZA S25/3239, 23/9/1936).  
 
Following Nehru's pro-Arab statement in September 1936, Golda Meyerson 
(Meir), of the political department of the Jewish Agency in Jerusalem, sent a letter 
of protest to the INCM trying to explain that the people of India misunderstood the 
socialist Zionist work in Palestine, but she did not receive any reply (CZA 
S25/6312, 30/9/1936). 29 
 
Following Olsvanger’s visit to India as well as Jacobson’s review on India, 
Eliyahu Epstein (Eilat), the head of the Arab desk in the political department in 
the Jewish Agency at that time, recommended the introduction of an information 
campaign in India and to develop contacts with Indian leaders (Shimoni, 
1977:28).  In March 1937, Shertok (Sharett) met Olsvanger and Kallenbach in 
London and briefed the latter about Olsvanger’s experience in India and with 
Gandhi in particular.  After a short visit in Palestine, Kallenbach arrived in India 
on 20 May 1937 and was welcomed warmly by Gandhi and his disciples.  He 
handed various pamphlets to Gandhi on the Zionist work in Palestine and made 
an effort (for two months) to gain Gandhi's understanding and sympathy for the 
Zionist case. He also stressed the urgent need of the Jews in Europe for a 
national homeland in Palestine and pointed out that Zionism was not a material 
movement but represented the spiritual aspirations of the Jewish nation.30  
                                            
29
 Golda Meir became the Israeli Minister of Foreign Affairs in the years 1956-1966 and the Prime 
Minister of Israel in the years 1969-1974.  
30
 For details about Gandhi’s attitude, see section 3.6.1. 
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Kallenbach’s visit did not change Gandhi’s negative attitude towards Zionism but 
he became more sensitive to the Jewish case.  Kallenbach reported that Gideon 
Shimoni asserted that Gandhi was willing, if called upon, to contribute to the 
practical working out of such a solution personally. He was willing to assist in 
bringing about direct conversations between the Arabs and Jews without the 
involvement of the British (Shimoni, 1977:33). However, Gandhi gave Kallenbach 
a written statement on Zionism and also gave him his blessing on his intention of 
settling in Palestine.31  On his way back from India to South Africa, Kallenbach 
stopped over in Palestine, handed over Gandhi’s statement about Zionism and 
reported to Shertok about his visit to India.  However, Gandhi never published 
this statement (Sarid & Bartolf, 1997:75).  Kallenbach recommended that the 
Jewish Agency sent him informational material on Zionism, which he would 
forward to Gandhi.32  Another outcome of Kallenbach’s visit in India was a 
decision made by the Jewish Agency in Jerusalem to give financial assistance to 
the Zionist office in Bombay.   
 
On 1 June 1937, David Ben-Gurion,33 the chairman of the Jewish Agency, met 
with Dr. Kayala M. Panikkar34 in London in order to discuss the Zionist cause.  In 
August 1937, following Kallenbach’s recommendations, the political department 
of the Jewish Agency prepared a comprehensive paper on Zionism and it was 
sent through him to Gandhi.  On 20 July 1938, Prof. Chaim Weizmann, the 
President of the World Zionist Organisation (WZO) initiated a meeting with Nehru 
in London for the exchange of views.35   
 
Kallenbach was back in India from February to May 1939 and he met Gandhi as 
well as A.E. Shohet.36  Shohet was an Indian Jew from the community in the 
Baghdadi origin, who conducted the affairs of the Zionist office and its fund in 
Bombay. He used the occasion of Kallenbach's visit to interview Gandhi (he was 
                                            
31
 Details of the meeting and Gandhi’s written statement are elaborated in section 3.6.1. 
32
 For details about Gandhi’s statement, see section 3.6.1. 
33
 Ben-Gurion was the chairman of the Jewish Agency and the Zionist executive in Palestine who 
became the first Prime Minister of the State of Israel later on. 
34
 About K. M. Panikkar, see section 3.6.3. 
35
 For details about the meeting between Prof. Weizmann with Nehru, see sections 4.6.1 and 
3.6.2. 
36
 For details about the meeting between Kallenbach with Gandhi, see section 3.6.1. 
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also the editor of the Jewish bi-weekly paper, The Jewish Advocate, which was 
published in Bombay).  Kallenbach urged Gandhi to declare his views publicly on 
the Arab-Jewish question in Palestine and the persecution of the Jews in 
Germany, but Gandhi was reluctant to do so. 
 
Shohet reported the details of the meeting on 7 March 1939 to the new head of 
the political department of the Jewish Agency, Eliyahu Epstein (Eilat).  According 
to his report, Gandhi viewed the Palestine question as a purely Muslim question; 
nevertheless Shohet recommended that contact with Gandhi should be 
maintained (Shimoni, 1977:49-50).37 
 
In turn, the political department of the Jewish Agency proposed that Joseph 
Nedivi, the town clerk of the city of Tel-Aviv, who was due to visit India, could 
meet with Gandhi and Nehru.  Kallenbach helped to arrange Nedivi’s meeting 
with Gandhi on 22 March 1939 and Shohet joined him. Importantly, Nedivi tried to 
convince Gandhi by emphasising the feudal character of the Arab leaders in 
Palestine and the benefit that the Jews had brought to the Arabs. At the same 
time, they tried to compare this situation to the Gandhian methods that were 
deployed in Gujarat, where low caste labourers were exploited on their own land 
by rich Indian farmers (Stein, 1998:322).  During his visit to India, Nedivi met the 
editor of the Harijan newspaper (who was also Gandhi’s secretary) and Gandhi’s 
son, Devdas Gandhi, who was the managing director of the Hindustan Times 
newspaper, for briefings on the Zionist cause in Palestine.  
 
Gandhi did not change his opinion on the question of Palestine and expressed 
his doubt about Nedivi’s description of the position in Palestine. He added that in 
any case, the requested statement would not serve any useful purpose for his 
visitors; but on the other hand, it would help the Indian-Muslim League by 
attacking the INCM (Shimoni, 1977:49-50). 38  During the meeting with Gandhi, 
Shohet indicated that the Muslims in India were fomenting hostility towards the 
Jews and that Gandhi could help influence Indian public opinion in favour of the 
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  For details about the meeting with Gandhi, see section 3.6.1. 
191 
 
 
Jewish viewpoint, but Gandhi refused to take such a step (CZA S25/6315, 
24/3/1939).  
 
Nedivi’s meeting with Nehru, on 20 March 1939, which took place two days 
before his meeting with Gandhi, was cordial but did not have any impact on 
Nehru’s pro- Arab attitude.  Nedivi also met Sardar V. Patel, chairperson of the 
Parliamentary Sub-Committee of the INCM and Gandhi’s trusted associate, G.D. 
Birla, one of the biggest industrialists and supporters of the INCM.  Other people 
he met were Mahadev Dessai, Gandhi's secretary and editor of the Harijan 
paper, as well as other Indian leaders.  Following Nedivi’s meetings in India, the 
political department in the Jewish Agency decided to upgrade its financial support 
to the Zionist office in Bombay. 
 
In the early 1940s, David Ben-Gurion, in his capacity as chairperson of the Jewish 
Agency, maintained correspondence with Mahatma Gandhi.  Ben-Gurion was an 
admirer of Mahatma Gandhi whom he described as a great pre-eminent Indian 
leader who was involved in a unique struggle, against the biggest empire in the 
world, namely Great Britain using his weapon of non-violence.   
 
The main reason for that correspondence, initiated by Ben-Gurion, was to gain 
Gandhi’s support for the Zionist endeavour, as well as his concern that the Indian-
Muslim response to the events in Palestine might influence the British position 
towards the Jews in Palestine in a negative way.   
 
Ben-Gurion made a distinction between the Muslims in Arab world and the 
Muslims in India. On one hand, he was concerned that the British support of 
Zionism could unite the Muslim world against Britain 39 in outrage and that the 
Western countries, including Britain and the US, might use it as an excuse to 
reduce their support of the Zionist cause.  On the other hand, he considered the 
support of the Arabs in Palestine by the Indian Muslims in India as well as the 
Indian Muslim League to be lip service to the Arab world, while their leaders used 
it to their domestic political advantage against the INCM (Yegar, 2004:31).  
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On 11 May 1945, Eliyahu Epstein (Eilat), in his capacity as the head of the 
Jewish Agency’s political department in Washington, met with Firoz Khan Noon, 
a member of the Indian delegation to the conference on the United Nations 
Organisation Constitution but the meeting was fruitless.  On 20 November 1945, 
F. W. Pollack, the secretary of the central Jewish Board in Bombay, wrote to the 
Jewish Agency in Jerusalem. He also sent copies to the regional Jewish 
Agencies offices in Washington, London and New York, offering an action plan in 
India:  
 
The best would be to delegate a capable personality of our Labour 
Movement who should work here all year round with the help of well 
staffed office. He should be assisted by regular visits of influential pro-
Zionist English and American politicians (CZA S25/2017, 20/11/1945). 
 
  
Even though the Jewish Agency recognised the political potential of India, at that 
stage not much was done about it in practical political terms such as pro-Zionist 
information campaigns in India. The budget allocated to their local office in 
Bombay for political and propaganda activities in India were limited.  The 
rationale for this state of affairs was that the local offices of the Zionist federation 
were not considered useful channels for political contacts because of a lack of 
necessary experience. However, in January 1947, it was pointed out in the 
minutes of a meeting of the political department of the Jewish Agency in London 
that it was important to forge closer ties with Indians in London as well as in India. 
Moshe Shertok (Sharett) himself stressed that more attention should be paid to 
India whose importance was growing steadily (CZA S25/4286, 8/1/1947).  
 
In March 1947 on the eve of Indian independence a Jewish delegation from 
Palestine arrived in India to participate in the first Inter-Asian Conference at New 
Delhi.  This conference was convened as an Asian Relations Conference of 
National Movements in Asia organised by the Indian Council for World Affairs, a 
research body in New Delhi headed by Nehru, in order to discuss the common 
problems of the emerging independent states in Asia.40  
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On 16 May 1947, the political department of the Jewish Agency made a decision 
to open a permanent office of the Jewish Agency in Bombay, which was 
commensurate with its decision in January 1947 to forge ties with Indians. 
However, due to technical and budgetary problems, the decision was not 
implemented.  In September 1947, Mrs. Golda Meyerson (Meir), the head of the 
political department of the Jewish Agency, planned to visit India but cancelled the 
visit because Mr. Meyerson had to leave for New York before the UN voting on 
the Partition Plan (CZA S25/9029, 3/3/1948).   
 
Despite India’s official negative approach towards the Partition Plan 
representatives of the Jewish Agency approached the Indian delegation at the UN 
even before the UNSCOP final report was submitted to the General Assembly as 
the vote of every delegation was considered crucial.  Meetings, in which they 
concentrated on the rationale of the Zionist Movement and the Partition Plan, took 
place in New York, between the Jewish Agency’s representatives and the Indian 
Ambassador to the UN and to the special General Assembly, Assaf Ali.  He (Assaf 
Ali) had also served as the Indian Ambassador to the USA and had previously 
been a chairman of the INCP. On 8 April 1947, Moshe Shertok (Sharett) met with 
Assaf Ali and so did Eliyahu Epstein (Eilat) a few days later.  Both of them 
returned from their meetings with him under the impression that Assaf Ali was 
totally committed to the Arab cause.  One month later, In May 1947, Ben-Gurion 
himself met Assaf Ali for a short and futile meeting during which Ben-Gurion 
categorically refused to consider Assaf Ali’s suggestion to stop Jewish 
immigration to Palestine for five years (Ben-Gurion, 1993:123). Several more 
meetings between Epstein (Eilat) and Assaf Ali took place during the year of 1947 
to discuss the Jewish Arab conflict, but the meetings did not bear any fruit (Yegar, 
2004: 203). 
 
An unfriendly encounter between Ben-Gurion and a high level Indian official took 
place in Jerusalem between 4 and 8 July 1947.  During that period, Ben-Gurion 
testified twice before the UNSCOP and Sir Abdur Rahman, the Indian 
representative to the UNSCOP, was hostile and rude towards him with an 
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unmistakably and openly pro-Arab approach (Ben-Gurion, 1993:266 and Yegar, 
2004:49).41  
 
Before the UN voting on the Partition Plan of Palestine, which took place on 29 
November 1947, Epstein (Eilat) was in constant contact with Dr. Kayala M. 
Panikkar and Shiva Rao, members of the Indian delegation to the UN.  Although 
Panikkar maintained his friendly approach towards the Zionist cause, he told 
Epstein, very clearly, that under no circumstances would the Indian delegation 
defy Nehru’s instructions and vote in support of the Partition Plan.  Shertok 
(Sharett) also met with Panikkar, but despite the latter’s friendly attitude, he was 
not in a position to help change the Indian position.42  
 
On 24 November 1947, a few days before the voting in the General Assembly on 
the Partition Plan, Shertok (Sharett) met with Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit (Nehru’s 
sister) who headed the Indian delegation to the UN assembly.  His aim was to try 
and convince her to modify the Indian vote in Israel’s favour, but to no avail.  Mrs. 
Pandit’s instructions on the voting were peremptory and in fact she had already 
announced on 11 November 1947 that India would vote against the partition.  
 
In a report sent to Ben-Gurion in Jerusalem, it was pointed out that before the 
voting, there had been important meetings with the Indian representatives in the 
Indian delegation to the UN Assembly. Undoubtedly, a high degree of 
understanding had been achieved, but that could not change the Indian 
politically- oriented position.   
 
The report emphasised the fact that there had been a debate within the Indian 
delegation about the voting and that Mrs. Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit had had a 
telephone conversation with her brother, Prime Minister Nehru.  During that 
conversation, she asked his permission to abstain from the voting on the Partition 
Plan in Palestine, but he insisted on her voting against it.  The report concluded 
with a quotation made by Shertok (Sharett) that Nehru's personal doctrine placed 
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section 3.9.2.2. 
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 For details about Panikkar and his approach towards Zionism, see section 3.6.3. 
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India in the pro-Arab bloc and therefore it would be too much to expect that India 
would not vote against the Partition Plan  (CZA S25/5471, 23.10.1947).  
 
On 1 February 1948, Ben-Gurion sent a cable of condolence to Prime Minister 
Nehru after the assassination of Mahatma Gandhi, on behalf of the Jewish 
Agency: 
 
Profoundly moved by the tragic news of Mahatma Gandhi's   death. 
Beg to convey to you, your government and entire Indian people 
expression of deep sorrow and heartfelt sympathy of Jews of 
Palestine and Jewish people throughout the world.  Example of 
Mahatma's life and teaching will always shine like a beacon to guide 
men of good will everywhere along the path of goodness and human 
worth (CZA S25/7494, 1/2/1948). 
 
4.4 Pre-independence Israel: The international system level of   analysis  
 
Israel’s pre-independence policy towards India, as well as Israel’s historical 
relations with India, including the meetings with Gandhi and Nehru, is a key factor 
that laid the foundation for the relations between Israel and India after Israel’s 
independence and is analysed in terms of the international level of analysis.43  
 
The pre-independence Zionist foreign policy towards India was self-restricted 
because of the reasons discussed in the following sub-sections.  The British 
mandate, which was granted to Britain at the pre-independence stage by the 
League of Nations in 1922, imposed limits on the freedom of international politics 
and the foreign activities of the Jewish leadership in Palestine.  Because of the 
imposed British limits, the Jewish Agency foreign activities were linked to the 
British global strategy.  However, there was nothing, in practical political terms, 
except a lack of political interest and general knowledge that the INCM was a 
supporter of Arab national movements that prevented the Zionist leaders from 
establishing relations with the INCM.  
 
The basic assumption of the Zionist Movement leaders was that the Muslim 
community in India (over 95 million before the India-Pakistan partition) was 
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opposed to the Zionist Movement in Palestine.  They made no serious attempt to 
establish contact with the leadership of the Indian Muslim community. There was 
a great deal of sympathy for India and its national struggle among the Jewish 
community in Palestine during the pre-independence era and Gandhi and Nehru 
were revered by many and there was an intellectual curiosity for India’s history, 
culture and spiritual tradition.   
 
Nonetheless, that sympathy was not translated into a political systematic effort to 
establish political contact with the INCM.  Moreover, only minimal effort was made 
to explain Zionism and the Jewish cause in Palestine to the Indian nationalists, 
with the exception of Mahatma Gandhi and Nehru. The reason for this state of 
affairs was because Gandhi and his teachings, despite his pro-Arab attitude and 
his opinion of the Zionist cause, carried special moral weight as far as the Zionist 
leadership in Palestine was concerned.  On the other hand, Nehru had a special 
appeal for the pre-dominantly socialist Jewish leaders, despite his pro-Arab 
approach (Shimoni, 1991:E3). 
4.4.1 Zionism’s self- imposed international isolation from India  
 
With historical hindsight, it now appears that the absence of relations between 
the Jewish Agency and the INCM turned out to be a political mistake and an 
obstacle to bilateral relations between the two countries after independence.  
This was directly related to the fact that their legal status as independent states 
and sovereignty could not erase the colonial heritage.  In order to obtain greater 
clarity regarding this issue in the field of world politics, we need to begin by 
examining the legacy and the history of the new independent states (Kegley & 
Wittkopf, 1995). 
 
The Jewish national movement and the Zionist leaders avoided identification with 
anti-colonial movements in Asia. They did not regard Zionism as an anti-
colonialist movement, but rather as a unique national revival movement of the 
Jewish people in the Holy Land.  No Zionist representative was to be found at the 
various anti-imperialist conferences and the Zionist Organisation did not join the 
international congress against imperialism (unlike the INCM that had joined it in 
1928). The only exception was the New Delhi Conference of the Asian Relations 
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Organisation (23.3.47-2.4.47), 44 which took place after the meeting of the political 
department of the Jewish Agency at which a decision was made to forge closer 
connections with the Indians in London and India.45   
 
There were no public pronouncements aligning the Zionist goals with those of the 
Asian nationalists, despite the fact that there was a strong affection for Gandhi 
and Nehru among the Jews in Palestine. A special effort was made to change 
their opinion regarding the Zionist cause. Nehru in particular, appealed to the 
predominantly Jewish socialist leadership in Palestine (his autobiography was 
translated into Hebrew in the thirties and was widely read).  Mahatma Gandhi 
was also admired for his moral stance and carried special moral weight as far as 
the Zionist leaders in Palestine were concerned.  They considered morality a 
precondition for a Zionist policy as declared specifically by Ben-Gurion (Gal, 
2004:17).46  Despite the Israeli affection for Gandhi and Nehru, the Indian 
approach towards Zionism made little difference to the Zionist leaders in 
Palestine, who concentrated their diplomatic efforts in London, Washington and 
Geneva.47   
 
This type of indifference could be understood in terms of the fact that the Zionist 
leaders in Palestine and the world Jewry were predominantly Western as well as 
the fact that potential Jewish funds and Jewish immigrants came from the 
Western countries.  The Jewish claim for national self-determination in Palestine 
seemed baseless to the Indian leaders.  In addition, they did not view the Jewish 
struggle for statehood and Zionism as a part of the general Asian struggle for 
national self-determination (that position was reserved by them for the Arabs). 
This view of the Jewish struggle in Palestine also provided the basis for the 
linking of Zionism with British imperialism by the INCM. 
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 The headquarters of the League of Nations were situated in Geneva. 
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Indians, in general, had little knowledge of Judaism and the Bible (Old 
Testament)48 and even a spiritual leader like Mahatma Gandhi, who included the 
Bible among the great religious books and had Jewish friends, could not accept 
the Zionist idea of the indissoluble link between the Jewish people, the Bible and 
Zion as the Holy Land.  Organising a possible information campaign about the 
Zionist cause in India was therefore more complicated than in the Christian 
Western countries.  In practical terms, it was difficult for the Zionist movement in 
Palestine to carry out any diplomatic campaigns in India where there was little 
inducement or opportunity to explain the Zionist cause.  As Michael Brecher 
(1962:127) puts it, the lack of knowledge about the Jewish link to Palestine was 
one of the factors that led Indians to discount the Jewish claim to the Holy Land. 
Moreover, the lack of anti-Semitism in India led them to discount the need for an 
independent Jewish state.   
 
On the other hand, the lack of knowledge by the Jewish leaders in Palestine of the 
Indian heritage and society is revealed by the fact that no attempt was made by 
the Jewish Agency to approach the Indian-Christian community that was familiar 
with the Bible and the New Testament, in order to gain their support for the Zionist 
cause.  In the broader context of the cultural and social gap, India seemed a 
remote, huge and strange country to the Zionist leaders.  What made India even 
more strange and different was its history and culture and the fact that it was a 
society seriously affected by caste conflicts and poverty. Consequently, India did 
not feature at all in the Jewish Agency’s future international plans.  
 
Despite the Jewish Agency’s office in Bombay, the Jewish community in India was 
not used as a bridge between the two national movements or as a local lobbying 
platform. The members of the Jewish community lacked lobbying capacity and 
power and in fact, India’s Jews (before Israel’s independence) numbered less 
than thirty thousand and did not have any political status or influence in New 
Delhi.49 
 
                                            
48
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The low-level priority of India on the Jewish Agency’s list was the main reason 
that no serious attempt was made to establish direct contact between the two 
national movements. The main concern of the Zionist leaders in Palestine 
regarding the struggle for independence in India had to do with the British concern 
about the conflict between the Jews and the Arabs in Palestine. This conflict could 
trigger disturbances amongst the Arabs throughout the Middle East and possibly 
also amongst the Muslims in India, a concern that could have had a negative 
influence on the British policy in Palestine.50 
 
The Zionist Movement was a Western oriented organisation that drew its support 
from the West and was identified with the British Government (and the Balfour 
Declaration), a force that the INCM was struggling against in order to achieve 
independence.51  Some of the movement leaders were identified with Britain, in 
particular Prof. Chaim Weizmann, the president of the World Zionist Organisation 
(WZO) who was pro-British in his philosophy and his political practice and Ben-
Gurion, the Chairman of the Jewish Agency in Palestine, who pursued and 
American oriented foreign policy (Gal, 2004:19).52 
 
Therefore, the Zionist Movement was regarded by the INCM as an extension of 
European colonialism and not as a genuine national movement.  Zionism was 
regarded, by many of the Indian leaders and Nehru in particular, as a British 
interest and a means to carry out their “divide and rule” policy between the Jews 
and the Arabs in Palestine (according to Indian leaders, similar to what occurred 
in India with the Hindus and the Muslims).  
 
The Zionist Movement failed completely to respond to the Indian political 
perception regarding Palestine or to try and modify the information concerning the 
Zionist cause accordingly.  It is important to note that no serious effort was made 
to change the perceptions regarding the Zionist cause amongst the Indian 
politicians and leaders as a target audience. In addition, not much effort was 
made to disseminate relevant information amongst the Indian public. Such a 
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change in tactics would have had to deal first and foremost with the fact that 
partition, as a political solution, was counter to the political goals of the INCM that 
was interested in independence in India, but without partition.  The Partition Plan 
of Palestine could set a negative example by encouraging Muslims in India to 
demand a separate independent state.  In addition, the INCM was committed to 
the idea of a secular state and to them the idea of religion being the basis of 
nationality was unacceptable as they regarded Zionism as a Jewish, religion 
based movement. The only exception was Professor Bergmann who tried to adapt 
the message of Zionism to his audience, during the New Delhi Conference of the 
Asian Relations Organisation (The New Delhi Conference Report, 1947). 53 
 
Although the Jewish Agency gradually recognised India’s importance, India did 
not head their list of priorities despite attempts to meet with Gandhi and Nehru. 
Importantly, no political activities or information campaigns, regarding the Zionist 
cause, were undertaken. The Zionist Movement saw no reason to offend Great 
Britain, especially during World War II, by publicly aligning its cause with that of 
the INCM.  Contrary to the Jewish national movement, the Arab nationalists and 
the Arab national movements formed close relations with the INCM, a process 
that had already started in the late 1920s and used them for propagating the Arab 
cause regarding Palestine.54 The friendly relations between the INCM and the 
Arab national movements had a negative impact on the Jewish Agency. This was 
an additional reason why direct contacts with the INCM were not initiated by the 
Jewish movement (Shimoni, 1977:E4). 
 4.4.2 The Jewish Palestinian delegation to India 
 
The New Delhi Conference of the Asian Relations Organisation that took place 
between 23 March 1947 and 2 April 1947, was an international conference during 
which India’s national leaders convened an Asian conference for national 
movements struggling for independence.  An official invitation was extended to 
the Hebrew University in Jerusalem only after Sarojini Naidu, a prominent INCM 
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leader and a national poetess, overcame strong opposition in New Delhi.55  
Nehru’s sister, Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit, who was India’s representative to the UN, 
assisted her. Mrs. Pandit was also approached, regarding that matter by 
Congressman Emanuel Celler and according to him, following his appeal, Mrs. 
Pandit requested her brother, Nehru, to issue an invitation, to the Hebrew 
University, to attend the conference (CZA S25/7482, 22/1/1947).  
 
In his inauguration speech, Nehru avoided any reference to the Jewish 
Palestinian delegation (although he welcomed other delegations warmly).  
Following the strong attack of Zionism by the head of the Egyptian delegation to 
the conference and the representative of the Arab League, Professor Samuel 
Hugo Bergmann, the head of the Jewish delegation, requested the right to 
respond.   However, his request was denied by Nehru who chaired the 
conference.  Professor Bergmann and his delegation left the conference hall in 
protest, but returned after the Indian delegates approached him.  Nehru 
appeased the Jewish Palestine delegation by allowing David Hacohen to chair 
the economic committee for two days.  He also invited the delegation to a 
private dinner with his sister, Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit and his daughter Indira 
Gandhi (who later became India’s Prime Minister). 
 
In his closing speech, Nehru expressed the sympathy of the Indian people with 
the suffering of the Jewish people in Europe as well as other places, but he 
went on to point out that India had always held the opinion that Palestine was 
mainly an Arab country.56    
 
The Jewish delegation met with Indian leaders as well as with high-level officials.  
During the conference, the delegation met key persons in India and established 
many contacts in particular with Indian socialist leaders who expressed an 
interest in Israel’s social enterprises such as the Kibbutz57 and the Moshav.58  The 
delegation met Socialist leaders such as Jaya Prakash Naryah, Ashok Mehta and 
Rammanohar Lohia, who expressed a special interest in the Jewish experience 
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in agriculture in Palestine. It also met Achary Kripalani, the president of the 
INCM, Sarojini Naidu, the writer Shinta Shiva Rao and her mother Rama Rao, a 
leader of the all- India Women’s Association.  
 
Gandhi’s meeting with the delegation was a short and disappointing encounter.  
He was reluctant to make any public statement on the Jewish question, adding, 
that if they insisted, his words would be directed mainly against Jewish terrorism 
in Palestine as well as for the adoption of the matchless weapon of non-violence. 
He therefore asked to be left out of the picture (CZA S25/7485, 17/4/1947). 59  
 
The delegation’s meeting with Nehru was cordial and following the delegation’s 
request, he agreed to extend the duration of the stay of a few hundred Jewish 
refugees from Afghanistan who were stranded in Bombay.  Nonetheless, he did 
not change his opinion about the Palestine question.60  During the meeting with 
Nehru, David Hacohen, one of the members of the Jewish delegation and a 
member of the political department of the Jewish Agency, brought up the option of 
partition in Palestine and later on he also reiterated it in writing to Nehru:  
 
 
Nothing but the establishment of a Jewish commonwealth, within the 
wider framework of the neighbouring states, can cure the world of the 
Jewish malaise but erecting a refuge for our people wherever and 
whenever they are persecuted and creating at the same time a 
constructive outlet for their energies.  We have achieved remarkable 
results in nation building but we lack the attributes of statehood 
without which we can make no further progress (CZA S25/7484, 
31/3/1947). 
 
   
Nehru, who did not support the idea of partition in Palestine, did not respond to 
the letter although he admitted he had read it (CZA S25/7485, 17/4/1947).  In 
addition, although the Indian press was found to be unfriendly towards the Jewish 
Palestine delegation, following their participation in the New Delhi conference, 
they strongly recommended the opening of an economic liaison office in 
Bombay.61 According to the delegation's report (The New Delhi Conference 
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Report, 1947), the Jewish Palestinian delegation to the conference met some 
resistance and hostility, and experienced several negative incidents, but at the 
same time, it also gained some support particularly from the Indian socialist 
leaders. 
 
Following the New Delhi conference, on 9 July 1947, a Hebrew Palestinian Unit of 
the New Asian Relations Organisation was established in Jerusalem and the 
following cable, giving information about the inauguration of the new local unit, 
was sent to Nehru in New Delhi: "On behalf (of the) Hebrew Palestine Unit of the 
New Asian relations inaugurated yesterday conveying you sincere greetings."  In 
return, Rao's secretary cabled back: "Your cable to Nehru. Hearty welcome to 
Hebrew Palestine Unit. Wishing best luck" (The New Delhi Conference Report, 
1947).  
 
The next meeting of the Asian Relations Organisation (ARO) was held in January 
1949 in New Delhi, in order to discuss Dutch politics in Indonesia, but the Hebrew 
Palestinian unit was not invited because of Arab pressure and the threat of a 
boycott (Kochan, 1976:249). 
 
      4.5 Pre-independence Israel: The state and society level of analysis 
 
The pre-independence Israeli foreign policy towards India is explained by the 
state and society (national) level of analysis with an emphasis on the Jewish 
Agency as an ultimate decision unit and the world Jewry.62  The pre-independence 
Zionist foreign policy was dependent on world Jewry and the Jewish organisations 
in the world, while special importance was attached to the Jewish media.  
 
The world Jewry was often an asset for the Jewish Agency as Jews around the 
world supported the Jewish Agency as part of their strong identification with the 
latter's aims.  The backing and support could take any one of several forms, 
ranging from fund raising and tourism, to volunteering personal services in times 
of crisis and war. However, the most important show of solidarity was the political 
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support the Zionist National Movement received as well as the support of the 
Jewish media.63  
 
In fact, the Jewish media played a defining role in the pre-independence relations 
between Israel and India.  On 2 October 1931, The Jewish Chronicle in London 
interviewed Mahatma Gandhi, during his visit to Britain for the Round Table 
Conference on India. In the interview, Gandhi referred to the spiritual basis of 
Zionism, by saying that Zion lies in the hearts and can therefore be realised in 
any part of the world.64  
 
The Jewish Chronicle did not like Gandhi’s message and the editorial pointed out 
the irony in his statement that Jews should not think of their own rehabilitation in 
national terms; whereas it was known that he was in London to demand national 
self-determination for India (The Jewish Chronicle, 2/10/1931).  One month later. 
Rabbi Stephen Wise criticised Gandhi, in The Jewish Chronicle, for his negative 
attitude regarding the Jewish national homeland, while he himself had demanded 
similar national self-determination for India.65  Importantly, between 1931 and 
1938, Gandhi refrained from writing about Palestine.  
 
In September 1936, Sydney Jacobson (CZA S25/3239, 23/9/1936), a Jewish 
journalist at the Statesmen newspaper in Calcutta, sent his impressions to the 
Jewish Agency in Palestine on the Indian attitude about the Palestine situation and 
pointed  out that:  
 
Palestine has come into some prominence: 1) Because the disturbances (in 
Palestine) have received wide publicity in the newspapers. 2) Because the 
Congress (nationalist) Party has tried to enlist the support of the Indian 
Muslims for its movement by professing sympathy with the Arabs in 
Palestine. 3) Because Palestine is a convenient weapon for Congress 
propagandists and newspapers to attack the British Government with.  
 
 
Jacobson added that there is intrinsically nothing anti-Semitic in this, that Indian 
Muslims were not deeply interested in Palestine, that the Pan-Islamic movement 
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was almost extinct in India and that the president of the INCM, Jawaharlal Nehru, 
used the Palestinian situation as a stick with which to beat British Imperialism.  
 
In 1938, Gandhi published a critical article on Zionism (Harijan, 38).  A. E. Shohet, 
the editor of the Jewish Advocate in Bombay, was the first to respond to Gandhi’s 
article in which he rejected the claim of the Jews to a national home. Shohet 
pointed out that Gandhi was judging the Jews according to higher spiritual 
standards than those applied to the Arabs and blamed Gandhi for being pro-Arab 
and biased.  Accordingly, Shohet felt that Gandhi had applied double standards in 
his judgment (Shimoni, 1977:49).  
 
A year earlier, Shohet had sent a letter to Nehru in which he declared his 
willingness to write an article about the Palestinian problem, but Nehru declined 
the offer with the excuse that he was too busy with other work.  However, Nehru 
used the opportunity to indicate, in his response, that the Jewish leaders in 
Palestine had relied too much on British support. He added that the resolution of 
the problem lay in the creation of an independent Arab state with the protected 
rights of Jews being an integral part of it (CZA S25/6312, 26/8/1937). 66 
 
Hayim Greenberg, the editor of the Jewish Frontier newspaper (a Zionist socialist 
paper printed in America), was an admirer of Gandhi. He too wrote a letter to 
Gandhi, in response to his article in the Harijan in which he had rejected the claim 
of the Jews to a national home in Palestine as well as their need for national self-
fulfilment.  Greenberg accused Gandhi of being biased and unfair towards the 
Jews and that he had ignored the imperative existential need for a Jewish 
homeland.  Gandhi responded to this accusation in his column in the Harijan, and 
even reproduced an abridgment of Greenberg’s letter pointing out that he saw no 
reason to change the opinion he had expressed in his article (Harijan, 1939). 67  
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In February 1939, Shohet interviewed Gandhi on the Palestinian question for the 
Jewish Advocate newspaper and although Gandhi referred to it in terms of Indian 
domestic politics, indicating that he regarded it as a purely Muslim question, the 
interview was not published as Gandhi did not approve it for publication.68 On 22 
March 1939, Shohet (who accompanied Nedivi to his meeting with Gandhi) 
interviewed Gandhi for the second time, but the notes of Gandhi’s secretary of 
that interview, which were sent to Shohet for possible publication, did not include 
Gandhi’s remark that he considered the real object of the Indian Muslim League’s 
propaganda on the Palestine question to be the INCM. Once again, that interview 
was never published. Shohet attributed that omission to the fact that although 
Gandhi was receptive he was also shrewd (CZA S25/6315, 24/3/1939).69  
 
Reports about India in the Jewish press in general and in Palestine, in particular, 
exposed the decision-makers in the Jewish Agency and the leaders of the world 
Jewry to the political potential of India in the international arena. This contributed 
to the fact that India was eventually put on the political agenda of the Jewish 
Agency as well as American Jewish organisations.   
 
4.6 Pre-independence Israel: The individual level of analysis 
 
The individual level of analysis is a key factor in the research of the Israeli 
historical relations with India.  The pre-independence Israeli foreign policy towards 
India was initiated and carried out by Zionist leaders and legislators as well as 
Jewish intellectuals. The following individuals and their contribution to the efforts 
to form contacts between the Jewish Agency and the INCM are indicated in this 
section. 
 
4.6.1 Zionist leader: Professor Chaim Weizman 
 
Professor Chaim Weizmann, President of the World Zionist Organisation (WZO), 
had considerable influence amongst the world Jewry and was strongly pro-British 
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in his political philosophy and practice (Gal, 2004:24).70  In 1926, he met Kayala 
M. Panikkar in London for the exchange of views.71  On 20 July 1938, he met 
Nehru in London where he tried to convince him of the Jewish moral right to the 
Holy Land and that the Jews had never given up the idea of returning to Zion 
(Palestine) as a free nation, but to no avail.72   
  
In 1943, Weizmann met Panikkar, in New York this time.  In 1947, the two met 
when Panikkar was a member of the Indian delegation to the UN.  The meeting 
with Panikkar was friendly but did not deliver any results as far as influencing the 
Indian vote regarding the Partition Plan as far as Palestine was concerned.  On 24 
November 1947, five days before the voting on the Partition Plan in the UN, 
Weizmann met with Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit, Nehru’s sister, the head of the Indian 
delegation to the UN General Assembly.  However, the meeting did not bear any 
fruit since she was under direct instruction from her brother to vote against it.  In 
his effort to convince the Indian delegation, Weizmann met with the Indian 
Ambassador to the US, Bengal Rama Rao.  Although that was the beginning of a 
friendship between the two of them, that eventually led to scientific cooperation 
with India, the meeting itself was fruitless since the Indian delegation could not 
defy Nehru’s instructions (Yegar, 2004:53).  
 
On 25 November 1947, Weizmann sent a note to the President of the US, Harry 
Truman, asked him to exert an influence on India (including other countries 
closely associated with the US) in favour of the Partition Plan in order to gain the 
majority in the voting in the General Assembly (ISA 93.03/2270/8, 25/11/1947).73  
In a last minute attempt before the Partition Plan vote, on 27 November 1947 (two 
days before the voting), Weizmann sent a personal cable to Nehru in New Delhi. 
In it he urged him to support the Partition Plan because that would mean 
independence for the Jews as well as the Arabs; consequently, it would lead to a 
better climate for Jewish-Arab understanding and would bring independent and 
harmonic development to the whole region:  
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I solemnly appeal to you at (the) most critical hour of two thousand years of 
Jewish history... (A) defeat of this proposal means invitation to Palestine 
Arabs led by Mufti (to) attack Palestine Jewry since it involves abdication of 
United Nations from control and abandonment (of) Palestine to free conflict 
(sic). Acceptance of (the) proposed decision involves independence for 
majority (of) both Arabs and Jews, termination of the mandate and good 
conditions for immediate Arab-Jewish understanding...(I) cannot 
understand how India can wish (to) obstruct such (a) settlement. May (a) 
sense of historic responsibility (of) peace of Asia guide your country’s 
actions (ISA 93.03/92/34, 27/11/1947).  
 
 
An identical telegram was also sent by him to the UN Indian delegation in New 
York, but his emotive appeal did not bring about any change in the Indian vote 
(ISA 93.01/2206/9, 27/11/1947).  
 
In November 1947, Weizmann offered science cooperation to Prime Minister 
Nehru, who served as a Minister of Science Research in addition to his post as 
Prime Minister of India.  The offer was made through Bengal R. Rao, the Indian 
constitutional advisor for scientific and technical cooperation. Nehru made use of 
the opportunity and invited scientists from Palestine to attend the Indian Science 
Congress, which took place in January 1948, but eventually the scientific 
cooperation did not materialise because of technical problems related to the 
Israeli War of Independence (Rao, 1972:40).  Unlike the Jewish Agency, 
Weizmann attached a great deal of importance to India as he wrote in his 
autobiography:  
  
 It was my good fortune during those fateful days of the United Nations 
sitting to come in close contact with the Indian delegation…These men 
look upon Palestine as an outpost of opportunity to build a bridge between 
the East and the West, which is one of the most attractive roles which the 
Jewish State in Palestine can play (Weizmann, 1949:570). 
 
4.6.2 Jewish legislators 
 
Jewish legislators abroad and in the US and Britain in particular, played a key role 
in the effort to promote international relations between the Jewish Agency and the 
INCM:  
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Sidney Silverman – He was a member of the British Parliament and a veteran 
advocate of the cause of Indian independence.  He paid a visit to Gandhi in India 
in March 1946 and discussed the Jewish question with him.  According to a 
report on his meeting in the Statesman newspaper, Gandhi expressed his 
sympathy with the Jews after World War II. However, he added his condemnation 
of the violent methods that the Jews were using in Palestine, stating that because 
of those methods; he was unable to support the Jewish cause in Palestine.74 
When asked by Gandhi about the Arabs in Palestine, Silverman pointed out that 
the country itself had largely been a wasteland when the Jews returned there and 
only after they had developed it, others wanted to evict them from that area. 
Nonetheless, Gandhi remained unconvinced, but he did not publish the 
discussion (Shimoni, 1977:57; Yegar, 2004:36). 
 
Emanuel Celler – US. Congressman Celler who was the chairman of the 
Judiciary Committee House was well-known and popular in India because of his 
support of the Indian struggle for independence in the American Congress. 
Importantly, he was instrumental in ensuring   that the Jewish delegation received 
an invitation to the first Asian Relations Organisation Conference in New Delhi in 
March 1947 (CZA, S25/7482 22/1/1947).  On 6 May 1947, he sent a letter that 
was later published in the US Congressional records to Nehru accusing him of a 
pro-Arab bias. Celler accused Nehru of sacrificing his principles for political 
opportunism.  He asserted that Jews had the moral right to a Jewish independent 
state; in particular after the Holocaust. Such a state could offer security to 
hundreds of thousands of Jewish refugees. Celler also sent a similar letter to 
public figures and organisations in India (Political Documents of the Jewish 
Agency, 1998).  
 
After the composition of the UNSCOP committee was made public in New York 
and after the Jewish Agency executive had expressed its concern regarding the 
fact that UNSCOP’s Muslim members, who represented India and Iran, would 
support the Arab case, Celler expressed his own concern about it in a cable sent 
to Nehru.  Nehru’s brief response to him, as reported by Epstein to Shertok 
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(Sharett), indicated that instructions from Nehru to the Indian representative in the 
UN committee (UNSCOP) emphasised the quasi-judicial character of the inquiry 
with special emphasis on complete impartiality (CZA S25/5373, 18/6/1947).  
However, Nehru’s instructions did not dissuade the Indian representative from 
following his biased approach.75 In October 1947, Celler made an effort to 
influence the Indian voting on the Partition Plan and personally tried to convince 
Mrs. Pandit, the Indian representative to the UN and Nehru’s sister, that the Indian 
attitude regarding the matter was wrong.  However, it was all to no avail, as she 
could not defy Nehru’s instructions from New Delhi (Yegar, 2004:53).76  In October 
1949, Celler accompanied Ambassador Eilat to his meeting with Prime Minister 
Nehru, where he stated that the US public was equally interested in India, Israel 
and close cooperation with the US. He also pointed out to him that Indian 
appeasement would not impress Arabs.77 
4.6.3 Jewish intellectuals 
 
The following Jewish intellectuals were another group that tried to influence the 
Indian attitude towards Zionism: 
 
Stephen Wise – In 1930, Rabbi Wise, from London, tried to secure a favourable 
reference to Zionism from Gandhi, but with no success (Rao, 1972:42).  One year 
later, in 1931, in an article published in The Jewish Chronicle, he criticised 
Gandhi on his attitude towards the Jewish national homeland, while he himself 
had demanded similar national self-determination for India (The Jewish 
Chronicle, 1931).78 
 
Martin Buber and Judah Magenes - Buber the philosopher and   Magenes the 
president of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem were two leading Jewish 
intellectuals, both of whom had long been admirers of Mahatma Gandhi.  In 
addition, both were devoted to Jewish-Arab peaceful co-existence and they were 
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also disappointed with Gandhi’s one-sided pro-Arab stance and undertook to 
enter into dialogue with him.  
 
Each of them composed a letter to Gandhi, to explain his respective 
misinterpretation of Judaism’s ideals and also stressed that his assertion that 
Zion was far from being an ideal in the heart of each individual Jew was 
erroneous as this ideal was in fact in the heart of the Jewish people as a 
collective community.79 They tried to counteract Gandhi’s bias in favour of the 
Arabs as it appeared in his statement about a Jewish homeland, according to 
them (Harijan, 1938). 80  
 
The argument that Buber presented to Gandhi, was that Jewish life would always 
be lacking in an essential way if the Jewish people had no spiritual and 
intellectual centre in Palestine as a national Homeland.  He also went on to 
explain to Gandhi that the Arabs attained their right of ownership in Palestine by 
conquest, which is a morally deficient way according to Gandhi’s own beliefs.  
Magenes argued that Jewish life would always lack   an essential constituent if 
Judaism and the Jewish people had no spiritual and intellectual centre in the Holy 
Land.  The two letters were sent in March 1939, but Gandhi probably never read 
them, considering the fact that absolutely no mention of those letters appeared in 
Gandhi’s writings or in his private letters to Kallenbach. In fact, when asked about 
the letters by Louis Fischer, Gandhi’s American biographer, Gandhi’s response 
was that he had no recollections of those letters (Shimoni, 1977:42).  
 
Henry S. L. Polak – Polak was a Jewish journalist and an old time associate of 
Gandhi who did not agree with Gandhi’s opinion that the Jews should practise 
true Satyagraha (Gandhi’s philosophy of non-violence) during the Holocaust.81  
Polak wrote to Gandhi asking for his reassurance that he had been misreported. 
Gandhi replied, in the Harijan, that his point was that the Jews were not non-
violent in the sense meant by him. Polak remonstrated in strong terms and he 
challenged Gandhi to prove his statement or to withdraw it unequivocally.  
Gandhi made a public retraction in the Harijan:  
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I did not realize the importance of the rebuke and I only hope that my 
observation did not harm any single Jew (Harijan, 1939). 
  
Felix Frankfurter – The US Supreme Court Justice Frankfurter was a staunch 
supporter of Zionism who was acquainted with the Indian constitutional advisor, 
Bengal R. Rao, when the latter was the Indian Ambassador to the US.  
Frankfurter was the one who introduced Professor Weizmann, the President of 
the World Zionist Organisation (WZO) to Rao at the end of 1947.  Weizmann in 
collaboration with Rao, tried to promote scientific and technological ties with the 
newly established Government of India with the blessing of Prime Minister Nehru, 
but that collaboration did not materialise due to the war of Independence in Israel 
(Chaim Weizmann Institute Archives, 22/11/1947; Rao, 1972:40). 82 
 
Albert Einstein – The world famous scientist and Nobel laureate appealed to 
Prime Minister Nehru, in 1947, and urged him to support the Partition Plan.  Nehru 
replied to his appeal on 11 July 1947, explaining India's support of the Arabs 
without changing his attitude towards the issue (ISA 93.03/92/34, 11/7/1947). 
 
Despite all the efforts made by a number of prominent Jewish leaders and 
individuals, their effect on the pre-independence Indian policy towards Zionism 
was marginal.   
4.7 Post- independence Israel: Historical and political context of foreign 
policy towards India 
 
The pre-independence time laid the foundation for Israel’s foreign policy, which 
was based on the historical concept of the role of the State of Israel as an 
independent, Jewish, democratic and modern state. The expansion of diplomatic 
relations with all countries was the general aim of the State of Israel’s foreign 
policy, but the Israeli–Arab conflict constrained it, because of the need to combine 
foreign policy with military actions.   
 
After independence, the main goal on the Israeli agenda was to consolidate the 
political and territorial gains that gave great weight to Israel’s security.  The 
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prevailing view of Israel was that of an underdog and a courageous small country, 
while the Arab countries embarked on a systematic campaign to discredit Israel, 
which was later   supported by many new Third World countries in general and 
India in particular. 
 
The Israeli foreign policy consciously sought opportunities to make closer contact 
with Western Europe and the US.  The collaboration with Britain and France 
against Egypt in 1956 was considered a compelling necessity in the eyes of the 
Israeli Government.  However, the Suez Crisis as well as the Suez Canal Military 
Operation that followed played into Arab hands by linking Israel in the eyes of 
many countries with Western imperialism.83  A convincing victory in the Six-Day 
War in 1967, on the one hand, changed the impression of Israel’s inherent 
strength.   On the other hand, the portrayal shifted to that of an occupying power 
bent on possessing Arab lands and denying Palestinian rights.  
 
In 1975, seventy-two UN members endorsed a resolution designating Zionism as 
a form of racism in the General Assembly, but on the other hand, the peace treaty 
with Egypt in 1979 reduced the decline in Israel’s prestige.  The destruction of the 
Iraqi nuclear reactor in June 1981 as well as the application of Israeli law to the 
Golan Heights in December 1981 caused considerable repercussions for Israel in 
the international arena. Severe international criticism was heaped on Israel for its 
armed incursion into Lebanon in 1982. In December 1987, Palestinian 
disturbances (the Intifada uprising) broke out on the  West Bank and the Gaza 
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Strip, which eventually resulted in getting  the two parties to attend the 
international conference in Madrid in 1991 (Klieman, 1990:28). 84 
 
Relations with India were considered particularly important, especially in Israel’s 
first years when the newly born state aspired to membership in a gradually 
forming group of non-aligned nations of which India was the main leader. In fact, 
since independence, Israel had continued lobbying, directly and indirectly for full 
diplomatic relations, but those efforts were in vain. 
 
 
4.8 Post- independence Israel: Ultimate decision units  
 
The first objective of Israel foreign policy after independence was the 
preservation of Israel security, territorial integrity and its national identity 
(Neuberger, 1992:496).  The expansion of diplomatic relations was a general aim 
of the State of Israel’s foreign policy, but the Israeli–Arab conflict hampered this 
goal, because of the need to combine foreign policy with military actions.  In the 
Israeli political system, the Prime Minister is a dominant figure with a great deal of 
influence on foreign policy, but most of the prime ministers of Israel had little 
interest in India (except for Prime Minister Ben-Gurion) and it was the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs (MFA), in particular the Asian experts in the ministry, that 
attended to the matters related to India.  
 
Israel foreign policy and diplomacy was led by the MFA, which was characterised 
with a cautious and conservative approach, however it had some successes such 
as engaging in relations with the US, peace with Egypt and Jordan and the Israeli 
foreign aid and cooperation programme. In fact, the MFA emerged as a natural 
continuation of the Jewish Agency political department.85 The MFA in Israel was 
the ultimate decision unit as far as foreign relations were concerned and the 
ministry handled Asian affairs in general and foreign policy towards India 
between 1948 until 1991 in particular.  
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After independence, the first goal of Israeli diplomacy was to receive de jure 
recognition from India.  The Israeli Ambassador to the US, Eilat accompanied by 
Congressman Celler met Prime Minister Nehru and the Indian Ambassador to the 
UN, Mrs. Pandit, to discuss the question of Indian recognition of Israel, which was 
eventually achieved on 18 September 1950.86  Since the 1950s, Israel's aim, 
which was directed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, including direct confidential 
instructions sent by Walter Eytan, the Director General of the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs to the Heads of the Israeli  missions abroad in June 1950 and January 
1953, had been establishing diplomatic relations with India, especially in the first 
years after independence when the new State of Israel aspired to membership in 
a gradually forming group of non-aligned nations of which India was the main 
leader (ISA 93.10/7/2, 09/06/1950, ISA 93.03/3010/5, 07/01/1953 and Shimoni, 
1991:E60). 87  
 
In 1951 an Asian Department was set up in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 
Israel (until then the British Commonwealth Department in the Ministry handled 
India, Pakistan and Ceylon). On 16 October 1951 the new head of the Asian 
Department submitted a tentative plan to establish diplomatic ties between Israel 
and Asian countries including the opening of an Israeli Chancery at New Delhi 
(ISA, 130.02/2415/31, 16/10/1951). However, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
Moshe Sharet, was against such a unilateral diplomatic step (ISA 130.02/2414/1, 
19/02/1952). Most of the Israeli Foreign Ministers between 1948 and 1991 lacked 
a genuine interest in India (and in Asia in general) and the Israeli foreign policy 
towards India was therefore actually handled by a few bureaucrats in the MFA 
with knowledge and expertise about Asia, however, some of them criticised the 
lack of determination in Israel’s foreign policy in Asia, a criticism which was 
rejected by the Minister of Foreign Affairs Sharett (ISA 130.02/2415/31, 
03/09/1952; Yegar 2004:387). 88  The Israeli bureaucrats regarded the Indian 
Ministry of External Affairs as a highly professional one but a conservative 
governmental organisation with difficulties in adjusting to international changes.  
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There was a growing awareness in the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the 
fact that the Indian Ministry of External Affairs was full of pro-Arab supporters with 
an anti-Israeli stance based on the Nehruvian heritage. A few unsuccessful 
efforts made to influence the Indian foreign policy towards Israel enhanced the 
Israeli perception concerning the Indian anti-Israeli and pro-Arab foreign policy 
and the image of the Indian Ministry of External Affairs as a staunch supporter of 
the Arab countries.89  In fact, the bureaucracy in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 
Israel did not believe that it was possible to change India’s official foreign policy 
and its negative attitude towards Israel because of political, Ideological and 
economic reasons and therefore diplomatic relations seemed improbable. 
 
As a matter of fact, this perception held by the bureaucrats of the Israeli Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs did not change until 1991. It was one of the main reasons why 
relatively little politically active effort was directed at transforming the Indian 
foreign policy towards Israel, as can be seen from the low volume of activities of 
the following foreign ministers in relation to India. 
  
4.8.1 Ministers of foreign affairs 
 
Traditionally the role of the ministers of foreign affairs in Israel was the 
implementation of foreign policy. However because of the low priority accorded to 
relations with India, their volume of activities with a few exceptions, was low and 
carried out at random.  
 
Moshe Sharett90 (1948-1956) - The first Israeli foreign minister had a genuine 
interest in Asia and in India in particular.  He looked at Asia from the point of view 
of a political leader with a statesman's vision and was concerned about Israel’s 
international standing in the Asian arena.  Before independence he made the 
following statement:  
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The next item and the principal one is Asia…We are facing a wall there; 
they see us as a sword the West is thrusting into the East.  There is a 
natural emotional tendency to identify with the Arab movement.  There will 
be need of a great effort which may not succeed but which may blaze a 
path to the hearts of many people. Our starting point is that we exist in 
Asia; we are part of it, part of the renewed Asia and part of ancient Asia 
(CZA S25/1621, 18/3/1947). 
 
 
Sharett attached a great deal of importance to India and he considered India as 
the rising star of Asia.  After independence, based on his strong American 
orientation, he was rather hesitant about establishing diplomatic relations with 
China, which was a communist state, and with Japan, which had been an ally of 
Nazi Germany, but he never had any hesitation about the importance of Israel’s 
relations with India (Brecher, 1976:218).  
 
On 17 May 1948, Sharett sent a cable to Nehru asking him for formal recognition 
of the newly born State of Israel, but there was no response.  The Indian 
recognition was eventually given on 18 September 1950 and Sharet 
acknowledged it with an official note to India when he wrote:91 
 
 
On behalf of my Government, I wish to express my deep and sincere 
satisfaction at this decision. I am happy to reciprocate, on behalf of my 
Government and the people of Israel, the greetings conveyed by Your 
Excellency, to the Government and the people of India (Jerusalem Post, 
18/9/1950). 
  
 
In the 1950s, there were some indications at that time, that Nehru might have 
accepted an Israeli embassy in New Delhi, but without reciprocity.  Sharett 
insisted on full reciprocity as a matter of principle and when his successor 
accepted the original proposal it was too late and India was no longer responsive 
to the idea (Brecher, 1972:560; Medzini, 1976:203; Shimoni, 1991:E8)92.   
 
On 29 October 1957, Sharett, a member of the Knesset and an important leader 
of the Mapai Party,93 who toured Asia after his resignation from his post as 
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Minister of Foreign Affairs, met Nehru in New Delhi.  Nehru felt free to criticise 
Israel’s policy in general and to express his anger about the Suez Canal Military 
Operation in particular.94  Sharett, in his reply, explained the Israeli defence 
orientation to him, while pointing out that the Suez Canal Military Operation 
(called the Sinai Operation in Israel) was an attempt to eliminate an Egyptian 
military threat against the State of Israel and to open the Gulf of Akaba for Israeli 
shipping. However, his explanation did not change Nehru’s attitude towards the 
operation and the perception he had of Israel as an ally of imperialism (Rafael, 
1981:87).  
 
Golda Meir (1956-1966) was the second Foreign Minister of Israel.95  In 1956, 
after being elected to the new post as Minister of Foreign Affairs, she observed in 
a newspaper interview: 
 
It is natural that we view ourselves as an integral part of the Asian 
continent and it is obvious that we shall endeavour to win our place among 
the peoples of Asia (Jerusalem Post, 1956).  
   
She felt a personal and ideological commitment to the Asian continent, which 
emanated from her pioneering socialist past and referred to Asia with respect, 
although the ancient complex tradition of the Hindu culture was hard for her to 
fathom (Brecher, 1972:244).  
 
Following the Afro-Asian Conference, Foreign Minister Meir regarded India and 
Nehru as hypocrites and during her ten year tenure no progress was made as 
far as Israel-Indian relations were concerned (Medzini, 1990:283).96 Foreign 
Minister Meir visited a number of Asian countries in 1962, but given the relations 
between Israel and India the option of a visit to India was not even considered.97 
 
During the Indo-China War in 1962, based on Prime Minister Ben-Gurion’s 
recommendation, Mrs. Meir approved the selling of heavy mortars and mortar 
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ammunition to India (Medzini, 1971:20).98   During the Indo-Pakistan War in 
1965, she was opposed to shipping ammunition to India, following the Israeli 
disappointment at India’s ingratitude in 1962, but eventually she was overruled 
by Prime Minister Levi Eshkol who approved the Indian request and Israeli 
supplied India with heavy mortars and ammunition (Medzini, 1990:284). 
 
Foreign Minister Meir followed a pragmatic approach to foreign policy approach; 
in fact, she had no intention of fitting Israel into the political map of Asia and did 
not have any aspirations of finding a way to influence the Indian policy towards 
Israel (Yegar, 2004:70). 
 
Abba Eban (1966-1974) was the third Foreign Minister of Israel.  Eban had 
already tried to promote the establishment of relations between the two countries 
in June 1949, when as a permanent representative of Israel to the UN he met his 
Indian counterpart, Benegal N. Rao, the permanent representative of India to the 
UN, in order to discuss the Indian attitude towards Israel.  In his Aide Memoirs 
the following aspects are pointed out:  
 
           1 There is no conflict of interest between the two countries. 
         2. Israel like India, seeks conciliatory and unprejudiced position in the 
conflict between East and West.  
3. India and Israel, almost alone amongst the newly liberated states of 
Asia, lay emphasis on the economic and social factor in national 
liberation. 
       4. Both India and Israel are faced with difficult problems arising from 
exclusive and expansionist movement in the Muslim world. 
5. If normal political relations can be envisaged there are good 
prospects for free and fruitful interchange on the scientific and 
cultural levels. 
      6. The Israeli attitude coincided precisely with that of the Indian 
delegation (regarding items on the agenda covering a wide area in 
international relations and fundamental human rights). 
7. Israel has always attempted to understand the special interests and 
problems, which have made it difficult for India to take an objective 
and detached view in the dispute between Israel and the Arab states.  
The Government of India however might find itself able at this stage 
to govern its attitude strictly on the merits of the case (CZA 2555/8, 
23/6/1949) 
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In 1952, Eban met Mrs. Pandit in New York where they discussed the 
establishment of relations between Israel and India. According to Mrs. Pandit the 
difficulties were budgetary (ISA 130.02/2413/29, 3/12/1952).99  Eight years later, 
in 1960, when he served as the Israeli Ambassador to the UN, Eban met Prime 
Minister Nehru in the US and had brought up the subject of the absence of 
diplomatic relations between the two countries. Nehru's answer was vague and 
only gave only general promises.100 In January 1967, in a speech given by Eban 
on the occasion of the establishment of the Israel-Asia Friendship League in 
Israel, he emphasised that Israel was an Asian country (Jerusalem Post, 1967). 
 
In March 1967, Eban paid a visit to Asia, but considering the relations between 
Israel and India during that period, visiting India was out of the question.101  In 
fact, Asia was a notable lacuna in Eban’s image of global politics as was 
demonstrated in his report to the Israeli Parliament (Knesset) after his visit to 
Asia.   That report had little substance, apart from an indication that the progress 
of Israel’s relations with the Asian states was intrinsically important and that with 
a reasonable investment of manpower and resources, it was possible for Israel to 
improve its standing and increase its positive presence in Asia. He spoke of new 
plans, but according to Michael Brecher, they remained unfulfilled (Brecher, 
1972:335).  In October 1969, Eban and the current Indian Minister of External 
Affairs, Dinesh Singh, met in New York during the General Assembly, where 
Singh, who held staunch pro-Arab views, tried to convince Eban that India was 
not hostile to Israel (Yegar, 2004:73).102   
 
  Yigal Allon103 (1974-1977) was the fourth Foreign Minister of Israel; he studied 
the history of modern India in Britain and visited India in February 1959 as a 
leading member of the Achdut Haavoda Party and a member of the Knesset 
(Israeli parliament). 104   
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While in New Delhi he met Prime Minister Nehru as well as Defence Minister 
Krishna Menon.105  The meeting was organised with the help of Aneurin Bevan, 
one of the leaders of the British Labour Party (Yegar, 2004:149). 106.  The meeting 
between Allon and Nehru was friendly and based on Allon's description in his 
book Curtain of Sand (Allon, 1981) Nehru had a positive approach towards Israel 
and he agreed to send a governmental high-level delegation to Israel to study 
agrarian and social methods.  Allon commented: 
 
Despite its support from the Arab world, sooner or later, eventually, India 
would stop its passive and negative foreign policy towards Israel…because 
of its status India could, more than any other country in the world, 
contribute to peace between Israel and the Arabs  (Allon, 1981:139). 
 
 
Following Allon’s visit to India and his meetings with Nehru, he recommended 
that India should not be pressed for full diplomatic ties. Instead, he advocated 
that they should try to open an Israeli Consulate in New Delhi (in addition to the 
one in Bombay) as well as consulting with India to ascertain if it was ready to 
open a similar Indian Consulate in Israel or at least to nominate an Indian 
Honorary Consul.  
 
In January 1963, Allon, already a Minister of Labour at that time, met with the 
Indian Minister of State of External Affairs, Dinesh Singh, at an international 
conference in Kampala in Uganda and one year later, in April 1964, Allon paid a 
visit to India in his capacity as Minister of Labour.  On 25 April 1966, Allon met in 
Washington DC with the Indian Minister Ashoka Mehta and offered him bilateral 
cooperation, including courses in research institutions in Israel, as well as 
technical cooperation and trade relations, which could be implemented without 
diplomatic relations.  Allon’s offer was rejected by India with the explanation that 
the time was not yet ripe for it, especially in the light of the forthcoming elections 
in India that were due to take place in January 1967 (Yegar, 2004:155). 
 
Allon saw the Third World as a global political force and the focus of his attention 
in the Third World was on India.  For a long time he had entertained the hope that 
Nehru’s socialism and commitment to democracy would overcome the 
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misconceived national interest of India which adhered blindly to the Arab cause, 
but to no avail. However, he remained faithful to the aim of achieving an Israeli- 
Indian friendship as the focal point of Israel’s Asian policy (Brecher, 1972:348).  
 
Despite his proven interest as the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Israel, and the 
goodwill demonstrated by him towards India, there was nothing he could do to 
improve bilateral relations between Israel and India. This can be ascribed to the 
strong anti-Israeli attitude of India after the October war in 1973 in general and 
the negative attitude towards Israel by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi in her second 
tenure in particular.107 
 
Moshe Dayan (1977-1979) - Foreign Minister Dayan visited New Delhi in August 
1977.  His visit was incognito and took place with the aim of exploring the option 
of establishing diplomatic relations between the two countries. A further aim was 
to engage in military and scientific cooperation with India, offer the sale of 
technology as well as possible cooperation in the nuclear field.  This secret visit 
was arranged by a business acquaintance of Dayan and was approved by the 
Israeli Cabinet only a day before the departure of the delegates to India.108  Whilst 
in New Delhi, Dayan met Prime Minister Morarji Desai and the Minister of 
External Affairs, Atal B. Vajpayee, but due to a disagreement about the Indian 
demand that Israel withdraw its forces from the captured Arab lands in the Six-
Day War, the visit did not bear any fruit (Dayan, 1981:28-32; Klieman, 1990:148; 
Swamy, 1982:21). 
 
Yitzhak Shamir (1980-1986) - In March 1980, Yitzhak Shamir was appointed 
Minister of Foreign Affairs and in that capacity he oversaw the implementation of 
the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty. Following Menahem Begin’s resignation from 
the premiership, Shamir became Prime Minister of Israel on 10 October 1983, 
while keeping the post of Foreign Minister as well.109  In September 1984, Shamir 
was appointed Deputy Prime Minister and also Foreign Minister in the 
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government formed by Prime Minister Shimon Peres.110 Shamir had an 
international reputation as a rigid, right wing politician as well as an obstructionist 
to any progress in the Middle-East conflict.   Two thirds of his tenure as Foreign 
Minister took place during Indira Gandhi’s term as the leader of India and 
considering her strong anti-Israeli attitude, any progress in the relations between 
Israel and India was improbable in any case.111  Furthermore, Foreign Minister 
Shamir insisted that India would not participate in the Madrid Conference in 
October 1991 before formal diplomatic relations had not been established 
between the two countries (Yegar, 2004:391). 
 
Shimon Peres (1986-1988) –, Peres was persistent in his capacity as Foreign 
Minister in his efforts to promote the peace process in the Middle East (Rolef, 
1993:399).  Importantly, he pursued overseas political initiatives concentrating on 
the peace process, but India, because of the absence of diplomatic relations, was 
not included as an international player in his peace initiatives. It should be 
pointed out that in 1985, Peres, as Prime Minister of Israel, met Prime Minister 
Rajiv Gandhi, during the General Assembly in New York, in order to try and find 
ways of improving bilateral relations between the two countries. 112  
 
Moshe Arens (1988-1990) - Arens as the Foreign Minister of Israel was 
regarded by India as a right wing politician, while his party (the Likud Party) was 
regarded as an obstruction to any settlement with the Palestinians as well as 
politically inflexible.  On the other hand, Arens regarded India as a biased pro-
Arab and hypocritical state (Rolef, 1993:354).113  
 
David Levi (1990-1992) – As a  Foreign Minister Levi supported the Israeli-Arab 
peace initiative of the US Secretary of State, James Baker, which paved the way 
for the Madrid Conference that followed the Gulf War state (Rolef, 1993:389).  
Before the Madrid Conference, Levi opposed India's suggestions to Israel that 
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India would participate in the Middle East peace process in return for India's 
commitment to the future improvement of bilateral relations with Israel.    
 
In addition, Levi made it clear that countries without diplomatic relations with 
Israel would be barred from the peace process in the Middle East. He also 
rejected a similar offer made by India prior to the multilateral talks on regional 
issues in Moscow in January 1992 and in fact, left the initiative to them.114  
Eventually, it was during Levi's tenure as Minister of Foreign Affairs that fully-
fledged diplomatic relations with India were established (Yegar, Govrin and 
Oded, 2002:547).115  
 
4.8.2 Israel’s international cooperation programme  
 
Israel's international cooperation programme is an integral part of the activities of 
the Ministry of External Affairs.  The programme was established in 1958 as a 
section in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that became a division one year later. 
The goal of the new division was to develop an aid programme for under-
developed countries (known by its Hebrew acronym: Mashav).  It should be noted 
that even before the official inauguration of the programme in 1958, Indian 
individuals, mostly from the sectorial trade unions and the Indian Socialist Party 
and later on, the Paraja Socialist Party116 were encouraged to undergo 
professional training in Israel.  
 
In 1953, four high ranking officials from Kashmir, Bombay, Bihar and West Bengal 
arrived  in Israel in order to learn about the Israeli experience in cooperation and a 
group of social workers from India, sponsored by the UN, came to Israel to learn 
about Israeli methods of doing social work.  In the same year, sponsored by UN 
fellowships, Indian participants took part in agricultural courses in Israel, while 
Israeli agricultural experts went to India to share their agricultural experience in 
various Indian states (Government Yearbook, 1953/54).  In 1955, three Israeli 
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students studied in India as part of a student exchange programme (Government 
Yearbook, 1955/56).  
 
After 1958, Israel expanded its cooperative activities in the Third World countries 
in collaboration with other international agencies and it developed a highly 
efficient agricultural extension service, which was among the most successful 
Israeli supported projects abroad.  The aim was to combine training in Israel with 
operations and projects abroad, mostly in agriculture.  The Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs believed that contacts at a technical level (in fields such as agriculture and 
community development) would encourage countries to cooperate with Israel, 
would demonstrate the value of bilateral relations with Israel and would eventually 
lead to improved relations with those countries.  
 
More than one hundred Indians received training in various courses that formed 
part of Israel’s international cooperation programme in the 1960s.  However, the 
majority of them participated in courses in the Afro-Asian Institute for Labour 
Studies and Cooperation in Tel-Aviv which was part of the General Federation of 
Workers in Israel (the Histadruth).117  Even though the programme did not have 
any impact on the Indian foreign policy towards Israel, it became a political issue 
in the Indian Parliament and the Indian press: 
 
The Indian Government's stand has been repeatedly criticized by members 
of India's Parliament and some Indian newspapers on the ground that India 
was cutting herself off from a useful source of technical assistance and 
cooperation. The argument has been supported also by those several 
hundred Indians who, despite their government's attitude, have visited 
Israel or gone there for training. Thus, while technical cooperation has not 
yet led to normal relations with India, it has become an important issue in 
the continuing Indian debate on the subject (Laufer, 1967:205). 
 
 
In fact, because of India’s participation in the Israeli international cooperation 
program, leading Indian newspapers called openly for the exchange of diplomatic 
envoys with Israel (The Indian Express, 1960; The Times of India, 1960; 1962; 
The Hindustan Standard, 1961). 118   
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The Budhan Movement which was a movement for voluntary grass- roots land 
reform connected with the Paraja Socialist Party was established by Narayan, the 
leader of the party, who visited Israel between 16 December 1959 and 20 
January 1960 for a study tour after his retirement from politics.119   Israel hosted 
another special seminar for a delegation of 28 members of the Budhan 
Movement, including five high-ranking official of the Paraja Socialist Party, from 
29 February 1960 until 1 June 1960.120  
 
In 1963, the Government of the State of Gujarat in India applied for the services 
of Israeli technical experts but Israel eventually turned the request down because 
the central Government of India refused to issue an official request for that 
cooperation.  Another request in 1964 for advice by Israeli experts on a large-
scale irrigation project by the State of Rajasthan was not granted after the 
Government of India refused to approve it.  A similar situation arose when New 
Delhi did not approve a contract between the state of Mysore and Israel’s water 
company on a project to supply water to Bangalore City.  In the 1970s, Israeli 
experts served in India under UN auspices and Indian trainees frequently 
underwent training courses in Israel.  Most of the Indian participants were not 
sent by the Indian Government but were usually sponsored by non-governmental 
Indian organisations and sectorial trade unions (Shimoni, 1991:E11).  
 
  The number of Indian participants in the training programme in Israel in the 1980s 
was significantly reduced for political reasons connected with India’s anti-Israeli 
foreign policy, in particular during Indira Gandhi’s second tenure.121  Most of the 
Indian participants who arrived at the Afro-Asian Institute for Labour Studies and 
Cooperation courses were sponsored by sectorial trade unions of India, but not 
by the trade unions that were associated with the INCP. 
 
Israel's international cooperation programme in India did not benefit Israel in 
terms of international dividends, apart from some positive media coverage in 
India in the 1960s.  This included criticism of the Indian Government by some 
members of the Indian Parliament as well as by some newspapers for not 
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utilising the Israeli source of technical assistance and cooperation. It also 
contributed to the random coverage of Israel’s technology in the Indian 
newspapers.  
 
4.9 Post-independence Israel: The international system level of analysis  
 
The international level of analysis is an essential factor in the understanding and 
analysis of foreign policy and is utilised in order to explain Israel's foreign 
relations with India between the years 1948 and 1991. The aim of Israel’s foreign 
policy after independence was the expansion of the network of diplomatic 
relations with states in the international arena including India.  However, despite 
the fact that Israel continued lobbying for diplomatic relations with India 
throughout those years up to 1991, its efforts were always in vain (Shimoni, 
1991:E8).  
 
4.9.1 Israel and bilateral relations with India 
 
After independence, there was a systematic effort to establish diplomatic 
relations with India, which led to bitter disappointment and ultimately, frustration 
and alienation in Israel.  
 
One of the objectives of the Israeli Foreign Ministry during the first years after 
independence, as a newly born state, was to campaign for diplomatic recognition 
by the Asian states.  India was on top of the Israeli list as far as relations with 
Asian countries were concerned, since Israel had hoped that Indian recognition 
would open the doors for Israeli political and economic activities in Asia (Eytan, 
1958:8).  Relations with India were also important because after independence, 
Israel aspired to obtain membership of a group of non-aligned countries of which 
India was the main leader.  On the other hand, paradoxically, the relations with 
the Asian countries and India in particular, were not Israel's first priority in 
international terms (Medzini, 1992:201).   
 
After independence, Israel’s basic foreign policy had a number of central 
objectives and India (and Asia in general) played only a marginal role in their 
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attainment. The reason was that the prime objectives of Israel were the 
preservation of Israel's security as well as the preservation of its territorial 
integrity and national identity (Neuberger, 1992:496).  During the years after 
independence, the purchase of arms was an important component of the Israeli 
defence policy and for all practical reasons it was obvious that India could not 
and would not be able to supply arms to Israel.  Prime Minister Ben-Gurion said 
as much in the Knesset:  
 
We must not forget, even for a moment, that we cannot obtain the 
equipment for the Israeli defence forces from Asia and Africa  (Brecher, 
1963:52). 
 
 
On 17 May 1948, Moshe Sharett the Minister of Foreign Affairs sent a cable to 
Prime Minister Nehru requesting recognition of the newly born State of Israel. On 
23 May 1948, the President of the State of Israel, Prof. Chaim Weizmann, 
requested the Government of India to recognise the Jewish state.  The Indian 
Government did not respond favourably as it was under pressure from the Arab 
states and in particular, under direct pressure from Egypt to refuse recognition of 
Israel (Rao, 1972:39).  
 
After the first Israeli Government was formed, on 11 March 1949, five initial 
principles of Israel’s foreign policy were approved by the Knesset (Parliament) 
but without any reference to Asia.122  Only in 1955, with the growing number of 
independent states in Asia, a new principle, which related to the foreign policy 
towards Asia, was added to the basic principles of the Government of Israel that 
promoted friendship with the Asian people. That principle was also included in the 
basic principles of the approved coalition program in 1959 and 1961 
respectively.123   
 
Amongst the basic principles approved in January 1966, the promotion of 
friendship with Asian people was incorporated into a general principle, which 
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related to friendship with all peace-loving states.  After the Six-Day War in 1967, 
the Asian countries’ hostility towards Israel increased.  Of importance is the fact 
that the Yom Kippur War in 1973 as well as the Lebanon War in 1982 did not 
help to make the international atmosphere in Asia and in India in particular, any 
better as far as Israel was concerned and diplomatic relations with India seemed 
improbable.  Israel’s feelings towards India (between 1948 and 1992), as 
described by Michael Brecher, changed from expectation to hope, to 
disappointment, to dismay, to anger and finally to indifference (Brecher, 
1976:218), as is demonstrated in the following sections. 
 
Matters deteriorated in 1956 after the Suez Canal Military Operation when Israel 
was linked with Western imperialism. There was a brief improvement in bilateral 
relations in 1962 when Israel used India’s conflict with China for back channel 
diplomacy by sending arms and military equipment to India. This act led to the 
exchange of several visits of high ranking military and intelligence officers from 
both armies however, it was just a passing episode.124 After the Six-Day War in 
1967, India identified even more strongly with the Arab world; this was 
accompanied by constant Indian criticism of Israel, despite the fact that the 
convincing Israeli victory established Israel as an important  power in the 
international system.  
 
In 1982, the Israeli Consul in Bombay was expelled from India and for several 
years India refused to accept a new consul.  Israel faced administrative and 
bureaucratic obstacles to trade and tourism from the Indian side. This was 
despite Israel’s attempt to include India in its international aid and cooperation 
programme and the unfriendly relations with India were perceived to be beyond 
Israel’s diplomatic capacity to change.125 The change in bilateral relations had to 
wait until 1992, when diplomatic relations between the two countries were 
established.126 
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4.9.1.1 Expectations and hope in Israel’s foreign policy towards India 
After independence, Israel considered India to be the rising star of Asia and also 
the emerging leader of neutral and non-aligned countries, while Israel was then in 
its non-identification phase. Among the leaders of the State of Israel, Nehru and 
Gandhi were held in great esteem. Nehru, in particular, appealed to the 
predominantly socialist leadership and the ruling Socialist Party127 of the newly 
born state.  Some Israeli leaders hoped that Nehru, even though he was a non-
Muslim but highly respected by the Arabs, would be willing to moderate Arab 
hostility and build a bridge between the Israelis and the Arabs, but they ceased to 
entertain this hope by the mid 1950s (Brecher, 1963:129).  
   
Despite the fact that India granted de jure recognition to Israel on 18   September 
1950, the Indian attitude regarding Israel was negative and clearly evident. This 
attitude was unlike that of some of the Asian states that established diplomatic 
relations with Israel irrespective of their UN stance or their relations with Arab 
countries, which was not the case with India.128  
 
In October 1949, Eliyahu Eilat, then serving as the Israeli Ambassador in 
Washington, met with Prime Minister Nehru who paid a visit to the US.129  In Eilat’s 
report to Foreign Minister Moshe Sharett, it was clear that the Muslim community 
in India was the main reason that forced India to view the Arab-Israeli conflict and 
the Palestinian problem through an Islamic lens.  His report was almost similar to 
his previous report about his meeting with Mrs. Pandit.  Five months earlier, Eilat 
had met her and it was clear that she followed a similar approach to that followed 
by her brother.  She told him that India’s recognition of Israel would only come 
about after the settlement of the Kashmiri dispute between India and Pakistan 
(Avimor, 1991:172). In fact, the dispute over Kashmir dominated the Indian foreign 
policy agenda and India was worried that the Arab and Islamic countries would 
endorse Pakistan’s claims (Kumaraswamy, 2002:3).  In the early 1950s, India was 
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 The following states in Asia recognized the State of Israel after its independence: Burma on 
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convinced that recognition of Israel would alienate the Arab world in general and 
Egypt in particular and would jeopardise its relations with Pakistan, which was an 
Islamic state: 
 
Egypt claimed that in the event of recognition being accorded by India, peace in 
the Middle East would be disturbed and would encourage Jewish aggression 
(Kumaraswamy, 2002:3). 
 
       
India was concerned about the attempt made by Pakistan to support and promote 
the causes and international activities of the Arabs in their campaign against 
Israel, while trying to forge a Pan-Islamic alliance. India realised that: 
 
In view of the deep emotional involvement of the Arab countries in the Israeli 
issue… the essential prerequisite for the enlistment of the Arab sympathy was 
the extension of the support to the Arab countries in their dispute (Rao, 
1972:35). 
 
 
India delayed its diplomatic recognition of Israel until 18 September 1950, thereby 
giving other Asian countries an excuse to postpone their recognition of Israel as 
well.130  Significantly, four countries in Asia recognised the state of Israel between 
1948 and 1950.131 After India's recognition of the State of Israel, the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs Sharett sent a cable to Nehru acknowledging and expressing 
satisfaction at this state of affairs (Jerusalem Post, 18/9/1950).132 
 
On 27 February 1952, the Director General of the Israeli Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, Walter Eytan, was sent to India following receipt of a cable from Prime 
Minister Ben-Gurion to Prime Minister Nehru requesting him to receive Eytan in 
New Delhi in order to meet him and explore the possibilities of strengthening 
bilateral relations.  
 
Between 27 February 1952 and 9 March 1952, Eytan entered into negotiations 
with Prime Minister Nehru as well as with senior officials of the Ministry of 
External Affairs of India in New Delhi.133  During his visit, there were preliminary 
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 The countries that recognised Israel between 1948 and 1950 were: National China, Burma, 
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 For details about the exchange of cables, see sections 3.8.1 and 4.8.1. 
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talks that fully-fledged diplomatic relations would be established between the two 
countries.  In addition, an Israeli mission would be opened in New Delhi. The 
Minister of Foreign Affairs Sharett insisted on reciprocity and ultimately, it did not 
materialise. 134  In fact, before Eytan left New Delhi he was informed that Prime 
Minister Nehru had approved the proposal of establishing full diplomatic relations 
including the opening of an Indian Embassy in Tel-Aviv, though the formal 
decision remained to be confirmed as soon as a new cabinet was set up 
following the elections a few weeks later.  
 
In reality, the newly-elected Indian cabinet did not make a formal decision about 
India’s relations with Israel due to Indian domestic politics.  Although an official 
explanation was never delivered to Israel, India’s refusal to establish full 
diplomatic relations with Israel was explained on a number of occasions. In 
speeches in the Indian Parliament and interviews, some of the reasons given 
were budgetary restrictions, a scarcity of personnel and a lack of urgent priority, 
but a political explanation could not be ruled out (Eytan, 1958:170).  According to 
Brecher (1963:130), the fact that India did not establish diplomatic relations with 
Israel in 1952 can be attributed to Maulana Azad, a Muslim who was the Minister 
of Education in Nehru's government and his personal friend.135 
 
The Israeli Ambassador to Britain, Eliyahu Eilat, reported to the Director General 
of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Jerusalem, Walter Eytan, on 2 September 
1953 on his meeting with the Indian High Commissioner, his old friend Kayala M. 
Panikkar.136  Eilat was told by Panikkar that the exchange of diplomatic missions 
between the two countries was not a viable proposition at that point in time. 
Furthermore, Panikkar was doubtful about whether any progress would be made 
in that regard in the near future because Nehru could do no more than maintain 
the status quo,  as long as India needed the support of the Arabs or at least their 
neutrality on the question of Kashmir (Kumaraswamy, 2002:3-4).137  
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According to Medzini (1976:202-203) and Neuberger (1992:496-497), after the 
recognition of the State of Israel by India, the Israeli goal was to establish 
diplomatic relations with India as part of a general Israeli drive to win universal 
recognition. In addition, their goal was to win Asian recognition and also to break 
through the wall of hostility which the Arab states attempted to erect around its 
borders. Israel believed that its recognition by India and the establishment of 
diplomatic relations with India would help assume it (Israel) assume its rightful 
place among other Asian capitals.  This would enable Israel to combat the 
growing political enmity and the economic boycott instituted against it by its 
neighbouring Arab states. Through the Asian states and India Israel planned to 
join the Afro-Asian forum as well as the growing bloc of non-aligned nations (most 
of whom had gained independence in the years 1945-1955).  
 
Israel believed it could join that group because there was a marked preference 
amongst its leaders for pursuing an independent foreign policy between the years 
1948–1950.  India espoused similar sentiments in the international arena and 
because of the socialist nature of the Government of Israel at that time. Israel 
hoped that with the help of India in conjunction with the prestige of Nehru it could 
become part of non-aligned states.138 By making such a move, Israel also hoped 
to rid itself of the charges made by Nehru and other Asian leaders, that Zionism 
was instituted in Palestine under the protection of British bayonets. Israel had 
even hoped that relations with India would assist in winning the friendship of a 
number of Muslim Asian states (such as Malaysia, Indonesia and Afghanistan).  
 
From the Israeli economic point of view, although India was a huge potential 
market, because of its socialist oriented economy it could not be considered a 
significant export target market for Israel. In fact, Israel regarded India as a 
country that was more likely to be on the receiving than the giving end when it 
came to investments. Israel expected only small returns in exchange for the 
enormous sums of money needed to invest in India, in order to make Israel’s 
presence felt both politically and economically.  
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 Israel ended its short experience as a non-aligned country when it supported the UN and the 
US in Korea after the breakout of the Korean War in 25 July 1950. 
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The complications resulting from the expansion of the Cold War to the Middle 
East along with Pakistan's role in it added a significant negative dimension to the 
hostile Israeli-Indian relations.139  While India knew how to play one side off 
against the other, in order to enhance its bargaining position with both camps, 
until 1950 Israel tried to steer the middle course between Moscow and 
Washington.  However, after the Korean War, Israel declared its allegiance with 
the West with a pro-American orientation.  This Israeli policy led to alienation from 
the Soviet Union and made it easier for India to voice its anti-Israeli foreign policy 
(Klieman, 1990:186). 
 
Israel considered itself an Asian state, at least in terms of its geographic location, 
but its early quest for Asian acceptance met with difficulties, which accounted for 
its slow and partial acceptance in Asia. Israel concentrated on the West as a 
source of military equipment, economic aid and international recognition while 
India’s national interest concentrated on Non-Alignment, the Afro-Asian Forum, 
the Soviet Union and the Arab world.  In the years following independence, there 
was limited mutual interest between the two countries and there was non-
compatibility between their national strategic interests.  The Afro-Asian 
Conference in April 1955 was a blow to the Israeli-Indian low-key ties and a 
severe international setback for Israel in Asia. 
 
4.9.1.2 Afro-Asian Conference  
 
 
Israel was excluded from the Afro-Asian Conference in Bandung Indonesia (18 – 
24 April 1955) despite the fact that Nehru and U Nu (from Burma) favoured the 
inclusion of Israel in the conference based on the argument that the five sponsors 
of the Afro-Asian Conference had declared that all independent states in the 
region would be invited. Pakistan and Indonesia opposed Israel’s inclusion, while 
Ceylon chose to remain silent and took no stand.  
 
The Arab League Council sent an official note to the five heads of states at Bogor 
indicating that the foreign policy of the Arab states had been not to participate in 
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any regional conference where Israel was represented.140 That demand meant 
that either Israel or the Arab states could participate in the conference. Following 
the Arab countries threat to boycott the conference if Israel were invited, Nehru 
and U Nu yielded to their pressure and eventually Israel was excluded from the 
Afro-Asian Conference.141  
 
Foreign Minister Sharett delivered the official response to Bogor’s decision in 
Israel:  
 
The Government of Israel regards this resolution as totally lacking in validity from 
any standpoint of international morality, principles of equality and cooperation 
between peace-loving nations, especially those who recently achieved their 
independence.  We are determined to persist in the struggle for the recognition of 
Israel’s status and rightful place at the conference (Jerusalem Post, 17/3/1955). 
  
  
Following the decision made at Bogor to exclude Israel from the Afro-Asian 
Conference and considering the Arab mass presence at the Afro-Asian 
Conference in Bandung, the final outcome of the conference was regarded as a 
blow to Israel. It was realised by the Government of Israel that as long as the 
Arab-Israeli conflict remained unresolved, Israel would be forced to stay outside 
the newly formed group of Afro-Asian states (Kochan, 1976:254). 
 
The Bandung Joint Statement contained a section referring to the Middle East and 
the Palestinian question.142 As a response to the Bandung Joint Statement, Prime 
Minister Ben-Gurion sent a telegram of protest to the Indonesian chairperson of 
the conference. In the telegram he expressed surprise at the fact that the 
conference found it appropriate to discuss the Israeli-Arab problem and to pass a 
resolution against Israel in its absence (Haaretz, 23/4/1955).  Ben-Gurion did not 
receive any response to his telegram.  
 
Although the official response in Israel was relatively reserved, Walter Eytan, the 
Director General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at that time, admitted in his 
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memoirs that the Afro-Asian Conference was a blow to Israel’s standing in Asia 
from which it could not recover easily.  In fact, the Afro-Asian Conference was a 
severe international setback for Israel, consequently, it became even further 
isolated from Asia (Eytan, 1958:175).  The Afro-Asian Conference in 1955 and the 
wave of Asian protests after the Suez Canal Military Operation in 1956 was a blow 
to Israel’s standing in Asia.  
 
On 3 January 1955, David Hacohen, (while serving as the Israeli Ambassador to 
Burma) met Nehru and Krishna Mennon at the International Airport in Rangoon 
and complained about the fact that India had complied with the non-invitation of 
the State of Israel to the Afro-Asian Conference.  Mennon replied that if they had 
not accepted it, the conference would have not taken place.  In addition, Mennon 
told Hacohen that Nehru himself had explained that, although the non-invitation 
of Israel to the conference had bothered him, he was compelled to comply with 
the decision because the only alternative option was breaking off the conference 
(Eytan, 1958:172-175; Hacohen, 1963). 
        4.9.1.3 Disappointment, anger and indifference in Israeli foreign policy 
towards India  
 
Despite the Bandung Joint Statement and its anti-Israeli spirit, In January 1956, 
Professor L. A. Meir from the Hebrew University in Jerusalem was invited to 
participate in an All-India Universities Conference, which took place in Calcutta 
(Government Yearbook 1956/57). The Second Asian Socialist Conference held in 
Bombay in November 1956, had already taken place under the shadow of the 
Suez Crisis with the participation of Mapai Party’s delegation headed by ex-
Foreign Minister and the Member of Parliament (Knesset), Moshe Sharett.143  The 
outbreak of the Suez Canal Military Operation surprised Sharett on the eve of his 
scheduled meeting with Prime Minister Nehru in New Delhi.  The meeting took 
place on 29 October 1956 and Nehru felt free to express his criticism of Israel’s 
policy in general and the military action in particular.144  Sharett, in return, 
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explained the Israeli defence orientation to him, but failed to change Nehru’s 
mind regarding that military operation.145 
 
As pointed out by Sudha Rao, the main result of Israel's participation in the Suez 
Canal Military Operation was to destroy whatever sympathy the Indian leadership 
and the Indian intelligentsia had had for Israel. The growing estrangement 
between the two countries becomes clear in the following extract: 
  
Until the events of 1956, when Indian attitudes underwent a qualitative change 
in terms of social and philosophical outlook, no country of people could have 
been closer to the thinking and ideology of the leadership of the Indian National 
Congress Party and the Indian intelligentsia than Israel and the Jewish people.  
Israel was a state that was based on the kind of socialist and egalitarian 
principles than the Indian National Congress and particularly Nehru held so 
dear. As a people who have been confronted by twenty centuries of 
persecutions with courage and humanist philosophy, they epitomised everything 
that Gandhi stood for.  Yet in spite of all these massive reasons arguing in 
favour of close and friendly ties between these two countries, events 
remorselessly pushed them further and further apart.  It is also entirely possible 
that if Indian policy had been more flexible and imaginative at certain crucial 
stages, this might not have occurred and that India might have been 
instrumental in bridging the gap between the Arabs and the Israelis (Rao, 
1972:57).146 
   
 
Ironically, Israel’s military victory increased Israel’s prestige in Asian countries 
(contrary to the situation in India). As a result of that operation, the maritime 
blockade over the Tiran Straits and the Gulf of Akaba that linked Israel with Asia 
was lifted. The Suez Canal remained closed for Israeli shipping even after 1956, 
in direct defiance of a UN Security Council resolution in September 1951 and the 
1888 Constantinople Convention. After the blockade was lifted it ensured Israel’s 
direct communication as well as Israeli trade and economic relations with the 
Asia. 
 
In October 1958, the Israeli Minister of Finance, Levi Eshkol, visited India for 
conventions of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund and met with 
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his Indian counterpart, Morarji Desai, but their talks had no practical outcome 
(Documents of the Foreign Policy of Israel, 2001: xlviii).147  
   
In June 1959 the Minister of Development, Mordechai Ben-Tov, visited New Delhi 
as an official guest of the Government of India. However, despite the official visit 
and although Israel’s diplomatic status in Asia improved, India remained one of 
the major gaps with its hostile foreign policy towards Israel.148  In May 1960, 
Prime Minister Nehru, flew to Gaza (with an UN airplane) to visit India's forces on 
one of his visits to Egypt. They were part of the United Nation's Emergency Force 
(UNEF) that observed the armistice line between Israel and Egypt. The flight was 
not coordinated with the Government of Israel and the Israeli air force aircraft 
were sent up to check on the unidentified flight, which entered one mile inside 
Israeli territory and caused a diplomatic incident.  The diplomatic dispute was 
settled after the two countries officially announced that the case was closed 
(Government Yearbook, 1959/1960).  
 
In fact, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Israel came to the conclusion that there 
was no point in raising the issue of diplomatic relations with India and the director 
of the Asian and African division gave direct instructions to the Israeli Consul in 
Bombay in this regard: 
 
There is no benefit in pursuing a controversy in India and it would be best  to 
concentrate on the change of atmosphere in conversations that should be held 
with moderation and tact…public opinion should be  deferred for the day, sooner 
or later, when the leadership will be changed…issues of ties between the two 
countries should not be raised.  The Indians are aware of Israel’s stand on this 
matter and there is no point in raising this matter time and again (ISA 
130.23/3101/5, 30/11/1959). 
 
In a further letter, one month later, he referred to the issue of the transfer of the 
Israeli Consulate from Bombay to New Delhi and requested that it should not be 
raised with the Indian government because: 
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with Asia. 
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This has been proposed by Israel in the past and has not been accepted. If the 
Indians raise this matter unofficially, the reply should be that Israel will be 
prepared to request the transfer only if an explicit undertaking is given that its 
request will be accepted (ISA 130.23/3101/5, 28/12/1959). 
 
 
Meetings with official representatives of India took place only sporadically in the 
1960s, mostly at the UN.  Friendly talks were held with Mrs. Vijaya L. Pandit, 
Nehru’s sister, while frustrating meetings took place with Krishna Menon, Nehru’s 
confidante, but no official dialogue of any political consequence took place 
between the two countries in the intervening years.  There was a small Israeli 
Consulate in Bombay that dealt with affairs of trade, migration and some restricted 
information work, but the definition of its function denied access to the decisive 
levels of the Government of India in New Delhi.  In addition, a student’s delegation 
from Israel made a goodwill visit to various universities in India in 1961 
(Government Yearbook, 1960/61). 
 
Gideon Rafael, the Director General of the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, was 
sent to participate in the annual conference of the World Health Organisation 
(WHO) in New Delhi in February 1961, as a member of an official delegation 
headed by the Israeli Minister of Health.  The Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
believed that his meetings in New Delhi would offer an opportunity to present the 
Israeli cause; likewise, it was thought that the visit was an opportunity to renew 
official contacts with the Indian Government. Mrs. Lakshmi Menon, the Deputy 
Minister of External Affairs of India, responded quickly to the request for a meeting 
with Gideon Rafael. Rafael (1981:87) describes the meeting in his memoirs: 
        
She was well disposed towards Israel, admitted the justice of some of 
our grievances and the usefulness of our suggestion on how to advance 
the relations from their state of stagnation, but she also pointed out that 
only Pandit Nehru himself could do anything positive about it.  
 
On 15 February 1961, Nehru’s private secretary unexpectedly invited Rafael to 
meet the Prime Minister of India.  Rafael gave him his survey of the international 
scene and briefed him about the Middle East while concentrating on the Soviet 
support granted to the Arabs, which made them believe that Moscow would 
provide them with the military and political strength to eliminate Israel.  Although 
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Nehru  referred to Israel’s achievements, he pointed out   that India had to take 
the possibility of a strong Arab reaction to the establishment of diplomatic 
relations between India and Israel into consideration.149   
 
As Rafael pointed out in his memoirs (1981:87-88), Nehru’s compliments 
regarding Israel were no more than courtesy gestures and his professed 
willingness to cooperate with Israel remained an uncovered cheque, which 
bounced on presentation.  
 
During the Indo-China War, in 1962, Ben-Gurion received an official letter from 
Prime Minister Nehru appealing for urgent support (a similar letter was circulated 
among other world leaders).150  In his reply Ben-Gurion expressed the hope that 
the tension and fighting between India and China would be ended quickly by 
direct negotiations, thereby enabling both countries to apply their resources to the 
achievement of progress and the development both really needed.  He added 
that every possible effort to prevent aggression and to settle differences by 
peaceful means, especially between neighbouring states, would always enjoy 
Israel’s complete cooperation and sympathy.   
 
Ben-Gurion availed himself of the opportunity to bring to Nehru’s attention that 
Israel was making an effort to resolve the differences between itself and its 
neighbours. Israel felt that general disarmament between Israel and the Arab 
states was the most effective way of preventing war. He also emphasised that 
Israel had expressed its readiness to sign a non-aggression treaty with its 
neighbours based on the view expressed by Nehru himself that it was incumbent 
to do everything possible to eliminate the use of force in international relations 
(Ben-Gurion, 1972:667).  However, Ben-Gurion’s response to Nehru's request 
was polite but non-committal. 
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Nevertheless, a few weeks later, Israel supplied India with heavy mortars and 
mortar ammunition and three months after the Indian defeat in the Indo-China 
War, Israel responded favourably to India’s request for military and intelligence 
cooperation (India Today, 1968).151 The exchange of visits of high ranking military 
and intelligence officers, from both sides, took place including visits of the Chief 
of the military intelligence of the Israeli army as well as the Head of the 
Operations Branch in the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF).152  Israel was hoping that 
this cooperation would pave the way for diplomatic relations between the two 
countries, but after the news about the secret cooperation leaked to the Indian 
press it was first played down and later on denied by the Indian Government. To 
Israel’s disappointment, there was no sign of gratitude from India and the 
relations between the two countries continued to deteriorate (Yodphat, 1983:45).   
 
 
An Israeli delegation participated in an international trade fair in the State of 
Gujarat in 1964 (Government Yearbook, 1964/65).  During the Indo-Pakistani 
War in 1965, heavy mortars and ammunition were supplied by Israel to India, but 
contrary to Israel’s expectations it did not have any impact on the relations 
between the two countries (The Statesman, 1970).153 In March 1966, the 
Government of India ignored a stopover of the President of the State of Israel in 
Calcutta, who was on his way to a state visit in Nepal.154 
 
After the Six-Day War in 1967, India (with the help of China) was instrumental in 
influencing Asian countries to take an anti-Israel stance at the UN.155  In 1968, in 
spite of the tension between the two countries, Israel participated in the Second 
UN Conference on Trade and Development in India (Government Yearbook, 
1968/69).  
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During the Indo-Pakistani War, in 1971, heavy mortars and ammunitions were 
supplied by Israel to India (Swamy, 1982:22).156  In August 1977, two months 
after the introduction of Prime Minister Begin’s new government, the Israeli 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Moshe Dayan, paid a secret visit to New Delhi.157  In 
September 1978, Israeli Defence Minister Ezer Weizmann secretly met Prime 
Minister Morarji Desai in London.158 
 
During the second tenure of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi from January 1980 to 
November 1984, India became more restrictive and negative towards Israel 
(Shimoni, 1991:E9).  The Israeli-Indian relations reached its lowest point in July 
1982, when the Israeli Consul in Bombay was declared a personae non gratae by 
the Indian Government, after an interview in a daily newspaper where he 
criticised the Government of India.159    Although the official Indian explanation for 
such a harsh move was the Consul’s interview, there was no doubt that the 
international criticism heaped on Israel for its armed incursion into Lebanon in 
1982, the destruction of the nuclear reactor one year earlier, in June 1981, as 
well as the application of the Israeli law to the Golan Heights in December 1981, 
encouraged the Indian Government, headed by Indira Gandhi, to downgrade its 
relations with Israel.160 
 
For three years, the Government of India refused to agree to accept a new 
Consul in the Israeli Consulate in Bombay.161  In 1985 a new Vice- Consul was 
allowed to take over after Prime Minister Shimon Peres met Prime Minister Rajiv 
Gandhi in New York and pressure was also applied on the latter from leaders of 
Jewish organisations such as the Anti- Defamation League (ADL). 162  
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It is important to note that Israeli tennis players played against an Indian tennis 
team in New Delhi in July 1987 as part of the Davis Cup tennis tournament 
(Rolef, 1993:376).  
 
In August 1988, after the strong pressure exerted by the American Jewry as well 
as Congressman Stephen Solarz on Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, the 
Israeli Vice-Consul in Bombay was upgraded to the diplomatic level of Consul.163  
In December 1988, Israel and India made indirect contact in Washington and 
New York and as a result, the Director General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
of Israel, Yossef Hadas, was invited to India during the same month, where he 
met with the Minister of External Affairs, Narasimha Rao. However, the visit was 
officially defined as a tourist visit by the Indian official spokesmen.164  The meeting 
was important, but it ended without any positive diplomatic results (Naaz, 
1999:244; Yegar, Govrin & Oded, 2002:202).  
 
In 1989, tourist visas were issued to Israeli tourists and the jurisdiction of the 
Consulate in Bombay was extended to the State of Kerela, the official explanation 
given was that there was a Jewish community in the city of Cochin in South West 
India.  Nevertheless, in 1990 Israel was not allowed to take part in a documentary 
film-festival in Bombay nor was it allowed to participate in a plastic-products trade 
fair in New Delhi (Yegar, 2004:162). 
 
During an international economic conference in Brussels in 1991, the Israeli 
Minister of Trade, Moshe Nissim, met the Indian Minister of Trade and Justice, 
Subramaniam Swamy, unofficially. The unofficial meeting took place despite the 
objection of the Indian Ministry of External Affairs.165 
 
In June 1991, a group of Israeli tourists, that was visiting Jammu-Kashmir in 
India, was kidnapped by Indian-Muslim terrorists (The Jammu-Kashmir Liberation 
Front). Most of the Israeli tourists managed to escape except for one who was 
killed during the escape attempt and another one who was recaptured by the 
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terrorists and was held by them as a hostage.  The Deputy Director General for 
Asia in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Israel, Moshe Yegar, left for New Delhi 
where he coordinated the release efforts and conducted indirect negotiations with 
the terrorist group, which led to the release of the Israeli hostage. This incident 
and Yegar’s visit to India put the Israeli-Indian relations on the agenda of the 
Indian media.  Yegar also took advantage of his visit to New Delhi and had an 
unofficial meeting with senior Indian officials, in order to try and promote the 
bilateral relations between the two countries.  Yegar met Ram Nath Kao, a retired 
head of RAW166 and Professor M.L. Sondhi organised a meeting for him with 
Narash Chandra, the Secretary of the Government of India (Yegar, 2004:164-
165). 167   
 
The WJC mission met Prime Minister Rao on 21 November 1991 in New Delhi, to 
discuss the issue of diplomatic relations with Israel.168 In January 1992, the 
Director General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Yossef Hadas, met  with the 
Deputy Chief of the Mission of the Indian Embassy, Lalit Mansingh in 
Washington, and made it clear to him that as far as diplomatic relations with 
Israel were concerned, it was up to India to take the initiative (Naaz, 1999:245).   
 
A short time later, on 22 January 1992, the Israeli Consul in Bombay was invited 
to the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of External Affairs of India, J. N. 
Dixit,169 late at night,170 in New Delhi and was informed about India’s intention to 
improve the quality of its relations with the State of Israel in the near future. The 
Israeli Consul responded by saying that Israel was only interested  in fully-fledged 
diplomatic relations and that such a diplomatic move would allow India to 
participate  in the working groups of the multilateral channel of the peace process 
in the Middle East.171  Therefore, India, which wanted to be involved in the Middle 
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 For details about RAW, see also section 3.10.3.3. 
167
 About Yegar’s meetings, see also section 3.10.3.2. 
168
 For details about the meeting with Rao, see sections 3.8.9 and 3.9.1.4. 
169
 For details about Dixit's activities vis-à-vis Israel, see section 5.2. 
170
 Permanent Secretary is the highest rank in the Indian Ministry of External Affairs. 
171
 The multilateral channel took place in parallel to the bilateral channel of the Peace Process in 
the Middle East that followed the Madrid Conference in October 1991.  
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East peace process and talks, realised that it would be necessary to establish full 
diplomatic relations with Israel (Naaz, 1999:246). 172 
 
On 29 January 1992, an official announcement was published simultaneously in 
Jerusalem, New Delhi and Moscow, where the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Israel 
participated in the first round of the multilateral talks on regional issues. The joint 
official announcement imparted information about the establishment of the fully-
fledged diplomatic relations between Israel and India (Yegar, 2004:164-167).  
4.9.1.4 Israeli- Indian and World Jewish organisations 
 
Jews worldwide were an asset to Israel, supporting it because they identified 
strongly with Israel’s cause.173  Mass Jewish support for Israel was demonstrated 
by a long list of voluntary and philanthropic groups as well as active organisations 
all around the world. The US Jewish community was particularly committed and 
active on behalf of Israel, its people and the Israeli causes. Their main targets 
were   enlisting public opinion, building a wider base of political support and 
gaining an appreciative ear among politicians, successive presidents and 
administrations through professional lobbying (Klieman, 1990:171-179).  
 
After the independence of the State of Israel, the US Jewish community, in 
collaboration with the world Jewry in general and Professor Weizmann in 
particular, put pressure on the Indian representatives in the US requesting the 
recognition of Israel.174  In 1953, the American Jewry was instrumental in 
convincing the Indian Government to open an Israeli Consulate in Bombay.  
 
According to Subramaniam Swamy (1982:20), Prime Minister Nehru was 
extremely aware of the political weight of the Jewish lobby in the Western world 
and in the US in particular.  He believed that the Jewish community dominated the 
Western academic sphere and the media and in order not to turn them against 
India, he indulged in games; in private, he assured the Israelis of his support and 
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 For details, see next chapter 5. 
173
 For pre-independence support of the world Jewry, see sections 4.5 and 4.6.3. 
174
 For details about the political pressure put on India requesting the recognition of Israel, see 
section 4.9.1. 
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in public, he denounced them.  On 27 June 1957, the President of the Jewish 
World Congress, Dr. Goldmann, met Prime Minister Nehru, in New Delhi, but he 
did not succeed in convincing Nehru of the necessity of having diplomatic 
relations with Israel.175  In his autobiography, Goldmann (1969:310) describes this 
meeting organised by the American diplomat Chester Bowles in London with 
Nehru, in the following way:  
 
Nehru's attitude toward Israel was well known to be ambivalent. To me 
he acknowledged that if he had been consulted before the UN decision, 
he would have opposed the creation of a Jewish state in a country the 
majority of whose people were Arabs, even though he recognized 
humanity's obligation, after the Nazi tragedy, to provide the Jewish 
people with a secure centre of existence.  
  
 
After the assassination of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi in October 1984, Indian 
Governments pursued various strategies to change Washington’s policy towards 
India. In particular, they tried to influence the American Congress, the US 
Executive Branch and the IMF  as well as the World Bank (Naaz, 1999:245).  The 
Indian Government realised that the American Jewry could be of assistance to 
them, or at least efforts should be made to prevent the Jewish lobby from 
becoming an obstacle to the Indian diplomatic activity in the US. Therefore, the 
objections of the Israelis regarding the anti-Israeli-Indian foreign policy should be 
kept in mind.176 
 
In the mid 1980s, the President of the WJC, Edgar Bronfman, used his 
international contacts and travelled to India where he raised the subject of the 
anomalous absence of formal diplomatic relations as well as the absence of 
official commercial ties between Israel and the Government of India (Klieman, 
1990:178).  In 1985 leaders of the ADL and Congressman Solarz met with Rajiv 
Gandhi in New York (in addition to Gandhi's meeting with the Israeli Prime 
Minister at the time, Shimon Peres) and as a result of the meetings, a new Vice- 
Consul in Bombay was approved by the Indian Government.177  
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 For details about the meeting with Nehru, see section 3.8.1. 
176
 For details about India, Israel and the US, see section 3.9.2.6. 
177
 For details about the meeting between Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and the US Jewish 
Organisations, see sections 3.8.6 and 3.9.1.4. 
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Subsequently, Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi had a high profile meeting with 
representatives of US Jewish organisations and pro-Israeli groups in New York on 
8 June 1988 and the meeting opened the door for the upgrading of the Israeli 
Vice-Consul in Bombay to the rank of Consul in August 1988.  In New Delhi on 8 
June 1988, a delegation of the ADL met Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, Minister of 
External Affairs Narasimha Rao and other senior officials in the Ministry of 
External Affairs (Naaz, 1999:244).178 
 
On 21 November 1991, a WJC delegation, headed by Isi J. Leibler, the 
Australian Co-Chairman of the Governing Board of the WJC, met Prime Minister 
Narasimha Rao in New Delhi.  A number of crucial issues were discussed such 
as establishing diplomatic relations between Israel and India and a decision was 
made by the two parties that a Jewish Colloquium would be held in New Delhi 
(Leibler, 1991).179 
 
Despite attempts made by US Jewish organisations to establish diplomatic 
relations between India and Israel, they were not successful in this regard. The 
most likely reason was the lack of US political influence on India before 1991.  
The common perception in Israel was that the main reason which prevented the 
Government of India from closing the Consulate in Bombay in 1982, when the 
Israeli Consul was expelled from India, was the political importance of the 
American Jewish organisations as well as the influence attached by the Indian 
Government to the US Jewish Congressman Stephen Solarz.180  
 
4.10 Post-independence Israel: The state and society level of analysis 
 
The state and society level of analysis stresses the influence of national factors 
on foreign policy concentrating on foreign policy process carried out by ultimate 
decision units.181  Israel's foreign policy decision- making process had elements of 
centralisation because foreign policy was secondary in the eyes of the Israeli 
                                            
178
 For details about the Indian Ministry of External Affairs and its attitude towards Israel, see 
section 3.10.3.2. The meeting took place with the Minister of External Affairs, N. Rao, Secretary 
Alfred Gonsalves and Joint Secretary P.K. Singh. 
179
 For details about the meeting with Rao, see section 3.8.9. 
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 For detail about Solarz, see sections 3.8.6, 3.9.1.4 and 4.9.1.3. 
181
 For details about the theories, see sections 2.2 and 2.3 
248 
 
 
electorate and only received serious consideration as part of the election cycle. 
However, state and society units are an integral part of the Israeli democratic 
process, are incorporated within the Israeli democracy and influence the course 
of the Israeli foreign policy.  While the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was analysed as 
an ultimate decision unit, the following national factors are analysed in terms of 
the state and society level of analysis as part of Israel's foreign policy planning 
and foreign policy-making regarding India.  The political factors that are analysed 
are the Israeli Parliament (the Knesset), the Israeli party system, the Israeli 
executive, including the Prime Minister, the Prime Minister’s Office and the 
Ministry of Defence as well as the General Federation of Workers of Israel (the 
Histadruth), pressure groups and the media (public opinion) are analysed,. 
 
Israel is a Jewish democratic state and it is essential to understand the domestic 
political and social scenario in Israel with a specific emphasis on national 
consensus as a political need. There was a political consensus in Israel that India 
would not change its pro-Arab foreign policy towards Israel as long as there was 
no significant change in the Arab-Israeli conflict. At the same time there was a 
general feeling of disappointment in and suspicion towards India amongst the 
Israelis. 
4.10.1 The Israeli Parliament: The Knesset 
 
Traditionally, the Knesset played a marginal role in Israeli foreign policy and even 
the influence of the Committee for Foreign Affairs and Security had been limited, 
given the primacy of the parties in the political system.  Members of the 
Committee for Foreign Affairs and Security were elected according to the 
representation principle of their party and the members of the committee usually 
followed their party leaders.182 The Knesset is a house of parties and the members 
owe their seats to their parties and there is no individual representative of the 
electorate and the whole state of Israel is one constituency. When the system 
functioned smoothly according to the rules of parliamentary and coalition politics, 
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 The Mapai Party, a Social Democratic Party and the ruling party, was the pivot of the Knesset, 
the coalition and the committee of foreign affairs, as were the other leading parties that followed, 
such as the Israeli Labour Party, the Alignment Party and the Likud Party (Klieman, 1990:121-
122).  
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the result was automatic legislative approval of foreign policy decisions or actions 
presented to the Knesset by the ruling coalition.  Key subjects of the Israeli foreign 
policy are brought before the Committee for Foreign Affairs and Security. The 
Committee for Foreign Affairs and Security was traditionally regarded as the most 
prestigious committee of the Knesset although it has minimal statutory power 
(Klieman, 1990:119).183  
 
Since Asia and India in particular, were never at the centre of Israel’s domestic 
politics, Israel’s foreign policy towards India was not an important factor as far as 
the Knesset was concerned (the Knesset  Assembly and the Committee for Foreign 
Affairs and Security) and it was hardly subjected to any intensive foreign policy 
discussions at all (Medzini, 1976:209; Klieman, 1990:122). In the absence of such 
discussions, there was no pressure on the Israeli policy makers concerning 
relations between Israel and India and the submissive foreign policy towards India, 
presented by the Government of Israel in conjunction with the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, was accepted by the Israeli legislative branch without any intensive foreign 
policy debates.184 
4.10.2 The party system in Israel  
 
The party system in Israel is based on a system of proportional representation in 
the Parliament (Knesset) and a multi-party system, and voting is for a party-list 
rather than for individual candidates. All governments in Israel from the time of 
independence  up to 1991, were coalition governments constructed around one of 
the two national parties in Israel, namely the Labour Party or the Likud Party (in 
their various political transformations) reinforced by several junior parties.  
 
There was a link between the political system in Israel and the Israeli foreign 
policy.  The foreign policy was influenced by the lobbying of pressure groups and 
associations, particularly on subjects directly related to the national security of the 
State of Israel.  Nevertheless, traditionally the people of Israel preferred to give 
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 For information about the Israeli party system, see section 4.10.2. 
184
 Submissive foreign policy limits itself to reacting to the initiatives of others while concentrating 
on cutting losses in order to save national orders (Klieman, 1988 and 1990).  See section 4.8 for 
more information on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as an ultimate decision unit.  
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the various governments a free hand in handling foreign policy not directly related 
to the immediate national interests of Israel and to give their political support to 
the government foreign policy that was announced.185  In fact, opinions and 
attitudes held by the public in the field of foreign affairs were actually formed by 
the foreign policy itself or by how the foreign policy has been presented by the 
government (Klieman, 1990:118-120). 
 
After independence foreign policy was not a crucial issue in the Israeli domestic 
politics and only four parties had platform with a foreign policy programme.  The 
ruling party, Mapai Party (Workers of the Land of Israel), was a Socialist 
Nationalist Party and led the government coalition from independence until 
1965.186 In the first government after independence, the Mapai Party held the 
three main portfolios including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The coalition 
government followed Mapai’s decisions on foreign policy and the Mapai Party and 
the Government of Israel were virtually synonymous in terms of foreign affairs and 
in political practical terms. Consequently, most major decisions in the international 
arena were taken within the party and not within the coalition government.  Prime 
Minister David Ben-Gurion and Foreign Minister Moshe Sharett conducted the 
foreign policy programme of the Mapai Party as well as the other coalition parties, 
which accepted their joint leadership (Brecher, 1972:162).187  
 
The need for friendship with Asian countries, including the specific need for 
normal relations with India, was approved by the party through its foreign policy 
platform in 1959 and was incorporated into a more general form of the foreign 
policy provision of the coalition programme. In the early 1950s, the Mapai Party 
had some internal debates about its foreign policy orientation and international 
priorities in general and Asia in particular.  Sharett’s asks some probing questions 
about Israel’s orientation and priorities in his speech at the Mapai’s Central 
Committee in April 1952: 
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 For the list of governments between the years 1948-1991, see appendix 2. For pressure 
groups in Israel regarding India, see section 4.10.5.  
186
 The Mapai Party was a member of the Socialist International Organisation of the social-
democrat parties, which was re-established in 1952.  The Mapai Party became a full member of 
the International Organisation in the 1950s until the Labour Party took its place in 1968. 
187
 For details about Ben-Gurion as well as Sharett, see section 4.11. 
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Does our belonging to Asia mean everything?  Do we throw all we have 
repeatedly learned into the Mediterranean Sea and then return to the 
Asiatic origins as they are?  Can we compare our link with America to 
our link with India (Bialer, 1981:29)?188  
 
In spite of its interest in Asia in general and in India in particular, the Mapai Party 
had some reservations about connections with the Indian ruling party, INCP, as 
demonstrated in the letter sent by the director of the Asian and African Division in 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Israeli Consul in Bombay:  
 
Contacts with the Congress Party are important and these must by 
strengthened, but this must be done while taking into consideration 
Mapai’s ties with the Indian Socialist Party. (ISA – File 130.23/310/5, 
28/12/1959). 
 
 
Most of the political parties in Israel, except for the Mapai Party, had relatively little 
interest in Asia, with the two exceptions of the Mapam Party and the Achdut 
Haavoda Party.  The Mapam (United Workers) Party was a Marxist Nationalist 
Party, which supported pro-Soviet neutralism that followed the evolution of 
Communism in Asia and was interested in India as a state controlled by a socialist 
government.  The Mapam Party expected to find common ground with Nehru and 
was hoping that their common socialist ideology would bring them closer together, 
an expectation that did not materialise.  
 
The Achdut Haavoda (Unity of Labour) Party was a leftist Nationalist Party and 
from a global perspective, this party had a socialist tinge with an interest in non-
alignment, but held militant views regarding the issue of the Arab- Israeli conflict.  
In April 1955, an Achdut Haavoda delegation participated in the Conference of the 
Communist Parties (COMIFORM), which took place in New Delhi, but following 
the Indian response to the Suez Canal Military Operation, the party avoided 
further foreign policy initiatives towards India.  
 
Two years later, in 1961, a principle referring to the friendship with Asian countries 
as well as India was included in the coalition programme.  In 1965, the Mapai 
Party and the Achdut Haavoda Party formed the Maarach (Alignment) Party.  The 
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 There was no contradiction between Sharett’s image as a Foreign Minister who promoted 
relations with Asia and the speech that emphasised the importance of America since he believed at 
that time that Asia would be engulfed by Communism (Bialer, 1981).  
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basic principles of the Alignment Party that were approved in January 1966 
included the principle referring to friendship with the Asian people. The Mapai 
Party tried to insert the principle regarding friendship with the Asian people into 
the government’s programme, but  its alignment partner, the Achdut Haavoda 
Party, did not support it and ultimately it was not included in the programme 
(Brecher, 1963:129; Brecher, 1972:162).  
 
After the Six-Day War in 1967 and the extremely pro-Arab and anti- Israeli-Indian 
foreign policy that ensued, it was obvious that the Alignment Party’s policy 
towards Asia in general and India in particular became irrelevant and outdated. 
Following the three-way merger between the Mapai Party, the Achdut Haavoda 
Party and the Rafi (List of Israeli Workers) Party, the Labour Party was born in 
1968.189  One year later, in 1969, the Alignment Party was formed by merging the 
Labour Party and the Mapam Party.  
 
As a result of the Yom Kippur War, which took place in October 1973, the 
Alignment Party was defeated by the Likud Party in the May 1977 elections.190  
President Sadat’s visit to Jerusalem in November 1977 and the peace agreement 
between Israel and Egypt that followed the Camp David Accords in September 
1978 did not have any political effect on the Indian foreign policy towards Israel. 
 
From 1977 to 1991, the Likud Party dominated the Israeli political scenario.191  
The Likud Party called for the implementation of a plan for the Palestinians that 
would give them complete autonomy on the West Bank and in the Gaza, which 
had been occupied by Israel since 1967.192 The Government of India did not 
accept the Likud’s platform and the Likud Party, on the other hand, had little 
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 Rafi Party was founded in 1965 by a group who left the Mapai Party under the leadership of 
David Ben-Gurion 
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 The meaning of Yom Kippur in the Hebrew language is Atonement Day. The war broke out on 
that Jewish holiday in October 1973 and is therefore, also known as the October war. The war 
broke out after Egyptian and Syrian armies attacked Israel simultaneously with their total forces.  
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 The Likud Party (the Union Party) was a right wing party, which was formed in 1973 as a 
political parliamentary group.  
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 A plan officially presented first by Prime Minister Menahem Begin, on 13 December 1977 for 
the self-administration of the Arab Palestinian population in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The 
autonomy plan underwent transformation in the Camp David accords signed on 17 September 
1978.  The agreement regarding the West Bank and Gaza referred to a transitional five-year 
period after which full autonomy would be granted to the inhabitants of these areas.  
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interest in India since its leaders considered India to be a hypocritical, biased and 
pro-Arab country.  
 
The only exception was Moshe Dayan, the Minister of Foreign Affairs in the first 
Likud government after the 1977 election; he paid a secret visit to India in August 
1977 where he met Prime Minister Desai and the Minister of External Affairs, 
Minister Vajpayee.193  This visit should be analysed  against the broader domestic 
political context of Israeli politics, considering the fact that Dayan defected from 
the Labour Party (although he was one of the founders of the party) after he had 
lost his popularity  because of the Yom Kippur War and joined Begin’s first 
government.  In his new capacity, as a Minister of Foreign Affairs, he played a 
major role in the peace process with Egypt and made some attempts, such as his 
secret visit to India, to improve Israel’s position in the international arena in view 
of the extremist image of Begin’s government.194  
 
Following the elections in 1981, a government led by the Likud once again was 
formed.  In June 1982, the Israeli intervention in Lebanon began and ended only 
when Israel withdrew to its international borders in June 1985.  The Lebanon War 
in general and the siege of Beirut City in particular had worsened Israel’s standing 
in the international arena, that included India, which was governed by Indira 
Gandhi, in her second tenure as Prime Minister.  Mrs. Gandhi openly aligned 
herself with the Lebanese side .195  
 
Following the political stalemate in Israel resulting from the 1984 elections, the 
Likud Party joined the Alignment Party in the formation of a National Unity 
Government in which the premiership rotated.  After the withdrawal of the Mapam 
Party from the Alignment Party in 1988, the Labour Party was re-established and 
In December 1988 the renewed Labour Party joined the National Unity 
Government headed by the Likud.  The Likud Party emerged from the elections in 
1988 with the majority, but the head of the party, Yitzhak Shamir, decided to form 
another National Unity Government with the Labour Party.  The National Unity 
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 For details about Dayan’s visit in India, see sections 3.8.4, 4.8.1 and 4.9.1.3.  
194
 Dayan resigned from Begin’s government in 1979 after a disagreement with Prime Minister 
Begin regarding who would be the negotiator in the autonomy talks with Egypt (talks that followed 
the peace agreement with Egypt).  For details about Begin, see section 4.11. 
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 For details about Mrs. Gandhi's attitude towards Israel, see section 3.8.3. 
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Government was brought down by a vote of no confidence on 15 May 1990 and 
on 11 June 1990, the Likud Party, headed by Prime Minister Shamir, formed a 
new government party (Rolef, 1993:369).  
 
Between the years 1987and 1992 there was a popular Palestinian uprising in the 
Arab territories held by Israel (commonly known as the Intifada) nevertheless, 
talks between the Palestinians and the Israelis started in 1991 that later led to the 
Oslo Accord.  During the Gulf War in 1991, Israel did not retaliate after being 
attacked by Iraq with more than forty Scud missiles launched against its cities.  
 
Israel also gained respect for its self-restraint; however, this restraint had no effect 
on the Indian foreign policy towards Israel (Khan, 1992:215). There was only one 
indirect political reference to it when Prime Minister Shekhar made a public 
statement that there was no connection whatsoever between the Iraqi withdrawal 
from Kuwait and the Palestinian problem (Becher, 2002:545).196 However, it did 
elicit considerable sympathy for Israel around the world and even the Indian press 
gave it favourable coverage.  
 
4.10.3 The Israeli executive  
 
In the area of foreign affairs, the competitive interplay of bureaucratic forces had 
become an accepted part of the Israeli Government service. In fact, 
competitiveness was institutionalised in the bureaucratic struggles waged 
amongst the three organisational actors: the Prime Minister’s Office, the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defence (Klieman, 1990:141).  With regard 
to India, between 1948 and 1991, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was the ultimate 
decision unit.  However, the Prime Minister’s Office and the Ministry of Defence 
were the driving forces behind activities directed towards India, while trying to 
exercise a preponderant influence on Israeli-Indian low key relations. 
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4.10.3.1 The Prime Minister and the Prime Minister’s Office 
 
Traditionally, the Prime Ministers of Israel were directly involved with its foreign 
policy as it was closely linked to Israel’s national security.197 The Prime Minister’s 
Office deals with three overlapping spheres: security, intelligence and statecraft. 
Substantial portions of these activities are clandestine and are mainly handled by 
the Agency of Intelligence and Special Operations (Mossad). The Mossad is part 
of the Prime Minister’s Office and is the national arm of Israeli defence and 
security affairs, specialising in clandestine operations beyond the borders of the 
country and the director of the Mossad reports directly to the Prime Minister.  The 
Mossad is also in charge of promoting contacts with countries where there is an 
absence of formal or direct diplomatic links, such as India until 1992 (Klieman, 
1988:47;  Klieman 1990:141). 
 
The Mossad enjoyed a period of prolonged cooperation and exchange of 
information with India’s Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), the Indian 
Intelligence Agency, which started in the second half of the 1960s under the 
supervision of Meir Amit (who headed the Mossad between 1964-1968).  That 
low level cooperation continued during the second tenure of the premiership of 
Indira Gandhi who persisted with her unwavering anti-Israeli attitude and also 
during other low points in the relations between the two countries (Kapila, 2000; 
Kumaraswamy, 1998:6; Naaz, 2000:971). 
 
4.10.3.2 Ministry of Defence 
 
Since independence, the Ministry of Defence had enjoyed an advantage in 
bureaucratic politics and tended to prevail over the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 
its competition for policy influence and policy control, a tendency that was also 
important for the understanding of Israeli foreign policy (Klieman, 1990:146).  
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 About the Israeli Prime Ministers and their influence on the Israeli foreign policy towards India 
(in terms of individual level of analysis), see section 4.11. 
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The Ministry of Defence coordinated international military relations as well as the 
foreign military assistance of Israel. That type of coordination included direct 
negotiations with other foreign governments, including covert negotiations with 
certain governments.  The Ministry of Defence was also in charge of arms sales 
and was committed to creating outlets for Israel’s growing arms industry 
(Brecher, 1972:137).  Importantly, military aid gave Israel a leading edge when 
dealing with Third World countries and in regions where other standard 
instruments of foreign policy did not work.  The Israeli arms export action set out 
to promote military, commercial and diplomatic contacts and Israel as an arms 
exporting country often used active arms sales diplomacy, as was the case when 
Israel sold arms and ammunition to India during its wars with China and 
Pakistan.198  
 
4.10.4 The Histadruth (The General Federation of Workers in Israel)  
 
The Histadruth (The General Federation of Workers in Israel) paved the way for 
Israeli assistance activities at government level in Asia, as well as Israeli aid 
activities in India.  In essence, the Histadruth was the unofficial promoter of Israel 
and its achievements in India and ceaselessly tried to establish unofficial contact 
with Indian political leaders, in particular socialist leaders as well as with Indian 
trade unions. 
 
In 1958, the Histadruth was planning to open a liaison office in New Delhi 
following some discussions between Reuven Barkatt, the director of the political 
department of the Histadruth and Prem Bhasin, one of the leaders of the Paraja 
Socialist Party in India. However, nothing came of these plans since the trade 
union that had direct links with the INCP was not given did not support the 
initiative (Aynor, Avimor & Kaminer, 1989:42-43). 199  
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 Israel was the only Western country that manufactured Soviet military equipment as well as 
ammunition suitable for the Indian army, based on expertise acquired by Israel from Soviet 
weapons, which were confiscated from the Egyptian army during the Suez Canal Operation.   
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 For details about the Paraja Socialist Party, see section 3.10.2.3. 
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The Histadruth created the Afro – Asian Institute for Labour Studies and 
Cooperation in Israel in1960, although its first training programme had already 
started in 1958 with a seminar on cooperative enterprises that took place 
between November 1958 and February 1959.  That seminar became the prelude 
to a growing number of similar seminars that followed.  The goals of the Institute 
were articulated as follows:  
 
To train manpower for the labour and Cooperative Movements in Africa 
and Asia in order to enable each movement to integrate more effectively in 
the general process of social programs and development of its own 
country.(Brecher,1971:492). 
 
 
The study programme of the Institute combined theory and practice in trade 
unions, cooperative and management activities and the training in the institute 
became a key component of the Foreign Ministry’s international cooperation 
programmes in Israel, in particular in the case of India.200  Significantly, between 
16 December 1959 and 20 January 1960, an official delegation from India visited 
the Afro-Asian Institute in order to learn about cooperation.   
 
A special three month course was organised for the leaders of the Budhan 
Movement of India and the Paraja Socialist Party.  The seminar, which 
concentrated on the Israeli socialist experience, took place between 29 February 
1960 and 1 June 1960 and following its success, a second course was organised 
for the Bhudan Movement (Aynor & Avimor, 1990:308-309; Avimor, 1991:359). 201  
 
From the opening of the Afro-Asian institute in 1958  up to  1961,  more than five 
hundred participants from India studied at the Afro-Asian institute in Tel-Aviv 
(Laufer, 1967:277).  In the absence of diplomatic relations with Israel and 
following the low-key relations between the two countries before 1992, most of 
the participants in the Afro-Asian Institute for Labour Studies and Cooperation 
came from the sectorial trade unions in India, which were not associated with the 
INCP.  
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 More details about the International Cooperation Program of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs can 
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4.10.5 Pressure groups in Israel  
 
Interest groups in Israel played little if any role in foreign policy formulation.  The 
Israeli multi-party system is in fact a substitute for such pressure groups 
(Klieman, 1990:1134).  Between the years 1948 and 1991, there were a small 
number of Indian diamond businessmen (mostly from Bombay), who resided in 
Israel with their families, but they had neither the ability nor the will to become 
involved in improving relations between the two countries. Consequently, their 
political influence in Israel (as well as their influence in New Delhi) was 
insignificant. 
 
 One striking exception was Zubin Mehta, who was an Indian-Parsi from Bombay 
by birth and a world- renowned conductor. He enjoyed long-standing working 
relations with the Israeli Philharmonic Orchestra and was a personal friend of 
many Israeli politicians.  For many years he was the main promoter of bilateral 
relations between India and Israel (Naaz, 1999:890).  
 
 In June 1977, despite political obstacles in New Delhi, Mehta made use of his 
acquaintance with Indian politicians and with their assistance, as well as with the 
cooperation of the “Time and Talent Club” in Bombay, he took the Israeli 
Philharmonic  Orchestra to New Delhi and Bombay for a tour of musical concerts.  
A similar tour of the Israeli Philharmonic Orchestra in India was also organised by 
him in 1993 after the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two 
countries, but the successful musical tour did not have any impact on the bilateral 
relations between the two countries.202 
 
For several years, the Indian Jewish community in Israel had two separate active 
organisations that later merged to become one organisation, the Central 
Organisation of Indian Jews in Israel (COIJI), with the goal of promoting the 
Jewish-Indian heritage in Israel.   However, the community did not play any 
significant role in Israeli politics in general or as a pressure group promoting 
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bilateral relations with India, in particular (Jerusalem Post-Special Supplement, 
2006).203  
 
4.10.6 Media and public opinion in Israel 
 
  Opinions and attitudes in the field of foreign policy held by the Israeli public are 
formed by diplomatic activities or by how situations and choices are presented in 
the media. This means that foreign policy in general was accepted politically by 
the majority of the public, which gave the Israeli leaders the freedom to carry out 
the Israeli foreign policy (Klieman, 1990:111). 
 
The media fulfilled a vital function in the Israeli democracy, however, the 
coverage of foreign affairs had traditionally been low compared with considerable 
importance attached to domestic politics and it concentrated mostly on foreign 
affairs topics directly related to the national interests of Israel.  Significantly, 
foreign policy decision-makers in Israel obtained much of their information from 
the media.  The print media and later on the electronic media were key factors in 
the process of policy making of foreign affairs, but the attention and coverage 
devoted to Asia and India in particular in the Israeli media, between 
independence and 1991, was rather low.  
 
The inadequate coverage of India in the Israeli media could be explained in part 
by the relatively low Israeli interest in Asia and the fact that the Israeli media 
never had any permanent correspondent on the Asian continent (the information 
about India was taken mostly from the international news agencies). An 
additional explanation could be the nature of the bilateral relations between Israel 
and India and the traditional low-key relations between the two countries until 
1991, which did not encourage high coverage of Indian affairs by the Israeli 
media.   
 
There was consensus in Israel, and not least of all in the media, that India was 
officially conducting an anti-Israeli foreign policy and was biased towards Israel.  
Consequently, this type of consensus resulted in a lack of interest that was 
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reinforced by the low-level of media coverage regarding India.  The low-level 
media exposure of India to the decision-makers and politicians in Israel was one 
of the main reasons why bilateral relations with India were rarely on the political 
agenda in Israel (Klieman, 1990:111). 
 
4.11 Post-independence Israel: The individual level of analysis 
 
The Prime Ministers of Israel were traditionally involved with the foreign policy of 
Israel as it was directly related to the Israeli national defence system due to the 
immediacy of foreign affairs and security. The following Israeli Prime Ministers 
played a role in Israel's foreign policy towards India. 
 
 
Predominant leaders: David Ben-Gurion 
 
David Ben-Gurion was the first Israeli Prime Minister and had a strong impact on 
Israeli relations (1948-1953 and 1955-1963).204  On the eve of Israel’s 
independence, Ben-Gurion attached more importance to the Western countries 
with a Jewish population than to Asia, but gradually he started to attach more 
importance to Asia (CZA S 5/322, 6/4/1948).   
 
Ben-Gurion had a general interest in Asia because of Buddhism and India in 
particular as a gateway to Asia to which he referred directly in his essay: Israel 
among the Nations.  In the essay, Ben-Gurion repeats his government’s duty to 
promote friendly relations and reciprocity with every peace- loving country.   He 
then singles India and China out as one of the two exceptional portents of our 
times (the second portent was the struggle for world leadership between the US 
and the Soviet Union) (Brecher, 1972:163, 264, 383; Aynor & Avimor, 1990:E12). 
In 1957 he declared: 
 
From the point of view of our existence and security the friendship of one 
European country is more valuable than the views of all the people of Asia 
(Medzini, 1976:201).  
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In February 1958, Egypt and Syria merged to form the UAR 205 and in his speech 
in the Indian Parliament, Nehru intimated that he regarded the Israeli criticism of 
the UAR as ominous, as it could lead to some dangerous action precipitated by 
Israel (Asian Recorder, 7-13/7/1958).206 In his reply in the Knesset on 21 May 
1958, Ben-Gurion expressed the wish that India would soon establish diplomatic 
relations with Israel and added that:  
 
I read with regret and concern the surprising statement of the Indian 
Premier for which there is no foundation whatsoever. No action, 
precipitate or deliberate has been or is about to be taken by Israel in 
connection to the Syrian Egyptian merger (Avimor, 1991:335). 
 
 
In 1959, Ben-Gurion published an analysis entitled: Towards a New World, in 
which he explained that Israel was morally, ethically and socially bound to assist 
the weak on the Asian continent whether they were individuals or national entities 
.In his analysis, he predicted that the Israeli assistance would eventually lead to 
political links with the Asian states that would find political expression in 
friendship, political understanding and economic relations (Government 
Yearbook, 1960/1961).   
 
Ben-Gurion had great personal respect for Gandhi and Nehru and was 
disappointed with Nehru’s attitude towards the State of Israel as revealed in an 
interview in London in 1959:  
  
I cannot understand how Mr. Nehru fits his behaviour to Israel with 
Gandhi’s philosophy of universal friendship.  Mr. Nehru gave definite 
promises to the Director General of our Foreign Ministry eight years ago 
that he would soon establish normal diplomatic relations with Israel, but 
so far he has not kept his word (The London Times, 1959 and Brecher, 
1976:223). 
 
Subsequently, Ben-Gurion voiced the following complaint:  
 
India under Mr. Nehru refuses to establish normal relations with Israel 
although he has repeatedly promised our representative to do so. Nehru 
too claims allegiance to neutrality…He is not even neutral in regard to 
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Israel and the Arabs for he has close ties and normal relations with the 
Arab countries but he has stubbornly refused to establish diplomatic 
relations with Israel, and on his frequent visits to the Middle East he has, 
on every occasion, and not by accident, overlooked Israel (Government 
Yearbook, 1959/1960).207  
  
 
In fact, Ben-Gurion made repeated efforts to invite Nehru through Indian visitors 
whom he met and through other heads of states to visit Israel.  In July 1960, he 
sent Nehru a personal letter in which he invited him to Israel.  The invitation was 
sent with Bajhumari Amrit Kaur who was an ex-Minister of Health in Nehru's 
cabinet, a Member of Parliament in the upper house and the head of the Indian 
Red Cross Organisation. This was followed up by a letter of invitation from Ben-
Gurion to Nehru sent on 28 July 1960:  
 
I am confident that this visit will be highly beneficial in the present 
disturbed state of international relations. Any expression of goodwill on 
the part of an illustrious statesman, the leader of a great nation like 
yourself, would undoubtedly have its effect, directly or indirectly, in 
improving the situation in the world, and in our area particularly (Ben-
Gurion's Archives, 28/7/1960). 
 
 
Nehru rejected the invitation and in his reply he explained that under the current 
circumstances it would not be advisable to undertake such a visit, as instead of 
improving relations, it might have the opposite effect (Yegar, 2004:159).  Mrs. 
Kaur also responded to the exchange of letters and wrote to Ben-Gurion:  
 
I can sense the disappointment that you must have felt at our Prime 
Minister's reply to your invitation to him to visit Israel. Knowing Mr. Nehru 
as I do, I can vouch for the fact that he has no animosity in his heart 
against your Government or your people. He however thinks that the 
time is not yet for him to make a move in the direction which you desire. 
And he honestly feels that instead of the helping he might even be 
making the position worse for you with the Arab world (Ben-Gurion's 
Archives, 2379, 2/11/1960). 
 
 
Ben-Gurion, who was fascinated by oriental Asian civilisations, made an effort to 
study Buddhism and visited Burma in 1961 where he spent a few days in 
Buddhist meditation and met Prime Minister U Nu.   However, he did not stop 
over in neighbouring India.  
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After Egypt, Syria and Iraq had decided to form an Arab federation in July 1963, 
Ben-Gurion sent a personal note to Nehru expressing his concern about the new 
Arab federation.208 In the note he asked Nehru to exert his considerable 
international influence on the President of Egypt in order to dissuade the latter 
from following a dangerous path and to convince him to start peace negotiations 
with Israel.  Ben-Gurion did not receive any official answer from Nehru (Bar 
Zohar, 1987). 
 
According to Netanel Lorch (1997:233), when he was talking to Ben-Gurion about 
Nehru, Ben-Gurion told him: “India is Nehru.”  Lorch's interpretation of that 
remark was that Ben-Gurion realised that as long as Nehru was the Prime 
Minister of India, diplomatic relations with Israel were improbable. 
 
Moshe Pearlman published his talks with Ben-Gurion during 1964, in which Ben-
Gurion freely expressed his views. Ben-Gurion’s reference to Nehru was quite 
appreciative; nevertheless, he expressed his disappointment about the lack of 
progress in their mutual relations:  
 
The one country which has succumbed to Arab pressure is not one of the newest 
States and not one of the smallest or least powerful. It is India, one of the largest, 
most populated and most progressive of the new States.  It was headed by one 
of the most eminent statesmen in the world, Nehru until his death.  He did great 
things for India, although he also left a number of important things undone, and 
despite his immense problems, he managed to achieve a large measure of 
democracy in his vast land. He showed imagination, ability and courage; and his 
whole background should have led him naturally to a sympathetic appreciation of 
what Israel had done since her statehood.  Yet, he remained aloof and 
consistently refused to establish diplomatic relations with us.  We did not resent 
his preference for the neighbouring Arab States, even the more backward of 
them, even the feudal, even the dictatorships.  That was his right. But it was 
strange that a man of his qualities, his progressive ideals and his vision, should 
have submitted to Arab pressure. Other countries follow normal diplomatic 
procedures by an exchange of representatives, for example the Soviet Union but 
not India.  Mind you, it is of no great importance for Israel.  Her basic interests 
remain unaffected by not being fully recognized by India. But it was a source of 
personal disappointment for me (Pearlman, 1965:178). 
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Predominant Leaders: Moshe Sharett - Sharett served as the Prime Minister of 
the State of Israel from December 1953 until November 1955. During his short 
tenure of premiership, he devoted most of his time to domestic political struggles 
in general and with his predecessor who later succeeded him, David Ben-Gurion, 
in particular.  Succeeding Ben-Gurion provided him with the opportunity to pursue 
his own ideas and to influence the Israeli foreign policy, but his tenure was brief 
and by the end of 1953 it may already have been too late because Ben-Gurion 
had managed to lay a firm foreign policy foundation (Klieman, 1990:71).209  
 
Predominant Leaders: Levi Eshkol - Prime Minister Eshkol, who succeeded 
Ben-Gurion, served as Prime Minister of Israel between June 1963 and February 
1969, but spent most of his time on domestic politics and on political struggles 
with his predecessor Ben-Gurion.  He was inexperienced in foreign affairs having 
been chosen mostly for his domestic competence and managerial skills and had 
to operate in the shadow of Ben-Gurion who frequently criticised the new 
government’s foreign policy (Klieman, 1990:73).  In addition to his duty as prime 
minister, he also served as a minister of defence up to the eve of the Six-Day 
War.  Eshkol had a pragmatic  approach to foreign policy was as he had  little 
knowledge of the topic other than his concern with foreign economic policy, the 
Israeli-Arab conflict and Israel's relations with the US, Europe, Soviet Union and 
the Jewish Diaspora.  Asia in general and India in particular, were not at the core 
of his international interests (Brecher, 1972:396).  
 
In addition, Eshkol did not see any hope for a change of foreign policy towards 
Israel by Nehru’s successor, Lal Bahadur Shastri. In fact, he did not deviate from 
his predecessor's foreign policy towards Israel.210  On 12 January 1966, when 
Eshkol presented his government to the Knesset, he expressed himself as 
follows: 
 
I may be permitted to note with satisfaction the positive result of the 
Tashkent conference in which India and Pakistan through the mediation of 
the Soviet Union, have issued a joint statement…On this occasion I would 
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like to express from the rostrum of the Knesset our profound sympathy with 
the government and people of India on the sudden death of the Indian 
Prime Minister, Lal Bahadur Shastri, in the midst of his efforts to achieve a 
peaceful settlement with Pakistan by direct talk (Medzini, 1966:680). 
 
 
The Six-Day War and Indira Gandhi’s premiership in India, as well as her anti-
Israeli attitude made an improvement of relations between the two countries 
improbable during Eshkol’s tenure as Prime Minister. 
 
Predominant Leaders: Golda Meir - Mrs. Meir became Prime Minister of the 
State of Israel after Levi Eshkol died in March 1969 and led the Israeli 
Government up to April 1974, including the Yom Kippur War in 1973.  At first, she 
headed the ongoing National Unity Government, but in July 1970 after the right 
wing bloc had left the government because of Roger's plan,211 Prime Minister Meir 
formed an Alignment-Left government.   
 
She resigned in April 1974 after the Geneva conference in December 1973 and 
the first Israeli-Egypt separation of forces agreement in January 1974 and 
following the publication of the commission report that referred to the Yom Kippur 
War. Although Meir showed a low degree of flexibility in the Middle East, she had 
a pragmatic approach to foreign policy in the rest of the world and she expressed 
an interest in the afflictions of the new states in Asia (Aynor and Avimor, 
1990:E9). 212 She came to her post from the Ministry of Labour and responded 
with warmth to problems that pertained to new states in Asia and Africa although 
her encounter with Asia was less productive; according to her biographer:  
 
Golda was less successful in establishing personal ties with the statesmen 
of Asia, while the basic human and political needs of the young African 
peoples appealed to her innate simplicity, the ancient, complex civilizations 
of Asia were harder to fathom (Breicher, 1972:305). 
 
 
Her entire tenure overlapped with Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's tenure.  Mrs 
Gandhi was a staunch supporter of the Arab world and was extremely incensed 
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with Israel in particular, after the Yom Kippur War (Sunday, 28/11-4/12/1982).213 It 
was therefore taken for granted by Meir that India would not change its foreign 
policy towards Israel in particular, considering India's anti-Israeli statements and 
India’s support of Egypt and Syria at the UN following that war.214 
 
Predominant leaders: Yitzhak Rabin (1974-1977) - Prime Minister Rabin was 
selected by the ruling Labour Party in June 1974 for his first tenure215 following 
Golda Meir’s resignation. It is noteworthy that Rabin assumed power at the most 
difficult time in Israel’s history after the Yom Kippur War.216 During his premiership 
and following the shuttle diplomacy of the US Secretary of State, Henry 
Kissinger, disengagement agreements were signed with Egypt and Syria in 1974 
and an interim agreement was signed with Egypt in 1975.  
 
 However, those agreements did not have any impact on the Indian foreign policy 
towards Israel, which declared its full support of Egypt and Syria.217 While in 
power Rabin concentrated on the economic problems of Israel after the war. 
Despite the agreements with Egypt and Syria, the Rabat Arab summit that took 
place in Morocco on 25 October 1974 adopted a resolution, which confirmed the 
right of the Palestinian people to return to Palestine and recommended the return 
of any liberated Palestinian authority to be put under the leadership of the PLO. 
Rabin summarily rejected the Rabat summit resolution (Shaham, 1998:369-371).  
 
After the Rabat Arab summit, India endorsed the PLO’s bid for observer status at 
the UN and in January 1975 it recognised the PLO.218 The Yom Kippur War also 
resulted in the Middle East being placed at the top of international agenda, as 
that war was considered to be the flashpoint for Soviet-American confrontation 
and the Arab oil issue had become a political weapon against Israel. During his 
tenure, Rabin made several secret visits abroad with the aim of promoting Israeli 
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interests, such as his visits to Morocco and Iran. However,  but India did not 
feature in his diplomatic initiatives as a result of the rift between  the two 
countries and the ongoing hostility displayed towards Israel in particular at the UN 
forum. 
 
Predominant leaders: Menahem Begin (1977-1983) - Begin was sworn in as 
Prime Minister of Israel in June 1977.  Importantly, Begin worked tirelessly at 
negotiating a peace treaty with Egypt, which was ultimately signed on 29 March 
1979, for which he was jointly awarded the Nobel Peace Prize with the Egyptian 
President on 10 December 1979.  During his tenure, the Iraqi Osirak nuclear 
reactor was destroyed on 7 June 1981 and in December 1981 Israeli law and 
order was extended to the Golan Heights. Subsequently, Israel invaded Lebanon 
in June 1982. The operation came to an end after the withdrawal of the Israeli 
forces to the international borders in 1985 (Rolef, 1993:57).  
 
Begin was aware of India’s importance and referred to it with respect, but he also 
assumed a pragmatic political approach towards India.  He supported Foreign 
Minister Moshe Dayan’s secret visit to India, therefore he was disappointed with 
the outcome of the visit.219 However, after Indira Gandhi’s return to power, Begin 
realised that due to her negative attitude towards Israel, the chances of improving 
relations with India were very slim.  
 
During a rare interview published in the Indian weekly Sunday with Subramaniam 
Swamy in Jerusalem, in the winter of 1982, Begin referred to India as a 
hypocritical state, considering the fact that Israel had supported India in its wars 
against Pakistan.  Importantly, in that interview, Begin called for better relations 
between Israel and India as well as full diplomatic relations.  He added that 
although India and Pakistan had waged war against each other, there were 
embassies in each other’s  countries as well as normal diplomatic ties between 
them (Sunday, 28/11-4/12.83).  
 
Predominant leaders: Yitzhak Shamir (1983-1984, 1986-1992) - Following 
Prime Minister Begin’s resignation, Shamir became Prime Minister of Israel on 10 
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October 1983 (Rolef, 1993:272). When Shamir assumed office Indira Gandhi was 
still in power and the relations between the two countries reached a low point 
after the expulsion of the Israeli Consul from India in Bombay and the Israeli 
invasion of Lebanon.220  
 
After the rotation of the premiership that resulted in the second tenure of Shamir 
as Prime Minister, which started in 1986, Shamir faced Rajiv Gandhi as the Prime 
Minister of India.  Shamir’s international image as a rigid right wing politician, the 
Palestinian uprising (Intifada) and Shamir’s policy on the issue of the continuation 
of Jewish settlements on the West Bank and Gaza, were impediments that made 
it difficult for Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi to bring about any significant change to 
the Indian foreign policy towards Israel (Yegar, 2004:162; Kumaraswamy, 
2002:7).221 Shamir was angered by the fact that Gandhi upgraded the diplomatic 
status of the PLO in New Delhi and also that he later recognised the State of 
Palestine… 
 
During the Gulf War in January 1991 Israel did not retaliate when Iraqi Scud 
missiles attacked Israeli cities and Shamir complied with the American request to 
stay out of the war, so that the participation of the Arab states in the war against 
Iraq would not be endangered.  Subsequently, ten months later, on 18 October 
1991, Shamir headed the Israeli delegation to the Madrid Conference (Shaham, 
1998:513-514).222. These two events as well as the end of the Cold War and the 
beginning of globalisation did not go unnoticed in New Delhi. 
 
 However, Shamir made it clear that countries interested in participating in the 
Middle East peace process, including India, would have to establish diplomatic 
relations with Israel. On 16 December 1991, India gave Israel its first sign of 
goodwill and voted with the majority in the UN General Assembly, which repealed 
the 1975 UN General Assembly resolution that equated Zionism with racism.223  
Consequently, the door opened for more diplomatic consultations between Israel 
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and India, which took place in Washington D.C. and led to fully-fledged diplomatic 
relations between the two countries (Yegar, 2004:161, 276). 
 
Predominant leaders: Shimon Peres (1984-1986) - The National Unity 
Government was formed on 13 September 1984 and according to the coalition 
agreement, Peres became Prime Minister for two years. 224 He was instrumental 
in bringing about the withdrawal of the Israeli army from Lebanon by June 1985, 
thereby breathing new life into the peace process.  Importantly, he made a major 
effort to improve Israel’s foreign relations such as establishing diplomatic 
relations with Spain, Poland and some African countries and tried to improve 
relations with India (Klieman, 1990:96).  In the winter of 1985, during the fortieth 
annual session of the UN, he met Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in New York and 
following the meeting, a new Vice-Consul was allowed by the Government of 
India to take up his position in the Israeli Consulate in Bombay (Kumaraswamy, 
1998:5; Yegar, 2004:162). 225  
 
4.12 Summation 
 
The focus of this chapter was on Israel’s relations with India and Israel’s foreign 
policy towards India before the establishment of diplomatic relations between the 
two states (from 1948 to 1991). The development of the Israeli foreign policy 
towards India as a political process was described in terms of a historical 
analysis.  The aim was to determine the factors that influenced the bilateral 
relations between the two countries before diplomatic relations were established 
and what affect they had on their mutual relations prior to 1991.   
 
 
The historical description of the relations between Israel and India from 1948 to 
1991 also provided the foundation, in terms of historical database accumulation 
and depth of knowledge, for a dynamic analysis of the bilateral relations between 
Israel and India. Because of the importance and relevance of pre-independence 
relations to Israel's foreign policy towards the Republic of India, an extended 
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section dealt with the Israeli pre-independence policy towards India before India’s 
independence. In addition, the relevant theoretical models and theories 
applicable to the first timeframe from 1948 to 1991 are utilised in the analysis of 
this chapter.   
 
The dominant actors regarding Israel’s historical relations with India were 
identified and analysed in terms of the ultimate decision unit, as a unit of action. 
This enabled the analysis of entities and authorities, including leaders, within the 
Israeli governments, which were important in the shaping of Israeli foreign policy 
as well as the conduct of diplomacy towards India.  
 
Israel’s foreign policy towards India was analysed in this chapter in terms of three 
levels of analysis: the international level, the state and society (national) level and 
the individual level.  The international level was divided into two types of 
relations: bilateral and multilateral relations. The three levels of analysis, in terms 
of the units of analysis of Israel as a unitary actor in the international system, 
provided a conceptual basis for a historical in-depth description. This enabled the 
identification, examination and analysis of the external and internal factors 
concerning Israel’s foreign policy towards India until 1991, while taking 
cognisance of the complexity level of the web of variables, the political process in 
Israel and the contextual determinants.   
 
The main objective of the Jewish Agency before 1948, as the ultimate decision 
unit, was to achieve a Jewish independent State in Palestine.  The major 
objectives of the Government of Israel as an ultimate decision unit, not only 
before but also after independence in 1948, were first and foremost, the security 
of the State of Israel, the preservation of Israel's territorial integrity and its 
national identity. 
 
From the outset, India was consistently unsympathetic towards Zionism and from 
the Indian records dating back to 1922; it was obvious to the Jewish leaders in 
Palestine that pursuing the Zionist cause in India would be a difficult experience. 
The Jewish Agency before independence as well as the State of Israel after 
independence accepted that pursuance of diplomatic activities and information 
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campaigns in India would be extremely complicated; while challenging the 
opening conditions coupled with a slim chance of success, were given political 
facts.  
 
 Only sporadic and limited efforts were made before independence to influence 
the INCM and Indian leaders in order to change their strong pro-Arab approach. 
The unfruitful Israeli attempts after independence, to improve the bilateral 
relations between the two countries only strengthened the Israeli prejudgment of 
the Indian partial foreign policy towards Israel.  However, the explanation for the 
lack of inclination to pursue the Zionist cause in India before 1948, as well as the 
Israeli submissive foreign policy towards India in the period from 1948 to 1991, 
can include numerous reasons, constraints and circumstances.     
 
In terms of the international level of analysis, the creation of the Jewish national 
homeland depended on Britain (following the Balfour Declaration and the British 
Mandate) and other leading Western powers of that period, which meant that the 
Zionist diplomatic efforts were concentrated in London, Geneva and New York.  
The world Jewry was predominantly Western and the funds for Jewish 
resettlement in Palestine mostly came from Western Jews, as did many potential 
immigrants at that stage after the Holocaust and the Second World War.  
Knowledge of the Jewish community in Palestine of the Indian heritage, culture, 
society and Hindu religion was marginal; likewise, the majority of Indian Hindus 
were not familiar with Judaism and the Bible (Old Testament).    
 
It is important to note that no systematic effort was made by the Zionist 
Movement to establish contacts with the INCM. India was geographically remote 
from Palestine and there was a cultural as well as a religious gap between the 
Jewish and Indian nations.  In addition, India was peripheral to the American-
European centred worldview of the Jewish leaders in Palestine.  
 
Israel, like India, had been under British rule, but the Zionist Movement failed to 
convince the Indian nationalists that the Israeli nation was locked in a struggle for 
independence no different to the one of the Indians or the other nations in Asia.  
In fact, Zionism did not consider itself a part of the historical process of a freedom 
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struggle throughout Asia, but rather as a unique case with the revival of the 
Jewish nation in its ancient homeland. The Zionist leaders avoided identification 
with the anti-colonial nationalist movements in Asia and the Zionist Movement 
(unlike the INCM) was not a member of the OICI. Furthermore, no Zionist 
representative was found at the various anti-imperialist conferences during the 
1920s and the 1930s and there was no public pronouncement aligning Zionist 
goals with Asian nationalism.  
 
The Jewish dependence on Britain for the creation of its national homeland did 
not encourage Jewish activism against Britain in India.  The main concern of the 
Zionist leaders in Palestine regarding the struggle for independence in India, was 
the fear that Britain might be apprehensive  that the trouble between the Jews 
and Arabs in Palestine could cause widespread unrest among the Arabs 
throughout the Middle East and possibly also among the Muslims in India.  
 
The assumption of the Zionist Movement was that the Muslim community in India 
(over 95 million before the Indo-Pakistani partition) was opposed to the Zionist 
Movement in Palestine. Consequently, no serious attempt was made by the 
leaders of the Zionist Movement to establish contacts with the leadership of the 
Indian Muslim community. This was despite the fact that Maulana Azad had 
offered to organise conciliation talks for a settlement in Palestine between the 
Arabs and Jews, but his offer was not taken seriously by the Jewish Agency.   
 
Similarly, no attempt was made by the Jewish Agency to establish contacts with 
the Indo-Christian community, which was familiar with the Bible and the New 
Testament.  Relations with the Indian Jewish community were also limited and 
the budget allocation for the Jewish Agency’s local office in Bombay was small.  
This was mainly because of the low importance attached to India by the Jewish 
leaders and the fact that the local office was not considered an effective channel 
for political contacts in India. 
 
In terms of the individual level of analysis, the most significant Indian leaders as 
far as the Jewish leadership before independence was concerned were Nehru 
and Mahatma Gandhi. However, despite the keen interest of the Jewish 
leadership in both of them, the sporadic meetings with Gandhi, Nehru and other 
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Indian leaders were conducted by Jewish supporters of the Zionist cause and low 
ranking emissaries, in contrast with the close relations that existed between Arab 
nationalist leaders and Indian leaders. Israeli leaders considered Gandhi to be 
pro-Arab and saw him as someone lacking a real understanding of Zionism.  
 
In fact, leaders like Gandhi and Nehru, were not aware of the Jewish spiritual 
connection to the Holy Land and after the independence of Israel, they both 
considered the newly born state to be a theocratic state and thus analogous to 
Pakistan.  However, Gandhi and Nehru were held in great esteem by the Jews of 
Palestine and Nehru in particular, appealed to the Jewish Agency predominantly 
socialist leadership. Consequently, the negative attitudes of Gandhi and Nehru 
towards Zionism and the failure to change their opinion regarding the Zionist 
cause were frustrating to the Jewish leadership in Palestine.  
 
After independence, the major priorities of Israel included arms procurement, 
fund raising, Jewish immigration and political as well as economic support for the 
newly born Jewish State and India was obviously not in a position to help Israel 
turn these its major priorities into realities. Because of the negative nature of the 
Indian foreign policy towards Israel, there was a general assumption in Israel that 
there was only limited scope for any Israeli diplomatic initiative regarding India. 
The Israeli assumption was that the leaders of India in general and the leaders of 
the INCP in particular were committed to the traditional Indian pro-Arab and anti-
Israeli foreign policy. Israeli diplomats were even instructed that issues such as 
the transfer of the Israeli Consulate to New Delhi or diplomatic ties between the 
two countries should not be raised.  Furthermore, the Israeli assumption was 
strengthened by the limitations imposed on the Israeli Consulate activities in 
Bombay and the expulsion of the Israeli Consul from India in 1982.  
 
In terms of the individual level of analysis, Nehru’s pre-independence support of 
the Arabs was transformed into an anti-Israeli doctrine based on his view of Israel 
as a product of Western imperialism.  India’s foreign policy towards Israel 
became more restrictive after Nehru’s death and the Indian leaders that followed 
him, particularly his daughter Indira Gandhi, who was a staunch supporter of the 
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Arab cause, persisted with his pro-Arab and anti-Israeli policy, considered by 
them as part of Nehru’s heritage.   
 
Even opposition leaders that had called for full diplomatic relations and closer ties 
with Israel continued with the Indian anti-Israeli attitude of their predecessors 
when they were heading coalition governments. The perception in Israel was that 
the leaders of India in general and the leaders of the INCP in particular, were 
committed to the traditional Indian pro-Arab and anti-Israeli foreign policy.  
 
In terms of multilateral relations as part of the international level of analysis and 
from a historical viewpoint, from July 1950 onwards, following the Korean War, 
the non-alignment policy of Israel gave way to an active quest for US patronage 
in the form of American guarantees for Israel.226  India, on the other hand, was a 
prominent leader of the NAM and pursued its policy of non-alignment while 
developing close economic, military and diplomatic relations with the Soviet 
Union, while demonstrating a consistent anti-Israeli foreign policy.  During the 
Cold War, Israel and India found themselves on different sides.  
 
In the context of the Cold War, Israel found the political American hold on India to 
be limited. The Jewish American Organisations’ pressure on India regarding 
issues related to Israel, which was partly coordinated by Israel, was not strong 
and not focussed enough. In fact, when the Jewish lobby put pressure on India 
regarding some issues connected to Israel, the Indian response was favourable. 
 
Issues such as the prevention of the closure of the Israeli Consulate in Bombay, 
the upgrading of the official rank of the diplomat in charge of the Consulate, the 
extension of the jurisdiction of the Consulate and pressure to establish fully-
fledged diplomatic relations with Israel, which were promoted by Jewish 
American Organisations, proved the validity of this point.  
 
The Israeli-Arab wars in 1956, 1967, 1973 and 1982 made the multilateral 
diplomacy of Israel move into a defensive mode with low activity in diplomacy in 
                                            
226
 The Korean War broke out on 25 July 1950.  Israel's Cabinet decided to convey official support 
for UN resolution and actions taken in response to the outbreak of the Korean War - and thereby 
abandoned the fundamental policy of non-identification (Brecher, 1974:111). 
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general and in the multilateral arena in particular.  India, on the other hand, was 
active in the international arena, particularly in the UN and constantly attacked 
Israel, on political and moral grounds. In addition, India introduced anti-Israel 
resolutions in international forums and organisations in support of the Arab 
cause.  
 
The Arab world was a geographical and economic barrier between Israel and 
India especially up to 1956 when the Tiran Straits, the Gulf of Akaba and the 
Suez Canal were closed by Egypt for Israeli shipping.  Egypt’s refusal of the 
passage of Israeli shipping through the Suez Canal and the closure of the Tiran 
Straits made Israeli trade with Asia and India extremely difficult. However, this 
situation was solved partly after the Suez Canal Military Operation that opened 
the route to Asia for Israel.  Nevertheless, the Israeli volume of trade with India 
remained low even after 1956, since India was not viewed as an important 
market for Israeli exports, considering its socialist market and the fact that the 
Indian governmental sector was prohibited from having direct trade relations with 
Israel. On the other hand, the Indian economy depended on Arab oil supplies and 
Arab markets for Indian-made goods and a large number of Indians were 
employed in the Gulf countries. India's pro-Arab foreign policy was based on 
international and economic interest and led to the Israeli conclusion that India 
was totally committed to its pro-Arab traditional foreign policy.   
 
The Israeli approach to the Indian Muslim community, including the attitude of the 
Israeli media and the public opinion in Israel continued to be dogmatic and one-
dimensional.  Since independence, it had been generally assumed that the 
Muslim approach towards Israel was negative; in contrast with the special 
relationship that existed between the Indian Muslim community and the Arab 
world. These assumptions were reinforced by the fact that the local Muslim 
community in India had gradually become a significant political factor, particularly 
important for the INCP, as a potential reservoir of votes.  This perception was 
strengthened by the fact that India was extremely concerned about Pakistan’s 
plan to transform the conflict in Kashmir into a Pan-Islamic issue.  To Israel’s 
disadvantage was the fact that diplomatic relations with Israel could be used for 
Pakistani propaganda against India in the Arab world, as well as the Muslim 
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Indian population in India in general and the Muslim Indian population in Jammu-
Kashmir in particular.   
 
In terms of bilateral relations as part of the international level of analysis, the 
Israeli military support during the Indian wars with China and Pakistan proved to 
be futile for Israel.  This support did not open any doors in India for Israel or bring 
about any substantial improvement of ties between the two countries, contrary to 
Israeli expectations, which was part of Israel’s arms diplomacy.  Exceptions were 
some articles expressing appreciation for Israel in the Indian press.  
 
In the Arab context, Israel failed to get the message across that it was 
maintaining fully-fledged diplomatic relations with Muslim countries and Arab 
states (such as Egypt, which traditionally maintained close relations with India) on 
the political agenda between the two governments. From a historical perspective, 
India overestimated the Indian Muslim community’s response regarding 
diplomatic relations with Israel, but Israel had failed to get this message across.  
This point was proved  by the fact that India’s recognition of Israel did not evoke 
any violent protests from them, as well as the fact that they reacted in a similar 
way when diplomatic relations between the two countries were established in 
1992.  
 
 Economic relations with India had little value for Israel as India was an 
underdeveloped country.   On the other hand, the Israeli investments and 
resources needed to make a political and economic impact on India would have 
been extremely big and out of proportion to the potential outcome. 
 
In terms of the national and society level of analysis, the left faction of the Israeli 
political system felt that closer political ties of friendship based on the socialist 
agenda and common national interest could be fostered, but all the initiatives in 
this direction were proven futile by Israeli ministers and politicians.  Even the 
change of governments in India (before 1992) and the coalition governments 
without the participation of the INCP, did not bring about any change in the Indian 
foreign policy towards Israel in terms of  friendlier  relations.   
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Unlike the anti-Israeli and pro-Arab Indian governments, a section of the Indian 
press was sympathetic towards Israel.  There were also some Indian politicians, 
members of the academy, businessmen as well as members of the alumni of the 
Israeli International Cooperation Programme who could have been mobilised as a 
lobbying group in India. This option was not exercised by Israel partly because 
Israel did not want to justify or defend its conflict with the Arabs in India and partly 
because of the Israeli conclusion that India was totally committed to its pro-Arab 
foreign policy in any case.  However, the few attempts that were made to set up 
Israeli-Indian friendship associations in India for the promotion of diplomatic 
relations with Israel did not bear any political fruit. The Israeli leaders did not 
believe that it is possible to change India’s official foreign policy and its negative 
attitude towards Israel because of political, Ideological and economic reasons in 
general and India’s relations with the Islamic world in particular.  
 
The Israeli foreign policy towards India since independence up to the 
establishment of diplomatic relations, showed a lack of foresight and the Israeli 
diplomatic efforts were found to be futile.  From the Israeli point of view, India was 
an anti-Israeli, pro-Arab and hypocritical state, which remained aloof and non-
cooperative until 1992.  On the other hand, the Israeli diplomacy towards India 
failed to create an understanding of the Zionist cause.  The prevailing diplomatic 
perception in Israel was that India remained committed to its pro-Arab and anti-
Israeli biased foreign policy.  This approach, as part of a centralised foreign 
policy- making process, was supported by consensus of most of the political 
parties in Israel, the Knesset, including the Committee for Foreign Affairs and 
Security, the Prime Minister's office, the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs.  
 
As part of its foreign policy, Israel had to make a strategic decision about the sort 
of diplomacy to engage towards India given the international circumstances and 
India’s anti-Israeli foreign policy towards Israel and the decision was taken to 
conduct a submissive policy.227 The operational diplomatic conclusion that 
emanated from this perception was that India would not change its fixed foreign 
                                            
227
 According to Aaron S. Klieman, the theoretical choice was between evasive diplomacy, 
submissive policy and policy initiative (Klieman, 1990). 
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policy towards Israel before a complete and comprehensive peace process in the 
Middle East was concluded. It was felt that in the interim, India would proceed 
with its traditional pro-Arab and anti-Israeli foreign policy.  That conclusion was 
supported by the fact that India did not change its foreign policy towards Israel 
even after the peace agreements were signed between Israel and Egypt and 
Jordan. 
 
In the final analysis, up to 1992 Israeli diplomacy vis-à-vis India was dogmatic 
and suffered from deficiencies.  Certain strategic actions could have brought 
about earlier positive substantial progress in the bilateral relations between the 
State of Israel and the Republic of India.   Examples of these actions are: a better 
awareness of the importance of India, a review of India with some vision 
combined with the allocation of funds, an assertive political approach in the 
international arena and creative diplomacy, including the efficient usage of 
American Jewish Organisations as political plus points.  
 
In terms of bilateral relations as part of the international level of analysis, Israel 
made a crucial diplomatic mistake, in March 1953, by insisting on reciprocity and 
not opening an Israeli Embassy in New Delhi when it was still accepted by Nehru.  
However, even if such an embassy had been opened, India would probably have 
closed it after the Six-Day War, as was done by the Soviet Union, in the light of 
Indira Gandhi's staunch support of the Arab world and her anti-Israeli attitude. 
The consequences of such a diplomatic move remained obscure, but it is 
accepted by international political experts such as Michael Brecher, that Sharett’s 
insistence on the principle of reciprocity was a lack of foresight. The stolid 
formalism on Israel’s part, according to him, made it easier for the obstructionists 
to such a diplomatic move, to triumph in New Delhi (Brecher, 1972:560).  
However, that diplomatic mistake was rectified in 1992 when Israel read the 
international political climate and the Indian political position vis-à-vis Israel in the 
international arena correctly and insisted on nothing less than full diplomatic 
relations between the two countries.  
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Chapter 5 
Transformation of India’s foreign policy towards Israel in 
January 1992 
 
5.1  Introduction 
 
In this chapter, the focus is on the Indian diplomatic initiative to establish 
fully-fledged diplomatic relations with the State of Israel in January 1992, 
in terms of the strategic change of the Indian foreign policy towards Israel. 
The main objective is to describe, examine and analyse the transformation 
of India’s strategic foreign policy towards Israel, which took place in spite 
of India's historical anti-Israeli as well as its traditionally biased pro-Arab 
foreign policy.1 
 
India is the unit of analysis of this chapter. The Indian ultimate decision 
unit regarding the decision to establish diplomatic relations with Israel was 
Narasimha Rao.2 The establishment of diplomatic relations between the 
two countries is analysed according to three levels of analysis3 and is done 
in accordance with the Aggregative Model of Bilateral Relations Strategic 
Change that is a new model in the field of foreign policy affairs.4 
Furthermore, an additional model, based on Hermann's Model of Foreign 
Policy Change Decision-Making is also used in order to achieve external 
validity while providing an additional viewpoint regarding the 
transformation of bilateral relations between Israel and India in 1992. 5 
 
Postulation of a connection between the Aggregative  Model of Bilateral 
Relations Strategic Change and foreign policy transformation in general 
                                            
1
 For details about India’s foreign policy towards Israel prior to January 1992, see chapter 
3. 
2
 For details about Ultimate Decision Unit Model, see section 2.2. 
3
 For details about Levels of Analysis Model, see -section 2.3. 
4
 For more details about the Aggregative Model of Bilateral Relations, see section 2.5. 
5
 For details about Hermann's Model, see section 2.4. 
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and the bilateral foreign policy change between Israel and India is 
demonstrated in  a number of stages, which will be discussed below: 
 
5.1.1 Pre-feasibility stage  
 
This was an incubating stage of the bilateral foreign policy change 
between Israel and India with emphasis on the pertinent circumstantial 
formative change determinants, which developed and influenced India’s 
foreign policy change towards Israel. 
 
5.1.2  Framing stage 
 
During this stage, change determinants were generated in terms of the 
pertinent circumstances that initiated and determined the bilateral foreign 
policy change and India’s foreign policy transformation towards Israel in 
particular. 
 
5.1.3 Cost and benefit stage 
 
Revision of alternatives took place and the pertinent Indian ultimate 
decision unit adopted new options in conjunction with contextual change 
determinants. This was done as part of the selective process, setting the 
stage for the development of the conditions within the operational 
international environment as well as domestic politics for a change in the 
bilateral foreign relations review of the relevant fundamental factors, which 
affected India's change of foreign policy towards Israel. 
 
5.1.4  Ripeness stage 
 
Change was accelerated by particular events and circumstances in the 
form of accelerating change determinants that set off the bilateral foreign 
policy change between the two countries in general and India's foreign 
policy change towards Israel in particular.   
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5.1.5 Reaching a focal point in foreign policy change 
 
Strategic and national interest-oriented factors, adjusted to suit the 
specific conditions and situation in line with the contextual as well as 
circumstantial adjustment determinants, synchronised with certain 
components, set the bilateral foreign policy change between Israel and 
India in motion. The timing of the Indian decision to establish diplomatic 
relations with Israel occurred simultaneously with the introduction of 
certain change elements aimed at synchronising the change process. 
 
5.1.6 Consolidation stage 
 
The determinants were consolidated in terms of the coordination and 
control of the bilateral foreign policy transformation between the two 
countries and impediments to the diplomatic relations between India 
and Israel by the Indian political system were examined. 
 
5.1.7 Assimilation and implementation stage 
 
Substantiating the change in bilateral relations was achieved by 
stabilising determinants, which affected both the international and 
domestic political sectors in India. The aim was to set the systemic 
foreign policy change process in motion, redefine foreign policy, and 
create new patterns of interdependence and direct diplomacy between 
the two countries. 
 
5.2 The eve of the establishment of diplomatic relations between India 
and Israel 
 
On 22 January 1992, the Israeli Consul in Bombay was invited to the then 
Secretary of the Ministry of External Affairs of India, J. N. Dixit, in New 
Delhi. He was informed about India’s intention to improve the quality of its 
relations with the State of Israel within a short space of time. The Israeli 
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Consul responded by saying that Israel was only interested in fully-fledged 
diplomatic relations and that such a diplomatic move would allow India to 
participate in the peace process in the Middle-East that included the 
working groups of the multilateral channel. Dixit told the Israeli Consul, 
Giora Becher, that the final decision, including the modality of the 
diplomatic relations, would be decided upon by Prime Minister Rao, himself 
(Yegar, Govrin &  Oded, 2002:548). 
 
On 28 January 1992, only one day before the establishment of diplomatic 
relations between the two countries, a final attempt was made by the 
Indian Government to upgrade the level of its diplomatic relations with 
Israel. It was  done so that India would not be left out of the Middle East 
peace process. India promised Israel that it would establish fully-fledged 
diplomatic relations with Israel three months later if Israel agreed to India 
joining the Middle East peace process. In the interim, during the ensuing 
three months, the Government of India would overcome the political 
resistance within the INCP to the establishment of diplomatic relations with 
Israel. However, the offer was rejected by Israel. Moshe Yegar, Deputy 
Director General of the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs describes this 
situation as follows:  
 
A last effort was made by senior officers of the Indian Ministry of 
External Affairs to receive an invitation to Madrid in return for a 
promise to normalize relations a few months later. Israel’s response 
was flatly negative (Yegar, 1999:130). 
 
  
On 29 January 1992, the Israeli Consul called the headquarters of the MFA 
in Jerusalem and informed them of India’s intention to publish an official 
announcement about establishing diplomatic relations with Israel. The 
Israeli Consul asked Dixit for a postponement of a few hours so that the 
message could be delivered to the Israeli Minister of Foreign Affairs, David 
Levi, who had attended the third round of the Middle East peace talks in 
Moscow. Dixit was also asked for the full text of the Indian announcement 
and a joint official announcement was published, simultaneously, in 
Jerusalem, New Delhi and Moscow, giving information about the 
establishment of the full-fledged diplomatic relations between India and 
Israel (Becher, 2002:548). 
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5.3   Transformation of the Indian foreign policy towards Israel in 
terms of Hermann's Model of Foreign Policy Change 
 
For better understanding of the transformation of the Indian foreign policy 
towards Israel and to provide external validity for the new model applied in 
this research regarding the analysis of the change process, the following 
theoretical parsimonious model of Foreign Policy Change (Hermann, 
1990:3-21) is used with reference to the multiple variables of the 
transformation:6 
 
Stage one of Hermann’s model deals with initial policy expectations. A 
reference to the Indian expectations of diplomatic relations with Israel was 
made by Dixit (1996:311) in his memoirs: “We examined the contrasting 
considerations in the Ministry (of External Affairs) and submitted policy 
recommendations to the Foreign Minister and the Prime Minister.” 
 
Stage two of the model refers to the external actor/environmental stimuli of 
foreign policy transformation. Ali Khan and Dixit as well as other Indian 
scholars pointed out that the confidential contacts between the 
Government of Israel and the Palestinian Liberation organisation (PLO) 
were the external environmental stimuli that influenced India to reconsider 
its foreign policy towards Israel (Khan, 1992:215; Dixit, 1996:311).  
 
Stage three refers to the possibility of recognition of discrepant 
information. Dixit (1996:309-310) describes such recognition in terms of 
the re-examination of information:  
 
In the context of the foregoing developments, a fundamental re-
examination of India’s relations with Israel became pertinent. A 
nuance, which is generally over looked, is that India had accorded 
recognition to Israel soon after it came into existence. We had 
allowed Israel to open a consulate in Bombay, which had continued 
to function during the entire period from 1949-50 onwards. India, 
however, had not established diplomatic relations nor did any 
meaningful bilateral contacts of cooperation exist with Israel. 
 
                                            
6
 For details about the Aggregative Model of Bilateral Foreign Relations Strategic 
Change, see section 2.5 and for the analysis of the transformation of the Indian foreign 
policy towards Israel based on this model, see section 5.4. 
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Stage four of the model deals with the postulation of the connection 
between problem and policy and in this regard, Ali Khan (1992:214).states: 
"India had consistently supported the Palestinian cause and refused to 
deal with Israel, which robbed it of an opportunity to play a role in the 
Middle East."              
  
In a similar vein, Kumaraswamy (2004:266) remarks:  
 
By becoming a prisoner of its idealism and rhetoric, India had 
divorced itself from political realism, with consistency ironically 
becoming the guiding principle of its policy towards the ever-turbulent 
Middle East.   
 
 
Two years before he had viewed this matter from an international 
perspective: “The lack of the relations with Israel precluded a better 
understanding with the industrialized countries especially the United 
States” (Kumaraswamy, 2002:8).  
 
The development of alternatives is stage five of Hermann’s model and J.N. 
Dixit refers to it directly: 
 
Many trends, motivations and assessments contributed to the decision 
(to establish diplomatic relations with Israel) were made and examined 
in the Ministry of External Affairs after the Gulf War (Dixit, 1996:310). 
 
 
In fact, the alternatives, in terms of their respective advantages and 
disadvantages, were examined and the advised alternative to establish 
diplomatic relation with Israel was examined carefully by the Indian MEA. 
The policy recommendation was submitted for a final confirmation to the 
Minister of External Affairs and the Prime Minister of India.   
 
In terms of diplomatic relations with India, Israel offered only two options: 
either to adhere to its traditional foreign policy or to establish fully-fledged 
diplomatic relations. A clear message was delivered to the government of 
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India, through various indirect diplomatic channels, namely that Israel 
would not settle for less than fully-fledged diplomatic relations.7 
 
Yegar, the Deputy Director General of the Israeli MFA at that time, 
stressed that Indian participation in the Madrid Conference had become a 
matter of prestige for them. However, the Government of Israel “made it 
quite clear that countries that refused to have normal diplomatic relations 
with her, while having such relations with the Arab countries, would be 
barred from the Madrid Conference” (Yegar, 1999: 109). 
  
The Indian Government realised that it was a critical moment for them and 
finally made the decision to establish diplomatic relations with Israel.  
 
Stage six of the model is about building authority consensus of choice and 
Dixit refers in his memoirs to the way such authoritative consensus was 
achieved within the Government of India regarding the establishment of 
diplomatic relations with Israel:  
 
The Prime Minister, in a number of internal meetings, highlighted a 
significant and relevant precondition to our taking this policy decision. 
He said that he would first take senior members of his own party into 
confidence about the rationale of establishing relations with Israel. He 
observed that after ensuring a consensus in domestic and political 
terms, he would hold discussions with Yasser Arafat to gauge his 
reaction and only then finalize the decision (Dixit, 1996:311). 
 
 
The last and seventh stage refers to the implementation of the new foreign 
policy and according to Naaz (2000:977), in the case of India's relations 
with Israel:  
 
The normalization of relations left both countries to explore as many   
areas as possible. While Indo-Israel relations increased rapidly in the 
field of trade and agriculture, both the countries continued to explore 
as many areas as possible for mutual cooperation. 
 
                                            
7
 For details about the Israeli official viewpoint on the eve of the establishment of 
diplomatic relations see section 5.2. 
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    5.4 Aggregative Model of Bilateral Foreign Relations Strategic Change 
for analysis of the transformation of the Indian foreign policy 
towards Israel 
 
The comprehensive review and analysis of the change in the bilateral 
relations between Israel and India as well as the unilateral Indian 
transformation of foreign policy towards Israel in 1992, is based on the 
Aggregative Model of Bilateral Foreign Relations Strategic Change.8  
 
5.4.1 Pre-feasibility stage  
 
An integral part of the model is the incubating stage of the foreign policy 
change process. The relevant fundamental national interests and strategic 
goals as foreign policy factors are taken into consideration in terms of 
micro international politics and diplomacy, while the foreign policy change 
process is influenced and directed by formative determinants. Such 
formative determinants of the Indian foreign policy transformation towards 
Israel were the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union. It 
also signified the end of the bipolar world as well as the Cold War that 
rocked the Indian foreign policy and was a traumatic experience for India.  
 
Kumaraswamy (2002:7-8) considers the momentous change of India’s 
foreign policy towards Israel as one of the benefits of the end of the Cold 
War. The collapse of the Soviet Union along with the paradigm of a stable 
new political world also meant that the concept of nonalignment had no 
validity. In the new era, India could change its foreign policy towards Israel 
and Prime Minister Rao could rectify the anomalous situation, which had 
existed for over four decades between the two countries. He explains: 
 
The end of the Cold World and the collapse of the Soviet Union 
played a significant role in this endeavor. Frequently, India’s Israel 
policy had coincided with Cold War politics, and Israel’s identification 
with the West had provided an ideological basis for India’s pro-Arab 
orientation (Kumaraswamy, 2002:7-8). 
 
                                            
8
 For details about the Aggregative Model of Bilateral Foreign Relations Strategic 
Change, see section 2.5. 
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Ali Khan (1992:214-215) adds that the collapse of the Soviet Union and 
the emerging of the US as the sole superpower, provided momentum for 
the peace  process in the Middle East and operated concomitantly with 
the factors that caused the shift  in India’s  stance towards Israel. 
5.4.2 Framing of foreign policy change  
 
The framing stage is characterised by a redefinition of fundamental foreign 
policy factors, such as national interests and strategic goals, influenced by 
generating determinants. Change determinants were generated in terms of 
the pertinent circumstances that initiated and determined the change of 
bilateral foreign policy as far as India's relations with Israel were 
concerned. Dixit describes it as follows: 
 
In the context of the foregoing developments, a fundamental re-
examination of India’s relations with Israel became pertinent…In the 
post-Gulf War international situation; India considered it advisable to 
establish diplomatic relations with Israel and to initiate bilateral 
cooperation across the board with that country (Dixit 1996:309-310). 
 
 
Dixit was afraid that India’s long-standing friendship and cooperative 
relations with the Arab countries would suffer if India established diplomatic 
relations with Israel. Therefore, he attached a great deal of importance to 
the confidential contacts between Israel and the PLO that had been 
established in Sweden and Norway with the backing of the US and the 
Soviet Union as well as the endorsement of important Arab countries. 
According to him, these were, the reasons for India reconsidering its 
foreign policy towards Israel (Dixit, 1996:311). One year later, he points out 
in an article in an Indian leading newspaper:  
 
India had opened diplomatic relations with Israel primarily on the 
rationale that the PLO was itself negotiating an agreement with 
Israel…There was an assessment that direct contacts would help it 
influence Israeli politics, making them more accommodative of 
Palestinians' legitimate aspirations (Indian Express, 11/12/1977). 
 
 
Kumaraswamy (2002:8) describes a similar approach to the change 
generating determinants:  
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The willingness of the Arabs and Palestinians to seek a political 
settlement with Israel through direct negotiations altered the rules of 
the Arab-Israeli conflict. Once the Arab states and the PLO 
embarked upon negotiations with Israel, there was no compelling 
reason for India to maintain the status quo. Moreover, Palestinian 
support for Iraqi president Saddam Hussein during the Kuwait crisis 
significantly undermined the Palestinian position.   
  
In a different reference, he explains that the willingness of the Arab 
countries to secure a negotiated peace settlement with the Jewish state 
and the inception of the Madrid peace process were the main factors that 
enabled Prime Minister Rao to pursue a new policy towards Israel 
(Kumaraswamy, 2004:266).   
 
Ali Khan (1992:215) attaches a great deal of importance to the visit of the 
PLO leader to India shortly before the establishment of the diplomatic 
relations with Israel. He points out that the PLO chairman’s visit (in the third 
week of January 1992) and Arafat's statement that the exchange of 
ambassadors and the mutual recognition are acts of sovereignty that made 
India feel that there would not be an adverse reaction in the Arab ranks to 
this fact.   
 
The end of the Cold War, the first Gulf War, the Madrid Conference, the 
Israeli Arab Middle East peace negotiations in general and the ongoing war 
with the Palestinians in particular, were the generating change 
determinants of the transformation of the Indian foreign policy towards 
Israel.  
 
5.4.3 Cost and benefit analysis  
 
The fundamental  and national interest oriented causative factors of the 
Indian foreign policy change towards Israel are analysed in conjunction 
with the pertinent contextual and situational change determinants as part of 
the bilateral change process in terms of the revision of alternatives and 
new options. 
 
In reality, the Government of India debated the decision as described in 
Dixit’s (1996:311-312) memoirs:  
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We examined these contrasting considerations in the ministry and 
submitted policy recommendations to the Foreign Minister and Prime 
Minister…The Prime Minister, in a number of internal meetings, while 
generally agreeing with this assessment, highlighted a significant and 
relevant precondition to our taking this policy decision…The Prime 
Minister discussed this crucial issue with senior cabinet colleagues 
on (or around) 23 January…The Prime Minister then rounded off the 
discussion. 
 
 
In addition, it should be pointed out that the final decision was made 
together with a cross section of opposition leaders (Naaz, 
1999:245).9 This change of policy had been advocated by the BJP 
especially (Cohen, 2001:247). One year later, Dixit points out in an 
article in an Indian newspaper the Indian Express (31/12/1996).  
"The Indian rationale proved largely valid while Yitzhak Rabin, 
Shimon Peres and their party remained in power.” 10 
 
5.4.3.1 Transformation of India’s foreign policy towards Israel in 
terms of the international level of analysis 
 
The following fundamental change factors of India's foreign policy 
transformation towards Israel, in convergence with contextual change 
determinants, in terms of cost and benefit, are analysed by means of the 
international level of analysis, which is divided into two types of foreign 
relations: bilateral and multilateral relations.11 
 
A.   Israeli- Indian bilateral relations: 
The analysis of the Israeli-Indian bilateral relations is based on the 
following review and evaluation made by India pertaining to its national 
security as well as national interests:  
 
 
 
 
                                            
9
 For details about the opposition leaders' attitudes see section 5.4.3.2 (2) and 5.4.6. 
10
 The Labour Party. 
11
 Multilateral relations refer to a system of coordinating relations between two or more 
states and/or international organisations with certain principles of international conduct. 
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1) Military cooperation with Israel  
 
Military cooperation between Israel and India had its roots in the 1960s. 
During the Sino-Indian war in 1962 and Indo-Pakistani wars in 1965 and 
1971, India obtained a limited quantity of arms and ammunitions from 
Israel.12 
 
According to Kumaraswamy (1998:3, 10):  
 
The decision by India’s Prime Minister P. V. Narasimha Rao, in 
January 1992, to establish full and normal diplomatic relations with 
Israel was partly influenced by an appreciation of the potential 
security cooperation between the two countries…The disintegration 
of the Soviet Union and the multiplicity of suppliers meant that India 
had to negotiate with numerous countries of the Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS). The fragmentation of the supply system 
made India extremely vulnerable.  
 
 
According to him, the immense difficulties India experienced with upgrading 
and modernising its armed forces compelled India to seek military 
cooperation with Israel. The arms build-up, modernisation of the defence 
forces and arms exports were of national interest to both countries with the 
emphasis on high quality weapons and military independence.   
 
In his memoirs, Dixit (1996:10) states that the need for arms was one of 
the reasons for the transformation of the Indian foreign policy towards 
Israel: “Israel had developed expertise in improving the weapons systems 
of Soviet origin which could be utilized by India.”13  
  
In other words, the unreliability of future arm supplies, in particular spare 
parts, became a major concern of the Indian army after the collapse of the 
Soviet Union. The reason was that the Soviet Union had supplied most of 
the Indian weaponry on easy terms since the mid 1960s and furthermore, 
India depended on the Soviet Union for supplies of arms and military 
technology.  
 
                                            
12
 For details about military cooperation between Israel and India in 1962 and 1965, see section 
4.9.1.3. 
13
 Knowledge and expertise acquired after Russian military equipment and arms had 
been captured by Israel during the Suez Canal military operations.   
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It is important to point out that following the Gulf War and even before the 
disintegration of the Soviet Union; India already had second thoughts about 
the Soviet weaponry: 
 
One of the major attractions of receiving weapon from the Soviet 
Union had been its reliability as a defence supplier, particularly 
when war had broken out. National security policy makers in 
Delhi will need to assess the implications of Soviet behaviour in 
the Gulf War for the other major recipients of Soviet weapons 
(Thakur, 1992:176). 
 
  
Another military factor to be considered was the fact that the Gulf War had 
shown that the American weapons were far superior to the Soviet equipment 
and demonstrated the ineffectiveness of Soviet weapons to India compared 
with the advanced Western weapons. It also raised the question of the 
effectiveness of the Indian indigenous production of weapons as well as a 
concern about India's military ability regarding adversary states that might 
have access to Western weapons (Thomas, 1993:55, 67).  
 
The Indian military establishment welcomed the possible military 
cooperation between India and the Israeli military industries, in terms of 
India’s search for military technological independence, as Kumaraswamy 
points out:  
 
Its subordination to the political authorities and their decisions did 
not prevent the military from developing a professional 
appreciation of Israel’s military experience and expertise. The 
absence of political contacts and interactions intensified the 
interest of the India security establishment, who followed closely 
Israel’s military adventures and successes…With this in view, 
normalization thus presented a formal structure and opportunity for 
greater understanding and cooperation in the security arena 
(Kumaraswamy, 1998:6). 
 
  
In fact, since 1991, India had tried to diversify its weapons procurement and 
Israel was willing to supply a specific advanced type of military equipment 
and technology, which were not freely available from the Western countries 
that restricted their military sales to India (Hewitt, 1997:25-28). 
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2) Intelligence cooperation with Israel   
 
There was prolonged historical intelligence cooperation between India’s 
Intelligence Agency, the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) and its 
Israeli counterpart, The Agency for Intelligence and Special Operations 
(The Mossad), but the establishment of diplomatic relations presented a 
formal structure and opportunities for better intelligence cooperation 
(Kapila, 2000:3; Kumaraswamy; 1998:6 & Naaz, 2000:971).14  
 
3) Counter-terrorism cooperation with Israel  
 
Dixit, the secretary of the Indian Ministry of External Affairs, attached a 
great deal of importance to the Israeli experience in counter-terrorism and 
considered it to be a key reason for the decision to establish diplomatic 
relations with Israel:  
 
Israel’s knowledge and experience in countering terrorism would 
be of immediate relevance to India and dealing with secessionist 
movements in different parts of the country (Dixit, 1996:310). 
 
Stephen P. Cohen (2001:249) also holds the opinion that the main reason 
for the change in Indian foreign policy towards Israel was Israel’s counter 
terrorism experience: “The dangers from Islamic extremism were so great 
that it was worth risking domestic Muslim opposition.” 
  
Ali Khan (1992:215) shares the opinion expressed above: “Both countries 
shared a strategic perception of threat of fundamentalism.” In his analysis 
of the situation, Martin Sherman (1999:17) points out with reference to the 
potential cooperation between the two states in the sphere of counter-
terrorism that the two states contend with nuclear, chemical and biological 
threats from non-state actors. 
 
Kumaraswamy (1998:6,18) hints at possible future cooperation between 
the two countries by pointing out that the violence in Kashmir over the 
preceding few years and the series of bomb blasts in Bombay following 
the demolition of the historic mosque at Ayodyha in December 1992 
                                            
14
 For details about the history of intelligence cooperation between the two countries, see 
section 4.10.3.1. 
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indicate that India is not immune to Islamic radicalism. He adds that in 
1984 India had already sought the advice of Israeli senior security 
specialists on security systems. According to him, the Indian National 
Security Guards (NSG), an elite commando unit responsible for VIP that 
had been created in 1984 following the assassination of Prime Minister 
Indira Gandhi, developed limited cooperation, mostly in the form of training 
courses, which was never officially confirmed, with the Israeli Security 
Service (SHABAK).  
 
In the 1990s, India and Israel both feared that their Muslim minorities could 
be radicalised. India was concerned about radical Islamic fundamentalism 
at home that could encourage domestic terror and extreme secessionist 
Muslim movements in Kashmir (the uprising in Kashmir in 1990 was at its 
peak) and there was the threat of possible terror by proxy initiated by 
Pakistan. It had to deal with the violence in Kashmir while being aware that 
the Hindu-Muslim rift could encourage radical Islamic fundamentalism in 
India.  
 
India also had to take the possibility into consideration that its neighbour 
Pakistan could be taken over by radical Islam and the security implications 
such development could have for India’s national security. In strategic 
terms, the rise of Islamic fundamentalism after the Gulf War encouraged 
similar movements in South Asia and aggravated Hindu-Muslim tensions 
in India (Thomas, 1993:29-32, 71-74). For that reason, the Israeli 
experience of counter-terrorism had a great deal of relevance for India. 
 
On 23 February 1992, less than one month after India had announced its 
decision to establish diplomatic relations with Israel, the Indian Defence 
Minister at that time, Sharad Pawar, declared openly that normalisation of 
relations  had paved the way for utilising Israel’s successful experience at  
curbing terrorism. His statement was denied, but three months later it was 
Pawar himself, in his new capacity as the Chief Minister of the State of 
Maharashtra, who, led an Indian delegation to an agricultural exhibition in 
Tel Aviv upon direct instructions from Prime Minister Rao. He was 
accompanied by a high-level military team, which visited Israeli military 
facilities including the Israeli Anti-Terror Unit (Naaz, 2000:982). 
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4) The Indian Ocean   
 
Both India and Israel have a strategic interest in the Indian Ocean, which 
has historically been an area of international competition regarding 
military, geo-strategic, political and economic supremacy. India, by 
definition, because of its geographic location, was an important 
international actor in the Indian Ocean and had a vital national interest in 
the region, while Israel had gradually developed a growing interest in the 
Indian Ocean. For Israel, the Indian Ocean is the only transit route to Asia, 
in terms of sea and air- lanes. In fact, Israeli aircraft were not allowed to fly 
over Arab countries in the Middle East on their way to Asia. A second 
reason for Israeli interest in the Indian Ocean was its potential in terms of 
strategic military depth. The Indian Ocean could provide the Israeli naval 
strategic force with the strategic depth it lacks as a small country as 
Subhash Kapila attests: 
 
In Israeli perceptions, the striking strategic imperative that is 
emerging is the development of sea-borne second-strike 
capability. This strategically has to be operative from the Indian 
Ocean and hence strategic cooperation with the Indian Navy is 
an imperative (Kapila, 2003:4).  
 
 
5) Nuclear power as a common issue with Israel  
 
The Indian AEC was created shortly after independence and India 
embarked upon an extensive programme of civilian nuclear research, 
which also included a military project. (Cohen, 2001:158). Since 1968, 
India had been requested by the super powers to sign the NPT, but 
despite the traditional Gandhian non-violence and the Nehruvian 
international moral precepts, India did not comply with the treaty (Kumar, 
2001:10).  
 
The treaty, adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1968, sanctioned the 
use of nuclear technology for civilian purposes under the international 
supervision of the IAEA. India developed a concept of what Indian 
diplomacy called discriminatory international nuclear dread and decided 
not to join the NPT. India objected to the treaty because the treaty made 
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no specific provision for collective security against non-nuclear states 
threatened by states already in possession of nuclear weapons and in fact, 
it restricted the sovereign rights of non-nuclear states to defend their 
national security.15  A non-weaponised deterrence system, mostly 
regarding China’s nuclear capacity, which was called a recessed 
deterrence strategy, was adopted by India: 
 
 
An undeclared nuclear weapon, whether assembled or not, 
provided a security umbrella in the unlikely case that another 
power threatened India with nuclear weapons. Weaponization 
might involve assembling a few last components and mounting a 
nuclear device on one of India's fighter-bombers. Until that 
moment, there was no need to declare India a nuclear weapons 
state (Cohen, 2001:165).  
 
  
However, the weaponisation of nuclear devices, based on the recessed 
deterrence strategy of India, was a limited strategy; it also lacked the 
weapons that could be used safely and reliably. It was an extended option 
strategy, which did not address the growing nuclear threat from across the 
Indian borders. In the 1980s, Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi’s action plan 
suggesting phased global and regional nuclear disarmament received a 
cool response from the nuclear states. It should be noted that between 
1987 and 1990, Pakistan was acquiring nuclear capability clandestinely 
and in addition, India also faced a Chinese nuclear threat.16 In the early 
1990s, Pakistan was convinced that India was working on a sophisticated 
process of inertial confinement fusion in order to produce and develop 
nuclear weapons including the hydrogen bomb.    
 
During the 1980s, India monitored Israeli nuclear strategy carefully and 
was aware of its nuclear potential, as Kumaraswamy (1998:6) explains:  
 
The Indian security establishment was following closely Israeli 
military adventure successes such as the bombing of the Osiraq 
Nuclear Reactor near Baghdad in 1981. 
 
                                            
15
 At that time there were speculations in the international arena that India had some 
ulterior motives in refusing to sign the treaty, namely its desire to become a  the nuclear 
power and as a matter of fact, in 1974 India conducted its first nuclear test that reinforced 
this type  of speculation and led to international condemnation. 
16
 Pakistan and India did not sign the NPT) or the CTBT. 
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According to Dinesh Kumar, Israel and India shared concerns over 
Pakistan's nuclear programme in the 1980s and it was widely believed that 
their intelligence agencies were in close contact over the issue.17 On the 
other hand, it was in Israel's interest that the nuclear issue remained 
confined to South Asia. Israel was concerned that Pakistan would develop 
a nuclear device of its own, which could later possibly be deployed in the 
Middle East as well as by extremist Arab countries (Kumar, 2001:10).18  
 
Following the establishment of the Indian integrated missile programme in 
1983, India started with the development of an indigenous missile system, 
which could be assisted by Israeli expertise and technology, while Israel 
was interested in the Indian satellite production with which India had been 
involved since the 1970s.19  In the international arena, in the 1990s, India 
and Israel had adopted a similar position regarding various arms control 
issues such as the NPT and the CTBT, since both were non-signatories to 
the treaties.20 
 
In 1991, the international media speculated about Israeli-Indian nuclear 
cooperation despite the fact that the two countries had not engaged in this 
type of cooperation previously as Israel was suspicious of India’s 
suspected nuclear cooperation with Iran and was unlikely to abandon its 
newly established military cooperation with China.21 On the other hand, it 
made sense that there was a need for a particular type of complementary 
cooperation between India and Israel on nuclear issues. Both countries 
had nuclear programmes and the two countries regarded their non-
conventional ambitions regarding nuclear weapons, missiles and satellites, 
                                            
17
 For details about intelligence cooperation between Israel and India before 1992, see 
also section 5.4.3.1. (2), and for more information on the nuclear power policy 
coordination after 1992, see section 6.3.4. 
18
 It should be indicated that at this point of time in 1991 the question of Islamic Bomb 
build by Pakistan was less crucial than at the end of the 1990's when Pakistan conducted 
its first nuclear test in May 1998.   
19
 The Indian missile system was made up of a mobile short-range missile (Paritvi) and 
intermediate range missile (Agni). 
20
 Israel eventually signed the CTBT in 1996. For details about the Nuclear Power Policy 
Coordination between Israel and India after 1992, see section 6.3.4. 
21
 For further information about Israeli-Chinese military cooperation, see section 3.9.2.7. 
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as an integral part of their national power and a tool for furthering their 
national interests as well as technological independence. 22 
 
6) Economic relations with Israel  
 
The opportunity for trade, technology transfer and investments by Israel, 
played a sufficiently important role in the Indian decision- making process 
to influence it to change its foreign policy towards Israel in particular, 
considering the fact that by 1991, India’s economy had been on the brink of 
collapse.23 On two different occasions, Dixit refers, to the importance of the 
economic variable in the Indian decision to establish diplomatic relations 
with Israel. On the first occasion, he writes: “There was, of course, the 
prospect of beneficial economic and technological equations” (Indian 
Express, 11/12/1977). 
  
He was more specific in his memoirs:  
 
Israelis were interested in establishing economic relations with India 
and were willing to invest here. They also wanted to initiate scientific 
and technological cooperation with us. Israel’s agricultural 
experiences in dry farming, desert irrigation, agro-industries and 
agricultural cooperatives could prove beneficial to India (Dixit, 
1996:310). 
 
 
Ali Khan (1992:218) also writes: “India could set the ball rolling for the 
transfer of technology for agricultural and other purposes.” 
 
Farah Naaz (1999:896) makes the following observation with regard to the 
establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries: “Relations 
with Israel had their own advantages as far as areas like agriculture, trade, 
science and technology, are concerned.” 
 
 
 
 
                                            
22
 For details about nuclear power policy coordination between Israel and India after 
1992, see section 6.3.4. 
23
 For more details about the economic liberalisation as a contextual determinant in Indian 
foreign policy change towards Israel, see section 5.4.4. 
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7) Foreign relations with Israel  
 
In terms of international law and diplomatic practice, India officially 
accorded recognition to the state of Israel through their respective 
ambassadors at Washington on 18 September 1950.24  
 
Bilateral foreign relations between India and Israel had not been an 
important priority for India’s foreign policy after independence. 
Kumaraswamy (2002:3) explains that after independence, financial 
constraints and the scarcity of personnel were determining factors leading 
to India’s decisions to either postpone new missions or to make its 
missions responsible for a number of neighbouring countries. Israel was 
one of the countries affected by that policy.  
 
In this context, it should be noted that no direct conflict or points of military 
or territorial friction have ever existed between India and Israel and there 
has never been any anti-Semitism in India. Both countries shared a similar 
historical background, with both having evolved from ancient civilisations 
and both having struggled for national independence from the British 
colonial empire, eventually leading to the creation of democratic states 
headed by their respective  ‘fathers of their nation’ (David Ben-Gurion and 
Jawaharlal Nehru). Nehru’s concept of India as a secular socialistic 
parliamentary democracy was similar to Ben-Gurion’s ideal of Israel as a 
secular Jewish social democracy and the two countries had shared 
democratic values and were the only democracies in their regions.  
 
After independence, India, which was preoccupied with the Kashmiri 
dispute, had exploited the Israeli issue and its bilateral relations with Israel 
in the international arena by trying to promote and consolidate its interests 
in the Arab and Islamic countries while trying not to antagonise its local 
Muslim community.25  
 
                                            
24
 For details about the recognition of the State of Israel by India, see section 3.9.1.1. 
25
 For details about India’s foreign policy towards Israel, see sections 3.9.1.2, 3.9.1.3 and 
3.9.1.4. 
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In fact, India was the last major non-Muslim country that established 
diplomatic relations with Israel (in 1992). Over time, a host of regional and 
international developments as well as political consideration had 
prevented any meaningful diplomatic interaction and bilateral relations 
between the two countries.26  After the establishment of diplomatic 
relations, India benefited directly and indirectly, mostly in the multilateral 
arena, from its bilateral foreign ties with Israel as described and analysed 
in the following part of this chapter.  
 
B.   Israeli-Indian multilateral relations 
 
The analysis of Indian-Israeli relations in the multilateral arena is based on 
the following review and evaluation pertaining to its national security as 
well as national interests:  
 
1) Indian geo-strategic interests  
 
Dixit (1996:310), while reviewing the Indian foreign policy towards Israel, 
states that the geo-strategic interests of India carried a great deal of 
weight:  
 
Arab and other Muslim counties in West Asia and. Maghrab (sic.) 
could pose a geostrategic threat to Indian security if they adopted 
hostile attitudes towards India’s initiating full-fledged political 
connections with Israel… Israel was strategically located on the 
northern or northwestern flank of a number of Muslim countries, which 
encouraged Islamic religious fanaticism in the Central Asian and 
South Asian region…  
 
   
One year later with reference to  the geo-strategic factor, he pointed some 
strategic key danger points (choke points) out such as the Strait of 
Hormuz, the Suez Canal and the Strait of Bab El Mandeb (at the entrance 
to the Red Sea): “The importance to India of the region from the Gulf to 
Israel and Turkey cannot be ignored…Arab sea lanes and air space are of 
vital economic and strategic interest" (Indian Express, 11/12/1977). 
 
                                            
26
 For details about Israel India relations pertaining to multilateral foreign affairs and state 
and society level, see sections 3.9.2 and 3.10. 
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2) Oil factor   
 
Ali Khan (1992:214) refers to the oil in the Gulf as being one of the main 
deterrents to India establishing diplomatic relations with Israel: “Being not 
self sufficient in energy resources (India) was dependent on the region for 
oil.”  
  
Dixit gives a similar explanation in a newspaper article: “The Gulf countries 
and Iran are vital sources of oil and petroleum products for India” (Indian 
Express, 11/12/1977)  On another occasion, Dixit (1996:310) indicates that 
the oil factor was a vital element that was taken into consideration in the 
Indian MEA before making policy change recommendations to Prime 
Minister Rao: “Establishment of diplomatic relations with Israel could have 
an adverse impact on oil supply from the Gulf to India.”  
  
In August 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait and an international embargo was 
placed upon the Iraqi and Kuwaiti export of oil and the price of oil jumped 
to $23 a barrel. After the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries 
(OPEC) had agreed on an increase in its production, the oil prices, that 
had reached $40 a barrel in early October, 1990 fell to $25 a barrel. In the 
first quarter of 1991, the oil price was $19 a barrel and the price fell to  
$17.5 a barrel in the second quarter and $16 a barrel a year later (Rivlin, 
2000:23). In 1991 India was importing 448,000 barrels of crude oil and 
203,000 refined petroleum products per day (Pattanayak, 2001:15). In 
terms of international politics, the decline in oil prices after the Gulf War 
played a positive role in the Indian examination of the impact of a unilateral 
foreign policy change towards Israel on the Arab oil supply to India and 
directly contributed as a change factor to the Indian foreign policy change 
towards Israel. 
 
3) Central Asia  
 
Central Asia is strategically located between Russia, China, Pakistan, Iraq 
and Iran.27 In geographical terms, Central Asia is the backyard of India, 
                                            
27
 For details about India and Russia, see reference no. 9 in this section.  For details 
about India and China (PRC) see reference no. 10 in this section. For details about India 
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which has traditionally maintained historical links and economic ties as 
well as cultural connections with that part of Asia. Most importantly, the 
area has been rich in oil and gas (Khan, 1992:210). 
  
The emergence of the five Central Asian republics rising from the ruins of 
the former Soviet Union created a series of opportunities as well as some 
dangers. In fact, India was amongst the first countries to establish 
diplomatic relations with the Central Asian republics (Mohan, 2003:222).  
 
By the 1990s, the Central Asian republics were multi-ethnic states with a 
political link between statehood and religion. Their state leaders tried to set 
up sanctioned Islamic institutions and referred to Islam as the need arose 
(Hewitt, 1997:107). Tajikistan and Turkmenistan joined the OIC, while 
Uzbekistan joined the NAM and New Delhi was apprehensive of the 
involvement of the Uzbeks and Tajiks within the Kashmir area as well as 
Islamic fundamentalism. India also feared that Pakistan might move 
quickly to assert itself with the new independent states using them as 
Pakistani strategic resources. 
 
India was concerned about extreme Islamic elements emanating from 
Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia and Iran to Central Asia and spreading from 
there to Kashmir. A similar concern of India’s was smuggling of arms to 
Kashmir. A reduction in the number of Muslim fundamentalist religious 
militants across the entire region was therefore of crucial importance to  
India and Israel (Cohen, 2001:251). 
 
India and Israel both feared the rise of Islamic fundamentalism in Central 
Asia and both countries were concerned that the Central Asian republics 
might fall prey to Islamic fundamentalism after the disintegration of the 
Soviet Union. India was particularly concerned that possible regional 
disorder in the region might break out because of widespread violence and 
warring factions. Furthermore, both countries shared a national common 
interest to counter the Islamic threat from Central Asia. Moreover, the two 
                                                                                                                          
and Pakistan, see reference no. 13 in this -section. For details about India and the Arab 
world, see reference no. 14 in this sub-section. For details about India Iran relations, see 
section 6.3.17. 
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countries could not afford to ignore the possibility that the newly born 
Central Asian states as well as Pakistan might have the potential of being 
taken over by radical Islamic rule; this could have serious strategic 
implications for their national interests. 
 
In his memoirs, Dixit (1996:310) refers to the common interest India and 
Israel had in Central Asia: “Israel was strategically located on the Northern 
or North-western flank of a number of Muslim countries, which encouraged 
Islamic religious fanaticism in the Central Asian and South Asian region.”  
 
In fact, the stability of the region was therefore of common national interest 
to both countries and Islamic extremism in general and in Central Asia in 
particular, constituted a security challenge to India and Israel. Both 
countries also found a common complementary economic interest in the 
new Central Asian republics, which had been exposed to a Western 
oriented economy, opening the door for Israeli-Indian joint ventures and 
economic operations.  
 
4) India, the Third World and the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM)  
 
India was a founding member and a prominent leader of the NAM.28   The 
NAM provided India with an opportunity for formulating the standpoint of 
the developing countries in both the UN and the international arena (in 
particular during the tenures of Nehru and Indira Gandhi). On several 
occasions, India had used the NAM as an alternative to the UN, as a way 
of underlining New Delhi’s independence as well as a way to reaffirm the 
importance of Third World solidarity and India’s leading role. In addition, 
the ideas of Non- Alignment and Third World solidarity had been one of the 
main manifestations of Sino-Indian rivalry.29 
 
India’s foreign policy towards Israel had coincided with the era of Cold War 
politics and Israel’s identification with the West had provided an ideological 
basis for India’s pro-Arab orientation. The Arab League and the PLO were 
                                            
28
 The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) was established in Belgrade in 1961 (the early 
ascendancy of the leaders of the organisation and the real foundation of NAM was at the 
Bandung conference in Indonesia in 1955).     
29
 For more details, see reference no. 10: India and China in relation to Israel.  
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observers in the NAM. The end of the Cold War marked a weakening of 
the movement and since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991; the NAM 
had been forced to reassess its rationale for its continued existence. Since 
Israel’s exclusion from the Bandung conference,30 the NAM had emerged 
as the principal forum seeking Israel’s international isolation. According to 
Mohan (2003:47), the NAM's position limited India's strategic options and 
in the case of Israel, India complied by limiting its interactions with Israel. 
 
Certain factors such as the end of the Cold War, the collapse of the Soviet 
Union along with the paradigm of a bipolar world, the US emergence as a 
single superpower and America’s enhanced global importance as well as 
the improvement of bilateral relations between Washington and Beijing, 
had eroded the very concept of the NAM and made it internationally 
irrelevant. According to Hewitt (1997:118), the NAM summit of 1989 was 
already marked by a new sense of realism and the erosion of the 
international status of the NAM had a direct influence on the change of the 
Indian attitude towards Israel. Kumaraswamy (2002:8) expresses similar 
sentiments:  
 
Most of the anti-Israeli resolutions at the UN and other forums were 
the result of Israel’s exclusion and isolation from the Third World. 
With the relevance of NAM becoming questionable, organized 
opposition to Israel began to wane, thereby facilitating India’s 
reappraisal of its Israel policy.  
  
 
    5) India as an acceptable international actor in the Middle East 
conflict  
 
Farah Naaz, a researcher at the IDSA, explains that the Government of 
India realised that in order to be accepted as an international actor in the 
Middle East conflict, India ought to establish diplomatic relations with 
Israel: “India wanted to be involved in the Middle East peace talks and 
both the US and Israel had made it clear that this would be possible only 
when India established diplomatic ties with Israel” (Naaz, 1999:896). 
   
                                            
30
 For details about the conference in Bandung, see sections 3.9.2.3 and 4.9.1.2. 
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Moshe Yegar, former Deputy Director General of the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs of Israel confirms this viewpoint as follows:  
 
Participation in that conference became a matter of national prestige 
for some countries. Israel made it quite clear that countries that 
refused to have normal diplomatic relations with her while having 
such relations with the Arab countries would be barred from the 
Madrid conference. It seemed that the MEA of India did not like the 
idea of staying out, especially when the People’s Republic of China 
(PRC), Russia, the United States and even Syria would be in (Yegar, 
1999:130). 
 
 
According to Khan (1992:214): "India had consistently supported the 
Palestinian cause and refused to deal with Israel, which robbed it of 
an opportunity to play a role in the Middle East.” 
 
6) India and the United Nations  
 
India has played a leading role in the UN since independence, by being an 
active member of various UN forums and was actively involved in certain 
UN peacekeeping forces throughout the world, including those deployed at 
the Egyptian-Israeli border before the Six-Day War.31 The Indian 
commitment to the UN was not only ideologically but also politically 
oriented and characterised by political realism with specific reference to 
Pakistan and the problem of the Kashmir conflict. Because of the 
Nehruvian legacy, (Indian foreign policy under Nehru had favoured the 
concept of international equality and international law), India’s political elite 
as well as the INCP remained sensitive to the UN opinion.32  In the UN, 
India had traditionally relied upon the use of the Soviet veto to shield itself 
from international condemnation and in return, its voting in the UN was 
invariably in favour of the Soviet Union.  
 
With the collapse of the Soviet Union, India could no longer rely on the 
Russian veto; it left India more vulnerable to hostile resolutions at the UN. 
Consequently, India was afraid that it could face censure in the UN over 
the handling of the Kashmir crisis (for years Pakistan used to bring up the 
                                            
31
 For details about India’s participation in the UN peacekeeping force at the Egyptian 
Israeli border before the Six-Day War, see section 4.9.1.3. 
32
 For details about Nehru, his legacy and foreign policy see section 3.8.1.  
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issue of Kashmir in the UN and envisaged a role for the UN in finding a 
solution to the Kashmir dispute).33   
 
During the 1990s, the role of the UN was transformed and although the 
role of the UN seemed set to increase, India’s input seemed set to decline 
(Hewitt, 1997:114).  However, in 1991 India was elected as a non-
permanent member for a two-year term, to the Security Council (the sixth 
one since its independence). Importantly, India continued to claim that 
since it was the second most populous country in the world and also a 
potentially industrialised country, as such it should be given a permanent 
seat in the Security Council (Cohen, 20 01:57).   
 
 India realised that its lack of diplomatic relations with Israel was reducing 
its chances of playing an active role in the Middle East peace process as 
well as weakening its demands for a permanent seat in the Security 
Council. India’s willingness to play such a role became evident for the first 
time when India voted in favour of repealing the 1975 UN resolution 
equating Zionism with racism. On 17 December 1991, the UN General 
Assembly revoked a 16-year-old anti-Israeli resolution (Rolef, 1993:410). 
India supported that revocation stressing that it can remove an obstacle in 
the path to peace in the Middle East and clear the way for a more active 
role for the UN in the peace process (Ali Khan, 1992:279).   
 
7) India and the United States (US)  
 
Cohen (2001:247) regards the role played by the US in South Asia 
during the Cold War as important: “The Cold War brought in the US to 
South Asia - ultimately as an ally of Pakistan.”  He states further that 
the new international scenario after the dissolution of the Soviet Union 
and the Gulf War presented an entirely new kind of challenge to India 
(Cohen, 2001:231). The US, a major power was sitting astride its vital 
oil supplies and showed very little interest in establishing a new 
relationship with New Delhi. 
                                            
33
 For details about the history of the Kashmir conflict, see section 3.5.  For details about 
the wars between India and Pakistan, see section 3.9.1.3.  For details about the bilateral 
relations between India and Pakistan with regards to Israel, see reference no.13 in this 
section.  
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For India, the disintegration of the Soviet Union, India’s most important 
former source of defence supplies, left it more vulnerable to hostile 
resolutions at the UN, introduced new instability, brought additional 
competitors for foreign aid and above all, made links with the West and the 
US in particular, more attractive. The Gulf War had shown that when 
Washington and Moscow found common ground, New Delhi had either to 
conform or risk being isolated.   
 
The Gulf War also proved that the US could mobilise impressive diplomatic 
resources, as it was an unchallengeable economic and military super- 
power. In the new world scenario after the Gulf War, the US was in a better 
position to assist India in its economic reforms and liberalisation as India 
needed American capital and technology (Thakur, 1992:165-182).   
 
Prime Minister Rao regarded the US both as one of India’s prime partners 
and as a potential economic supporter and the absence of diplomatic 
relations with Israel was seen as a crucial impediment to improving 
relations with the US.34 After the 1991 general elections in India, the Rao 
government concluded that a major improvement in Indo-American 
relations was required. In this regard, India realised that Israel could be a 
common factor that could promote closer ties with the US. Moreover, the 
assistance and collaboration of the US Jewish organisations as well as the 
Jewish American lobby were key elements in such an approach, 
particularly before Prime Minister Rao’s visit to the US at the end of 
January 1992. 35   
 
In this regard, Kumaraswamy (2002:8) makes the following 
observation: 
 
Having opened up the economy he (Rao) looked to the West to 
become his prime partner for economic development. The lack of 
relations with Israel, however, precluded a better understanding 
with industrialized countries, especially with the United States. 
                                            
34
 In terms of the individual level of analysis, see section 5.4.3.3 for details about P.M. 
Narasimha Rao who influenced the transformation of Indian foreign policy towards Israel. 
35
 For details about India and the American Jewish organisations, see reference no.8 in 
this section.  
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Since 1947, Washington had been nudging India to modify its 
foreign policy towards Israel.  
 
 
Farah Naaz considers the Indian need for better relations with the US, 
which emerged as the sole superpower after the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, as the most important reason that convinced India to establish 
diplomatic relations with Israel: 
 
India became vulnerable to the US pressure due to its influence in 
the    IMF and World Bank. Developing relations with Israel would be 
an important gesture that could clear the way for closer economic 
cooperation with Washington (Naaz, 1999:245). 
 
 
Inbar (2004:102) confirms this opinion: “Definitely New Delhi believed 
that upgrading its relations with Israel would have a positive effect on 
the United States.”  
 
8) India and the American Jewish organisations  
 
High-level Indian officials, including Prime Minister Narasimha Rao and Rajiv 
Gandhi before him, realised that the influential American Jewish community 
and the Jewish lobby in the US could be helpful with building economic 
relations with the US (as well as having a positive impact on the bilateral 
relations between India and the US in general).  
 
The power of the American Jewish Lobby received special attention in 191 
from Prime Minister Rao when Rao’s new government applied to the World 
Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for urgent support. 36  Rao 
realised that the Jewish Lobby in US could be instrumental in such a 
request, or an obstacle, as it had proved to be four years earlier. In May 
1987, following an Anti Defamation league protest, after Israeli tennis 
payers were not allowed to participate in the Davis Cup tournament in New 
Delhi, the American Congress support was reduced from 60 US million 
dollars to 35 million US dollars. In fact, India was subsequently forced to 
allow the Israeli players to take part in the tournament. The government of 
                                            
36
 For details about Prime Minister Rao’s role in the transformation of India’s foreign 
policy towards Israel in 1992, see section 5.4.3.3. 
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India and Rao in particular, realised the necessity to mobilise the political 
weight and power of the American Jewish organisations in favour of India 
in 1991 when the country was on the verge of economic collapse.   
 
Mohammed Ali Khan (1992:215) describes the potential contribution of the 
American Jewish organisations to India: “Normal relations with Israel could 
help turn pro-Israeli lobbies in the US to show at least a modicum of 
leaning towards India.”  
 
9) India and Russia  
 
According to Stephen Cohen  (2001:142, 231), India’s non-alignment  
policy was a historical pretext for close bilateral relations with the Soviet 
Union and India had become highly dependent on Moscow for military 
supplies as well as international support. Israel, on the other hand, was 
considered an important part of the American sphere of influence and the 
containment strategy of the US and its allies. The Soviet Union provided 
India with vast supplies of modern weapons; consequently, India became 
the world’s largest arms importer. Until the collapse of communism, Indo-
Soviet relations prospered mainly because of the need for a balance of 
power regarding the West, shared security and geopolitical concerns, and 
the existing anti-Israeli foreign policy adopted by both countries. After the 
first Gulf War, India took note of the fact that the Soviet Union and Russia 
did not oppose the war and ended its support for Iraq, which like India, had 
been supplied with Soviet weapons.  
 
Ali Khan (1992:214) considers the Soviet Union’s collapse (together with 
the emerging of the US as the sole superpower) as an important factor 
that accelerated the Indian foreign policy change towards Israel. According 
to him, India’s close relations with the former Soviet Union through the 
Cold War, restricted India’s freedom of operation and was one of the 
reasons that kept India away from Israel. In 1987, the Soviet Union started 
to change its foreign policy towards Israel and consulates were opened in 
both countries. India was watching the growing rapprochement between 
the Soviet Union and later on, the new Russian Federation and Israel 
closely. That rapprochement reached its peak when full diplomatic 
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relations between the two countries were entered into on 18 October 1991. 
Farah Naaz (1999:245), who supports his opinion, indicates that the Soviet 
Union had already intimated directly to India in 1989 that Moscow would 
normalise its relations with Israel.  
 
Despite the fact that the Indian military connection with the Soviet Union 
was a part of a large strategic alignment between the two countries, 
surprisingly Dixit (1996:309-310), does not attach a great deal of 
importance in his memoirs to the Soviet collapse as a change determinant 
that had had an impact on the Indian foreign policy transformation towards 
Israel. However, he does refer to it indirectly when he mentions the Soviet 
backing of the negotiations between Israel and the PLO as a reference 
point in the Indian foreign policy transformation towards Israel. He also 
points out that: “Israel had developed expertise in improving the weapon 
system of Soviet origin, which could be utilized by India” (Dixit, 1996:309). 
  
On the other hand, on another occasion, one year later, Dixit indicates that 
on the macro level, the end of the Cold War was one of the factors that 
compelled India to establish diplomatic relations with Israel (Indian 
Express, 11/12/1977).37  
 
In fact, India established its diplomatic relations with Israel three months 
after Russia had taken the initiative for such a diplomatic move. 
 
10) India and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) 
 
The NAM was an important factor in understanding India’s relations with 
China. Traditionally, the idea of the NAM was the main reason for the 
Indian rivalry with China and in fact, many Indian analysts had considered 
China to be India’s primary rival and there was also a clear military 
asymmetry between the two countries, which was particularly relevant in 
the field of nuclear capabilities.   
 
                                            
37
 For details about the re-establishment of diplomatic relations between Israel and the 
Soviet Union as a contextual determinant in the Indian decision to establish diplomatic 
relation with Israel, see section 5.4.4.2. 
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Though India’s relations with China had gradually improved throughout the 
1980s, the fundamental issues of concern and potential for friction 
remained open and China had continued to be a major security threat to 
India. The long-term plan of India had been to match China’s strategic 
challenge in the region and develop a military deterrence system against 
the use of Chinese nuclear and missiles weapon systems. China on the 
other hand, had been engaged in efforts to create a ring of anti-Indian 
influence around India through a military and economic assistance program 
to India’s neighbouring countries, combined with diplomacy (Hewitt, 
1997:57).   
 
India was particularly concerned about the close military relations between 
China and Pakistan38 and regarded this issue to be a part of its security 
dilemma. India, on the other hand, had traditionally supported Tibetan 
claims for greater autonomy from China despite the fact that the Indian 
Government had recognised China's take-over of Tibet in 195139 (Khan, 
1992:202). India was afraid that a strong China might attempt to seek a 
military solution to the long-standing territorial disputes between the two 
countries and Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi’s visit to China in 1988, the first 
visit of an Indian Prime Minister  since Nehru, had not improved the pace of 
border negotiations between the two countries. However, it did mark the 
resumption of a political dialogue at the highest level (Swaminathan, 
2006:2). China was seeking to enlarge its sphere of influence in Southeast 
Asia and the Bay of Bengal. China’s growing power and influence in Asia 
was a strategic challenge for India and some of India's experts believed 
that China would never make concessions regarding the border disputes 
until India became its nuclear equal.  
 
In 1991, China was building on more than a decade of economic reforms 
and considered itself to be economically and technologically ahead of 
India. With its permanent membership of the UN Security Council and its 
                                            
38
 For more details about the Kashmir conflict’s implications as well as India-Pakistan 
relations pertaining to the Muslim and the Arab world see references nos. 12, 13 and 14 
in this section . 
39
 The exiled Dalai Lama lives in Dharamsala in North India. India did not grant him the 
status of government in exile, but the status of a spiritual leader. 
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nuclear power status, China played a more significant role in the 
international arena than India. Furthermore, China had embarked upon the 
consolidation and development of its military capabilities. According to 
Indian strategic researchers, China’s foreign and defence policy initiatives 
were designed to marginalise India in the long term and to reduce India to 
status of a sub-regional power by increasing Chinese influence and 
leverage in the Southern Asian region  The gap between India and China 
regarding overall military potential, particularly in terms of strategic 
weapons, was widening rapidly in China’s favour. Both countries competed 
for foreign investments and markets for their products. Another factor of 
concern to India was the presence of Chinese nuclear missiles in Tibet as 
well as the fact that a border conflict between the two countries could not 
be ruled out.  (Cohen, 2001:261). 
 
Since the 1980s, China’s relations with Israel had developed gradually with 
an emphasis on military procurement and technology transfer. India and 
the Indian military establishment in particular, were aware of the potential 
of Israel as an arms supplier of sophisticated military equipment.40 China’s 
acquisition of Israeli high-technology military equipment was of strategic 
concern to India and it monitored the Chinese-Israeli improvement of 
relations closely. Importantly, in India’s strategic evaluation regarding 
China, Israel turned out to be an international player with which the others 
had to reckon (Kumaraswamy, 1999:145). India was also concerned that 
Israeli military equipment, procured by China, would find its way to 
Pakistan considering the close defence ties between the two countries 
(Pant, 2005:15). Accordingly, India announced its decision to establish 
diplomatic relations with Israel five days after the Chinese move. 
 
11) India and world globalisation  
 
Globalisation led to new and more cosmopolitan opportunities in foreign 
policy. This was particularly true in the India of 1991, in terms of its 
liberalisation and economic reforms. Raja Mohan (2003:266) points out 
that India realised that the traditional methods of engaging the world were 
                                            
40
 For details about Indian military cooperation with Israel, see reference no. 1 in previous 
section (section A.).  
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no longer tenable and driven by necessity; India had to find new ways for 
doing business with the world and to display inventiveness unparalleled in 
the annals of Indian diplomacy. At first haltingly, then more 
wholeheartedly during the 1990s, New Delhi, abandoned the philosophical 
premises that had guided Indian diplomacy for forty years and 
transformed their country’s approach to global affairs.   
 
The economic liberalisation initiated by Prime Minister Rao had opened 
the Indian economy up to the West and to globalisation and the imperative 
of the Indian foreign policy had changed accordingly. Consequently, Israel 
as an advanced modern technologically oriented state had the potential to 
become an important player in the new Indian global orientation.41  
 
12) India and the Muslim world  
 
 
India had been invited to attend the summit of Islamic states at Rabat 
(Morocco) in 1969, but in the face of Pakistani protests and the threat of 
their withdrawal from the summit, Saudi Arabia, cancelled India’s invitation. 
The OIC that was founded in 1971 had traditionally been critical of India’s 
international politics in particular with respect to Kashmir. As Stephen 
Cohen (2001:248) states: 
 
The Organization of Islamic Conferences has been critical of India’s 
policies in Kashmir and a number of West Asian and Gulf States 
allowed their citizens to fight in Kashmir as part of a pan-Islamic 
jihadist movement.   
 
 
In 1991, a conference of the Foreign Ministers of the OIC, which had been 
convened in Karachi, set up a fact finding mission and proposed that it 
would be sent to Jammu and Kashmir in order to report on the situation 
there. Following India’s refusal to allow the mission into the country, the 
OIC summit condemned India for its violation of human rights in Jammu 
and Kashmir, thereby encouraging Pakistan to pursue an active Islamic 
anti-Indian foreign policy. The OIC, consistently supported Pakistan 
                                            
41
 For details about Israel as a potential helper to India following the Indian economic 
reforms in 1991 and the Indian economic liberalisation as a contextual determinant in the 
Indian decision to establish diplomatic relations with Israel, see section 5.4.4.1.  
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against India over the Kashmir issue, despite India's pro-Muslim and pro-
Arab foreign policy, but in 1991 India finally realised that diplomatic 
relations with Israel could generate new rules for the game with the Muslim 
world: "Close relations with Israel could counter moves by those Muslim 
countries, which were inclined to act against Indian interests if instigated 
by Pakistan" (Dixit, 1996: 312). 
 
13) India and Pakistan  
 
After the creation of Pakistan, India had a powerful Islamic rival in South 
Asia competing for the same markets and resources and consequently, it 
was involved in a continual struggle to establish itself in the Middle East. In 
the years following independence, Pakistan pursued an active Islamic 
foreign policy that brought international and financial dividends. In return, 
Pakistan expected material and financial help from the OIC as well as 
diplomatic support in its conflict with India regarding the Kashmir issue. 
 
According to Dixit (1998:93), one of the main reasons for India cultivating 
friendships with Islamic countries was to counter Pakistani hostility. The 
Indian foreign policy since independence in general and in the UN in 
particular, was viewed in its entirety through the prism of the Indo-Pakistani 
conflict regarding Kashmir. Pakistan was seen by India as an essential 
element in a shifting alliance against India, composed of the West, Islam, 
China and other hostile states (Cohen, 2001:202). Significantly, Mohan 
(2003:187) points out that Pakistan did eventually realise that traditional 
military conflict with India would not serve its purposes. Subsequently, 
Pakistan started to engage in a low-intensity conflict with India, particularly 
in Kashmir, without the fear of conventional retaliation, while using 
terrorists and militants in its onslaught on India.  
 
In fact, since independence India had been concerned about the Arab 
support of Pakistan and one of the ways of tackling it was by total support 
of the Palestinian cause. Another concern of India’s was that Israeli military 
equipment sold to China would find its way to Pakistan.42  In this regard, it 
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 For more details about India and China concerning Israel, see reference no.10 in this 
section. 
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should be pointed out that both India and Israel were concerned that the 
Kashmiri conflict with Pakistan and the Palestinian conflict could destabilise 
their regions in a way that would attract unwanted external interventions. 
(Inbar, 2004:93). In addition, India was also worried that arms sales to Arab 
countries in the Middle East would be diverted to Pakistan (Hewitt, 
1992:31). 
 
In 1991, India was concerned that Pakistan had supposedly crossed the 
nuclear threshold while supporting the insurgency in the state of Jammu 
and Kashmir. By that time, India already realised that the price it had paid 
to keep the Muslim world as neutral as possible in its conflict with Pakistan 
in general and the Kashmir issue in particular, was too high.43 Dixit 
(1996:310) takes it one political step further by pointing out that: “Close 
relations with Israel could counter moves by those Muslim countries, which 
were inclined to act against Indian interest if instigated by Pakistan.”  
  
14)  India and the Arab world  
 
India attached a great deal of importance to the Arab countries. The Arab 
world in general and the Palestinians in particular, were key variables in 
the Indian decision to establish fully-fledged diplomatic relations with Israel. 
Traditionally, India considered its foreign relations with the Arab world to be 
of prime concern for its national interest and was ready to pay for it with its 
relations with the state of Israel. In fact, India was using the state of Israel 
as a trump card in the game of international politics in general and with the 
Arab world in particular, exploiting it in order to promote its interests with 
the Arab and Islamic countries. According to Kumaraswamy (2002:7-9):  
 
By consistently adopting an anti-Israel stand, India had become a 
prisoner of its rhetoric but its steady backing of the Arab world, 
especially on issues regarding Israel, was not met with reciprocal 
support by the Arab and Islamic world. Moreover, in the past, India 
had been either unable or unwilling to seek and secure a quid pro quo 
for its pro-Arab policy. Even when some of the Middle Eastern 
countries provided political and occasionally military support to 
Pakistan, India did not react. 
 
                                            
43
 For details about India and the Muslim world see reference no.12 and about India and 
the Arab world see reference no.14 in this section. 
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According to Farah Naaz (1999:895), one of the reasons that India had 
leaned towards the Arab countries was its historical and cultural affinity 
with the Arab and Muslim world.   
 
As Dixit also describes it, the Arab countries were key factors in the 
decision making process of the redirection of the Indian foreign policy 
towards Israel:  
 
Our missions in the Gulf conveyed the assessment that Israel-PLO 
contacts had the endorsement of important Arab countries such as 
Saudi Arabia, the UAE44 and Kuwait…The reverse side of the coin 
entailed the appreciation that India’s long-standing friendship and 
cooperative relations with the Arab countries would suffer if we 
established diplomatic relations with Israel (Dixit, 1996:309-310). 
 
  
New Delhi was particularly concerned that arms sales to the Middle East 
Arab countries would be diverted to Pakistan (Hewitt, 1997:31).45 The Arab 
world emerged from the Gulf War divided, the price of oil slumped46 and 
the international status of the PLO and its leader, Yasser Arafat, who 
supported Iraq’s dictator, Saddam Hussain, plummeted. 
 
Dixit (1996:310) describes the impact of the Gulf War on the Arab world’s 
status indirectly: “In the post Gulf War international situation, India 
considered it advisable to establish diplomatic relations with Israel.”  
 
Eventually, a final Indian decision was taken in favour of establishing full 
diplomatic relations with Israel while taking the Arab factor into 
consideration:  
 
Keeping in view the international power equations and overarching 
influence of the US with the majority of Arab and Muslim countries 
the assumption that establishing relations with Israel would result 
in India’s relations with Arab and Muslim countries going into an 
irretrievable spin was not logical (Dixit, 1996:311). 
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 United Arab Emirates. 
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 For details about India and Pakistan concerning Israel, see reference no.13 in this 
section. 
46
 For details about the oil factor, see reference no. 2 in this section. 
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India’s frustration with the Arab countries was also a factor considered by 
India as expressed by Dixit when he conducted a briefing for Arab 
ambassadors in New Delhi:  
 
There was no change in India’s politics on the Palestinian question or 
on the importance that we attached to nurturing close friendship with 
Arab countries… India had not received any reciprocity on the 
Kashmir issue despite our long-standing support to several Islamic 
countries… (Dixit, 1996:310)  
 
A similar message was also delivered by Indian ambassadors in Arab and 
Islamic countries upon the instructions of Prime Minister Rao.   
 
In 1991, India reached the conclusion that the political price paid to the 
Arabs was too high. The Arab world's response was also taken into 
consideration and the Indian assumption was that no adverse reaction 
from the Arab world would be evoked. 47   
 
Dixit  describes this situation in a newspaper article as follows:  
 
A subconscious factor was the Indian feeling that despite its 
unqualified commitments to Palestinian aspirations and support of 
Arab causes there was no Arab reciprocity on Kashmir and 
Pakistan. Arab countries themselves had close relations with the 
US despite its closeness to Israel, so their placing a ban on India in 
this respect was not logical  (Indian Express, 11/12/1977) 
 
 
Kumaraswamy (2002: 8).points out that once the Arab states and the PLO 
had embarked upon negotiations with Israel, there was no compelling 
reason for India to maintain the status quo in its foreign relations towards 
Israel.  
 
15) Indo-Arab economic relations  
 
Economic relations between India and the Arab world were extremely 
important for India. In addition to the fact that the Gulf countries (and Iran) 
were vital sources of oil and petroleum products,48 a large number of 
Indians were employed in the Arab countries, thereby contributing to the 
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 For details about the Arab countries’ response towards the establishment of diplomatic 
relations between India and Israel, see section 5.4.6 
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 For details about the oil factor see reference no. 2 in this section. 
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Indian foreign exchange reserve. According to Mohan (2003:228), the lack 
of adequate sources of energy always made the Persian Gulf crucial in 
India's economy arithmetic and remittances by Indian labour were taken 
into consideration. Dixit (1998:93) explains that "India's economic interests 
(as well as trade routes) were dependent on friendship with the Arab 
countries which included India's dependence on the energy resources of 
the West Asian and Gulf regions…” Two years earlier, Dixit described the 
possible negative economic impact of establishing diplomatic relations with 
Israel on India:  
 
Such an eventuality (establishing diplomatic relations with Israel) 
could have an adverse impact on oil supplies from the Gulf to 
India and might also result in the repatriation of large numbers of 
Indians working in the Gulf and other Muslim countries who are 
contributing to India’s economic resources as well as foreign 
exchange reserves (Dixit, 1996:310). 
 
 
16) India and the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) 
 
In January 1975, India recognised the PLO and allowed it to open an office 
in New Delhi. In March 1980, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi granted 
diplomatic recognition to the PLO by upgrading its office in New Delhi to 
the level of a fully-fledged embassy. In November 1988, India was one of 
the first non-Arab countries to recognise the State of Palestine proclaimed 
by the Palestinian Council in Algiers.49 
 
In 1991, before initiating any diplomatic move towards Israel Prime 
Minister Rao insisted on discussions with Yasser Arafat, the PLO leader, 
in order to gauge his reaction to the Indian idea of establishing diplomatic 
relations with Israel. Arafat was invited to India for an official visit and 
visited New Delhi from 20 to 22 January 2001 where he held detailed 
discussions with Rao.   
 
Dixit (1996:311) recalls that Arafat used that opportunity to brief Rao on 
the confidential discussions held with the Israeli authorities and states that: 
 
                                            
49
 For details about India's relations with the PLO, see sections 3.7, 3.8.3 and 3.9.2.1. 
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There was a likelihood of official relations being established 
between them (the PLO and Israel) in a period of about six to 
eight months. He agreed with the Government of India’s intentions 
to establish diplomatic relations with Israel and added that, in fact, 
India having full-fledged relations with Israel would result in the 
PLO having a trusted friend such as India as an interlocutor 
between his organization and Israel.  
 
 
According to Ali Khan (1992:215), the statement made by the PLO 
chairperson during his visit to India, namely that the exchange of 
ambassadors and recognition of Israel by India as acts of sovereignty, 
were particularly significant for the Indian government. This helped to 
convince the government of India that there would be no adverse reaction 
in the Arab ranks to establishing diplomatic relations with Israel.  
 
When the issue of relations with Israel was discussed in the Indian Cabinet 
(on 23 January 2001, only one day after Arafat’s visit to New Delhi),  Prime 
Minister Rao rounded off the discussion on the subject of relations with 
Israel. Dixit (1996:312) points out that he concluded his speech: “…by 
advancing the clinching argument that Arafat himself was supportive of 
India’s decisions to open up contacts with Israel.”  
  
Kumaraswamy (2002:8) presents a similar explanation:  
 
The willingness of the Arabs and Palestinians to seek a political 
settlement through direct negotiations altered the rules of the Arab-
Israeli conflict. Once the Arab states and the PLO embarked upon 
negotiations with Israel, there was no compelling reason for India to 
maintain the status quo. Moreover, Palestinian support for Iraqi 
President Saddam Hussein during the Kuwait crisis significantly 
undermined the Palestinian position. During his visit to India, shortly 
before normalization, Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat reconciled to 
India’s new approach to the Middle East.  
 
In addition, in order to proceed cautiously in terms of domestic 
politics in general and vis-à-vis the Indian Muslin community in 
particular, the Government of India frequently pointed out that the 
establishment of diplomatic relations with Israel would not change its 
support for the fulfilment of the legitimate aspiration of the 
Palestinian people. Prime Minister Rao stated that: “India would play 
a constructive, even-handed role in the peace process” (Dixit, 
1996:312). 
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5.4.3.2 State and society (national) level of analysis 
 
The transformation of the Indian foreign policy towards Israel in 1992 and 
the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries are 
analysed at the following national levels, with special emphasis on Indian 
politics concerning Israel: the MEA foreign policy, the INCM's foreign 
policy, the Nehruvian tradition of the Indian government, the Indian Muslim 
factor and the Indian media: 
 
 
A.  Ministry of External Affairs (MEA)  
 
According to Mohan (2003:xi-xxii), since the early 1990s, India, driven by 
necessity, abandoned the philosophical premises upon which Indian 
diplomacy had been based for forty years and began to pursue a new 
Indian foreign policy, which was more suitable for meeting the challenges 
of the coming century. Mohan highlights five profound changes guiding the 
new Indian foreign policy, which also had a direct influence on the Indian 
decision to transform its foreign policy towards Israel:  
 
1) A shift in the national orientation occurred, namely from the domestic 
focus on socialism to capitalism. 
 
2) A redirection of the Indian economy took place with liberalisation coming 
to the fore that emphasised trade and foreign investment, replacing the 
begging bowl as a symbol of Indian diplomacy. 
 
3) India’s abandonment of its forty years of close relations with the Third 
World, which had been characterised by its obsession with non-
alignment and its leadership role in NAM. India became more interested 
in becoming a leader in the international system and not just remaining a 
protesting leader of the Third World trade union. The national self-
interest became the driving force behind Indian diplomacy. 
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4) A shift in Indian policy from a rejection of the instinctive anti-Westernism 
that dominated Indian thinking about the global order for four decades to 
a new more open view of the West. 
 
5) India exchanged its idealistic approach for a new hard-headed, 
pragmatic approach. 
 
Dixit (1996:312) reports in his memoirs that the contradictory 
considerations regarding Israel were examined in his ministry and policy 
recommendations were submitted to Prime Minister Rao who was also the 
acting Minister of External Affairs. 
 
Kumaraswamy (2002:9) has the following to say regarding India’s relations 
with Israel: “It (the diplomatic relations establishment with Israel) appears 
to have been a well thought-out move aimed at establishing balance and 
pragmatism in Indian foreign policy.” 
 
However, the MEA had difficulties in changing its attitude towards Israel. 
From a structural viewpoint, the inflexible and conservative approach of 
the MEA towards Israel in 1991, can partly be ascribed to the fact that 
senior Indian ambassadors and officials of the MEA had received their 
training and international experience under the INCP. This had been the 
formative political period of India with its emphasis on Nehruvian 
internationalism, which had formed their international perception and 
indoctrinated them against Israel. In addition, the US, which was 
considered hostile towards India, was an ardent supporter of Israel.50 In 
fact, it commensurate with the description made by Stephen Cohen “The 
Indian Foreign Service (IFS) had difficulty adjusting to change in the 
international system and the post Cold War realities” (Cohen, 2001:89). 
 
The year 1991 signalled a change in India's diplomatic approach towards 
Israel, which was reflected in India's vote in the UN to repeal the UN 
General Assembly resolution of 1975. This resolution equated Zionism 
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section B in this section. 
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with racism,51 but eventually the MEA’s officials had to come to terms with 
Israel's new status in the international system in general and the Indian 
government’s decision to establish diplomatic relations with Israel, in 
particular. 
 
 
     B. Nehruvian tradition of Pro-Arab foreign policy as a factor in Indian 
foreign policy change towards Israel 
 
Nehru, India’s first Prime Minister, dominated the Indian strategic foreign 
policy perspective and nearly forty years after his death his ideas and 
policies remained influential, even when India had diverged from them. 
Nehru was sympathetic towards the Arabs as well as the Palestinian 
cause and made it a central theme of Indian foreign policy (Cohen, 
2001:37).52  
 
Yegar's impression of his visit to New Delhi, in July 1991, following the 
kidnapping of the Israeli tourists in Jammu-Kashmir by Indian-Muslim 
terrorists, was that the resistance against the improvement of relations 
with Israel still prevails within the leadership of the INCP (Yegar, 
2004:166). 
 
In Dixit’s memoirs, he points out that the senior cabinet minister, Arjun 
Singh, had implied that establishing diplomatic relations with Israel would 
be a departure from the Nehruvian framework of traditional Indian foreign 
policy; to which his rebuttal had been: “There would be no departure from 
the Nehruvian framework, because Panditji53 himself had given formal 
recognition to Israel” (Dixit, 1996:310). 
 
C.  INCP's traditional pro-Arab and anti-Israel foreign policy  
 
The Indian political traditional pro-Arab policy dates back to the beginning 
of the century and to the two pre-dominant political leaders of the INCM, 
                                            
51
 For details about the Indian voting in the UN, which repealed the resolution that 
equated Zionism with racism, see section 3.9.2.2.  
52
 As described in details in section 3.6.2 pertaining to Nehru. 
53
 Reference to Jawaharlal Pandit Nehru. The suffix ji to a name is a traditional Indian 
form of respect. 
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Mahatma Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru.54  It is important to point out that 
the INCP lost the support of many of the minorities including the Muslims 
in 1989.55 Subsequently, Rajiv Gandhi’s government vacillated between its 
fear of offending the Hindus and its fear of losing the Muslim vote. The 
result was a political impasse during which the Hindu parties took the 
initiative. 
   
The INCP establishment, which continued to insist on party consensus as 
well as national consensus regarding Indian foreign policy, went on 
supporting the Palestinians and continued in their opposition to Israel as 
part of the progressive orientation of the ruling party. In fact, the pro-Arab 
foreign policy not only became an INCP consensus, but also an integral 
part of the party’s ethos. The long rule of the INCP created generations of 
Indian politicians and bureaucrats committed to the Nehruvian tradition in 
general and pro-Arab foreign policy in particular, which in fact continued 
until the establishment of diplomatic relations with Israel in 1992 and even 
after that time.56  As pointed out by Kumaraswamy (2002:7, 10), the 
normalisation of diplomatic relations with Israel were seen by the INCP as 
a betrayal or even as a hasty or unprincipled move. Moreover, it was also 
portrayed as an anti-Muslim alliance and the betrayal of a traditional 
position. 
 
 
D.  Indian Muslim community 
 
The political weight of the Muslim community in India has been reduced 
since the 1980s, as there has been an alteration in the core values of India 
from a commitment to secularism towards some notion of cultural 
Hinduism. In that context, since the 1980s, the INCP has attempted to 
appeal to both Hindus and Muslims to ensure their political loyalty; 
however, in the process it has lost the support of the Indian Muslim 
community.  
 
                                            
54
 For details, see sections 3.6.1 (Mahatma Gandhi) and 3.6.2 (Jawaharlal P. Nehru). 
55
 For more details about the Indian Muslims, see sub-section D. in this section. 
56
 About the pro-Arab Nehruvian tradition, see also sub-section B in this section. 
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In the mid-1980s, the right wing party, the BJP, India’s People Party, 
benefited from several politically expedient concessions made by Prime 
Minister Rajiv Gandhi to the Indian Muslim clergy, which were seen as 
blatant examples of minoritism. In fact, the BJP could not afford to have 
India's 110 million Muslims view their party as their sworn enemy.  (Cohen, 
2001:122). 
 
In particular, since 1989, the Indian Government had faced a sustained 
military threat from a series of groups claiming to represent Kashmir 
sentiment in favour of joining Pakistan or in becoming a separate 
sovereign state. The Muslim secessionist movement in the Kashmir valley 
became more threatening and had clear religious links with extreme 
Muslim organisations outside of India as well as Pakistan. 
 
The BJP turned Jammu and Kashmir into a major political issue, asking if 
the Indian Muslims could be patriotic Indians while supporting a special 
status in the only state in which they were in the majority. The Muslim 
community was increasingly seen as an enemy of the state; funded and 
supported by external forces and in addition, there was the fear of a 
spread of militant Islam in India (Gupta, 1995:17).  
 
Since 1989, India had witnessed instances of Hindu-Muslim violence, 
which had direct repercussions in the Indian political arena (as well as on 
Indo-Pakistani relations).57  The result was a political impasse during which 
the Hindu parties took the political initiative. Between November 1989 and 
February 1990, the BJP was successful in winning two state elections 
exploiting insecurities among the Hindu majority community. The INCPs 
trust and vital Muslim votes were alienated since the Muslims in India felt 
insecure and no longer saw the Congress as a dominant party that could 
provide security and promote a move towards equality. The Hindu/Muslim 
divide at the centre of the Indian domestic politics reduced the political 
weight of the Muslim community in India and made it easier for Prime 
Minister Rao to make the decision to establish diplomatic relation with 
Israel. As Farah Naaz declares:  
                                            
57
 Violence that reached its peak in 1992 with the Ayodyha Mosque demolition. 
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One of the reasons that made India to reconsider the decision of 
establishing diplomatic ties with Israel was less consideration for 
the Muslim vote bank in the calculation of the regime in power 
(Naaz, 2000:969). 
  
 
Cohen (2001:247-248) is more specific: “Prime Minister Rao calculated 
that: the dangers from Islamic extremism were so great that it was worth 
risking domestic Muslim opposition. In the end, there were no serious 
objections.”  
 
In fact, Prime Minister Rao had taken a calculated political risk, which paid 
off as the Indian Muslims complied with the decision to establish 
diplomatic relations with Israel met only by minor protests.58 
 
E) India's media  
 
After the Gulf War, India's media demanded a fair attitude towards Israel 
(Kumar, 2001:2). In addition, the kidnapping of Israeli tourists at Jammu-
Kashmir by Indian-Muslim terrorists in July 1991 (the Jammu-Kashmir 
Liberation Front) resulted in the Indian media viewing Israeli-Indian 
relations in a more favourable light.59  Subsequently, most of them called 
upon the government of India to establish diplomatic relations with Israel 
because India could benefit from it (Yegar, 2004:164).60  
5.4.3.3 Individual level of analysis 
 
The transformation of Indian foreign policy towards Israel in 1992 and the 
establishment of diplomatic relations with Israel are analysed with respect 
to the individual level of analysis, namely the leaders that initiated and 
brought it about.  
 
According to Raja Mohan, Indian Prime Ministers Rajiv Gandhi and 
Narasimha Rao were the leaders who initiated conceptual breakthroughs in 
                                            
58
 For details about the Indian Muslim community as a pressure group, see section 
3.10.5.2 and for details about Prime Minister Narasimha Rao, see section 5.4.3.3.   
59
 For details about Israel's international image, see section 5.4.3.4. 
60
 For details about the kidnapping of the Israeli tourists and Yegar’s meetings in New 
Delhi, see sections 3.9.2, 3.10.3.2 and 4.9.1.3. 
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the field of international relations. In fact, it was Rajiv Gandhi who 
recognised the bankruptcy of Indian foreign policy, which was based on 
non-alignment and a slavish attachment to the NAM. He was constantly 
looking for new approaches to India’s engagement with the international 
system including the Western world:  
 
Rajiv Gandhi had less political inhibition in accepting change, and 
throughout his five-year rule (1984-89) he sought new ideas on 
foreign policy and constantly looked for ways to get India out of its 
diplomatic rut (Mohan, 2003:32-33). 
 
 
In his book, India’s Foreign Policy, Dixit (1998:172) remarks that: 
 
Rajiv Gandhi initiated a series of changes in India’s foreign policy in 
its political and economic dimensions. He was not tied to the 
ideological or political socialist orientations of his mother and his 
maternal grandfather, his predecessors as Prime Ministers of India.  
 
A similar viewpoint was expressed by Kumaraswamy (2002:6) who 
regards Rajiv Gandhi as the leader who signalled a fresh Indian 
approach towards Israel:  
 
Though unable to reverse traditional policy completely, he 
initiated a number of moves that later facilitated normalization. 
Unlike his predecessors, he openly met Israeli officials and pro-
Israel leaders in the United States.61  
 
 
In turn, Kumaraswamy (2004:263) explains Gandhi’s orientation 
regarding Israel in the following way:  
 
His lack of ideological orientation together with an improvement in 
Israel’s international image combined to produce the break through. 
Though unable to completely reverse the traditional course of Indian 
policy, he initiated a number of moves in this direction. 
 
 
Prime Minister Narasimha Rao, who succeeded Rajiv Gandhi, 
capitalised on the changes initiated by Gandhi. Rao, who became 
Prime Minister in June 1991, demonstrated a diplomatic and 
pragmatic approach and was the one who succeeded in initiating 
and implementing a new foreign policy attitude towards Israel.62  
                                            
61
 For details about Rajiv Gandhi, see section 3.8.6. 
62
 For details about Narasimha Rao, see section 3.8.9. 
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Prime Minister Rao had been Indira Gandhi’s Minister of External 
Affairs as well as the Minister of External Affairs under Prime 
Minister Rajiv Gandhi. In fact, he had more experience in foreign 
policy affairs than anyone else in his government, in his own party 
(INCP), any opposition member on the opposition benches or within 
the Indian MEA's bureaucracy. Mohan (2003:32-33) sums up Prime 
Minister Rao’s role in the policy change as follows:  
 
The Narasimha Rao government understood the demands of 
the new international order on India, but there was no way the 
Congress, with its reverence of the Nehru dynasty, could come 
up with an open criticism of non-alignment and make a credible 
case for change in foreign policy. That would have invited 
serious political troubles both inside and outside of the Congress 
party. Yet in his own low-key manner, it was Narasimha Rao 
who paved the way for change…Narasimha Rao navigated the 
difficult diplomatic water adroitly, and in the end, he had 
changed Indian foreign policy by a large measure. 
 
 
Rao deserves credit as a political leader and ultimate decision-
maker, for making the transformation of India’s foreign policy 
towards Israel an international and political reality and ultimately he 
was the one to establish fully-fledged diplomatic relations between 
the two countries.  
5.4.3.4 Israel’s international image  
 
The image of the State of Israel in the international arena as well as 
in India had improved and had played a role in India's decision to 
establish diplomatic relations with Israel after the Gulf War and the 
inauguration of the Middle East peace process in Madrid in October 
1991(Kumaraswamy 2002:8).63  In fact, the opposition had 
campaigned for the establishment of diplomatic relations several 
years before the establishment of diplomatic relations actually took 
place and undoubtedly, this influenced Rajiv Gandhi to change his 
approach towards Israel (Naaz, 1999:245).64  
                                            
63
 For details about the reference to India's media, see sub-section .(E) in section 5.4.3.2. 
64
 For details about Rajiv Gandhi, see section 3.8.6, and about Gandhi's approach 
towards Israel, see section 5.4.3.3 
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5.4.4 Growing ripe  
 
There were two change determinants at this stage, which served as 
accelerating determinants. The first and most important change 
determinant was the Indian liberalisation campaign and economic reforms 
that started in 1991. The second one was the re-establishment of 
diplomatic relations between Israel and the Soviet Union.  
 
5.4.4.1 Economic liberalisation  
 
The government of Narasimha Rao, who came to power in May 1991, 
announced policy changes regarding liberalisation measures, economic 
reforms and a new industrial policy.65 By the end of 1991, the old order in 
India was on the verge of collapse, the gross domestic product (GDP) 
growth was sluggish, inflation had reached double digits, the budgetary 
deficit was surging upwards and the economy was failing. Foreign 
exchange reserves had fallen to little more than one billion US dollars, a 
mere two weeks’ worth of imports and foreign debt had climbed to more 
than 70 billion US dollars. Following the liberalisation measures and Indian 
economic reforms that had started in the winter of 1991, the economic 
liberalisation initiated by Prime Minister Rao and orchestrated by the 
Minister of Finance, Manmohan Singh, had opened up the Indian economy 
to the West and to globalisation.  
 
It was therefore imperative that the Indian government should act; 
therefore Indian foreign policy was changed accordingly. Indian foreign 
policy was bound to change from a politically intentioned policy to an 
economically oriented foreign policy in line with international pragmatism. 
In that specific period, Israel was one of the Western industrialised 
countries that could be helpful to India in terms of the inflow of foreign 
capital and the pursuance of new technology in general and agricultural 
high technology, in particular. 
 
                                            
65
 For details about India and world globalisation, see sub-section B (No.11) in section 
5.4.3.1.. 
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In a newspaper article in the Indian Express (11/12/1977), Dixit refers to 
the importance of globalisation and the Indian economic liberalisation in 
the context of Indian-Israeli relations. In this regard, he writes that the 
global orientation towards non-compartmentalised and harmonious 
relations between countries was a further key factor, at a macro level, that 
compelled India to establish diplomatic relations with Israel.  
 
Naaz (1999:893) also refers to this particular point: “India's liberalization 
policies and globalization strategies make Israel well positioned to fulfil the 
economic and technical demands of India's rapidly developing economy.” 
 
5.4.4.2 Re-establishment of diplomatic relations between Israel and 
the Soviet Union 
 
The re-establishment of the diplomatic relations between Israel and the 
Soviet Union on 18 October 1991 and the growing rapprochement 
between Israel and the Soviet Union and later with Russia was watched 
closely by India and was a contextual determinant in Indian foreign policy 
change towards Israel. India and the Soviet had shared a security and 
geopolitical orientation that had determined their anti-Israeli foreign 
policies up to 1991. By the end of 1991, some of the main reasons that 
had stood in the way of diplomatic relations between India and Israel in the 
past, were no longer relevant. particularly after the collapse of the Soviet 
Union and the active participation of Russia in the Middle East peace 
process.66 
5.4.5 Focal point of change  
 
The synchronisation of the change of Indian foreign policy towards Israel at 
a focal point was achieved by contextual determinants, which were utilised 
as fine- tuning elements in the change process. 
 
                                            
66
 For details about India and Russia with regards to Israel, see also sub-section B (No. 9) 
in section 5.4.3.1.  
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According to Dixit (1996:312), the timing of the establishment of diplomatic 
relations with Israel was discussed with senior cabinet colleagues on (or 
around) 23 January 1992:67  
 
I was authorized to make a formal announcement of India’s 
decision to   establish diplomatic relations with Israel and the 
opening of embassies in each other’s capitals. I made this 
announcement on 24 January. 
 
 
In fact, the Government of India was trying to postpone the decision on 
diplomatic relations with Israel, but because of the firm Israeli stance and 
certain fine-tuning elements to be discussed next, the Indian decision was 
finally made. 68     
 
There were three key change determinants, which served as fine- tuning 
elements during the window of opportunity offered by the change systemic 
process. These key change determinants were instrumental in influencing 
the timing of the Indian transformation of foreign policy towards Israel at 
the focal point of the change process.  These three change determinants 
were: 
 
1) The establishment of diplomatic relations between China and Israel 
on 24 January 1992 were watched closely by the Indian 
government.69.    
 
2) The opening of the third round of the Middle East peace talks in 
Moscow, which took place between 28 and 29 January 1992.70  
 
3) The official visit of Prime Minister Narasimha Rao to the US, to attend 
the UN Security Council meeting in New York, which took place at the 
beginning of February 1991. As Kumaraswamy (2002:8) puts it: "Since 
1947, Washington had been nudging India to modify its policy toward 
                                            
67
 There is a mistake in Dixit’s memoirs. The actual date of the cabinet meeting was 28 
January 1992 and the announcement was made on the following day.  
68
 For details about the Israeli response, see sections 4.8.1 and 5.2. 
69
 For details about India, Israel and the People’s Republic of China, see section 3.9.2.7. 
70
 For details about the Middle East peace talks in Moscow and its relation to India, see 
sections 4.8.1 and 5.2. 
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Israel. It was not accidental that normalization was announced on the 
eve of Rao’s visit to New York…" 
 
An official announcement making the establishment of fully-fledged 
diplomatic relations between India and Israel known, was published 
simultaneously in Jerusalem, New Delhi and Moscow (where the Israeli 
Minister of Foreign Affairs was on an official visit participating in the third 
round of the peace talks) on 29 January 1992. On the same day, the 
Secretary of the Ministry of External Affairs of India sent a letter to the 
Israeli Consul in Bombay, Giora Becher, informing him of the following 
Indian announcement:  
 
The governments of India and Israel have decided to establish 
full diplomatic relations. Embassies will be opened in Tel Aviv 
and New Delhi. Modalities regarding this arrangement will be 
worked out through normal diplomatic channels. In pursuance 
of the above, I have been directed to invite your government to 
open an embassy in New Delhi  (Becher, 2002:548). 
 
 
In March 1992, the provisional office of the Israeli Embassy in New Delhi 
was opened (at the Meridian Hotel). In July 1992, a new Consul and a 
Charge d’Affaires, Itzhak Gerberg, arrived in India. In November 1992, the 
first Israeli Ambassador, Ephraim Duek, presented his credentials to the 
President of India as an Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Ambassador to 
India. 
 
5.4.6 Consolidation stage of change  
 
The process of foreign policy change does not end at the focal point of the 
change, but proceeds to two additional stages respectively: the 
consolidation stage and the stage of assimilation and implementation. The 
consolidation stage mostly refers to addressing the impediments to foreign 
policy change (determinants of impediment). The consolidation stage of the 
transformation of the Indian foreign policy towards Israel, which was 
characterised by India’s slow and gradual progress in the bilateral 
relations, concentrated on the impediments to foreign policy change. 
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The three main change impediments to India's foreign policy change 
towards Israel were the following: the Arab states, the Indian-Muslim 
minority and leading conservative INCP members. 
 
     5.4.6.1 The Arab states as a change impediment 
  
Some of the Arab states were displeased about India moving closer to 
Israel but the over-all response was subdued and the situation did not 
evoke any adverse responses:71 
 
Contrary to past fears and apprehensions, the newly established    
relations with Israel did not inhibit India from pursuing productive 
relations with a number of Middle Eastern countries 
(Kumaraswamy, 2004:67). 
 
 
The Arab League and some of its constituent states continued to raise 
objections to India’s ties with Israel. Most of these objections were lodged 
by either Pakistan or Egypt.   
   
Dixit (1996:312-313), explains in his memoirs that he was instructed by 
Prime Minister Rao to brief the Muslim countries in detail about the 
decision to establish diplomatic relations with Israel and also to instruct the 
Indian Ambassadors in Arab and other Islamic countries to brief the 
respective governments to which they were accredited: 
 
Some of the Arab Ambassadors were aggressively 
resentful…when a couple of my ambassadorial colleagues 
crossed thresholds of political courtesy and mentioned that 
India would face uncertain consequences, I decided to take the 
bull by the horns…I declared that India had not received any 
reciprocity on the Kashmir issue despite our longstanding 
support to several Islamic countries in international fora (arena). 
I also underlined the fact that India would not accept any 
extraneous limitations on its sovereign right of determining its 
policy decisions within the framework of Indian interests. There 
was some criticism of India in the Arab media. Some 
questioned the wisdom of India’s decision. But this decision did 
not affect Indo-Arab relations negatively (Dixit, 1996:312-313).72  
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 For details about the Arab countries response, see sub-section B (no. 14) in section 
5.4.3.1. 
72
 For more details about the Arab countries see -section 5.4.3.1. 
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5.4.6.2 The Indian Muslim community 
 
 Dixit refers to the choices facing leaders of the Indian Muslim community 
and Muslim political groups in his memoirs as follows:  
 
If the choice is between taking decisive steps to safeguard   
fundamental national interests or being sensitive to regional and 
sub-regional concerns, the option should be in favour of the former 
(Dixit, 1996:114).73  
 
In fact, the establishment of diplomatic relations with Israel did not evoke 
any adverse responses, except some payment of lip service to the 
Palestinian cause by the Indian Muslim community.  
 
5.4.6.3 The INCP’s conservative politicians 
 
 Raja Mohan points out that there was some vociferous opposition from 
those within the Congress Party who believed that India should do nothing 
that could jeopardise Indian support for the Palestinian cause (Mohan, 
2003:226). Dixit (1996:114) refers to it by pointing out that Prime Minister 
Rao was aware of this particular impediment and therefore, after the 
establishment of diplomatic relations between India and Israel, he wanted 
to proceed slowly. He instructed that contacts should first be made at the 
official level and then at foreign secretarial level. On 23 March 1993, 
during his visit to Israel, Dixit indicates there were elements in the INCP 
that objected to the normalisation of relations with Israel even after the 
establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries (Yegar, 
2004:173).74  
 
According to Kumaraswamy (2002:10), neither the members of the INCP 
nor a section of the Indian intelligentsia received the normalisation of 
diplomatic relations with Israel well initially, as it was seen not only as a 
betrayal, but also as a hasty and unprincipled move. Some critics 
suggested that India should have waited until the situation in the Middle 
East had changed substantially and by some, the move was even 
perceived as an anti- Muslim alliance, if not a conspiracy.  
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 For more details about the Muslim factor in Indian politics, see section 5.4.3.2. 
74
 For more details about the INCP, see section 5.4.3.2. 
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Indian foreign policy towards Israel was slowly acquiring bipartisan political 
backing in India; in addition to the BJP, which was enthusiastic in its 
support for a pro-Israel Middle East, the INCP was slowly reversing its 
past opposition to Israel. Even the Janata Dal Party, which had opposed 
the decision to establish diplomatic relations with Israel, had come to 
terms with reality. Importantly, the question of ties with Israel ceased to be 
a contentious issue. 
 
The Israeli side was eager to follow the establishment of diplomatic 
relations through with high-level political and economic contacts, but 
understood India’s political constraints, as Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon 
Peres explained on his visit to India from 17-19 May 1993:  
 
He (Peres) exhibited sophistication in acknowledging that India-
Israel cooperation in these sensitive spheres carried much larger 
political implications, especially for India. He, therefore, agreed 
that cooperation in these particular areas should evolve gradually 
over a period of time (Dixit, 1996:114). 
 
  
The Indian way of addressing these three change impediments to 
India’s policy change towards Israel was to issue an official statement 
explaining that the establishment of diplomatic relations with Israel did 
not mean that India would change its support of the Palestinian people’s 
campaign to realise their legitimate aspirations. This statement also 
emphasised that India’s longstanding friendship and cooperative 
relations with the Arab countries would continue as before. 
  
  5.4.7 Assimilation and implementation  
 
The assimilation and implementation stage is set through foreign policy 
change directed by stabilising determinants (as described and analysed in 
the next chapter).75 Shortly after January 1992, India opened its embassy in 
Israel and it was followed by a similar Israeli move in New Delhi. The 
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 See chapter six for information about the evolving relations between India and Israel 
between 1992 and 2005. 
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stabilising determinants, as pointed out by Naaz (2002:979), were the 
following:  
 
The normalization of relations left both countries to explore as 
many areas as possible. While Indo-Israel relations increased 
rapidly in the field of trade and agriculture, both the countries 
continued to explore as many areas as possible for mutual 
cooperation. Military, is one such area which both the countries 
are exploring…Such cooperation is based on India’s realistic 
assessment of the global and regional security environment as 
well as technological requirements.  
  
 
In a previous article, she writes: “The bilateral ties have evolved rapidly, 
covering the whole gamut of interstate relations” (Naaz, 1999:896).  
 
As indicated by Dixit (1996:315), relations between India and Israel 
improved between 1991 and 1994. Dixit himself, as a Secretary of the 
Indian Ministry of External Affairs, played a significant role in the 
assimilation and implementation stage in the bilateral relations between the 
two countries with his official visit to Israel, from 22 to 25 March 1993.76 
According to Dixit, the Israelis were serious about following the 
establishment of diplomatic relations through with high-level contacts. Dixit 
has the following to say about his meeting with the Prime Minister of the 
State of Israel at that time, Yitzhak Rabin:  "He (Rabin) stated that Israel 
would be willing to cooperate with India in every sphere without any 
reservations". Rabin himself referred positively to the defence ties with 
India in general and with regard to fundamentalism and terrorism in 
particular (Dixit, 1996:313).77 
   
The Chief Minister of the State of Maharashtra, Sharad Pawar, who had 
previously been the Defence Minister of India, declared unofficially that the 
normalisation of diplomatic relations with Israel had made it possible for 
India to draw on Israel’s successful experience regarding the curbing of 
terrorism. He led an Indian delegation to an Agritech exhibition in Israel in 
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 For more details about Dixit's contribution to the bilateral relations between India and 
Israel, see section 6.4.4.1. 
77
 For more details about the meeting between Dixit and Rabin, see section 6.2.2. 
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May 1993, accompanied by a high-level military team78 (Naaz, 2000:982). 
In turn, during the same month, an Israeli delegation consisting of military 
equipment manufacturers and experts visited India.79  
 
During Dixit’s meeting with the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Israel, Shimon 
Peres, after the establishment of diplomatic relations with India, the Israeli 
minister pledged Israel’s absolute support for India regarding the Kashmir 
issue and also discussed issues related to human rights and expressed 
Israel’s willingness to transfer technology to India. In addition, Peres 
assured Dixit of the intention of the Israeli private sector to participate 
actively in the Indian economic endeavours. Furthermore, he instructed the 
Israeli Ambassador in New Delhi to invite the Indian leaders of various 
parties and Chief Ministers to visit Israel so that they could get a first hand 
idea of those areas in which cooperation between the two countries could 
be developed. Following Dixit's visit to Israel, Peres received an invitation 
to pay an official visit to India, which he accepted without hesitation and 
subsequently, his official visit to India took place in May 1993.80 
 
Dixit (1996:313-314) refers to the following stabilising determinants regarding 
international politics:  
   
I was informed during this visit that India had been invited (by 
Israel) to become a member of the five working groups engaged 
in the task of normalization of relations with the PLO These 
groups dealt with issues such as arms control, regional security, 
refugees, environment, management of water resources and 
regional economic development. India’s role was endorsed by 
the U.S and the Russian Federation as well as by the other 
Arab participants. A part from the operational contributions 
which we made to the deliberations of these working groups, 
our presence in all the five working groups provided 
confirmation of our political status as a factor of influence in 
West Asian affairs.  
 
 
As far as Indian relations with the Jewish lobby were concerned, during 
Rao’s official visit to the US, a few days after the establishment of 
diplomatic relations with Israel, he met with representatives of US Jewish 
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 For more details about Pawar’s attitude towards Israel, see section 5.4.3.1 reference 
no. 3. 
79
 For more details about defence relations between Israel and India, see section 6.3.2. 
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 For foreign ministries' dialogues, see section 6.3.1.2. 
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organisations in New York. The meeting, which had originally been 
scheduled before diplomatic relations had been established between the 
two countries, turned out to be a friendly gathering and the two parties 
discussed the modalities regarding future cooperation between India and 
the American Jewish community.  
 
Isi J. Leibler, co-chairman of the WJC, who had met with Prime Minister 
Rao on 21 November 1991 with the aim of convincing him to promote 
bilateral relations between India and Israel, met Rao again in New Delhi in 
February 1992;  this time in order to express the gratitude of the WJC.81 
Leibler expressed the appreciation of the WJC for Rao’s brave diplomatic 
move in particular and for the dramatic improvement of relations between 
India and Israel and the Jewish people in general (Yegar, 2004:169) 82. 
 
Following the announcement of the establishment of diplomatic relations 
between the two countries, Congressman Stephen Solarz, chairperson of 
the sub-committee for Asia and the Pacific, issued a press release and 
expressed his satisfaction with the new diplomatic development. In turn, he 
received extensive praise from both parties that expressed their gratitude 
to him for his personal contribution to the establishment of diplomatic 
relations between Israel and India,  
 
Relations between India and Israel expanded and Israel slowly acquired 
bipartisan backing from Indian politicians and even such political parties as 
the Janata Dal and the Communist parties, which had been opposed to the 
establishment of diplomatic relations with Israel, had finally come to terms 
with the idea that relations with Israel were in India's interest. After the 
establishment of relations, both countries sought to compensate for past 
neglect and indifference; subsequently they established and maintained 
large-scale cooperation in a host of activities and projects in various fields. 
 
Normalisation of diplomatic relations with Israel ceased to be a contentious 
issue in India and defence cooperation with Israel was primarily seen as a 
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4.9.1.4.  
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professional decision best left to the security establishment. The pace of 
bilateral economic relations indicated that the two countries were making 
up for the lost years when there had been no diplomatic relations between 
the two countries. There was extensive cooperation in the area of defence 
cooperation, as well as areas such as agriculture, trade and science and 
technology as the stabilising determinants of bilateral relations between 
India and Israel.  
 
Despite a succession of various Indian governments, led by parties and 
coalitions across the entire political spectrum, in the years following the 
establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries, it has 
transpired that bilateral relations between India and Israel have  become a 
matter of consensus on the Indian political scene. This change in outlook 
has found its expression in the Indian oscillated diplomacy towards Israel.83  
 
5.5 Summation 
 
Transformation of Indian foreign policy towards Israel and the 
establishment of the diplomatic relations between the two countries (on 29 
January 1992) are considered by India as a strategic change and one of 
the most important steps in Indian diplomatic history. Regarding the large 
number of dependent variables, including their composite and comparative 
weight; the use of the Aggregative Causal Model of Bilateral Relations 
Strategic Change as an analytical and explanatory tool has contributed to a 
better review and analysis of the systemic change process of the 
transformation of Indian foreign policy towards Israel. It enables an 
analysis of the multiple national defence oriented factors that influence the 
systemic process of this foreign policy change together with contextual 
determinants. Hermann’s Model of Foreign Policy Change is also used in 
this chapter in order to provide external validity to the analysis of the 
                                            
83
 For details about the evolving relations between India and Israel between 1992 and 
2005, see chapter 6  for more information on the Oscillated Diplomacy Model as an 
analytic tool regarding the evolving bilateral relations between the two countries, see 
section 6.1. 
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transformation of the Indian foreign policy towards Israel and to provide an 
additional perspective on Indian foreign policy change.   
 
Based on the Aggregative  Model, the formative determinants of Indian 
foreign policy change, in terms of the pre-feasibility stage, which incubated 
the change process, were the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the 
Soviet Union as well as the emergence of the US as a sole superpower.   
 
Generating determinants in terms of framing and redefining Indian foreign 
policy change towards Israel were the first Gulf War, the Madrid 
conference and the Israeli- Arab Middle East negotiations in general and 
with the Palestinians, in particular. 
 
The fundamental and national security oriented causative factors of Indian 
foreign policy change that are analysed in conjunction with contextual and 
situational change determinants are divided into three levels of analysis. 
The first level of analysis is the international level pertaining to the revision 
of alternatives and new options and is subdivided into two types of foreign 
relations. The first type of foreign relations at the international level of 
analysis is bilateral relations and as far as Israeli-Indian bilateral relations 
are concerned, a number of change factors were reviewed and evaluated. 
These factors are India’s military cooperation with Israel, India's interest in 
intelligence-operations with Israel, counter-terrorism cooperation, the 
Indian Ocean, nuclear power as a common issue between the two 
countries, economic relations with Israel and foreign relations with Israel.  
 
The second type of foreign relations at the international level of analysis is 
multilateral relations and in this regard, the analysis of India’s change of 
foreign policy towards Israel is dealt within the Israeli context in the 
multilateral arena. It is based on reviewing and evaluating the following 
change factors pertaining to India’s national security as well as on national 
interests: the Indian geo-strategic interests, the oil factor, Central Asia, 
India and the Third World with emphasis on the Non-Aligned Movement 
(NAM). Further change factors are India as an acceptable international 
actor in the Middle East conflict, India and the UN, India and the US, India 
and the American Jewish Organisations, India and Russia, India and the 
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PRC. . Furthermore, India and world globalisation, India and the Muslim 
world, India and Pakistan, India and the Arab world, Indian Arab economic 
relations and India and the PLO were also dealt within the context of the 
multinational arena.   
 
The second level of analysis is the state and society (national) level of 
analysis. The transformation of the Indian foreign policy towards Israel and 
the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries in 
terms of the state and society level of analysis is analysed by change 
determinants with emphasis on Indian politics pertaining to Israel. They are 
the MEA, the Nehruvian tradition of Pro-Arab foreign policy as a factor in 
Indian foreign policy change towards Israel, the INCP's traditional pro-Arab 
and anti-Israel foreign policy, Indian Muslim community and the Indian 
media. 
 
The third level of analysis is the individual level and the transformation of 
the Indian policy towards Israel is analysed accordingly with reference to 
the leadership of India. The improvement of Israel’s international image 
after the first Gulf War and the inauguration of the Middle East peace 
process in October 1991 as a contextual determinant are also discussed. 
The individual level of analysis was examined in terms of leadership 
concentrating on Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and Prime Minister 
Narasimha Rao as the ultimate decision-makers of the transformation of 
Indian foreign policy towards Israel.   
 
At the growing ripe stage of the Aggregative Model of Bilateral Relations 
Strategic Change, there are two contextual change determinants, which 
served as accelerating determinants of Indian foreign policy towards Israel. 
They are Indian liberalisation and the economic reforms that began taking 
place in 1991 and the re-establishment of diplomatic relations between 
Israel and the Soviet Union on 18 October 1991.   
 
At the focal point of change of the Indian foreign policy transformation, the 
fundamental factors were synchronised by three fine tuning elements. The 
first one was the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and 
Israel, which took place on 24 January 1992. The second was the opening 
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of the third round of the Middle East peace talks in Moscow, which took 
place between 28 and 29 January 1992. The third and last one was the 
official visit of Prime Minister Narasimha Rao to the US, to attend the UN 
Security Council in New York, which took place at the beginning of 
February 1992. All three events occurred at the beginning of 1992 and are 
discussed in terms of the focal point of change, in this regard.  
 
The consolidation stage of the model was characterised by the slow and 
gradual advancement of the bilateral relations between Israel and India. 
This particular stage dealt with three main impediments to the Indian 
foreign policy change towards Israel: the Arab states, the Indian Muslim 
community and the INCP’s conservative politicians.   
 
The assimilation and implementation stage was examined with the help of 
stabilising determinants that were in accord with the content and spirit of 
the newly established bilateral relations between India and Israel. . These 
stabilising determinants are found in fields such as military collaboration, 
counter terrorism, agriculture, trade and high technology. In addition to 
these determinants are the willingness of the Jewish organisations in the 
US to cooperate with India, Israel’s support of India on issues of special 
importance at the UN (such as the Kashmir issue) and the Israeli invitation 
to India to take an active part in the Middle East peace process.   
  
Following the Indian transformation of foreign policy towards Israel and the 
establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries, the 
evolving bilateral relations have become a cornerstone of their foreign 
policies and are of considerable strategic importance for both India and 
Israel as will be reviewed and analysed in the next chapter.  
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Chapter 6 
 
Evolving relations between Israel and India between 1992 
and 2005 
 
 
 6.1 Introduction 
 
In this chapter, the focus is on the evolving relations between Israel and 
India since the establishment of the fully-fledged diplomatic relations 
between the two countries (1992-2005). The main objective of this chapter 
is to examine and analyse the ongoing relations between Israel and India 
with special emphasis on their national interest and the potential for future 
cooperation between the two states. 
   
Since the establishment of diplomatic relations between Israel and India (in 
January 1992), the two countries found a growing convergence in their 
strategic interests and developed close bilateral relations including 
cooperation in many areas of mutual interest. Among these areas are 
defence, security, economy, trade and international politics.  
 
The bilateral relations between Israel and India are analysed in terms of 
three levels of analysis:1 The international level of analysis, is divided into 
bilateral and multilateral relations. The domestic factors, which have 
influenced relations between the two countries with special emphasis on 
politics and the economy and individuals in both countries, in addition to 
the ultimate decision units, are analysed in terms of the state and society 
level of analysis.2 The evolving bilateral relations between Israel and India 
in general and Indian foreign policy towards Israel in particular, are 
reviewed and analysed with the help of the Oscillated Diplomacy Model. 3 
The oscillated diplomacy, as part of a systemic and diachronic process, 
has been influenced by three different types of mutual national strategic 
                                            
1
 For details about the Levels of Analysis Model, see section 2.3 
2
 For details about the Ultimate Decision Unit Model, see section 2.2. 
3
 For details about the Oscillated Diplomacy Model, see section 2.6 
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interests of the two countries, namely, joint strategic interests, common 
strategic interests and discrepant strategic interests. The term “joint 
strategic interests” refers to goals that Israel and India have pursued in 
order to maximise overlapping inter-related strategic interests while the 
term “common strategic interests” refers to goals that the two states have 
pursued in order to achieve complementary strategic interests. On the 
other hand, the term “discrepant strategic interests” refers to a third type of 
strategic interest, which has a negative impact on their bilateral relations.   
 
The bilateral relations between the two countries have been strongly 
influenced by the political attitude of the Indian governments in power, 
which had a direct effect on the volume and direction of the Indian foreign 
policy towards Israel. The Indian foreign policy towards Israel between 
1992 and 2005 was accepted by most of the political spectrum in India 
after the majority of the political parties in India came to terms with the 
bilateral relations between India and Israel. 
 
Bilateral relations improved in particular during the tenure of the National 
Democratic Alliance (NDA) led by the BJP.4 According to Dinesh Kumar, 
after four decades of strained relations, warm and special ties including a 
strategic alliance between the two countries have developed: 
 
  
Once the ice was broken, a new era of partnership began between 
India and Israel… helped by fast changing international realities 
the two countries moved very carefully but rapidly to develop a 
many-faced friendship (Kumar, 2001:3). 
 
 
In June 2004, a new UPA government’s foreign policy was expressed, in 
the following statement, which was delivered by the Indian President in the 
Parliament: 
  
Traditional ties with the countries of West Asia will be given a fresh 
thrust; my government will continue to fully support the legitimate 
                                            
4
 For details about the ultimate decision units in India between 1992 and 2005, see 
section 6.2.1. 
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aspirations of the Palestinian people. Our relations with Israel, 
which have developed on the basis of mutually beneficial 
cooperation are important, but this in no way dilutes our principled 
support for the legitimate aspirations of the Palestinian people 
(MEA, 7/6/2004). 
 
 
6.2 Ultimate decision units  
 
The following ultimate decision units of Israeli-Indian relations (from 1992 
until 2005) are also analysed: the ultimate decision units in the Republic of 
India and the ultimate decision units in the State of Israel.  
 
6.2.1 Ultimate decision units in India  
 
The first ultimate decision unit in the process of the evolving relations 
between the two countries after the decision to establish fully-fledged 
diplomatic relations with Israel was Prime Minister Narasimha Rao, who is 
also considered to be the architect of the diplomatic relations between the 
two countries.5  After the change of government` in India in June 1996, 
Israel believed that the new United Front (UF) coalition would change 
Indian foreign policy towards Israel. The UF had been  led by the Janata 
Dal party (JDP), which had objected in the past to the establishment of 
diplomatic relations with Israel, headed by Prime Minister Deve Gowda 
who was succeeded by Prime Minister Inder K. Gujral,. An important factor 
that could help effect this change was the fact that a new government led 
by the Likud right wing party had taken over in Israel.    
 
The Government of Israel was concerned that Prime Minister Gowda 
(1/6/1996-20/4/1997) and later on his successor Prime Minister Indir 
Kumar Gujral (22/4/1997 to 18/3/1998), as the succeeding ultimate 
decision units, would be detrimental to the Israeli-Indian evolving bilateral 
relations.6 This concern was less acute in the case of Gowda, who had 
                                            
5
 For details about Narasimha Rao as a pre-dominant leader, see section 3.8.9. 
6
 Atal Behari Vajpayee       16/5/96-28/5/96 
  H.D. Deve Gowda            1/6/96-20/4/97 
  Inder Kumar Gujral         21/4/97-18/3/98 
  Atal Behari Vajpayee     19/3/98-23/5/04 
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previously visited Israel as the Chief Minister of the State of Karnataka and 
had concentrated more on Prime Minister Gujral. Such a concern was 
based on the historical fact that Gujral, who was considered to be a classic 
Nehruvian, had served in the past as India’s Ambassador to the Soviet 
Union and had served twice under Prime Ministers Chandra Sekhar and 
Deve Gowda, as the Minister of External Affairs. Gujral was also identified 
with the Gujral Doctrine, which embodied the accommodation of India’s 
asymmetric relationship with its neighbouring countries.  
 
Contrary to general pessimistic assumptions,  Israel’s concern about the 
UF governments led by Gujral proved to be unjustified and bilateral 
cooperation between the two countries during his tenure continued 
although on a low scale in terms of official diplomatic practice such as high-
level official visits. Despite his image, Gujral took note of new global 
realities and retreated from state-directed economic politics; while 
advancing the integration of India’s economy with the rest of the world and 
claiming that he wanted to revive the spirit and substance of regional 
cooperation sponsored by Nehru.  
 
Prime Minister Gujral’s assumption of power coincided with the change in 
government in Israel in June 1996 (the previous INCP government 
overlapped the tenure of the Labour government in Israel). The new Likud 
government in Israel was led by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu who 
was considered in India to be a right wing extremist leader that had backed 
out of Israel’s commitments to the Palestinians.7 As Dixit points out in a 
newspaper article:  
 
The Indian rationales proved largely valid till Yitzhak Rabin, Shimon 
Peres and their party remained in power, with Netanyahu’s advent 
there has been a negative refraction, through substantive 
cooperation continues …The point is that these trends (of the Indo-
Israel cooperation) were initiated by Israel’s previous Labour 
                                                                                                                          
  Manmohan Singh             from 24/5/04 
 
7
 For details on Israeli Prime Ministers, including Netanyahu, as ultimate decision units, 
see next section 6.2.2. 
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government. In spite of the inherent vibrancy and potential for 
expanding relations, the process is likely to run into difficulties 
because of the state of the Middle-East peace process, which has 
stalled primarily due to the paranoid self-centred approach of 
Netanyahu and Likud extremists  (Indian Express, 11/12/1997). 
 
The UF governments failed to win a solid majority in the Indian Parliament 
and Gowda and Gujral were often unable to control their coalition partners. 
It led to a continuous search for new political allies to replace defectors and 
produced two consecutive notably weak governments that concentrated on 
domestic politics. In 1998, the BJP led the NDA coalition to a victory, 
headed twice  by Atal Behari Vajpayee (19/3/1998-23/5/2004). Vajpayee 
was pragmatic in his foreign policy approach and as an ultimate decision 
unit; he was responsible for the improvement of relations with a wide 
variety of states including the State of Israel. Traditionally, he had been a 
staunch supporter of the state of Israel even before the establishment of 
diplomatic relations with Israel and during his tenures as Prime Minister, 
India lost its reluctance to deal with Israel on a larger scale.8 
 
During Vajpayee’s tenures, extensive cooperation developed between the 
two countries as reflected in India’s Home Minister Advani’s and the 
Minister of External Affairs Jaswant Singh’s visits in Israel in the summer of 
2000. In August 2001, acting on Vajpayee’s instructions during the UN 
sponsored conference against racism in Durban, South Africa, India 
refused to re-equate Zionism with racism, despite the appeals of the Arab 
and Islamic countries and the visit of the leader of the Palestinian Authority 
Yasser Arafat to New Delhi before the opening of the conference.  
 
Prime Minister Vajpayee was the first Indian prime minister to host an 
official visit of an Israeli prime minister in India, namely the visit of Prime 
Minister Ariel Sharon in September 2003.9   In a speech given by Vajpayee 
at a banquet he hosted for Sharon, he expressed the view that the Israeli 
leader’s visit to India was an important landmark in the bilateral relations 
                                            
8
 For details about Vajpayee’s approach towards Israel before 1992, see sections 3.9.1.4, 
3.10.2.2 and 3.10.2.4.  
9
 For details about Sharon's official visit in India, see section 6.2.2. 
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between the two countries. He added that in the relatively short history of 
the formal diplomatic relations between them, India and Israel have 
established a vibrant partnership. He also referred to trade relations 
between the two countries and focussed on the Israeli-Indian defence 
cooperation, counter-terrorism as a key area of cooperation and people-to-
people interaction (The Hindu, 10/9/2003).   
 
Following the general elections in India on 23 May 2004, a new coalition 
government, The United Progressive Alliance (UPA), led by Prime Minister 
Manmohan Singh was formed by the INCP, although the president of the 
INCP was Mrs. Sonia Gandhi, but after conducting the election campaign, 
she refused the option of premiership.10 
 
Concern was expressed in Israel that Singh’s new government, based on 
the common characteristics of his coalition government, which was 
supported by the communist parties, would have a negative effect on the 
Indian foreign policy towards Israel. One year later, it looked as if the UPA 
government headed by the pragmatic economy- oriented Prime Minister 
Singh, as the ultimate decision unit, was determined to continue along the 
path of strengthening bilateral relations between the two counties, while 
improving its relations with the Arab countries at the same time.  
 
One should recall that the historical decision to establish fully-fledged 
diplomatic relations and normalise India's bilateral relations with Israel in 
1992 was initiated by Prime Minister Rao, the head of the INCP and the 
current Prime Minister Singh was finance minister in Rao’s government.11 
In fact, bilateral relations with Israel have acquired the backing of most of 
the political spectrum in India, which came to terms with the bilateral 
relations with Israel realising its value in terms of the national interest and 
                                            
10
 For details about Sonia Gandhi's influence on India's bilateral relations with Israel, see 
section 6.4 
11
 For details about Narasimha Rao, see sections 3.8.9 and 5.4.3.3. Singh as the Finance 
Minister in Rao’s government was considered to be the architect of the Indian 
liberalisation and economy reforms in 1991. 
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the strategic advantage of these relations for India in general and regarding 
the military field in particular.12 
 
6.2.2 Ultimate decision units in Israel  
 
Traditionally, since independence, the Israeli government was based on a 
pivot party, while the strategic foreign policy was handled by the Israeli 
Prime Minister himself as an ultimate decision unit. It was particularly valid 
in the years 1996 to 2003 when a new law of direct election of prime 
minister was implemented in Israel while keeping a parliamentary 
democracy intact.  
 
On 23 June 1992, four months after the establishment of diplomatic 
relations with India, general elections took place in Israel and three weeks 
later, Yitzhak Rabin was sworn in as the Prime Minister of Israel. In March 
1993, India’s Foreign Secretary, J.N. Dixit paid an official visit to Israel and 
was received by Prime Minister Rabin. According to Dixit (1996:313), Rabin 
stressed the following: 
  
The utmost importance he had always attached to Israel having full-
fledged relations with India... Israel would be willing to cooperate 
with India in every sphere without any reservations…In Israel’s 
assessment, a democratic, stable, strong and secular India was 
(would always be) a major factor in insuring stability and political 
equilibrium in Asia.13  
 
 
Following Rabin’s assassination, on 4 November 1995, Foreign Minister 
Shimon Peres, who was known as a staunch supporter of Israeli relations 
with India, took over as an acting Prime Minister and the country was 
subjected to a snap election campaign.  
 
On 18 June 1996, a new Israeli government, led by Prime Minister 
Benjamin Netanyahu of the Likud party, was established.14 Netanyahu was 
                                            
12
 For details about the State and Society Level of Analysis, see section 6.4 and for 
details about the Indian political system in particular, see section 6.4.1. 
13
 Regarding the meeting between Rabin and Dixit, see also section 5.4.7. 
14
 The first direct election of an Israeli prime minister. 
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considered by many Indian politicians, particularly in the INCP, to be a right 
wing extremist leader who had reneged on Israel’s commitments to the 
Palestinians. Despite the Indian sentiments about him, Prime Minister 
Netanyahu attached a great deal of importance to Israel’s relations with 
India. He regarded the defence cooperation between the two countries to 
be of strategic importance and of mutual benefit to both countries. In 
addition, he  pointed out that Israel would like its developing ties with India 
to be as close and prolific as possible (Kapila, 2000:7). However, the 
slowing down of the peace process with the Palestinians that followed 
during Netanyahu’s tenure as prime minister had an impact on Indian 
foreign policy towards Israel.15 
  
Following the snap general election in Israel on 29 May 1999, a new Israeli 
government, led by the Labour party (under the name of One Israel) 
headed by Prime Minister Ehud Barak, was established on 6 July 1999. 
Barak met the Indian National Security Advisor, Brajesh Mishra, a few 
weeks after being elected and reconfirmed the growing improvement of 
bilateral relations between the two countries. On 10 December 2000, Prime 
Minister Barak resigned and a new election took place in Israel on 6 
February 2001.  
 
A new Israeli government, led by Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, from the 
Likud party, was established on 7 March 2001 and on 28 January 2003, 
following the change in the laws governing the direct election of Prime 
Minister Sharon, as the leader of the Likud party, was re-elected as the 
Prime Minister of Israel. The close and friendly relations between Israel 
and India continued as long as the NDA remained in power and reached a 
new peak when Ariel Sharon paid an official visit to India. 
   
Prime Minister Sharon’s official visit to India - Prime Minister Sharon 
visited India from 8 to 10 September 2003 and was hosted by Prime 
Minister Vajpayee. Sharon was accompanied by the Minister of Justice, 
                                            
15
 For details about P.M. Gowda and P.M. Gujral and their attitude towards Israeli, see 
section 6.2.1. 
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Yossef Lapid; the  Minister of Culture, Education and Sport, Limor Livnat 
and the Minister of Agriculture, Israel Katz. He was also accompanied by a 
large business delegation. During his visit, Prime Minister Sharon called on 
the Indian President Dr. A.P.J. Abdul Kalam and held talks with Prime 
Minister Vajpayee. He held meetings with the Deputy Prime Minister and 
the Minister of Home Affairs, Lal Kishen Advani; the Minister of Defence, 
George Fernandes; the Minister of Finance, Jaswant Singh; the Minister of 
External Affairs, Yashwant Sinha; the National Security Advisor, Brajesh 
Mishra and the leader of the opposition and president of the INCP, Mrs. 
Sonia Gandhi.16  
 
During Sharon’s visit, an official joint statement, the Delhi Statement on 
Friendship and Cooperation between India and Israel, was issued and six 
agreements of cooperation between both countries were signed. The 
agreements covered fields such as the environment, health matters, 
combating illicit drug trafficking, education and culture, including an 
exchange programme and waiving visa requirements for holders of 
diplomatic, service and official passports. In this regard, the following joint 
statement was issued in New Delhi at the conclusion of Sharon’s official 
visit to India:  
 
India and Israel share a goal of advancing peace, security and 
stability in their own regions and respect for democracy in the entire 
world…As ancient cultures and societies India and Israel have left 
their mark on human civilization and history. As democratic countries 
since their inception, both nations share faith in the values of freedom 
and democracy…Both countries gained independence during the 
same period and embarked on a course of nation building to advance 
the well being of their respective peoples and to build modern 
democratic states able to face difficult challenges…Together with the 
international community and as victims of terrorism, Israel and India 
are partners in the battle against this scourge…Shared ideals draw 
both peoples into a natural amity in pursuit of common goals. Both 
sides attach great importance to strengthening their long term 
cooperation in the political, defence, economic, commercial, cultural 
and science and technology areas (The Hindu, 11/9/2003). 
 
                                            
16
 For Sharon’s meetings with Mrs. Gandhi and Brajesh Mishra, see also sections 6.4.4.1 
and 6.4.4.2. 
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6.3 Analysis of Israeli – Indian relations by the international level of 
analysis  
 
 Factors relating to  Israeli-Indian relations are analysed by an international 
level of analysis, divided into two types of sublevels of international 
analysis: bilateral and multilateral relations.17  The analysis of the bilateral 
relations is based on the Oscillated Diplomacy Model.18  The oscillated 
diplomacy between India and Israel included many facets based on 
strategic interests divided into three sub-groups, namely joint strategic 
interests and common strategic interests in relation to discrepant strategic 
interests.19 As pointed out by Dinesh Kumar (2001), India and Israel have 
found a growing convergence in their strategic interests. 
 
In terms of bilateral relations, following the establishment of diplomatic 
relations between the two countries, during the tenure of the INCP, 
relations were gradually improving. Bilateral relations during the tenure of 
the two UF governments that followed the INCP government (June 1996 to 
March 1998), were less cordial in terms of high-level official diplomatic 
practice. During the period that the NDA governments were in power 
(March 1998 to May 2004), bilateral relations were at their peak and 
included bilateral talks about the strategic alliance between the two 
countries.20  
A new coalition government, the UPA, was formed by the INCP in May 
2004. In fact, there was some concern in Israel that the change of 
government might be detrimental for Israeli-Indian ties (Pant, 2005:3). 
Consequently, its relations with Israel cooled in terms of high-level official 
visits while maintaining its economic and military cooperation.21  The UPA 
                                            
17
 For details about Levels of Analysis Model, see section 2.3 
18
 For details about the Oscillated Diplomacy Model, see section 2.6. 
19
 For a definition of the Oscillated Diplomacy Model including the three types of strategic 
interests, see section 2.6. 
20
 For more details about the NDA government’s policy towards Israel, see sections 6.2.1 
and 6.2.2. 
21
 For details about the implementation of the UPA’s foreign policy in terms of official 
statements of the Indian Ministry of External Affairs, see section 6.4.2.  
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government renewed its traditionally friendly foreign policy with the Arab 
world projecting an image of itself as a supporter of the Palestinians and 
their quest for an independent state; while maintaining Israeli-Indian 
cooperation regarding strategic issues.22  In January 2005, the UPA 
appointed Ambassador Chinmay Gharekhan as a special envoy to the 
Middle East.23  The Israeli Consulate General in Mumbai (Bombay) was 
reopened in the summer of 2005 after it was closed two years earlier due 
to budget constraints. 
 
In terms of multilateral relations, after the 1990s, India shifted from a policy 
of non-alignment, striving for the best interests of the Third World and 
standing up to the western world for the promotion of its own national 
interests in the international arena. India, which aspired to a seat as a 
permanent member of the UN Security Council, started a long campaign for 
the enlargement of the UN Security Council. Israel, on the other hand, 
because the majority of the Arab world and Third World countries at the UN 
organisations and agencies in international politics supported the US as the 
leading superpower in the post cold war arena. Indian consistently voted 
against Israel in international organisations in general and the UN in 
particular on issues related to Israel and the Palestinian cause, although 
substantive bilateral cooperation continued between them. 24   
 
6.3.1 Diplomatic relations as a joint strategic interest 
 
India’s diplomatic activism since the 1990s has included relations with 
Israel.25 After the establishment of diplomatic relations, India has moved 
from an anti-Israeli and pro-Arab stance to a pragmatic and more balanced 
stance towards Israel while maintaining close relations with the Arab 
countries, within the limits of the Indian oscillated diplomacy towards Israel 
                                            
22
 For details about the Palestinian Authority’s relations with India, see section 6.3.20. 
23
 For details about the Indian special envoy to the Middle East, Chinmay Gharekhan, see 
section  6.3.20 
24
 For more details about the UF government’s policy towards Israel, see section 6.2.1. 
25
 For details about India’s diplomatic activism in general and  towards Israel in particular, 
see section 5.4.3.2 
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as guiding parameters. The following is a review of mutual high-level 
official visits, foreign ministries' dialogues and bilateral agreements. 
  
6.3.1.1 High level official visits. 
 
A stream of reciprocal visits by senior officials added a new dimension to 
Israeli-Indian relations and enabled the development of collaboration 
between the two countries in various fields of activities:26  
 
•  The Chief Minister of the State of Maharashtra, formerly the Minister of 
Defence, Sharad Pawar, led an Indian delegation to the Agritech 
exhibition in Tel Aviv In May 1993.27 
• Israel’s Minister of Agriculture, Yaacov Tzur, visited India, 
accompanied by a large delegation of agro-businessmen, in 
December 1993. 
• Israel’s State Comptroller, Justice Miriam Ben-Porat, visited India in 
November 1994. 
• Israel’s Minister of Trade Industry and Tourism, Micha Harish, 
visited India accompanied by a trade delegation, in December 
1994. 
• Israel’s Minister of Finance, Avrham Shochat, visited India in 
January 1996. 
• Israel’s Minister of Education and Culture, Amnon Rubinstein, 
visited India in January 1996. 
• The President of the State of Israel, Ezer Wiezman’s, state visit to 
India took place in December 1996 and brought a new perspective 
on the bilateral relations of the two countries.28 
• India’s Home Minister, Krishna Advani paid a visit to Israel in May 
2000. 
                                            
26
  For details about the bilateral fields of activities, see sections 6.3.1.3, 6.31.4, 6.3.2.1- 
6.3.2.3 and 6.3.3-6.3.7. The information concerning the visits was obtained from  
the official website of the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs:  http://www.mfa.gov.il  and the 
official website of the Ministry of External Affairs of India: http://www.mea.gov.in 
27
 See section 6.3.2.1 for more information about the military aspects of the visit. 
28
 For more information about the fruit of Wiezman’s visit  to India, see section 6.3.1.3. 
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• Israel’s Minister of Regional Cooperation, Shimon Peres, visited 
India in January 2001 (Shimon Peres visited India twice as the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs).29 
• India's Minister of Parliamentary Affairs, Communication and 
Information Technology, Pramod Mahajan, visited Israel in January 
2002. 
• Israel’s Minister of Ecology, Tzhachi Hanegbi, visited India in 
February 2002. 
• Israel’s Prime Minister, Ariel Sharon, went to India on an official in 
September 2003.30 
• Israel’s Minister of Science and Technology, Modi Zandberg, visited 
India in 2003. 
• The Indian Minister of Commerce and Industry and Law and 
Justice, Arun Jaitley, heading the Indian delegation to the third joint 
trade and economic committee meeting, visited Israel in January 
2004. 
• Israel’s Chief Justice and President of Israel’s Supreme Court, 
Aharon Barak, visited India in February 2004.  
• Israel’s Deputy Minister of Trade, Industry and Employment, 
Michael Ratzon, visited India in February 2004. 
• Israel’s Deputy Minister of Defence, Ze’ev Boim, visited India in 
February 2004. 
• India’s Comptroller and Auditor General, V.N. Kaul, visited Israel in 
March 2004. 
• Israel’s State Comptroller, Justice Eliezer Goldberg, visited India in 
December 2004. 
• Israel’s Minister of Trade, Industry and Employment, Ehud Olmart, 
paid a visit to India in December 2004. Following his visit, the Indian 
Trade Ministry Secretary visited Israel in February 2005 and a 
                                            
29
 For details about Peres’s other visits, see the details of the dialogues between foreign 
ministries in section 6.3.1.2. 
30
 For details about Sharon's official visit, see section 6.2.2. 
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Memorandum of understanding (MOU) of Industrial Research and 
Development was signed between the two ministries. 
• India’s Minister of Science and Technology, Kapil Sibal, visited 
Israel in May 2005 (the first official visit of a UPA government 
minister). 
• India’s Minister of Commerce, Kamal Nat, visited Israel in 
November 2005. 
 
6.3.1.2 Dialogues between foreign ministries 
 
Ongoing official dialogues as well as bilateral consultations have taken 
place between the foreign ministries of India and Israel. The following list 
shows the official visits of the Foreign Ministers of both countries and their 
deputies, which enhanced the institutional framework of diplomatic 
relations and consolidated the bilateral relations: 31  
 
• Israel’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Shimon Peres, visited India in 
May 1993.  
• Israel’s Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Yossi Beilin, visited India 
in March 1994. 
• India's Minister of State of External Affairs, R. L. Bhatyia, visited 
Israel in April 1995. 
• The Indian Minister of External Affairs, Jaswant Singh, visited Israel 
in June 2000 (the first Indian Minister of External Affairs visiting 
Israel). 
• Israel’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Shimon Peres, visited India in 
February 2002.32 
• Israel’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Silvan Shalom, visited India in 
February 2004. 
                                            
31
 Information concerning the visits of the foreign ministers was obtained from the official 
website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Israel:   http://www.mfa.gov.il  and the Ministry 
of External Affairs on India: http://www.mea.gov.in . 
32
 His third visit to India and his second visit as Minister of Foreign Affairs. About his visit 
to India as Minister of Regional Cooperation, see section 6.3.1.1. 
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It should be noted that in diplomatic practice, a large number of high-level 
official visits in general and dialogues between foreign ministers in 
particular are considered the litmus test of bilateral relations between 
countries. It is therefore important to note that the increased number of 
Indian high-level official visits particularly during the NDA governments, 
reflected the strengthening of India's bilateral relations with Israel. 
 
6.3.1.3  Israel’s International Development Cooperation Programme   
(Mashav) 
 
Since the late 1950s, Israel has been sharing its expertise with other 
countries through Israel’s International Development Cooperation 
Programme. Training courses in Israel, overseas courses, projects, 
technology transfer, research collaboration and long and short-term 
assignments by Israeli experts are the essence of the activities of the 
centre for International Cooperation of the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
(Mashav)  (Laufer, 1967:17-36). 
  
Since the establishment of diplomatic relations between India and Israel, 
and even before it, hundreds of Indians participated in training courses in 
areas such as agriculture, community development, public health and early 
childhood education as well as management and small and medium 
enterprises. These were all activities in areas where Israel could share its 
knowledge and experience with India by applying its expertise and 
innovative technology aimed at creating the best solutions for rapid and 
sustainable development  (Yegar, 2004:176). 
  
Special emphasis was placed by Mashav on agricultural and farming 
courses. Consequently, the Israeli - Indian cooperation in agriculture grew 
significantly after 1993 following the signing of a bilateral agreement in the 
field of agriculture. A new chapter in Israeli-Indian cooperation began on 31 
December 1996 after the president of Israel at that time, Ezer Weizman, 
laid the foundation for the Israeli - Indian Research and Development Farm 
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at the Indian Agricultural Research Institute (IARI) in Pusa near New Delhi 
(Indian Express, 31/12/1996). The aim of the project was to introduce a 
variety of Israeli technologies that focussed on promoting the intensive and 
commercially viable cultivation of agricultural crops in India. In this regard, 
an official visit to the IARI was undertaken by the Indian Agricultural 
Minister, Ajit Singh, in December 2001. In addition, in February 2001 the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent an Israeli army medical team to the state of 
Gujarat, following a devastating earthquake to help restore the state's 
medical facilities.  
Training courses in Israel, on the spot courses and consultancies are key 
features in Mashav's activities in India: 
 
  Table 6.1. The Israeli-Indian International Development Cooperation          
  Programme (1993-2004).33 
Years Indian 
trainees 
 in Israel 
Indian trainees 
in “On- the- 
Spot courses” 
Long term 
consultancies 
in India 
Short term 
consultancies 
in India 
1993 87         (1)  52  1 
1994        102 (4)  89  8 
1995 81 (8) 241  3 
1996 92 (8) 174  4 
1997 85       (10) 460  1 
1998        103  (9)  336 2 5 
1999 92  (7)  301 2            12 
2000 93 (10)  330 2 7 
2001 72 (7)  190 2 6 
2002 99 (7)  170 2 1 
2003 61 (4)  116 1 4 
2004 30 (1)   28  1 
Total         997     (76*) 2537 11 53 
* Number of on-the-Spot courses. 
 
                                            
33
 The above information is based on data available from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
centre for cooperation’s annual reports (http://www.mfa.gov.il).  
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The growing number of courses, Indian trainees and consultancies, since 
the establishment of diplomatic relations between Israel and India indicate 
the importance attached by the Government of Israel to its bilateral 
relations with India.  
 
6.3.1.4 Israeli - Indian bilateral agreements 
 
After the establishment of diplomatic relations between Israel and India, a 
large number of bilateral agreements were signed and ratified by both 
countries (see appendix 3).34 
 
6.3.2 Defence relations as joint strategic interests 
 
Diplomatic relations between Israel and India and the normalisation of 
bilateral ties enabled the two countries to develop their military cooperation 
as a joint strategic interest. Extensive changes in India, by the beginning of 
the 1990s had brought about a significant change in the Indian security 
perspective and a restructuring of its defence capability (the fourth largest 
army in the world). During that decade, India underwent a transitional stage 
in terms of building strategic security as well as in terms of its national 
defence policy.  
 
According to Nancy Jetty, the following parameters influenced the Indian 
security perspective in the 1990s: 
  
First, India’s status and power projections remain essentially 
contingent on its national security in terms of political stability, 
economic development and military strength. Second, although 
the asymmetrical power structure in South Asia ensures India’s 
centrality, its regional power and influence tends to get 
circumscribed by the neighbouring countries’ sustained pressure 
to counter its pre-eminence. In particular, Pakistan’s unceasing 
search for parity with Indian makes for a deep-rooted strategic 
dissonance in the region which effectively reduces its capacity to 
shape or influence events in its neighbourhood. Third, continued 
involvement of external powers in the region remains an integral 
part of South Asian geopolitical realities. The end of the Cold War 
                                            
34
 For the list of Israeli-Indian, bilateral agreements, see appendix 3. The list was obtained 
from the MFA's official website (http://www.mfa.gov.il). 
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has weakened the inevitable link between regional conflict and 
Great Power rivalry. However, the inability of the states of the 
region to evolve a credible bilateral and regional framework for 
cooperation would continue to play an important role in reinforcing 
the pattern of external involvement – primarily in pursuance of 
their own strategic interests – in the region (Jetty, 1997:1245).  
 
A framework of India’s national security has to take both military and non-
military dimensions into consideration, in terms of both external threats and 
internal challenges to India’s international integrity and national unity in the 
short term as well as in the long term. In addition, issues pertaining to 
regional peace and stability continue to dominate the Indian national 
strategy. In addition, the crucial link between external hostile forces and 
domestic subversive forces continues to pose a severe challenge for Indian 
national security (the incidence of terrorism in Kashmir has risen since the 
1990s, with Pakistan’s support).  
 
The strategic Northeast ring consisting of China, Bangladesh and Myanmar 
(including the Chinese presence in Myanmar) is considered a major 
security concern for India in terms of Low Intensity Conflict (LIC).35  In 
recent years, China has presented an indirect military and economic for 
challenge to India (Cohen, 2001:266). 
 
On 11 and 13 May 1998, India claimed to have detonated five nuclear 
devices, to which Pakistan responded on 28 and 30 May 1998, by claiming 
that it had detonated six nuclear weapons. India had to decide how to deal 
with this issue and had to decide how to adapt its nuclear doctrine and 
what form it should take in relation to Pakistan and China. Making choices 
regarding the building of missile delivery systems had been another 
strategic matter of concern to India. The linkages between drug trafficking, 
organised violence and the magnitude of the proliferation of small arms 
had also become a source of instability in India (as well as in South Asia). 
In addition, India had to deal with the trafficking of guns and drugs that 
                                            
35
 LIC – low intensity conflict is a term in international relations when the commitment of 
the military capabilities is finite and limited. 
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generated interstate tensions and terrorism, as well as the movement of 
refugees from neighbouring countries.  
 
Israel, on the other hand, sees itself as an island fortress in the Middle East 
and considers security as its number one strategic interest (acute “Security 
Dilemma”) while concentrating on its ability to respond to any military threat 
and/or violence against its territory or citizens in defensive as well as 
offensive manners. Israel's security situation is reflected in a high state of 
military alertness, resource mobilisation (including budget allocations) and 
indigenous defence industries. At the same time, it maintains its strategic 
relationship with the US in order to preserve its military strength and 
regional military superiority as well as its deterrent capabilities (Klieman, 
1990:1).  
 
The normalisation of bilateral ties between Israel and India since 1992 
made it possible for two countries to develop their military connections 
based on their security and commercial interests (Pant, 2005:3). Both 
countries have adopted similar positions on arm control issues and Islamic 
radicalism, but the real opportunity for Israeli-Indian military strategic 
cooperation can be found in India’s search for technological independence 
and Israel’s quest for military qualitative superiority regarding its Arab 
neighbours. India’s substantial difficulties with upgrading and modernising 
its armed forces compelled India to seek long-term collaboration with 
Israel. On the other hand, arms exports have been an essential and 
integral part of Israel’s security sector since such exports lower  the unit 
cost of production, offset the cost of research and development, reduce 
Israel’s balance deficit and provide employment. In fact, the Israel defence 
industries cannot depend on the Israeli market alone and about three-
quarters of its production has to be exported. Therefore, Israel’s military 
relationship with India presents an attractive and challenging opportunity 
for Israel and provides a market for its defence industry. In other words, 
India’s search for technology and Israel’s need for making its defence 
research a viable economical entity are complementary (Klieman, 1990:3). 
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The national security factor has evolved as the dominant factor regarding 
Israeli - Indian relations and is based on the convergence of strategic and 
national security interests. Significantly, India has gradually emerged as 
Israel’s most important arms market. September 11, the Afghanistan war 
and the war in Iraq (the second Gulf War) as well as the Kargil War in 1999 
with Pakistan and the terror attack on the Indian Parliament in New Delhi in 
December 2001 were the key determinants that effected the Indian 
defence reorientation towards Israel. In fact, according to Dennis Kux the 
attack on the Indian Parliament was the decisive moment as far as India's 
war on terrorism was concerned (Kux, 2002:98). Despite the cooling of 
formal relations between them during the tenure of the UPA government, 
the working meetings and mutual visits of military officials continued as well 
as official dialogues between the foreign ministries.  
  
According to Dinesh Kumar (2001:4-8), the symbiotic nature of Indian and 
Israeli security interests caused the two governments to interact 
extensively in terms of the development of Israeli-Indian military 
cooperation. He pointed out that India has developed its military ties with 
Israel because of the following challenges facing the Indian military 
establishment:  
 
•  After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, crucial supplies of military 
spare parts were interrupted and India felt the need to diversify its 
defence suppliers and realised the danger of being too dependent on one 
source.  
 
• India’s short-term defence preparedness depended not only on its ability 
to obtain crucial spare parts, but also on upgrading its existing forces. 
 
•  India’s major defence projects were constrained because of the lack of 
advanced technology. 36 
                                            
36
 Projects like the Main Battle Tank (Arjun), Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) and the 
integrated Missiles Development Programme (IMDP). 
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•  In recent decades, India’s internal security situation has deteriorated. 
The availability of modern arms and weapon systems to terrorists has 
necessitated the introduction of the latest security technology.  
 
India has realised that overcoming the above challenges can be achieved 
by developing its military ties with Israel since Israel’s research-oriented 
industrial-military sector is viewed by India as a good option for answering 
some of its defence and security needs.37 Israel’s sophisticated expertise in 
the sphere of manufacturing and upgrading high-combat aircraft, anti-
tactical ballistic missiles, electronic warfare and communication equipment, 
as well as security technology are of particular interest to India. The Indian 
military force has also shown interest in the Israeli Defence Forces’ 
successful warfare strategies and concepts. On the other hand, Israel is  
interested in military cooperation with India.  
 
The Israeli need for military superiority in terms of arms over its neighbours 
is linked to its need for having access to more markets for its military 
exports and India is a big attraction in this regard. In addition, unlike some 
other countries, Israel does not have any objection to selling its arms and 
technology to India. Southeast Asia has become an important destination 
for Israeli trade and Israel has a deep interest in Israeli-Indian naval 
cooperation in particular and in developing close military ties with India in 
general. Subhash Kapila (2000:4-7) spells out the following imperatives for 
strategic military cooperation between Israel and India:  
 
• Israel is a valuable autonomous source of sophisticated weapons and 
military equipment developed indigenously; it therefore rules external 
pressure out on Israel not to supply military equipment to India. 
 
• Israel’s defence industries have earned a global reputation for the 
upgrading of old weapons systems to the latest technological 
                                            
37
 The issues of counter terrorism and intelligence cooperation are dealt with separately in 
the following part of this section. 
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capabilities. This applies specifically to India’s large number of 
Russian combat aircraft and tanks.  
 
• Israel’s technological advances in the fields of satellites, satellite 
imagery, missiles, rockets and nuclear fields are appreciable. As 
most of them are the result of indigenous development, they can 
be a source of advanced technology for India. India prefers to 
purchase electronic warfare equipment from suppliers that do not 
sell equipment to Muslim countries in general and Pakistan in 
particular. 
 
• The potential exists for  Israeli - Indian joint defence production 
projects and the marketing of conventional military equipment. In 
addition, India’s underutilised and ageing defence production 
facilities could be modernised and upgraded for export purposes.   
 
• India offers a potentially vast market for arms sales, as India’s 
weapons and military equipment requirements are going to grow 
exponentially in the following ten years. 
 
• India needs independent sources of military equipment and 
technology in the fields of nuclear power generation, space 
technology and satellite imagery; all of which Israel can supply. 
 
• The high cost-effectiveness of joint Israeli - Indian defence 
production ventures. 
 
• Israel’s hi-technological industries could find India an attractive 
market for sales, the transfer of specific technologies, joint 
production and marketing. 
 
• India can offer advanced technological and industrial expertise, in 
certain fields, for Israeli civil and military uses. 
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6.3.2.1 Military cooperation  
 
Following the Pakistani nuclear test in 1998 and the Kargil War with 
Pakistan in 1999, the demand of the Indian defence forces for Israeli-made 
military equipment has escalated and Israel has become India’s second 
largest weapon supplier (after Russia). As Dinesh Kumar (2001:5) points 
out:  
 
Israel’s developed and research-oriented industrial-military 
complex is viewed by India as a good option answering some of 
its defence and security needs. Indian military officials are not 
only interested in Israeli weapons and technology, but they have 
also shown interest in the Israeli Defence Forces’ successful 
warfare strategies and concepts. On the other hand, the Israeli 
quest for qualitative superiority in arms over its neighbours is 
closely linked to its tapping of more markets, and India is a big 
attraction in this regard.  
 
 
The change of government in India in 2004 (as well as in Israel) did not 
change the Indian military cooperation level with Israel. The Indian Defence 
Minister in the UPA government, Pranab Mukherjee, made India’s policy 
towards Israel clear by declaring openly: "There will be no change in the 
existing defence ties between India and Israel.” (Indian Express 1/7/2004). 
 
Since 1992, as far as military visits and military contacts between Israel 
and India were concerned, senior officials from the Defence Ministries of 
both countries have regularly exchanged working visits, many of which 
were veiled in secrecy. In February 1992, the Director-General of the 
former Israeli Police Ministry attended an international police convention in 
New Delhi. In May 1992, an Israeli delegation including manufacturers of 
military equipment, visited India. In August 1992, a delegation from the 
Malat Company came to India to offer cruise missile technology for 
unmanned reconnaissance aircraft and according to some media reports, 
the offer included the joint development of the Searcher Unmanned Aerial 
Vehicle (UAV) and the supply of an Israeli secure digital data link to India’s 
MiGs combat jets. A follow-up delegation from the Malat Company 
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finalised the deal in New Delhi in December 1992 (Kumaraswamy, 
1998:14).  
 
In April 1993, a delegation of the Manufacturers Association of Israel, 
which included representatives from the Israeli Defence Industry, visited 
India. In May 1993, the Chief Minister of the State of Maharashtra, 
formerly the Minister of Defence, Sharad Pawar, acting on direct 
instructions from Prime Minister Rao, led an Indian delegation to the 
Agritech exhibition in Tel Aviv accompanied by a high-level military team 
that visited Israeli military facilities and establishments such as an anti-
terror training facility (Sunday, 30/5/1993). In June 1993, the Joint 
Secretary of the Indian Defence Ministry, G.S. Lyer, led a National 
Defence College delegation to Israel. In September 1993, a delegation 
representing Israeli telecommunications and electronics visited India. 
Visits from other Israeli delegations, such as the Israeli Export Institute 
delegation in October 1993, included representatives of the Israeli Aircraft 
Industry (IAI) as well as other military and electronic industrial companies. 
In December 1993, Israel participated in India’s first air show AVIA-93 in 
Bangalore.  
 
In August 1994, Israeli Defence Ministry’s Director-General, David Ivry, 
visited India (Yegar, 2004:75). In March 1995, Israel’s Air Force 
Commander, Herzl Bodinger, paid an official visit to India and his Indian 
counterpart reciprocated by visiting Israel in July 1996. According to the 
Indian media reports, while Bodinger was in India he offered: 
 
A package deal which Airborne Warning and Control Systems 
(AWACS), Remotely Piloted Vehicles (RPVs), access to an air 
platform of anti defection and anti jamming manoeuvres, as well 
as a recently launched Israeli military communication satellite, 
specialized weapons…and training of Indian air force personal 
in the fourth generation fly-by-wire systems. In return, Israel, 
apparently, demanded the use of the Indian Air force bases at 
Jodhpur or Bhuj as air staging facilities (Hindustan Times, 
27/1/1995 and Kumaraswamy, 1998:17-18). 
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In July 1995, the Indian Defence Secretary. K.A. Nambiar visited Israel 
and in the same month, the Joint Secretary of the Indian Defence Ministry, 
Kaushal Singh, led a delegation of the Indian National Defence College to 
Israel. In November 1995, two Indian naval ships, INS Gomati and INS 
Subhadra, visited Israel as the guests of the Israeli Navy. In December 
1995, Air Vice-Marshal V.K. Bhatia, the Assistant Chief of Air Staff 
Operations, led a delegation to Israel to discuss flight safety measures.  
 
In June 1996, the Chief of the Indian Defence Research and Development 
Organisation (DRDO) and the scientific advisor to the Defence Minister, 
Abdul Kalam, paid a visit to Israel, which was described as a highpoint of 
Israeli-Indian security cooperation (Kapila, 2000:4).38  In July 1996, Air 
Chief Marshal S.K. Sareen came to Israel as the guest of the Israeli Air 
Force Commander and in September 1996, Deputy Chief Marshal M.S. 
Vasudev visited Israel. Later, in November 1996, the Israeli Naval Chief, 
Vice Admiral Alex Tal visited India. In addition, in December 1996, Israel 
participated in the AeroIndia International air show in Bangalore. In 
December 1996, the head of the IAI, Moshe Keret, visited New Delhi.  
 
In February 1997, the Indian Defence Secretary, T.K. Banerji, reciprocated 
Ivry’s visit and led a high-level delegation to Israel. Subsequently, in April 
1997, Wing Commander N. Brown assumed office as India’s first Defence 
Attaché in Israel. Furthermore, in March 1998, the first serving Indian Chief 
of Army Staff, General Prakash Malik visited Israel (Yegar, 2004:176). 
 
The visit of Home Minister, L.K. Advani, in May 2000, has been another 
important step in strengthening the Israeli-Indian relations in the field of 
security cooperation. An ongoing dialogue was conducted between the 
National Security Councils of the two countries since September 2001. In 
June 2002, before the Indian limited military strike against Pakistan 
(“Operation Parakram”), the Director General of the Israeli Ministry of 
Defence, Amos Yaron, visited India and following his visit, Israel supplied, 
                                            
38
 Abdul Kalam was elected President of the Republic of India in 2002. 
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the Indian army with the hardware necessary for their operation in the 
Pakistani border with special aeroplanes (Pant, 2005:8). The Israeli Air 
Force Commander, Dan Halutz, visited India in February 2003. Yaron paid 
another visit to India in December 2003. He visited India in September 
2004 and his visit was reciprocated later that year by his Indian 
counterpart in December 2004. 
   
Defence cooperation including high level Israeli and Indian Defence 
Ministry officials has continued even after the change of government in 
India in May 2004 and the Vice-Chief of the Indian Army, the Indian Navy 
Chief and the Chief of the Indian Air Force visited Israel. In May 2004, two 
Indian naval ships, INS Mysore, a general purpose destroyer and INS 
Godavari, a missile frigate, visited Israel on a goodwill visit., Yaron paid 
another visit to India in March 2005 where he participated in the opening 
ceremony of the Israeli booth at the Aero-India 2005 Exhibition. 
Subsequently, the Israeli booth in this exhibition was visited by the Indian 
Defence Minister Mukherjee.  
 
In terms of military equipment procurement and arms sales, India is the 
third larger importer of Israeli weaponry after China and Turkey (Kumar, 
2001:5). Israeli companies are selling military equipment to India and are 
helping it to upgrade some of its ageing Soviet weaponry. By the end of 
1993, the Foreign Defence and Export Department of the Defence Ministry 
of Israel had appointed over fifty local agents in New Delhi to sell various 
Israeli defence items to India (Kumaraswamy, 1998:16).  
 
On 7 June 1993, the Aviation Week and Space Technology Journal 
reported that India had purchased an Israeli fire control system and a 
thermal imager for installation in the Indian Vijayanta tanks. In addition, 
armour upgrading was also undertaken and artillery equipment as well as 
ammunition was purchased. In March 1994, Defence News disclosed 
India’s purchase of 16 Hunter and Seeker Unmanned Aerial Vehicles 
(UAVs) from Israel. In April 1995, Flight International disclosed that India 
had bought Harpy Missiles from Israel. 
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According to the Strategic Digest, India bought Elta Electronics’ radar-
jamming pads for its air force in spring 1996. That year Israel lost the 
contract to Russia for the upgrading of MiG 21 jets but managed to secure 
the avionics sub-contract for the Elta Company and the IAIs. The 
companies also signed several contracts with the IAF for projects that 
included fitting India’s MiG 21 aircraft with laser-guided bombs. In 
December 1996, it was reported in the Indian media (Times of India, 
27/12/1996) that the Indian Air force had bought a sophisticated Air 
Combat Manoeuvring Instrumentation system (ACMI) from Israel for 
developing air combat tactics and that the Ramata division of IAI was 
awarded a contract to build two Devora patrol boats in Goa. . In addition, 
the Indian Navy had bought electronic support measure sensors from 
Israel and the Tadiran Communication Company provided military 
communication systems to the Indian Army.   
 
In December 1996, during the state visit of the Israeli President, Ezer 
Weizman, to India, Elta signed a contract with India to supply it with 
electronic warfare systems; while the Iscar Company initiated a 
partnership contract with the Indian Air Force’s blade factory 
(Kumaraswamy, 1998:19). In 2001 Israel responded quickly to India's 
request for arms during the Kargil War with Pakistan. Unmanned Aerial 
Vehicles for high altitude surveillance, laser-guided systems and many 
other items were provided within days of the request (Asia Times, 
10/6/2003).   
 
After the Kargil border conflict in 1999, the Indian Defence Ministry signed 
a contract (for five years) for the delivery of 100 tactical Unmanned Aerial 
Vehicles (UAVs) and 200 UAVs for low and high altitude operations. In 
February 2003, a contract was signed to supply advanced Israeli Avionics 
Systems for India’s new MiG 27 combat aircraft. In March 2003, a contract 
for the development of Helicopter’s Detachable Systems between Israel’s 
Aviation Industry (IAI) and Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. (HAL) was signed. 
Israel also supplied India with various radar systems including portable 
 1368 
battlefield radars as well as border monitoring equipment, human 
movement detecting sensors, hand-held thermals and night vision 
equipment (Inbar, 2004:96).  
 
In 2003, a contract was signed with the IAI for 18 Heron UAVs with an 
option for an additional 16 UAVs. In the same year, India ordered 20 
Israeli Barak Sea- to-Air anti-missile weapons for its Navy (with an option 
to purchase ten more missiles over the successive five to seven years. 
(Defence News, 24/2/2003). Another contract was signed in the same year 
with Israel’s Sultam Systems Company, which upgraded 133 mm. Artillery, 
-anti- aircraft guns and sold 155 mm. self-propelled ammunition to the 
Indian army. Israel also sold the Indian army assault rifles in addition to 
Galil sniper rifles and laser range finding and targeting equipment. 
(Defence News, 12/5/2003). HAL signed a contract with the IAI concerning 
the development and supply of advanced avionics for 200 light Indian 
Helicopters (Times of India 14/3/2004). In 2003, India also purchased the 
rather advanced long-range radar Arrow missile's defence system ("Green 
Pine"). India has officially expressed its special interest in the Arrow 
missile defence system (Arrow 2 missile) which was developed by Israel 
(Inbar, 2004:96).  
 
The transfer of technology, joint weapon development and joint military 
production were important elements in Israeli-Indian military collaboration. 
As pointed out by Kumar (2001:5), India needed Israeli technology for its 
military projects such as battle tanks, light combat aircraft, unmanned 
aerial vehicles and various types of missiles. In principle, military 
cooperation and joint ventures work for both countries. India is developing 
its military manufacturing capability; while it is contributing to Israeli 
research and the development of new weaponry. India’s objective of 
developing a quick deployment force and a rapid mobility force for special 
missions is based on the Israeli experience and technology. The Israeli -
Indian upgrade of MiG 27 is an example of military cooperation by IAI and 
HAL. In September 2002, the two companies signed a contract to 
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manufacture Advanced Light Helicopters (ALH) for the Indian army jointly 
and the two companies set up a division in Hyderabad for the maintenance 
and aviation services. IAI also signed another contract in February 2003 
with the Nelco Company to develop, manufacture and market a range of 
electronic products primarily for the Indian Defence Forces. Rafael, Israel’s 
weapon development authority, signed a contract in 2003, for the transfer 
of technology to produce the Spike anti-armour and the advanced Python–
4 air-to-air missiles. Another contract was signed by Israel’s Military 
Industries (IMI) with the state-owned company, Ordinance Factory Board, 
for a joint venture regarding artillery production that included 130 mm. and 
155 mm. cargo projectiles, 122 cargo projectiles, 125 advanced tank 
ammunition and 122 cargo mortars.   
 
According to publications in India, an Indian delegation from the DRDO 
held discussions in Israel regarding the option of Israeli-Indian cooperation 
including the development prototype of a nuclear submarine.. As part of 
this naval cooperation, Israel and India’s sharing of military technology 
may result in the first completed submarine models produced in the 
production line for service in the Indian Ocean within the next few years 
(Singh, 2003:1, Financial Express, 3/11/2003). Inbar (2004:100) points out 
that in order to parallel its air power and its capability to project long 
distance might:  
 
Israel built an Ocean going Navy. Israeli Saar-5 corvettes, which 
are able to stay at sea for long periods, have been seen in the 
Indian Ocean. Three new Israeli submarines are equipped with 
long-range cruise missile launching capability. One such missile 
was tested in the Indian Ocean, generating reports about Indian-
Israeli naval cooperation. India is not averse to a greater Israeli 
presence in the Indian Ocean. Indeed, Israel has plans to triple its 
submarine force and to build additional Saar-5 corvettes. 
Generally, the Israeli strategic community is increasingly interested 
in the sea, both to provide depth and for deployment of a 
submarine-based nuclear second-strike force.  
 
 
In March 2004, a contract  totalling US $1.1 billion was finalised between 
Israel and India concerning the delivery of Phalcon Airborne Warning and 
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Controlling Systems (AWACS) on the platform of a Russian Ilyushin 
military aircraft.39  In the same month, Tadiran Communication was 
declared the winner of a bid amounting to US $113 million to supply 
military communication systems to the Indian Army (Haaretz 11/3/2004). 
The Vice Chief of the Indian Army, the Indian Navy Chief and the Chief of 
the Indian Air Force visited Israel in the winter of 2004  (Pant, 2005:9). 
 
In March 2005, the IAI and India’s Aeronautic Development Establishment 
signed a contract to manufacture three types of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles 
jointly (Globes, 2/3/2005)40 and the IMI Corporation won a US $140 million 
tender to construct chemical factories in the state of Bihar (Asian Age, 
11/5/2005).  
 
A Joint Defence Ministerial Committee is convened regularly to discuss 
military cooperation and military topics of mutual concern. Israeli - Indian 
military cooperation is undoubtedly a key joint strategic interest, in terms of 
volume and quality, in bilateral defence relations in particular and a 
cornerstone in the bilateral relations between the two countries in general. 
 
6.3.2.2 Counter-terrorism cooperation  
 
Counter-terrorism is another key area that plays a role in the cooperation 
between Israel and India. India has shown considerable interest in Israel’s 
internal security technology, equipment and methods to counter cross-
border terrorism in Kashmir and the insurgencies in the North-eastern 
states  (Kumar, 2001:7). 
 
Islamic fundamentalism and terrorism have been issues of concern for both 
Israel and India, particularly after 11 September 2001. In fact, the Israeli 
head of the National Security Council, Major General Uzi Dayan held high-
level discussions regarding counter-terrorism in New Delhi on the same 
day. Following the aerial attack on the World Trade Centre in New York, 
                                            
39
 A first delivery of five Falcons was scheduled to be delivered in 2007. 
40
 Rustan, Pawan and Gagan. 
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India has increased its cooperation with other countries regarding 
international terrorism by forming Joint Counter Terrorism Working Groups. 
According to Dennis Kux (2002:93), September 11 and India’s undivided 
support of the US war on international terrorism gave India an opportunity 
to transform its ongoing Indo-Pakistani conflict into part of the global war 
against terrorism while improving India’s relations with the US.41 
 
In January 1995, a delegation from the Indian Home Ministry travelled to 
Israel to study the Israeli developed barbwire system in order to examine it 
as an option to seal the Indo-Pakistani Line of Control in the Kashmir 
Valley as well as the borders of the States of Gujarat and Rajasthan 
(Jerusalem Post, 6/5/1995).42 In October 1995, the Director General of the 
National Security Guards visited Israel in order to establish a channel of 
cooperation, including the training and purchase of weaponry.43 Counter-
terrorism cooperation was built up on a working basis, and the visit of the 
Indian Home Minister, in charge of internal security, L.K. Advani, to Israel 
in May 2000 marked a major step in the process of strengthening of Israeli-
Indian cooperation in the field of security and counter- terrorism. This 
included an official meeting he had with the heads of Israel's Intelligence 
Agency (Mossad).44  During his visit, Advani emphasised that India shared 
Israel’s views regarding the menacing threat of terrorism, especially when 
coupled with religious fundamentalism.According to Dinesh Kumar 
(2001:7), Israel agreed to provide India with modern security equipment as 
well as anti-terrorism training and was probably the only country that had 
access to sensitive Indian installations in Kashmir.  
 
The Indian Minister of External Affairs, Jaswant Singh, visited Israel in 
June 2000 and during his meeting with the Israeli Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, David Levi, the two decided to establish a mechanism to deal with 
                                            
41
 For details about the United States, concerning foreign relations between Israel and 
India, see section 6.3.9.1. 
42
 Home Ministry is in charge of Indian domestic security. 
43
 Elite commando unit responsible for VIP protection. 
44
 For more details about the Mossad cooperation with India, see sections 4.10.3.1 and 
6.3.2.3. 
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the fight against terrorism with the aim of institutionalising these contacts 
(Jerusalem Post, 3/7/2000). The first Israeli-Indian Joint Working Group 
(JWG) on counter- terrorism was set up in the same month, on 6 January 
2000, in order to strengthen the cooperation between the two countries in 
their fight against terrorism including cooperation on multilateral forums 
and since then the JWG have been meeting, alternately, on a regular 
basis. During the visit of the Minster of Foreign Affairs, Shimon Peres, in 
January 2002, a mutual agreement on counter terrorism was discussed 
between the two countries  (Yediot Acharonot, 11/1/2002).  
 
The second Israeli - Indian JWG meeting on counter-terrorism took place in 
Delhi in May 2002 and the third one was held in Jerusalem on 24 March 
2003. On 11 July 2003, the visiting Israeli special envoy, David Ivry, said at 
a press conference in New Delhi that Israel would help India to fight 
terrorism (The Hindu, 11/7/2003). During the visit of Ariel Sharon in India, 
counter terrorism was defined by Prime Minister Vajpayee as a key area of 
cooperation between India and Israel (The Hindu, 10/9/2003). Following 
the fourth meeting of the Israeli - Indian Joint Working Group on counter-
terrorism and the first round of consultations on disarmament issues, which 
took place in New Delhi between 29 November and 2 December 2004, the 
following joint statement was published in a leading Indian newspaper:  
 
Both sides reaffirmed their unequivocal condemnations of all 
acts of terrorism. They reviewed the global campaign against 
terrorism and discussed ways and means by which the fight 
against terrorism by the international community can be made 
more effective and how India and Israel can contribute to this 
(The Hindu, 4/12/2004).   
 
 
The gradual globalisation of Islamic terrorism after September 11, 2001 
has brought about improved cooperation between India and Israel in the 
field of counter-terrorism. After September 11, international collaboration 
regarding terrorism became an urgent priority and the war on terrorism that 
followed, appeared to create a better climate for Israeli - Indian cooperation 
particularly in the counter-terrorism field. Israel and India have diversified 
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and have widened the scope of subjects discussed at the Joint Working 
Counter-Terrorism Group including combating international terror. 
Seminars dealing with subjects such as border security, suicide bombers, 
aviation security and the financing of terrorism as well as information 
security including digital and cyber warfare, were held in India by Israeli 
experts (Times of India, 30/5/2005).   
 
The globalisation of Islamic fundamentalism and the growing connection 
between Kashmiri and Palestinian militant organisations have created 
mutual concern in Israel and India. Both countries believe that by fighting 
the menace of terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism, it will enhance peace 
and security in the Middle East and South Asia. Israel considers the spread 
of Islamic militancy and terrorism in the Middle East, Central Asia and 
Southeast Asia as a threat to its national security. From an international 
viewpoint, both countries were also concerned about maritime terrorism as 
well as possible outside intervention in Kashmir or the West Bank and 
Gaza in particular, considering the fact that in terms of maritime terrorism, 
the Indian Ocean region is highly vulnerable.45 At a banquet for Israel’s 
Prime Minister Sharon during his official visit to New Delhi, on 8 September 
2003, Prime Minister Vajpayee remarked that: 46 
 
Together with the international community and as victims of 
terrorism, Israel and India are partners in the battle against this 
scourge (The Hindu, 10/9/2003).  
 
 
The common theme of uniting against terrorism was highlighted in the joint 
statement regarding Sharon’s visit:  
 
Terrorism undermines the very foundation of freedom and 
democracy, endangers the continued existence of open and 
democratic societies and constitutes a global threat; therefore, 
there cannot be any compromise in the war against terrorism 
((The Hindu, 10/9/2003). 
 
  
                                            
45
 For details about the Indian Ocean, see section 6.3.12. 
46
 For details about Sharon’s visit in India, see section 6.2.2. 
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6.3.2.3 Intelligence cooperation  
 
 
Intelligence cooperation is commensurate with counter-terrorism 
cooperation and is one of the key areas of collaboration between the two 
countries. Radical Islamism, both at home and in its immediate 
neighbourhoods, has cemented Israeli - Indian intelligence cooperation. 
According to Subash Kapila (2000:7-8), during the visit of Home Minister 
Advani, in May 2000, he had a meeting with the heads of the Israeli 
Intelligence Agency (Mossad).47 Advani was accompanied by the heads of 
India's intelligence agencies the RAW, the Investigation Bureau (IB) and 
the Central Police organisations fighting terrorism and he formalised 
intelligence sharing and cooperation agreements with Israel including 
collecting counter-terrorism intelligence in general and technical 
intelligence (TECHINT) regarding maritime security  in particular.48  
 
During May 2000, India's Government appointed a special task force to 
make recommendations for the overhaul of the Indian intelligence 
apparatus. The threats covered by the task force encompassed the entire 
spectrum of likely threats including terrorism and insurgencies in various 
forms such as religious and ideological terrorism (Raman, 2005:1). The 
assumed attack by Al-Qaeda on a US Naval ship at Aden in October 2000, 
added another area of concern to India regarding possible maritime 
terrorism. The September 11 2001 terrorist strike and the precision with it 
was planned and executed, were sources of serious concern for both 
Israel and India and have increased their intelligence cooperation in the 
ensuing years.. During the visit of the head of the Indian Intelligence 
Bureau, K.P. Singh to Israel, he met the heads the Israeli Security Service 
in March 2004. His meetings strengthened the intelligence collaboration 
between the two countries as part of their counter-terrorism cooperation as 
                                            
47
 For information about Advani’s visit, see also section 6.3.2.2. 
48
 For more details about Israeli-Indian counter- terrorism cooperation, see section 
6.3.2.2. 
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well as their monitoring of nuclear technology in Pakistan (Times of India, 
19/3/2004).49   
 
6.3.3 Space cooperation as a joint strategic interest  
 
While Israel’s space efforts revolved around its high resolution imaging 
capabilities, India’s space programme, which is one of the country's 
success stories, covers a wide range of activities in launch vehicles, 
satellites and space applications. India builds a wide variety of remote 
sensing, meteorological and communications satellites and launches them 
with its own rockets.50 In 2001, the Indian Space Research Organisation 
(ISRO) launched a technology experiment satellite by means of the Polar 
Satellite Launch Vehicle (PSLV).   
 
In October 1994, Prof. U. R. Rao, a member of the Indian Space 
Commission and former chairperson of the ISRO visited Israel with a four-
member delegation where they met with the heads of Israel’s Space 
Agency in order to establish ties between the two countries in this 
particular field (Kumaraswamy, 1998:17). In November 2002, the space 
agencies of Israel and India signed an agreement on cooperation with 
regard to peaceful uses of outer space. While Israel was interested in 
India’s launch vehicles, India was interested in Israel’s concept of small 
satellites and their employment for dual use, including military functions 
(Inbar, 2004:98).  
 
In August 2003, the chairperson of the ISRO, Krishnaswami Kasturirangan, 
paid a visit to Israel. According to The Hindu newspaper (10/9/2003), 
during his visit, the two countries signed an umbrella agreement, which 
included collaboration in the area of small and micro satellites. One month 
later, during Prime Minister Sharon’s visit to India in September 2003, 
                                            
49
 For details about intelligence cooperation pertaining to Pakistan, see section 6.3.16. 
50
 Five Ofek satellites have already been launched by Israel as well as an Eros-A1 
satellite on a commercial basis and an Amos 1 communication satellite. 
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Sharon announced the launching of an Israeli space telescope, on top of 
the Indian Polar Satellite launch Vehicle (Pant, 2005:10). 
  
The Israeli Minister of Science and Technology, Modi Zandberg, together 
with the Chairman of Israel’s Space Agency, visited India in December 
2003 and discussed the possibility of joining the Indian planned project of 
sending an unmanned spaceship to the moon in 2008. The heads of the 
two countries’ space organisations exchanged visits once again in 
December 2004 in order to finalise the space agreement between the two 
countries. 
 
6.3.4 Nuclear power policy coordination as a joint strategic interest 
 
Israel and India have not signed the NPT and therefore have common 
ground for formulating a coordinated diplomatic policy regarding that 
matter, although, Israel, in contrast with India had signed the CTBT in 
1996.. Israel did not sign the NPT because it cannot afford to rely on the 
treaty and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for its national 
security, particularly after two signatories of the treaty from Muslim 
countries, namely Iraq and Iran had developed nuclear capabilities.51 Israel 
has adopted a cautious stance that is characterised by deliberate 
ambiguity regarding the matter of nuclear power policy by declaring: "Israel 
does not possess nuclear weapons and would not be the first to introduce 
them into the Middle East” (Rolef, 1993:232).  
 
India saw the indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995 as a sort of 
legitimisation of its possession of nuclear weapons. The Congress 
government in the 1990s as well as the two United Front governments that 
followed (from 1996 to1998) did not support the idea of nuclear tests. 
However, the BJP government did conduct two nuclear tests on 11 and 13 
May 1998 respectively.  
                                            
51
 On 7 June 1981, Israel raided a nearly completed Iraqi nuclear reactor (OSIRAQ). In 
1993 Israel’s Prime Minister Netanyahu, regarded the prevention of the nuclear bomb as 
Israel’s most important task (Haaretz, 26/8/1996). 
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Officially, India and Israel have denied the existence of any nuclear 
cooperation between them (Kumar, 2001:10). On 3 June 1998, the Israeli 
Deputy Minister of Defence, Silvan Shalom, in reply to a question in the 
Knesset, emphasised that: "Israel does not have and did not have any part 
in the Indian nuclear tests, despite of false foreign publications about it.” 
(Israel's Yearbook of Official Documents, 1998).  
 
However, both countries share concern over Pakistan’s nuclear capability 
and according to Dinesh Kumar: "It is widely believed that since the 1980s 
their intelligence agencies are in close contact over the issue" (Kumar, 
2001:10).52  
 
Pakistan’s nuclear capability is one of the key reasons why both countries 
have a keen strategic interest in anti-ballistic missile defence systems and 
India had officially expressed its special interest in the Arrow missile 
defence system (Arrow 2 missile) that was developed by Israel. Israel has 
a vital interest in preventing the transfer of nuclear capability from Pakistan 
to the Middle East and it is in Israel’s national interest that the Pakistani 
nuclear capability is confined to South Asia and that no nuclear technology 
is transferred to the Middle East. Israel could not rule out the possibility of 
nuclear technology spilling over to the Middle East, in particular after the 
publication of A. Q. Khan’s sales of nuclear technology to Iran, Libya and 
North Korea (Dawn, 25/01/2004). Khan, the founder of the Pakistani 
nuclear programme, sold nuclear technology on the international black 
market and was officially deposed from his position as advisor to the 
President of Pakistan.  
 
Israel has repeatedly expressed its concern to India about a possible 
nuclear technology leak or the transfer of nuclear related information to 
Iran, a country that is developing nuclear capabilities and which is regarded 
by Israel as a strategic threat to its national security, in particular 
                                            
52
 For details about the Israeli-Indian dialogue in the late 1980’s about the Pakistani 
nuclear facility, see section 3.10.3.3. 
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considering the fact that India has close ties with Iran.53  Unlike the US, but 
similar to other Asian countries, Israel did not react to the Indian nuclear 
test conducted in May 1998 and did not react when New Delhi tested the 
Agni, India’s intermediate-range ballistic missile in January 2002.  
   
6.3.5 Economic relations as a joint strategic interest 
 
Since the establishment of diplomatic relations between Israel and India 
the two countries have witnessed tremendous growth in their bilateral 
economic relations and have implemented many measures to promote 
them, including an agreement for agricultural cooperation signed in 
December 1993. The Indian foreign policy emphasis on international 
politics shifted its focus to the economy, mindful of how far it had fallen 
behind the rest of Asia, including China, in economic development. India 
began to look for foreign investment, joint ventures that build up expertise 
in general and high technology in particular and new markets, in order to 
improve its export and foreign trade.  
 
As pointed out by Farah Naaz (1999:247), the establishment of diplomatic 
relations between Israel and India enabled Israel, a modern technology 
oriented country, to take part in these new Indian developments. Both 
countries have signed a large number of trade agreements as well as 
memorandums of understanding including the granting of the Most 
Favoured Nation (MFN) status, the avoidance of double taxation and 
bilateral investment protection. In addition, the two countries initiated joint 
and industrial projects and India became an attractive market for Israel's 
agro-technological industries and its largest trading partner in Asia.54    A 
joint business council between the Federation of Israel Chamber of 
Commerce and the Federation of Indian Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry was set up after the establishment of diplomatic relations and joint 
economic committees meetings between them take place on a regular 
basis.  
                                            
53
 For details about Iran as a discrepant strategic interest, see section 6.3.17. 
54
 For the list of bilateral agreements between Israel and India, see appendix 3. 
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As described in a paper published by the Export-Import Bank of India 
(Israel and India: A study of trade and investment potential, 2000:38-40), a 
development farm was introduced at the IARI in New Delhi during the visit 
of the Israeli President, Ezer Weizman, in December 1996.55 Various other 
projects were also initiated during the visit, including a cotton 
demonstration farm in the state of Maharashtra and a demonstration dairy 
farm in the state of Punjab. During 1999, two delegations, namely from  the 
Small Business Authority of Israel and the Federation of Israel Chamber of 
Commerce respectively, visited India for discussions with their Indian 
counterparts. The Indian Trade Promotion Organisation (ITPO) held a 
week to showcase India’s industrial strength, namely the “India Week” in 
Tel Aviv in May 2000. In September 2003, the Confederation of Indian 
Industry (CII) and the Israel Export and International Cooperation Institute 
as well as the Manufacturers Association of Israel, set up a forum 
consisting of senior businesspersons from both countries to promote trade 
and economic relations.  
 
During Prime Minister Sharon’s visit to India, in September 2003, six 
agreements were signed between the two countries.56 Israel's Finance 
Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, met his Indian counterpart in Washington in 
October 2004 in order to discuss monetary guarantees for Indian states for 
projects carried out by Israeli enterprises. The Israeli Minister of Industry 
Trade and Employment, Ehud Olmart, visited India from 6-9 December 
2004 with representatives from 45 leading Israeli companies. Following his 
visit, the Director General of the Indian Trade Ministry arrived in Israel to 
discuss bilateral trade between the two countries in order to prepare the 
ground for a grand economic agreement between the two countries. The 
Bank of India (BOI) opened its first branch in Israel in November 2005 
(Maariv, 23/8/2005). 57  
                                            
55
 For details about the Israeli development farm as well as Israel’s International 
Development Cooperation Program (Mashav), see section 6.3.1.3. 
56
 For details about Sharon's visit, see section 6.2.2. 
57
 The largest bank in India. 
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    Table 6.2   Israeli - Indian bilateral trade (1992-2005) 
Israel’s Export 
 (in US$ million) 
India’s Export 
(in US$ million) 
Bilateral Trade 
(in US$ million) 
 
Years 
127  75  202  1992  
228  129  357 1993  
363  151  514  1994  
313  190 503 1995  
311  251  562  1996 
365  293  658  1997  
332  343  675  1998  
531  397  928  1999  
551  453  1004  2000  
470  413  883  2001  
648  608  1,256  2002  
883  703  1,586  2003  
1,123 1,021 2,146 2004  
1,191 1,214 2,405  2005  
*   Information is compiled from data available from the Industrial, Trade and Labour 
official web site: http://www.moital.gov.il 
 
In 1992, the bilateral trade between Israel and India amounted to US 
$202 million but in 2005, it reached US $2.4 billion, while the unofficial 
goal agreed upon between the two countries is to boost bilateral trade 
between them to US $5 billion. Active participation in trade fairs and 
exhibitions enhanced the awareness regarding business opportunities 
and promoted contact between Indian and Israeli firms, in particular the 
international Agro-exhibitions. Traditionally, the international agricultural 
exhibitions in Israel have attracted a large number of delegations and 
high-level officials from India, including state ministers, resulting in 
increased collaboration in the field of agriculture.58  
  
                                            
58
 For details about high-level official visits to Israel, see section 6.3.1.1 and regarding 
Sharad Pawar’s visit to Agritech 93, see section 6.3.2.1. 
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There are direct air connections between the two countries. El-Al, Israel’s 
national airline operates two commercial flights to Bombay (Mumbai) as 
well as freighter flights between Israel and India. Zim, Israel’s Navigation 
Company, has a permanent General Agent in India and Israeli ships arrive 
regularly in Indian ports. The Shipping Corporation of India (SCI) transports 
goods to and from Israel  (Jerusalem Post-Special Supplement, 2006). In 
terms of tourism between India and Israel, since the 1990s, nearly 75,000 
Israeli tourists have been visiting India every year and about 25,000 
Indians are visiting Israel annually. 
 
  Since 2002, bilateral trade and economic relations between the two 
countries have grown substantially. In addition, there are promising 
prospects of further improvement in their economic relationship with regard 
to the complementary potential existing between the various sectors of the 
two economies. Importantly, the Free Trade Agreements between Israel 
and the US and the European Union (EU) present opportunities for India to 
take advantage of Israel’s position as a bridge for exporting Indian products 
to those areas as well as presenting Indian exporters with opportunities to 
set up joint ventures in Israel. On the other hand, setting up joint ventures 
in India would give Israeli companies opportunities and access to India’s 
expanding domestic market as well as non-traditional markets in Asia.  
 
6.3.6 Science and technology cooperation as a common strategic 
interest 
 
Bilateral economic growth between Israel and India included cooperation in 
science and technology, which commenced in May 1993 with the signing of 
a bilateral agreement on science and technology. In December 1994, the  
Industrial Research minutes were signed to set up a Science and 
Technology Fund (amounting to US $3 million) in order to facilitate 
industrial research and development cooperation between the two 
countries. 
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Following the Science and Technology agreement, a number of research 
projects were carried out in fields such as advanced materials, electro-
optics and biotechnology, to name only a few. Exchange visits of scientists 
took place and joint seminars and conferences were held. In addition, an 
agreement to facilitate bilateral cooperation and exchanges in the field of 
science and technology was signed by the Indian Science Academy and 
Israel’s National Academy of Science and Humanities and later on an 
additional protocol of cooperation was signed between India’s Department 
of Science and Technology and the Israeli Ministry of Science.   
 
Between 1995 and 1997, seven Memorandums of Understanding were 
signed regarding research projects in the field of advanced materials 
including two research projects, which took place in the field of information 
technology (IT). In June 1996, the Chief of the Indian DRDO and the 
scientific advisor to the Defence Minister, Abdul Kalam, paid  a visit to 
Israel, which was described as a high point of Israeli-Indian security 
cooperation (Kapila, 2000:4).59  
 
In November 1999, under the Protocol of Cooperation, both sides agreed 
on joint research and development between the office of the chief scientist 
of Israel and the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research (DSIR) 
as well as eleven other projects. The agreement also provided a framework 
for the exchange of researchers and for national conferences on scientific 
issues. In February 2002, an Israeli delegation consisting of 12 leading 
Israeli companies in the field of telecommunications and Information 
technology visited India. In addition, joint committee meetings in the field of 
science and technology have started to convene on a regular basis. A 
meeting in the field of biotechnology took place in Israel in February 2004 
and a science and technology joint committee meeting followed in July 
2004. During the visit of India’s Minister of Science and Technology, Kapil 
Sibal,  the two countries signed a memorandum of understanding on Israel-
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 Abdul Kalam was elected President of the Republic of India in 2002. 
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India Industrial, Research and Development Initiative Cooperation (IIRDC) 
on 30 May 2005 in Israel and agreed upon setting up a joint research and 
development fund (Jerusalem Post-Special Supplement, 26/1/2006). 
 
6.3.7 Cultural relations as a common interest. 
 
Cultural ties between the two countries since 1992 have become 
considerably more intense than before that period. In 1997, Israel 
celebrated India’s 50th year of independence with the Shalom India 
Festival, while India reciprocated one year later by organising many 
cultural events all over Israel as part of the celebration of the fifty years of 
Israeli independence.  
 
The Israel-India Cultural Association was established in 1992 with Zubin 
Mehta, the Bombay born chief conductor of the Israeli Philharmonic 
Orchestra, as its honorary president. Israeli publishers regularly participate 
in book fairs in India and Israeli anthologies have been a success in India 
and were made available in 13 local Indian languages as well as in 
English. Furthermore, there are an increasing number of Indian students at 
Israeli universities as well as at art academies. A cultural agreement was 
signed by Israel and India in May 1993 during the visit of Israel’s Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, Shimon Peres, and within the framework of this agreement, 
two cultural exchange programmes were implemented. In 1994, the Israeli 
Philharmonic Orchestra visited India and several concerts were conducted 
by Zubin Mehta in Bombay and New Delhi. 
 
During the visit of President Weizman to India in December 1996, the 
second cultural exchange programme was signed, Israel participated in the 
Delhi International Book Fair for the first time and the Israel cultural centre 
was inaugurated in New Delhi with the Shalom India Festival, a month long 
celebration of India’s 50th anniversary. The well-known Indian poet, Vikram 
Seth, participated in the Jerusalem Poet’s festival in 1997 and his book ‘A 
suitable boy’ was translated into Hebrew  (Naaz, 1999:900).  
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In 1999, a festival to celebrate Israel 50th anniversary was celebrated in 
eight cities around India and the exhibition of the City of David was 
featured in Bombay and an ethnic pop musical concert by Israel’s 
prominent singers was performed in Delhi and Mumbai. Israel participates 
annually in film festivals in India and a weeklong festival of Israeli films is 
featured regularly. Books by Israeli writers are being published by private 
publishers in India and a meeting of Indian and Israeli intellectuals takes 
place annually (Israel-Indian Bilateral Relations, 2001). The Israeli Minister 
of Education and Culture, Limor Livnat, signed an Action Plan in New Delhi 
in September 2003 as part of a programme for cultural and educational 
cooperation and an exchange programme on cooperation in the field of 
education.60  The Israel Festival that included a film festival, a food and 
wine week, exhibitions, lectures and musical events took place in March 
2005 in India. 
 
In the context of bilateral relations, there is a mutual understanding that 
cultural ties should be tightened in order to reach both the civil society as 
well as the elite in both counties. There is general consensus that this 
should not be confined mainly to institutional relations and that socio-
cultural affinities are a key element to improving ties between the two 
countries. 
 
6.3.8 The United Nations as a discrepant strategic interest  
 
The economic reforms and the Indian economic success story of the early 
1990s created renewed hope in India that rapid growth would be the basis 
for its becoming a major power in the world. This raised the question 
regarding where India stood vis-à-vis the UN in general and its aspirations 
of becoming a permanent member in the UN Security Council. (Mohan, 
2005:xx). The issue pertaining to India’s voting in international 
organisations in general and at the UN in particular, has been a constant 
item on the agenda between Israel and India since the establishment of 
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 Livnat accompanied Prime Minister Sharon in his official visit to India. For details about 
Sharon's visit in India, see section 6.2.2. 
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diplomatic relations between the two countries. This is important, especially 
considering the fact that after the 1990s and the Gulf War and the Oslo 
process, Israel was continually trying to improve its relations with the UN.  
 
In September 2001, despite Arab pressure and the visit of the PLO leader 
Yasser Arafat in New Delhi, India refused to support the resolution 
equating Zionism with racism in the Non-Governmental Organisations 
(NGO) part of the UN sponsored World Conference against Racism in 
Durban South Africa. 
 
The issue regarding India's voting at the UN constantly appeared on the 
agenda of the two countries’ meetings and was also raised during the visit 
of the Israeli Prime Minister Sharon in New Delhi in September 2003. 
According to Dinesh Kumar:  
 
Indian official are stressing that Delhi has already begun the process 
of reviewing its international position on the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict, however they stress that such a review or policy change 
could only be a gradual process. India has stopped sponsoring anti-
Israel resolutions at the United Nations and might well start to abstain 
from voting on them in the near future (Kumar, 2003:2).  
 
 
An Indian regiment has been part of the UN Interim Force in Lebanon 
(UNIFIL), which is posted on the border between Lebanon and Israel.61 In 
December 2003, India supported the UN resolution that requested the 
International Court Justice (ICJ) to render an advisory opinion on the 
legality of Israel’s security wall (although 74 out of 191 assembly members 
abstained).  
                                            
61
 UNIFIL was created in March 1978 to confirm the withdrawal of Israeli forces from 
Lebanon and secure the border areas between the two countries. 
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Since 1992, India no longer sponsored anti-Israeli UN resolutions; however 
it went on supporting the Palestinian cause at the UN General Assembly 
and committees while abstaining on the nuclear issue (Yegar, 2004:177).62  
          
    Table 6.3 Indian voting regarding resolutions relating to the UN 
General Assembly and to the  Committees 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 
2000 Y Y Y Y Y Y * A Y Y Y Y Y Y * Y Y Y Y Y  Y Y 
2001 Y Y Y Y Y Y * A Y Y Y Y Y Y * Y Y Y Y Y  Y Y 
2002 Y Y Y Y Y Y * A Y Y Y Y Y Y * Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
2003 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y A Y Y Y Y Y Y C C 
2004 Y Y Y Y Y Y * A Y Y Y Y Y Y C Y Y Y Y Y Y C C 
2005 Y Y Y Y Y Y * A Y Y Y Y Y Y C Y Y Y Y Y C C C 
  Voting key - Y: in favour; N: against; A: abstain; --: absent 
 
 *: Resolution that adopted without a vote; C: cancelled 
 
* The information is compiled from the MFA's official web site: http://www.mfa.gov.il 
 
 1 – Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the 
Palestinian People. 
 2 – Division for Palestinian Rights of the Secretariat. 
 3 – Special information programme on the question of Palestine. 
 4 – Peaceful settlement of the question of Palestine. 
 5 – Jerusalem. 
 6 – The Syrian Golan Heights. 
 7 – Assistance to the Palestinian People. 
8 – The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East. 
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9 –  Permanent sovereignty of the Palestinian People in the Occupied     
Palestinian Territories including East Jerusalem and the Occupied 
Syrian Golan. 
10-  The right of the Palestinians to self-determination. 
11-   Assistance to Palestinian refugees. 
12-  Persons displaced as a result of June 1967 and subsequent     
hostilities. 
13-  Palestinian refugees in the near east (operation of UNRWA). 
14-  Palestine refugees’ properties. 
15-  W. G/Assistance to Palestinian refugees and support for UNRWA. 
16-  Work of the special committee to investigate Israeli practices    
affecting the Human Rights of the Palestinian People. 
17-  Geneva Convention applicability to the Occupied Territories. 
18-  Israeli Settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. 
19-  Israeli practices affecting the Human Rights in the Occupied 
Territories. 
20-  The occupied Syrian Golan Heights.  
21-  Situation of and assistance to Palestinian children. 
22-  Offers of grants and scholarships to Palestinian   students by   
member states. 
23-  University of Jerusalem “Al-Quds.” 
 
 
6.3.9 Superpowers as a common strategic interests 
 
Since the 1990s, the changes in India’s foreign policy with regard to the 
super-powers were accelerated (mostly under the BJP led government) 
and reconfiguring relations with the superpowers had become a key 
feature of the new Indian diplomacy. Similarly, Israel maintained its close 
relations with the US while improving its ties with Russia. 
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6.3.9.1 The United States  
 
The interest of the Americans in the Indian Ocean had existed since the 
establishment of a permanent military base on the island of Diego Garcia in 
the 1970s that was followed by the creation of a Central Command in 
Florida in 1983 and the building of the Fifth Fleet in the mid-1990s. After 
the Gulf War, India realised the centrality of the US as a superpower. The 
end of the Cold War eased US - Indian relations and the Indian economic 
reforms that followed boosted US business interest in India. In May 1994 
the US and India agreed on closer defence cooperation and in January 
1995 the first ever agreed minutes on Indo-US defence  cooperation was 
signed between the two countries. 
 
 Four months after the Indian nuclear tests in May 1998, the US 
condemned the tests and responded with sanctions that put great strain on 
their relationship with India. However, in his speech at the Asia Society in 
New York on 28 September 1998, Prime Minister Vajpayee declared that 
India and the US were natural allies. The American decision to lift the 
sanctions imposed on India following India’s nuclear tests while entering 
into a high-level dialogue removed a serious obstacle between the two 
countries and indirectly contributed to Israel’s relations with India in general 
and in the military field in particular. In fact, the two Gulf wars, which 
proved to be to the advantage of the American weapon systems, 
encouraged India to purchase Israeli-made arms.63  
 
 In mid 1999, the Clinton administration forcefully convinced Pakistan to 
withdraw the forces it had sent across the Line of Control (LOC) in Kashmir 
(the Kargil War). In March 2000, President Clinton paid a successful official 
visit to India (the first American president to visit India in more than 22 
years) and half a year later, Prime Minister Vajpayee paid a return visit to 
the US. Both sides agreed to explore the substance of their relationship 
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more systematically and regularly rather than trying to reach some major 
agreement in disputed areas while searching for a strategy to cope with the 
emergence of China as a world power (Cohen, 2001:296-297). 
 
After September 11, 2001, the Indian Government led by the BJP party 
had an opportunity to expand military cooperation with the US that was 
ready to strengthen this type of cooperation with India as part of its 
strategic plan to build a regional coalition to contain forces of terror and 
regional destabilisation. According to Dennis Kux (2002:93-94), India 
headed by Vajpayee, seized the opportunity to improve its relations with 
US while trying to transform the long Indo-Pakistani conflict into part of the 
global war against terrorism by casting Pakistan in the role of al Qaeda and 
India as the victim. The new convergence of interests in the war against 
international terrorism helped India to overcome much of the traditional 
resistance to military cooperation with the US and after the attack on the 
World Trade Centre, Prime Minister Atal Vajpayee offered to extend the US 
whatever support it wanted, including a military basis.   
 
There is growing consensus in India that improved ties with the US can 
attract foreign investments, enable India to assume a greater global role 
and ensure that US foreign policy does not jeopardise Indian national 
interests. Five months earlier, India welcomed the American initiative on 
National Missile Defence (NMD) as a positive move towards the reduction 
of nuclear arms. The decision to support the American war on terrorism as 
well as the initiative on missile defence was a product of incremental 
changes in the Indian foreign policy since the 1990s. According to Raja 
Mohan (2003: xii), in 2002 the US helped to reduce the tension between 
India and Pakistan and Washington reacted in a subdued manner when 
India tested its intermediate-range ballistic missile. In May 2003, at the 
Washington Foreign Press Centre US National Security Advisor 
Condoleezza Rice stressed that the Indo-American relationship is a broad 
and a deepening one: 
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It goes beyond regional issues... this President George W. Bush, 
is dedicated to strengthening and broadening the Indian 
relationship to make it in accordance with the fact that India is the 
world’s largest democracy (Singh, 2003:11).  
 
 
Since September 11, the US has also sought Indian naval escorts for 
vessels moving through the Malacca Straits trying to increase Indo-US 
security cooperation in the preservation of sea-lanes and the maintenance 
of peace and stability in the Indian Ocean.64 In June 2005, India's Minister 
of Defence, Pranab Mukherjee, visited the US and signed an agreement of 
military cooperation, which has upgraded the military ties between the two 
countries.   
 
Following the visit of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh to Washington on 18 
July 2005, the door has opened for achieving new cooperation between the 
two countries. President Bush told Prime Minister Singh that his 
administration sees India as a world power and wants to work with it as 
global partners in a wide range of areas. These areas range from  civilian 
nuclear cooperation to defence and military matters, technology and space, 
energy, agriculture, economy, combating Aids, forming a joint front against 
terrorism as well as spreading democracy. The joint statement issued 
identified civilian nuclear activities, civilian space programmes and high 
technology trade as a key area of bilateral cooperation. President Bush has 
committed himself to adjusting the prevailing US laws, policies, regulations 
and obligations under international relevant regimes. In return, India 
accepted the same responsibilities and practices as other states with 
advanced nuclear technology. In the long-term, increased cooperation with 
the US is likely to emerge as fundamental to the Indian national interest as 
well as Indian strategy in the region of South Asia. 
 
The war on international terrorism and the improvement of relations with 
the US have been also connected with Israel in the eyes of the Indian 
policy makers. After September 11, there was a growing understanding in 
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India as well as in Israel that trilateral Indo-American-Israeli cooperation is 
likely to produce considerable benefits for all parties concerned. The 
Indian leadership, as ultimate decision units, became increasingly 
convinced that the American Jewish Lobby provides a vital link of influence 
in US policy making as well as in American finance.65  As pointed out by 
Dennis Kux (2002:96), since December 2001, military cooperation 
between India and the US has increased rapidly and in addition, the US 
sanctioned the inclusion of US technology in the radar system sold by 
Israel to India. In 2003, India’s National Security Advisor, Brajesh C. 
Mishra, visited the US.  According to Gajendra K. Singh, he was the 
driving force behind the Idea of formulating a tripartite axis between the 
US, Israel and India, He participated as a guest speaker at the annual 
meeting of the AJC, where, after emphasising the similarities between 
India and Israel, he commented that 
 
We are all democracies sharing a common vision of pluralism 
tolerance and equal opportunities. Stronger India US relations and 
India Israel relation have (therefore) a natural logic (Singh, 
2003:12). 
  
 
6.3.9.2 Russia  
 
After the collapse of the Soviet Union (USSR) in 1991, the relations 
between India and Russia appeared to have little chance of surviving, 
following the new economic conditions in Russia and the decline in contact 
between the civil societies. The bartered agreements between the two 
countries gave way to hard currency payments and Russia sold advanced 
military hardware to China.66 In January 1993, President Yeltsin visited 
India and a new agreement, which replaced the Indo-Soviet Treaty of 
Peace, Friendship and Cooperation, was signed between the two 
countries. In fact, the new agreement confirmed that India-Russia relations 
had changed; however, the two countries agreed to streamline the supply 
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of spare parts of Russian military equipment for the Indian army and 
announced a protocol on nuclear cooperation. In June 1994, a long-term 
Integrated Military Technical Cooperation Agreement was signed between 
India and Russia (the agreement was later extended to 2010).  
 
In 1998, Russia condemned the Indian nuclear tests, but on the other 
hand, at the UN Russia protested against imposing sanctions on India. The 
condemnation caused tension between the two countries. Subsequently, a 
rapprochement between India and Russia took place in 2000, with 
Presiding Vladimir Putin’s coming to power, when a declaration of a 
strategic partnership between India and Russia was signed between them. 
As a result of military agreements, military cooperation between India and 
Russia grew significantly.67 The two countries have also faced common 
threats of religious terrorism in particular after the rise of the Taliban in 
Afghanistan and coordinated efforts to extend support to the Northern 
Alliance. They have also collaborated in the field of energy and have 
supported the idea of a multi-polar world order (Mohan, 2003:125; Cohen, 
2001:89).  
 
Israel’s specialisation in Russian military equipment paved the way for 
trilateral joint military cooperation as had already been done successfully in 
the case of the upgrading of avionics of the Indian MIG 21s and the 
upgrading of T-72 Tanks as well as the planned installation of Israel’s 
Phalcon warning and controlling systems sold to India on Russian Ilyushin 
military aircrafts. There was common ground for trilateral cooperation in the 
field of energy as well as counter-terrorism in the international arena in 
general and in Central Asia in particular. The latter area was considered to 
be part of its extended neighbourhood by India. In addition, industrial 
cooperation including cooperation in diamond processing was another area 
for potential cooperation between Israel, India and Russia (Joshi, 
2005:176-178).  
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6.3.10 Geo-strategy as a common strategic interest  
 
The geo-strategical locations of Israel and India have encouraged strategic 
cooperation between the two countries, which are both placed on the flank 
of central Arab countries and an Islamic bloc. Both countries have their 
own   minority Muslim population, which plays a role in their domestic 
politics.68 This strategic cooperation can be based on common political 
interests in the region, in particular in dealing with the menace of Islamic 
fundamentalism and terrorism. 
 
The cold war and the Indian socialist economic policy has undoubtedly 
undermined India’s status and primacy in the Indian Ocean littoral. As part 
of India’s new foreign policy, India has every intention of becoming an 
important element in the Indian Ocean (this is known in India as the vision 
of the British Viceroy, Lord Curzon) and has a strategic interest to maintain 
the security of maritime traffic in the Indian Ocean and the sea-lanes to the 
straits of Malacca. According to Raman (2005:1-2), the Indian Ocean and 
the Bay of Bengal are highly vulnerable in terms of maritime counter-
terrorism for the following reasons:  
 
• The presence of terrorist or insurgent organisations with proved 
capabilities for maritime terror operations (such as the Liberation Tigers 
of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) of Sri Lanka, the Free Ache Movement of 
Indonesia and Abu Sayaf of the Philippines). 
 
• The networking of Al-Qaeda including surrogate Jihadi terrorist 
organisations that are members or associates of the International 
Islamic Front (IIF). 
 
• The continuing availability of large quantities of arms and ammunition in 
the region. 
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• The reputation of the area as being piracy prone. 
 
• The presence of a large number of uninhabited islands that can serve as 
sanctuaries and operational bases for unwanted insurgents. 
 
The Indian Ocean has become important for the security of Israel. Israel 
needs offshore strategic depth to sustain a second strike capability, which 
can be found in the Indian Ocean.69 Furthermore, Asia has been an 
important destination for Israeli trade and India is one of the key actors, in 
geo-strategic terms, in safeguarding the commercial shipping routes 
between the Middle East, Israel and Asia. Martin Sherman explains the 
situation as follows: 
  
Joint Indo-Israeli naval cooperation may well assume vital 
importance particularly because possible advantages in satellite 
surveillance technique…especially in terms of maintaining 
deterrent retaliatory capabilities… (Sherman, 1999:17). 
 
 
Ephraim Inbar gives more details: 
 
To parallel its air power, Israel built ocean-going navy, Israeli 
Saar-5 corvettes, which are able to stay at sea for long periods, 
have been seen in the Indian Ocean. The three new Israeli 
submarines are equipped with long-range cruise missile 
launching capability. One such missile was tested in the Indian 
Ocean, generating reports about Indian-Israeli naval cooperation 
(Inbar, 2004:100). 
 
6.3.11 Energy as a discrepant strategic interest  
 
India is the sixth largest energy consumer in the world and India’s 
intention to sustain its high level of economic growth since 1991 has 
required a high level of oil reserves. India depends on energy from 
the Middle East and is exploring enduring energy links with the oil 
supplying countries.70 According to Mohan (2003:228), since the 
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1990s, India has adopted the concept of energy security in which 
relationships have been developed with the oil supply countries and 
the Gulf countries, Iran and Saudi Arabia in particular, that go beyond 
simple buyers–sellers.71 In the case of Saudi Arabia, India has even 
transformed its relations with this country, previously considered by 
India to be a strong supporter of Pakistan. Subsequently, friendly 
relations have developed between them reaching a peak with the 
official visit of the Minister of External Affairs, Jaswant Singh, to Saudi 
Arabia in January 2001. It was the first official visit by an Indian 
Minister of External Affairs since the visit of Prime Minister Nehru to 
the desert kingdom in 1950. The Ministers of Petroleum and Finance 
of India paid visits to Saudi Arabia as well.  
 
In the case of Iran, following the visit of the Indian Minister of 
Petroleum in Iran, in June 2004, India purchased natural gas from 
Iran worth US $7.5 million and a gas pipeline project (from Iran to 
India through Pakistan) is currently on their bilateral agenda 
(Pattanayak, 2001:15-16).72 The oil supplying Arab countries have 
evolved from being merely a source of oil to being economic and 
political partners.73  Energy cooperation emerged as the dominant 
feature of Indo-Gulf relations as India is on its way to become one of 
the most important customers of the oil producing countries of the 
Gulf as the expansion of Indo-Gulf energy ties have been propelled 
by changes in the Indian economy.   
 
India’s policymakers must ensure access to safe and affordable 
energy resources in order to sustain its economic growth. 
Consequently, the energy coordination committee chaired by Prime 
Minister Singh himself was set up in July 2005 in order to address 
India’s energy security concerns (Dadwal, 2005:312). 
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J.N. Dixit (1998:93) clearly points out that India’s economic interests 
in the Arab countries include India’s dependence on the energy 
resources of the West Asian and Gulf regions. Therefore, India’s 
stance on the Middle East issue and the Arab–Israel conflicts, which 
support the Palestinians and the Arabs, was shaped by India’s 
dependence on oil resources.74  As far as India was concerned, since 
the 1990s, the lack of adequate energy resources, Arab oil and the 
demand for oil based products such as petrochemicals and fertilisers 
made the relationship between India and the Gulf countries an 
important factor in Indian foreign policy. India’s need to  maintain 
good relations with the Arab countries for its future oil policy  makes 
Arab oil a key factor in the bilateral relations between India and Israel.  
 
6.3.12 The Non- Aligned Movement (NAM) as a discrepant strategic 
interest 
  
For years, India had complied with the Non- Aligned Movement (NAM) by 
limiting its diplomatic interaction with Israel, but by the late 1990s, it was 
compelled to look for ways to ease out of the political limits the NAM had 
imposed on its foreign relations in general and vis-à-vis Israel in 
particular.75 During the 1990s, the altered international system in general, 
as well as the end of the cold war and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 
particular, forced India to examine the relevance of the Non-Alignment 
policy in its foreign relations. Indian foreign policy shifted from a Third 
World policy to the promotion of its own self-interest (as did most of the 
developing countries) and the pursuit of its own national interests. As 
pointed out by Raja Mohan:  
 
The Narasimha Rao government understood the demands of 
the new international order on India, but there was no way the 
Congress, with its reverence of the Nehru dynasty, could come 
up with an open criticism of non-alignment and make a credible 
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case for change in foreign policy. That would have invited 
serious political trouble both inside and outside of the Congress 
party. Yet, in his own low-key manner, it was Narasimha Rao 
who paved the way for change...The imperatives of economic 
globalization and reconstruction of Indian foreign policy in a 
world without the Soviet Union compelled India to unveil a new 
foreign policy agenda without appearing to reject the old 
commitments and the NAM (Mohan, 2003:32-33).  
 
 
Since the 1990s, the NAM’s influence on Indian diplomacy steadily eroded 
as India sought to reconstruct its foreign policy to meet the requirements of 
the post cold war world. The dominance of multilateral diplomacy and the 
NAM in Indian foreign policy began to be questioned and India started to 
focus on issues of concern for its national interest. The BJP did not refer to 
Non-Alignment as a major principle regarding India’s foreign policy. In fact, 
the BJP governments marginalised the concept of Non-Alignment and had 
fewer illusions about the relevance of past Indian foreign policy and old 
commitments to Non-Alignment as well as to the NAM. Nevertheless, 
Prime Minister Vajpayee attended the NAM summit in Durban, South Africa 
in 1998. 
 
Israel was a direct beneficiary of the changed Indian international 
orientation towards the NAM. Traditionally, the political dynamics in the 
organisation was unconditionally in favour of the Arab world in general, 
while adopting a constant anti-Israeli attitude and participating in solidarity 
demonstrations with the Palestinian cause in particular. Following the new 
Indian approach towards the NAM, India made serious attempts to 
moderate the NAM’s resolutions against Israel, even though it remained 
an active member of the Palestinian committee of the NAM. In August 
2004, India sent an official note to Malaysia, as the chair of the NAM, 
expressing its reservations concerning the anti-Israeli declaration (the 
Palestinian Declaration), which had been adopted at the organisation’s 
foreign ministers’ summit in Durban, South Africa and called for the 
imposition of  sanctions against Israel.  
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6.3.13 Asia as a common strategic interest 
 
India has gradually emerged as an Asian regional force since 1994 with 
its” Look East policy” originally initiated by Prime Minister Narasimha Rao. 
According to Raja Mohan, India’s “Look East policy” went through two 
distinct phases. The first one focussed on renewing political and 
commercial contacts, whereas the second one was India’s search and 
development of new economic relations with Asian countries driven by 
globalisation while unveiling of the geopolitical dimension. (Mohan, 
2003:212-213). India became an active participant in the Association of 
South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum (ARF) in 1996 and 
has been a summit player of ASEAN called ASEAN Plus India since 2002 
and ASEAN’s Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC).76 It made India a 
vital international player in Asia. In 2003, the India-ASEAN framework 
agreement on comprehensive economic cooperation was signed and laid 
the basis for the future establishment of an India-ASEAN Regional Trade 
and Investment Area, which will include a Free Trade Agreement 
(tentatively scheduled for December 2011). (Naidu, 2005:222). India has 
been able to utilise Israeli technology and expertise in order to promote its 
trade and economic relations with Asia. Israel, on the other hand, that is 
still struggling for  full international legitimacy in Asia, has realised that its 
relations with India could be instrumental in helping it to achieve such a 
type of legitimacy as well as upgrading its international status in Asia. 77  
 
 
6.3.14 People’s Republic of China (PRC) as a discrepant strategic 
interest  
 
India’s relations with China are based on its location and history. The 
border dispute between them is still one of India’s leading security 
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concerns (nearly 7000 km of their 16,560 km border is disputed). After the 
Cold War, the Indian focus had shifted from the Soviet Union to the 
international consequences of rising China as a regional power in Asia. In 
the 1990s, after the Gulf war, India seemed to have overcome its trauma 
regarding the 1962 war with China and tried to normalise the bilateral 
relations between them. India also reassessed its role in the balance of 
power in Asia, while trying to regain parity with China, which has been 
considered a global power.78  Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi’s historic visit to 
China in December 1988 created a new political basis for bilateral relations 
after an extended period of stasis in their bilateral relations and reduced 
the prominence of the boundary dispute between the two countries. 
Chinese Prime Minister Li Peng visited India in 1991 and India’s Prime 
Minister Narasimha Rao reciprocated with a visit to Beijing in 1992 that 
enhanced the bilateral relations further. At the end of the 1990s, India 
embarked on a process of normalisation of foreign relations with China, 
while keeping a watchful eye on China’s aspirations of becoming a 
superpower in the international arena in general and in Asia in particular 
(Mohan, 2003:143-144).  
 
A new highpoint in the Indo-Chinese bilateral relations was achieved 
following China’s Prime Minister Wen Jiabao’s visit to India in May 2005 
when the two sides agreed to a road map to settle their border conflict that 
included eleven guiding principles on the basis of which their border 
dispute would be demarcated. By moving closer to China, India also saw 
an opportunity to weaken the Chinese-Pakistani ties, but despite the 
improvement in their bilateral relations, China still represented an 
economic as well as a military challenge to India, although not a direct 
military threat any longer. The reason was that China continued to be the 
main supplier of military and nuclear technology to Pakistan, including aid 
to build a naval base in Gwadar, which could control access to the Persian 
Gulf. China also helped Myanmar and Bangladesh with naval facilities and 
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the Chinese military build-up was viewed with concern by India (Mansingh, 
2005:56).79 
 
Chinese-Israeli relations in general and their military cooperation in 
particular were of concern to India and were watched closely in terms of 
national security concerns. According to Kumaraswamy, Israel's policies 
towards China and Pakistan posed certain concern in India and Israel's 
military cooperation with China was considered a threat to India's 
strategic interests:  
 
Such cooperation not only enhances the capabilities and 
modernization programs of China but also improves the quality 
of its arms exports. As a traditional customer of China, Pakistan 
would thus indirectly benefit from this military cooperation 
(Kumaraswamy, 2004:269). 
 
 
6.3.15 Central Asia as a common strategic interest  
 
India has had historical strategic and cultural relations with Central Asia but 
has also had to pick up the pieces from its previous shattered Afghan 
policy in general and its compliance, in the past, with the Soviet Union 
invasion in Afghanistan. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, India 
wanted to secure its political and economical presence in the Central Asian 
countries in order to preserve the moderate religious character of their 
regimes, gain access to their energy resources and limit Pakistani 
influence in the region.80 In the mid-1990s the Central Asian Republics 
(CARs) as well as India were alarmed by the rise of the Taliban in 
Afghanistan and its affect on their stability and India started cooperating 
with them in a bid to counteract  fundamental Muslim terrorism. 
 
After September 11 and the American war on terrorism and following the 
overthrow of the Taliban in Afghanistan, India has been engaged in 
extended economic diplomacy, by redefining a new approach towards 
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Afghanistan and Central Asia. However, the CARs’ need to cross the 
Pakistani territory to gain access to world markets and the Indian Ocean 
has predisposed them to favour relations with Pakistan over those with 
India. According to Mohan (2003:217), India had four objectives in Central 
Asia, namely to gain political and economic prestige and power, to 
preserve the moderate religious character of the regimes, to access energy 
resources and to limit Pakistani influence in the region. A similar viewpoint 
is expressed by Jyotsna Bakshi (2005:240,246) who declares that India 
can develop closer ties with the CARs by  increased economic and trade 
cooperation that can promote its stability and interdependence; while  
multilateral cooperation is enhanced to protect India’s core interests. 
 
Both India and Israel have to work hard to be regarded as significant 
players in the region considering the high level of evolvement and 
competition with Russia (previously the Soviet Union), the US, China, 
Pakistan, Iran, Saudi Arabia and Turkey. In the case of both countries, the 
Central Asian region is, in fact, an extended strategic neighbourhood 
(Inbar, 2004:101). Both countries have sold military equipment to the 
CARs, have had an economic interest in the region including the field of 
energy and have been trying to limit the influence of Iran and Saudi Arabia 
as agents of radical Islamisation. In such a situation and being an area of 
strategic concern for both countries, mutual cooperation between Israel 
and India in Central Asia has been a common strategic interest while 
affecting their bilateral relations positively. 
 
6.3.16 Pakistan as a common strategic interest 
 
In the years 1947, 1965, 1971 and 1999 India and Pakistan had waged war 
against each other and Pakistan had constantly encouraged  the activities 
of Muslim extremists, in particular when it suited its foreign policy goals in 
with relation to India and Afghanistan. However, during the Kargil crisis in 
1999, Pakistan was eventually forced to withdraw behind LOC, In addition, 
after the September 11 terrorist attack on New York changed the political 
environment of the world regarding terrorism and forced the President of 
 1402 
Pakistan to ensure that Pakistan would not allow its territories to be used 
by terrorists for launching attacks on other countries.  After the recognition 
of Pakistan and India as nuclear states India was concerned that the 
Kashmiri conflict would attract unwanted international intervention to 
prevent a nuclear confrontation. This could  increase the possibility of 
Pakistan intervening in the disputed Jammu and Kashmir areas by 
resorting to cross- border terrorism (Inbar, 2004:93). In September 2004, 
the encounter between the leaders of India and Pakistan at the UN 
confirmed that there was an impasse in the Indo-Pakistani dialogues and 
their joint statement was vague  (Bahadur, 2005:269).   
 
The nuclear weaponry brought a new dimension into the bilateral equation 
between India and Pakistan. Pakistan’s nuclear tests in 1998 constituted a 
threat to both India and Israel and there was concern that if the Pakistani 
nuclear arsenal fell into the hands of radical Islamic rulers it could pose an 
existential threat to both countries. The Pakistani nuclear bomb was often 
called the “Islamic Bomb” and after the Pakistani nuclear tests in 1998, 
Iran’s Foreign Minister issued a statement during his visit to Pakistan that 
Muslims felt more secure under the Pakistani nuclear umbrella.81 The 
Pakistani nuclear ability, which has been of concern to India and Israel, 
constitutes a mutual security challenge, which includes intelligence 
cooperation, for both countries because of the gradual radicalisation of 
Pakistan..82  
 
In this regard, it  should also be pointed out that according to Dinesh 
Kumar (2001:5, 10), India and Israel were engaged in secret dialogue over 
the possibility of destroying Pakistan’s nuclear facility in Kahuta at the 
beginning of the 1990s. According to Farah Naaz (2000:988), Israel 
provided India with satellite intelligence on Pakistan as part of their bilateral 
intelligence cooperation. Harsh Pant (2005:5) adds that India and Israel 
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also exchanged intelligence information on Islamic terrorist groups and 
Israel helped India to fight terrorism in Kashmir by providing logistical 
support. 83   
 
The Kargil crisis between Indian and Pakistan in 1999 has expanded the 
amount and quality of military cooperation between India and Israel 
significantly and has increased the volume of arms sales, although the two 
countries emphasised that their defence ties are not directed against any 
specific third party. Israel sent laser guided missiles to India, making it 
possible for the Indian air force to destroy Pakistani bunkers in the 
mountains of Kargil (Pant, 2005:8). Israel was particularly concerned about 
the seepage of nuclear technologies, authorised by the Pakistani 
government and also as part of a rogue operation. It was feared that 
Pakistan would become a supplier of intermediate range missile to Arab 
countries in the Middle East and Iran (Inbar, 2004:101).84  
 
6.3.17 Iran as a discrepant strategic interest 
 
Since the mid-1990s, India has improved its relations with the Islamic 
Republic of Iran. The key reasons for the improvement were: 
 
• Security concerns. 
• Common opposition to the Taliban.  
• Energy needs. 
• Shared interests in Central Asia, which included seeking alternate 
roads into Central Asia  (Ansari, 2000:250).85   
 
The visits to Iran, by the Indian Minister of External Affairs, Jaswant Singh, 
in May 2000 and by Prime Minister Vajpayee in April 2001, which was 
reciprocated by the Iranian President Mohammad Khatami when he visited 
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India in January 2003, have consolidated their bilateral relations (Mohan, 
2003:229). 
 
Iran is considered to be close to having the capacity to build a nuclear 
bomb and in July 2003, it announced the operational deployment of 
surface-to-surface Shihab 3 missiles, which put Israel into its striking 
distance (Inbar, 2004:99).86  Iran does not recognise the state of Israel and 
its antagonism regarding Israel was demonstrated by its support of terror 
organisations in the Middle East such as the Hizbullah organisation in 
Lebanon, the Hammas and the Islamic Jihad on the West Bank and Gaza 
and also by its use of inflammatory anti-Israeli rhetoric. Israel regarded 
Iran’s Islamic governments and its fundamental regimes as a strategic 
threat and as an existential danger to the state of Israel as well as a 
serious danger to the stability of the region in particular, considering Iran’s 
nuclear weapon capabilities.  
 
Israel’s attitude towards Iran has been in stark contrast with the Indian’s 
relations with Iran. The close India-Iran relations were taken into account 
by Israel in terms of strategic discrepant interests as far as the promotion 
of bilateral military relations between Israel and India was concerned. In 
fact, Israel has regularly expressed its concern about India's close ties with 
Teheran and the possibility of India selling advanced technology and 
military equipment to Iran was brought up in official meetings between 
military representatives of the two countries.   
 
6.3.18 The Islamic world as a discrepant strategic interest  
 
Traditionally, relations with the Islamic world have been pivotal in India’s 
foreign policy in general and India tried to create a mutuality of economic 
interests with Muslim countries in the Middle East in particular. In the past, 
India stressed its historic links with the Islamic world while trying to avoid 
excessive focus on Kashmir and tensions with Pakistan. It also tried to 
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neutralise Pakistan and its ability to play the Islamic card against India. 
Despite India’s traditional friendly relations with the Islamic world, the 
Israeli- Indian military collaboration provided Pakistan with justification for 
mobilising the OIC against India, so that strictures were passed against it.87 
The OIC had been critical of India’s policies in Kashmir and a number of 
Gulf States allowed their citizens to fight in Kashmir as part of a pan-
Islamic jihadist movement (Cohen, 2001:248). Since the 1990s, India had 
changed its approach and no longer objected to ties between Pakistan and 
Islamic countries, but the new approach only resulted in bilateral dividends, 
however the OIC has continued its traditional support of Pakistan. 
Nevertheless, according to Kumar (2001:9), India regarded Israeli security 
and intelligence cooperation as a valuable asset for dealing effectively with 
the Kashmir problem; therefore it offset  the consequent unfriendly attitude 
of the Muslim countries.  
 
Following the change of governments in India and the return to power of 
the INCP in May 2004, E. Ahamed, the representative of the Muslim 
League in the state of Kerela, was appointed Minister of State for External 
Affairs. His nomination reflected the UPA government’s will to improve its 
relations with the Islamic world, the Arab countries and the Indian Muslim 
community.88  In January 2005, Chinmay Gharekhan was appointed special 
envoy of the Prime Minister, to the Middle East.89 Despite the new UPA 
government’s will to improve its relations with the Muslim world, the OIC 
has continued to endorse the Pakistani backed militants in Kashmir. In 
turn, India rejected a resolution passed in July 2005 on Jammu-Kashmir by 
the foreign ministers of the OIC in Yemen,  claiming that the OIC has no 
stand (locus standi) on that issue which is an internal Indian matter.  On the 
other hand, India made an effort to improve its bilateral relations with Saudi 
Arabia, other Arab Gulf States, Turkey and Iran. In fact, it tried to find 
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common ground between them regarding support for political moderation 
and religious extremism, taking advantage of the fact that religious 
extremism has altered the political discourse in the Islamic world  (Mohan, 
2003:232). 90  
 
6.3.19 The Arab world as a discrepant strategic interest 
  
India has traditionally pursued a pro-Arab foreign policy in general and a 
pro-Arab policy regarding the Arab- Israeli conflict in particular, mainly in 
order to counter Pakistani influence in South Asia and to secure access to 
the Middle East oil resources (Heitzman & Worden, 1995:537). However, 
there was a shift in the Indian foreign policy towards the Arab countries 
after the Gulf War and also as a result of the evolving relations with Israel 
based on India’s perception that it could serve its national interests better 
by having close relations with both Israel and the Arab world (Kumar, 
2001:8).   
 
In July 1999, the Arab League, openly warned against the danger of the 
growing Israeli-Indian military cooperation for the first time. After 
September 11, India has found increased common political ground with key 
Arab countries based on the shared perception of the need for political 
modernisation and opposition to religious fanaticism and extremism. In 
fact, this started with the rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan in the mid-1990s 
and the political convergence between India and a large number of Arab 
countries that followed.91  On 22-23 March 2005, the Indian Minister of 
State for External Affairs E. Ahamed, who represents the Muslim League in 
the state of Kerela, represented India as an observer at the Arab League 
summit in Algeria. This was the first official Indian participation at such a 
summit). 
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As part of the new forward-looking Indian foreign policy, India’s partnership 
with the Gulf countries and the accompanying energy security was of great 
consequence as India is the biggest potential consumer of natural gas 
resources in the Gulf and Central Asia.92 The financial value of India’s 
relations with the Arab Gulf countries has grown (in 2002 it was estimated 
to be around US $5 billion). The Gulf and the Arab countries were no 
longer just a source of oil and destination for Indian labour (3.5 million 
Indians work in the Gulf countries); they have also become economic 
partners (the financial value of India's relationship with the Gulf countries 
was estimated in 2001 to be around US $15 billion) as well as political 
partners.  
 
India has preferred, to keep a low profile in the Middle East and avoid 
political involvement in that region since the 1990s and Delhi conveyed to 
the Arab leaders that in their dispute with Israeli they should not take Indian 
support for granted (Kumar 2001:9). According to Raja Mohan, after the 
1990s there was a shift in India’s foreign policy from a one-sided viewpoint 
in favour of the Arabs regarded their dispute with Israel to a more balanced 
stance and India recognised that it must be able to do business with all 
sides in the Middle East, but without ignoring India’s economic and political 
interest in the region: 
 
As India quickly discovered, it did not have to choose between 
Arabs and Israelis it could do business with both. India’s new 
Middle East policy recognized the shades of grey in the region 
and acknowledged the pragmatism of the Arabs themselves, 
who did not really object to India’s new relations with 
Israel…India support could no longer be taken for granted by the 
Arabs in its disputes with the US and Israel. This new Indian 
approach was to develop equities on both sides, and New Delhi 
was loath to project itself as a potential interlocutor between 
Israel and the Arabs (Mohan, 2003:226-227). 
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6.3.20 The Palestinian Authority as a discrepant strategic interest 
 
The Oslo Accords in 1991 and the second Palestinian uprising in 
September 2000 (the second Intifada) were the two major events that had 
an impact on the Indian foreign policy towards the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict. In between, in June 1996, India nominated an official diplomatic 
representative for the Palestinian Authority (PA), the Chairman of the PA 
Yasser Arafat paid a State visit to New Delhi in November 1997 and in 
September 1999, Arafat arrived in India for a working visit. The direct trade 
volume between India and the Palestinian Authority in 2001 was US $20 
million including the joint ventures and were concentrated on 
telecommunications and pharmaceuticals.  
 
During the visit of Prime Minister Sharon in India in September 2003, Prime 
Minister Vajpayee indicated that this visit would boost military and trade 
ties between India and Israel; but he declared that India’s support of the 
Palestinian cause would not be diluted (The Hindu, 11/9/2003).93 In winter 
2003, India supported the transfer of the case of Israel’s Security Fence to 
the ICJ in The Hague.94   
 
When the new coalition government, the UPA, was formed by the INCP in 
May 2004, the following proclamation, as part of the common minimum 
program of the UPA, was made: 
 
The UPA Government reiterated India's decades-old commitment to 
the cause of the Palestinian people for a homeland of their own (The 
Pioneer, 21/6/2004). 
 
 
In September 2004, the Indian Minister of State for External Affairs E. 
Ahamed visited the Palestinian Authority (as well as Saudi Arabia and 
Jordan) where he met Yasser Arafat and other Palestinian leaders. His visit 
was described by Pant (2005:12) as a symbolic move by the new 
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government of India demonstrating its strong support for Palestinian 
independence while calling on Israel to lift the siege imposed on the 
headquarters of the former Palestinian leader, Yasser Arafat. An Indian 
official delegation headed by the Minister of External Affairs, Natwar Singh, 
participated in the funeral of Yasser Arafat in Cairo on 12 November 2004.  
 
In addition, India supported and sent observers to the general election of 
the Palestinian Authority (PA) in January 2005 and sent a note of 
congratulations to Abu Mazen (Mahmoud Abbas) upon his election as the 
new leader of the Palestinian Authority. In the same month, January 2005, 
Chinmay Gharekhan was appointed special envoy to the Middle East 
(West Asia).95 His nomination was carried out by the UPA government led 
by the INCP, which wished to improve its relationship with the Arab world. 
It also wanted to be portrayed as a true supporter of the Palestinian cause 
as well as the Palestinian quest for an independent state (in contrast with 
the previous NDA government that was led by the BJP, which had been 
perceived as pro-Israeli).  
 
Gharekhan visited Israel and the Palestinian Authority (PA) in February 
2005. During his visit to Israel (24-26 February 2005), he met Vice-Prime 
Minister, Shimon Peres, and the Minister of Foreign Affairs Silvan Shalom 
and during his visit to the PA, he met with the newly elected chair Abu-
Mazen. In March 2005, he also met the President of Lebanon, Emil Lahud 
as well as the Secretary General of Hizbullah in Lebanon, Hassan 
Nasralla. Israel protested officially against Gharekhan's meeting with 
Nasralla (Gerberg, 2005:6). Later Abu-Mazen visited New Delhi between 
19-20 May 2005 where he met with the Indian President Abdul Kalam and 
Prime Minister Manmohan Singh as well as the President of the INCP, 
Sonia Gandhi. One month later, Natwar Singh, the Indian Minister of 
External Affairs was critical of Vajpayee’s government’s efforts to promote 
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Israeli-Indian ties at the expense of the Palestinians while in the opposition. 
He issued the following statement: 96 
 
We have civilizational links with the Arab world and have always 
supported the just aspirations of the Palestinian people and the 
establishment of an independent state of Palestine (MEA, 
27/6/2005). 
 
The collapse of the Oslo process in Camp David, the death of the 
Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat, the end of the second Intifada (April 
2003), the election of Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) as the new leader of 
the Palestinian Authority (PA) and the introduction of the Road-Map 
initiative as well as the failure of the implementations of the Road-Map 
have influenced the Indian foreign policy regarding the Israeli Palestinian 
conflict. 97 The UPA government has supported the Road-Map initiative, 
which called for a set of confidence building measures between Israel and 
the Palestinian Authority to be followed by the establishment of a 
Palestinian State with provisional borders leading to the conclusion of a 
permanent status agreement. Israel accepted the outline of the Road-Map 
but had reservations about certain aspects. Ultimately, neither the 
discontinuation of violence between the Palestinians and Israel nor the 
disintegration of the Palestinian political and security apparatuses were 
achieved. Neither was the first phase of the Road-Map implemented.98  
 
According to Hamid Ansari (2005:252), the Indian position on the 
Palestinian question has been based on clearly demarcated principles and 
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viewpoints  since the beginning of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and has 
been commensurate with the views of the greater majority of the 
international community. However, Mohan (2003:228) points out that the 
Palestinians and Israelis would have liked to see India as an interlocutor in 
the prolonged conflict between them, but India’s diplomatic energy has 
been focussed more on the Gulf than on the Arab- Israeli dispute. 
However, the UPA government has been ready to demonstrate that its ties 
with Israel would not affect its support for the Palestinian cause (Indian 
Express, 12/7/2004).   
 
Following the failure of the implementation of the Road-Map, Israel 
proposed a unilateral Disengagement Plan from the Gaza Strip and part of 
the North West Bank, which led to a cease-fire supported by the 
Palestinian Islamic organisations. The UPA government allocated US $15 
million for assistance to the Palestinian Authority (including US $3 million 
for educational projects) and took a positive view of the Israeli 
Disengagement Plan. The condition was that it would only serve as the first 
stage of a comprehensive peace process that would lead to an 
independent and viable Palestinian state and has encouraged Israel to 
take steps that can improve the Palestinian economy and revitalise the 
Palestinian Authority.   
 
6.4 Israeli - Indian relations analysed by the state and society  
 level of analysis and individual level of analysis 
 
Based on the International Level of Analysis Model and the Oscillated 
Diplomacy Model, the guiding parameters of the bilateral relations between 
Israel and India are also analysed according to the state and society 
(national) level of analysis, namely the analysis of the Indian political 
system, the Indian Ministry of External Affairs and pertinent pressure 
groups. In addition, there are individuals, in India who have played a role in 
the evolving bilateral relations between the years 1992 and 2005 and their 
contribution to it is analysed in terms of the individual level of analysis.   
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6.4.1 Indian political system  
 
Since the 1990s, Indian politics has undergone a period of  transformation 
from a situation in which socialism and local politics were stressed to a 
situation where the focus falls strongly on the modern economy and new 
economic approaches.. The Congress Party, which was once the symbol 
of the architecture of the Non-Aligned Movement and India’s state 
socialism, led India to its economic reforms as well as economic 
liberalisation.  
 
The two United Front governments that succeeded the Congress 
government continued with economic reforms while accommodating the 
new global realities and the BJP governments in particular, were less 
inhibited by the ideological traditional inheritance of the Indian foreign 
policy and therefore more open to economic reforms. The INCP that 
returned to power in 2004 has maintained the processes of liberalisation 
and globalisation.99  
 
The changing orientation in Indian politics and liberalisation of the economy 
since the 1990s has also found expression in Indian foreign policy in 
general and in its stance towards Israel in particular. In both cases, India 
pursued a new foreign policy, which was more suitable for meeting the 
challenges of the coming century while shifting from idealism to 
pragmatism (Mohan, 2003: xxi).100 In addition to the governmental build- up 
of official relations with Israel, the Indian political system has gradually 
come to terms with the evolving relations between the two countries.   
 
In May 1993, an Israeli Parliamentary delegation of the Knesset visited 
New Delhi, where the Inter Parliamentary Union (IPU) conference took 
place. On 13 November 1994, the Speaker of the Lower House of the 
Indian Parliament (Lok Sabha), Shivraj V. Patil, visited Israel. Later, in 
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January 1997, an Indian Parliamentary delegation visited Israel. In turn, an 
Israeli parliamentary delegation visited India in February 1997, in order to 
participate in an IPU conference. In the summer of 2000, the chairperson 
of the India Israel Parliamentary Friendship League, Somnath Chatterjee, a 
leader of the Communist party in India (CPI), accompanied by the former 
Chief Minister of West Bengal, Jyoti Basu visited Israel. This visit 
demonstrated the fact that even the communists were no longer opposed 
to Indian ties with Israel. Between 25 November and 5 December 2001, 
members of the Israel-India Parliamentary Friendship League in the Israeli 
Knesset, headed by M.K. Amnon Rubinstein, visited New Delhi upon an 
invitation from the Indian Parliament.  
 
During the years between 1992 and 2005, a large number of Chief 
Ministers visited Israel, including the Chief Ministers of the following states: 
Maharashtra, Punjab, Rajasthan, Haryana, Mhadhya Pradesh, New Delhi 
and Kerala as well as West Bengal (Neotia, 2002:23).101. On 17-23 May 
2005, an official delegation of young Indian politicians visited Israel. On 9 
June 2005, the leader of the opposition in the Upper House of the Indian 
Parliament (Rajya Sabha) and the Former Minister of External Affairs, 
Defence and Finance, Jaswant Singh, visited Israel. In addition to his 
participation in an academic conference regarding Israel-Indian relationship 
in Tel-Aviv University, he met with the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Silvan 
Shalom and Minister of Finance Benjamin Netanyahu, as well as the 
Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Regional Planning Shimon Peres.  
 
Between 1992 and 2005, all the governing parties as well as most of the 
political parties in India have realised that the success of the Indian foreign 
policy depended on the pace of India’s globalisation and its ability to 
strengthen its ties with the West. Israel, as a modern technology-oriented 
economy, has become an important economic partner of India in trade, 
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joint ventures and the transfer of expertise and technology.102 The 
diplomatic relations with Israel have acquired the backing of most of the 
political spectrum in India. Most of the political parties came to terms with 
the bilateral relations between the two countries realising its benefit for 
India in general and for the defence and military relations in particular, 
while continuing their support of the Palestinian cause.103 The return to 
power of the INCP on 23 May 2004 completed a political circle as far as 
bilateral relations with Israel were concerned. Some concerns were 
expressed in Israel about possible changes in India’s foreign policy 
towards Israel, however, military, economic and cultural relations have 
been maintained, while bilateral relations, especially in terms of high-level 
official visits received less predominance. 
 
6.4.2 Indian Ministry of External Affairs  
` 
The MEA has slowly adjusted to the change of the traditional Indian foreign 
policy towards Israel after the establishment of diplomatic relations 
between the two countries and the change of international reality in the 
Middle East.104 This adjustment, according to Dinesh Kumar, was made in 
the following way:  
 
Delhi began to perceive that it would serve its interest better by 
having close relations with both Israel and the Arab world…This 
was why Delhi preferred to keep a low profile in the region and 
avoid active involvement in the Middle East conflict. India expressed 
concern whenever there were setbacks to the peace process (for 
example, during the opening of the tunnel beneath the Temple 
Mount and the disturbances in the Har Homa neighbourhood) but 
unlike as in the past, it refrained from openly criticising Israel  
(Kumar. 2001:8). 
 
 
The BJP governments have been especially enthusiastic about ties with 
Israel and consequently, since 1999 the Indian MEA and the Israeli 
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Ministry of Foreign Affairs have held annual bilateral consultations 
alternately in Jerusalem and New Delhi. In September 2004, the new 
government extended a symbolic gesture by sending the Minister of State 
for External Affairs, E. Ahamed, to the Palestinian Authority (PA), 
demonstrating India’s strong support for the Palestinian cause.105  
 
 Natwar K. Singh, the Secretary General of the Non-Aligned Movement 
summit in 1983 and Nehruvian in his foreign policy approach, served as 
the Minister of State for External Affairs in Rajiv Gandhi’s government 
(1986 – 1989), and was nominated as India’s Minister of External Affairs 
by the new UPA government. While in opposition, he was critical of the 
NDA governments’ foreign policy to promote Israeli - Indian relations at the 
expense of the Palestinians (Pant, 2005:12). However, in his new position, 
he made it a point to maintain India’s traditional ties with the Palestinians 
as well as improving relations with the Arab world but without undermining 
the Israeli-Indian relations. The Indian foreign policy was summarised by 
him in a press interview in New Delhi when he said: "We greatly value our 
relationship with Israel but this will not and should not affect our relations 
with Palestine” (Times of India, 12/7/2004).  
 
Following the Sharm-El-Sheikh summit in February 2005, the Indian 
Ministry of External Affairs published the following statement in support of 
the Israeli- Palestinian peace process:  
 
India has consistently urged an end to violence from all sides. We 
look forward to further progress In the peace process that would 
bring about a just and peaceful solution within a reasonable 
timeframe, leading to a sovereign, independent state of Palestine 
with well-defined and secured borders, living at peace with the state 
of Israel (MEA, 13/2/2005).  
 
 
The Indian Minister of External Affairs, Natwar Singh referred once again to 
the Israeli Palestinian conflict during his visit to Britain:  
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We were happy to see the revival of the peace process and hope it 
leads to the establishment of a sovereign, independent and viable 
state of Palestine with safe and secure and well-defined borders. 
In line with the relevant United Nation Security Council resolutions 
and the quartet Road map, living side by side with the state of 
Israel  (MEA, 27/6/2005). 
 
 
The MEA welcomed the Israeli withdrawal from settlements in Gaza and 
the Northern West Bank as part of the Israeli unilateral Disengagement 
Plan: 106 
 
…A positive development and the beginning of a process that we 
hope will culminate in a mutually acceptable, negotiated settlement 
in accordance with the roadmap and the relevant UN Security 
Council resolutions. We trust that this window of opportunity will be 
used by all sides in taking forward the negotiations that will lead, 
within a reasonable time frame, to the creation of a truly sovereign, 
independent and viable Palestinian State within well-defined and 
secure borders, living side by side at peace with Israel (MEA, 
13/9/2005). 
 
 
6.4.3 Pressure groups  
 
Pressure groups in terms of small lobby groups in society that are engaged 
in promoting a certain foreign policy are common in democracies. Israel 
and India are both democracies, but pressure groups have traditionally 
played a minor role in the two countries as far as the formulation of foreign 
policy is concerned. However, the US Jewish organisations could be 
considered an exception due to their collective function as an external 
powerful group exerting pressure on India.107 
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6.4.3.1 Friendship societies in India   
 
More than 50 societies and associations promoting people- to- people 
friendship between India and Israel can be found in different parts of India 
including the Shalom Alumni Club of Israel’s development cooperation 
programme (Mashav).108 In 1995, a friendship delegation consisted of 
members from the various societies and associations visited Israel (Singh, 
2002:67). Mashav’s relationship with the alumni members continues 
through a network of Shalom clubs and long term professional contacts 
with various academic institutions in Israel (Israeli -Indian Bilateral 
Relations, 2001). The Shalom club of Bombay (Mumbai) has been 
particularly active in professional and social activities in the State of 
Maharashtra and among its many activities have been workshops on topics 
ranging from AIDS prevention education to the organisation of events such 
as fund-raising for homeless children. However, the Shalom Club has not 
been involved in India’s politics in general and has not played a role as a 
pro-Israeli pressure group in India in particular, except for its contribution to 
the improvement of Israel’s image in India, which broadened the base of 
their bilateral relationship. 
 
6.4.3.2 Jewish community in India   
 
The Jewish community in India is a microscopic minority community in an 
ocean of 1.3 billion people. In the complete absence of anti-Semitism and 
persecution of Jews in Indian history, the Jews in India have considered 
themselves to be Indian first and Jews second and have had little interest 
in Indian politics and Indian foreign policy (Sampemane, 1994:23).109  At 
the end of the 20th century, the Indian Jewry numbers have shrunk to no 
more than 4500 in the whole country against about 30 thousand at the 
beginning of the 1950s. It is important to point out that the Jews in India 
have made a valuable contribution to India in various fields such as 
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education, local politics, the armed forces, public health, art, literature 110 
and the film industry. However, they have not played a significant role as a 
pressure group in Indian politics with the exception of Lt. Gen. J. F. R. 
Jacobs, who served as the Governor of Punjab in the 1990s (Malekar, 
2002:64). 
 
6.4.3.3 The Indian community in Israel  
 
The Immigration of the Indian Jews to Israel started with the establishment 
of Israel in 1948, when they joined Israeli settlers in building the country.111  
The Jews of India in Israel have been organised into communities 
throughout the country under the central organisation of Indian Jews in 
Israel. In 1992, the Israel-India Cultural Association was established in 
order to promote cultural relations between the two countries. The Jews of 
India have retained pride in their Indian heritage; with gratitude to Mother 
India for the treatment they received in their native country where they 
were never exposed to anti-Semitism (Weil, 2002:63). They were active in 
various sectors of the Israeli industry and agriculture and many of them 
attained high positions in the army, politics, media, sport and culture. 
 
The Bne-Israel community (which means “Children of Israel”) preserved 
their local mother tongue, Marahti, in Israel.112 An international conference 
for Marahti speakers was held in October 1996 in Israel with more than 500 
representatives from all over the world, among them, Manohar Joshi, ex-
Chief Minister of Maharashtra and Sharad Pawar, former Minister of 
Defence as well as former Chief Minister of Maharashtra (Massil, 
2002:65).113  The central organisation’s goal is to assist members of the 
community in fields such as education and culture, but it is not actively 
involved in Israeli national politics in general or promoting Israeli-Indian 
bilateral relations in particular. 
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6.4.3.4 Muslim community in India  
 
The overwhelming majority of the Indian Muslim community (about 140 
million) have been staunch supporters of the Palestinian cause with a 
traditional anti- Israeli attitude as expressed by some protesters from 
Muslim organisations in New Delhi, when they protested against the visit of 
Prime Minister Sharon in India.114 Indian Muslims have constantly 
articulated the view that India, regardless of the changes in international 
politics since the end of the cold war, should sustain its previous pro-Arab 
and anti-Israeli policy as well as its Nehruvian tradition. The Indian Muslim 
community has been a political factor to be reckoned with especially after 
the 1990s, since the Indian political system has been transformed into a 
type of coalition government. After the new UPA coalition government was 
formed by the INCP in May 2004, the level of expectation of the Indian 
Muslim community regarding a change of foreign policy towards Israel was 
high (it was also supported by the old guard of the INCP as well as left 
wing parties). However, regardless of the INCP's criticism while in 
opposition, of the previous NDA governments’ efforts to promote Israeli-
Indian ties, which they regarded to be at the expense of the Palestinians, 
the new UPA government sent a clear message to the Muslim community 
in India, from the Minister of Defence Pranab Mukherjee. That message 
declared that relations with Israel in general and military cooperation 
between the two countries in particular, would be retained (Pant, 2005:9).  
 
6.4.3.5 Indian media 
 
Israel’s image in the Indian media has undergone a positive change after 
1992. In March 2004, The National Herald, considered the Congress 
party's voice, published an editorial referring to the relations between India 
and Israel as a strategic imperative. The editorial regarded the Indian 
military procurement from Israel as well as the dialogue on counter-
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 About Sharon’s visit, see section 6.2.2. 
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terrorism as a useful hi-technology deal with Israel, which served the 
national Indian strategic interest (National Herald, 10/3/2004).   
 
6.4.3.6 US Jewish lobby   
 
The Indian leadership as well as Indian prime ministers, as ultimate 
decision units, became increasingly convinced that the American Jewish 
lobby provides a vital link of influence to American policy making as well as 
American finance. When Prime Minister Rao paid a visit to the US at the 
end of January 1992, a few days after the establishment of diplomatic 
relations with Israel took place, his meeting, in New York, on 1 February 
1992, with the representative of the American Jewish organisations, turned 
out to be cordial. Subsequently, the two parties discussed possible 
cooperation between India and the Jewish community in the US (Yegar, 
2004:169). The pro-Israel and pro-India lobbyists also worked together 
successfully to gain the approval of the Bush administration for Israel to 
sell Phalcon AWACS to India and Israel’s Arrow ballistic missile defence 
system.115 With regard to the activity of the US Jewish lobby in stopping 
AWACS sales to Pakistan, Dinesh Kumar (2001:3) comments that: "The 
Indian leadership became increasingly convinced that the American Jewish 
lobby provides a vital link of influence in American policy making and 
finance."  
 
The coalition of the two lobbying groups included the US – India Political 
Action Committee (USINPAC), the American-Israel Political Action 
Committee (AIPAC) and the AJC (Singh, 2003:12).116  
 
Since 1995, the AJC has sent a number of delegations to India and it has 
brought a group of Indian American leaders to visit Israel as well. 117  The 
AJC conference was held in New Delhi in 1997 to celebrate the fiftieth 
anniversaries of independence of both India and Israel. Subsequently, a 
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 The last delegation visited India in January 2004. 
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delegation of the AJC visited New Delhi in January 2004. India’s Prime 
Minister, Manmohan Singh, met the leaders of the AJC in September 2004 
when he visited New York and praised their contribution to India – US 
relations as well as the Israeli-Indian friendship.118 The Jewish 
Organisations in the US share close relations with the Indian-American 
community, relations that have also been instrumental in shaping Israeli-
Indian ties (Pant, 2005:9).  
 
According to Ephraim Inbar (2004:102),  New Delhi believed that upgrading 
its relations with Jerusalem would have a positive effect on the attitude of 
the US towards India: 
 
American Israel Public Affairs Committee, the American Jewish 
Committee, the Jewish Institute on National Security Affairs, and the 
American Jewish Congress nourish ties with India and with the Indian 
Lobby in Washington. Many members of the US – India Political 
Action Committee, which was formed only in September 2002, are 
blunt about their desire to emulate American Jewish groups and are 
interested in building a long-term relationship (Inbar, 2004:102).  
 
The Jewish-Indian alliance in the US has combined forces on electoral 
politics in order to defeat those whom they perceive as antagonistic to both 
Israel and India. The two countries’ lobbies are working together on a 
number of domestic and foreign affairs issues, such as hatred, crimes, 
immigration, anti-terrorism legislation and backing pro-Israel and pro-India 
candidates. 
 
6.4.4 Indian individuals  
 
Several Indian individuals, in addition to the ultimate decision units, played 
a role in formulating the Indian foreign policy towards Israel following the 
establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries. 
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6.4.4.1 National defence advisor  
 
In December 1998, at the recommendation of a special task force, a new 
National Security Management System was formed. The task force 
recommended, among other matters, the creation of the post of National 
Security Advisor (NSA) to the Prime Minister of India. The new post has 
been proven to be a key factor as far as India's foreign policy towards 
Israel was concerned, in particular during the tenure of the first two 
National Security Advisors.  
  
The first National Security Advisor, Brajesh Mishra described by Mohan 
(2003:264) as a principal foreign policy aide to Prime Minister Vajpayee 
who left a strong imprint on India’s diplomacy, was a staunch supporter of 
the Indian enhancement of bilateral relations with Israel.119  In 1999, he 
was sent to Israel personally in the middle of the Indian parliamentary 
election, to meet Israel's Prime Minister Barak  in order to find new ways of 
strengthening the relations between the two countries (Kumaraswamy, 
2002:11). He was also considered the force behind the idea of the tripartite 
alliance between the US, Israel and India. Accordingly, in a speech to the 
Jewish American Committee in Washington in May 2003, he outlined a 
proposal that India, Israel and the US should unite to combat the common 
threat of Islamic fundamentalism while forming a viable alliance of 
democratic nations (Pant, 2005:9).120 In September 2003, during his official 
visit to India, Brajesh Mishra met Israel’s Prime Minister Sharon to discuss 
further ways of strengthening the relations between the two countries. 121 
 
Mishra’s successor, J. N. Dixit, who was a co-chair of the External Affairs 
Committee of the INCP before being nominated to the post of National 
Security Advisor, also attached a great deal of importance to India's 
bilateral relations with Israel. Notwithstanding the fact that Dixit was a 
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staunch and consistent supporter of the relationship between India and 
Israel, he was also a staunch supporter of the Palestinian cause and 
Palestine’s right to an independent state. It is important to note that he was 
the Foreign Secretary in 1991 and was one of the architects of the 
establishment of diplomatic relations (together with Prime Minister Rao) 
with Israel.122  His perception concerning bilateral relations with Israel is 
described in his memoirs as follows: 
 
I considered our establishing relations with South Africa and then Israel as 
the most significant among developments in India's foreign policy, which 
occurred during my period as Foreign Secretary (Dixit 1996:315). 
 
 
6.4.4.2 President of the Indian National Congress Party 
 
Traditionally, while in power, the Prime Minister who leads the Congress 
government is also the President of the INCP. However, Sonia Gandhi has 
been the President of the INCP since 1998 and has been considered to be 
the strongest political figure in India despite not holding the premiership 
post.123 After the successful general election campaign of the INCP in 
2004, which was led by her, she was elected as the leader of the party in 
the Parliament but declined the post of premiership. Mrs. Gandhi, who is 
considered to be the kingmaker of the ruling party, the INCP and currently 
one of the most important politicians in India, while in the opposition, met 
Israel’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Shimon Peres, who visited India in 
February 2002. She also met the Israeli Prime Minister, Ariel Sharon, 
when he visited New Delhi in September 2003. This meeting took place 
despite the fact that an important section in the INCP was not in favour of 
the meeting (The Hindu, 6/9/2003). On 20 May 2005, as the president of 
the ruling party of India, she met the head of the Palestinian Authority (PA) 
Abu Mazen (Mahmoud Abbas) in New Delhi.  
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 For details about the contribution of Dixit to the establishment of diplomatic relations 
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 Sonia Gandhi is the widow of former Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi who was 
assassinated in 1991 by Sri Lanka’s Tamil Tiger rebels. 
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6.5 Summation 
 
The evolving bilateral relations between Israel and India from 1992 to 2005 
is analysed by the  Oscillated Diplomacy Model as a theoretical model of 
International Relations that helps to explain the nature of the bilateral 
relations between the two countries as well as the Indian operational 
diplomacy towards Israel. The political attitude of the Indian governments 
in power, as a guiding parameter of foreign policy, has had a strong affect 
on the volume of the oscillated diplomacy between the two countries. The 
Israeli-Indian relations have been characterised by diplomatic vicissitudes 
and were influenced by the convergence of mutual national strategic 
interests.  
 
Since 1992, and even before that time, the change in governments in India 
has caused a great deal of concern in Israel and has had a direct impact 
on bilateral as well as multilateral relations between India and Israel in 
terms of guiding parameters, which influenced the volume and direction of 
the relations between the two countries. From a political level of analysis, 
the various governments in India since the 1990s have been coalition 
governments and since then, India’s ideological approach has been 
replaced by a pragmatic attitude in its foreign policy.   
 
The Indian foreign policy towards Israel has received the backing of most 
of the political spectrum in India and most of the political parties have come 
to terms with India’s ties with Israel, realising its value for India in general 
and the military field in particular. However, there was consensus in Indian 
politics regarding the continuation of the support of the Palestinian cause 
and the need for friendly relations with the Arab world. The UPA 
government has set the Palestinian cause back as a relevant factor 
regarding Israeli-Indian relations and as part of India’s new foreign policy 
and diplomatic activism, the Arab world in general and the Gulf countries in 
particular have become political and economic partners of India.  
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India’s diplomatic activism since the 1990s has been demonstrated in its 
bilateral relations with Israel as India realised that such diplomatic ties are 
of strategic value to India in general and to the Arab world in particular, 
after India perceived that it could serve its national strategic interests better 
by having close relations with both Israel and the Arab world. The Kargil 
crisis between India and Pakistan in 1999 and the terrorist attack on the 
Indian Parliament in December 2001 boosted military collaboration 
between India and Israel and increased the volume of arms sales between 
the two countries. In addition, September 11 2001 brought a new 
dimension to international counter-terrorism and has improved the 
collaboration in that field between the two countries in particular, during the 
tenure of the NDA governments. Consequently, the volume of arms sales 
between Israel and India has reached a certain critical mass and the level 
of sophistication of the arms sales has increased as well.  
 
India has moved from an anti-Israeli and pro-Arab approach to a pragmatic 
approach, which included a more balanced approach towards Israel while 
maintaining its close relations with the Arab countries, within the delimited 
lines of the Indian oscillated diplomacy towards Israel. Israel on the other 
hand, realised the potential of the ties between the two countries as a joint 
strategic interest immediately after the establishment of diplomatic 
relations. High-level official visits, foreign ministries’ dialogues and bilateral 
agreements were the first ingredients of the diplomatic relations as mutual 
strategic interests between the two countries. The Israeli international 
cooperation programme, an integral part of the Israeli Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, has been highly active in India and has contributed significantly to 
the improvement of bilateral relations between the two countries as well as 
Israel’s image in India. 
 
The oscillation of the Indian diplomacy towards Israel has been influenced, 
in terms of operational diplomacy, by three types of mutual national 
strategic interests, which determined the volume and direction of the 
diplomatic ties between the two countries. The convergent Israeli-Indian 
 1426 
strategic interests are divided into two types of strategic interests: joint 
strategic interests and common strategic interests. The joint strategic 
interests refer to goals that the two states have pursued in order to 
maximise overlapping inter-related strategic interests in terms of strength 
and intensity while the common strategic interests, in terms of scope, refer 
to goals that the two states have pursued in order to achieve 
complementary strategic interests. On the other hand, discrepant strategic 
interests are a third type of strategic interest, which has a negative and 
counteractive impact on bilateral relations.  
 
Joint strategic interests between Israel and India have included military 
cooperation in particular, which covers arms sales, the transfer of military 
technology, joint weapon development, joint production and the marketing 
of military equipment, which has made India the third largest importer of 
Israeli arms after Turkey and China. Counter-terrorism has been another 
joint strategic interest and was based on the perception that Islamic 
fundamentalism and terrorism, particularly after September 11, have been 
a mutual concern to Israel and India. The joint strategic concern regarding 
radical Islamism at home and in neighbouring countries has also increased 
intelligence cooperation between Israel and India.   
 
Space cooperation has been another joint strategic interest between Israel 
and India. A space cooperation agreement has been signed between the 
space agencies of the two countries and was followed by the installation of 
an Israeli set of wide field ultraviolet telescopes in an Indian satellite. India 
on the other hand, expressed its interest in the Israeli Arrow 2 anti-ballistic 
missile system. The prevention of nuclear technology leaks and nuclear 
policy coordination has been of joint strategic interest for both countries, as 
neither of them signed the NPT (although Israel signed the CTBT). In this 
regard, it is important to consider the fact that Pakistan’s nuclear potential 
could have constituted a threat to both countries especially if Pakistan had 
been taken over by Islamic extremist forces. 
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Since the middle of the 1990s, India has been Israel’s largest trading 
partner in Asia after China and Hong Kong. The economic cooperation 
between the two countries has been increasing steadily, including joint 
industrial ventures with an emphasis on science and high technology, 
which was related to the opening up of the Indian economy to the West 
and to globalisation. Israel has had free trade agreements with the US and 
the European Union while India has been a signatory to the ASEAN-India 
framework agreement on comprehensive economic cooperation and the 
two countries have had the potential to promote joint economic activities for 
their mutual benefit. In addition, cultural ties between the two countries 
have intensified significantly since 1992 and reached a peak in 1997 when 
Israel celebrated India’s 50th year of independence with the Shalom India 
Festival. India reciprocated one year later by organising many cultural 
events all over Israel as part of the celebration of the fifty years of Israeli 
independence.   
 
Relations with the superpowers and the US in particular, have become a 
common strategic interest for Israel and India. After September 11, there 
was a growing understanding in India as well as in Israel, that trilateral 
Indo-American-Israeli cooperation is likely to produce considerable benefits 
for all concerned. The Indian leaders have become increasingly convinced 
that the American Jewish Lobby provides a vital link of influence with US 
policy-making as well as with American finance. It is important to point out 
that Israel, India and Russia share common threats regarding religious 
terrorism. Trilateral cooperation in the field of energy as well as counter-
terrorism in the international arena in general and in Central Asia, which 
India considered as part of its extended neighbourhood in particular, as 
well as industrial cooperation including cooperation regarding diamond 
processing and trilateral joint military cooperation.  
 
Geo-strategy has been a common strategic interest of both countries in 
general and maintaining the security of the Indian Ocean has been a 
common strategic interest in particular. The Indian Ocean has been the 
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most important geo-strategic location as far as India’s strategic interest is 
concerned, while Asia has been an important destination for Israeli trade. 
The two countries are located strategically on the flank of number of 
Muslim countries and have a strategic interest to secure the sea-lanes to 
the Straits of Mallaca.   
 
The Central Asian region has been an area of common strategic interest 
for Israel and India as well as an extended strategic neighbourhood. Both 
countries have sold military equipment to the Central Asian countries; in 
addition, they have both had an economic interest in the region including 
the field of energy and have been trying to limit the influence of Iran and 
Saudi Arabia as agents for radical Islamisation. India and Israel have to 
work hard in order to be counted as significant players in the region 
considering the high volume of involvement and competition with Russia 
(and previously the Soviet Union), US, China, Pakistan, Iran, Saudi Arabia 
and Turkey.  
 
Pakistan was another common strategic interest between Israel and India. 
The Kargil crisis between Indian and Pakistan in 1999 expanded the 
military cooperation between India and Israel significantly and elevated the 
volume of arms sales. India and Israel have also exchanged intelligence 
information on Islamic terrorist groups and Israel helped India to fight 
terrorism in Kashmir by providing logistical support. The Pakistani nuclear 
ability, which has been of concern to the two countries, constitutes a 
mutual security challenge, which includes intelligence cooperation. Israel 
was particularly concerned about the seepage of nuclear technologies with 
the authorisation of the government of Pakistan or as a rogue operation 
and that Pakistan would become a supplier of intermediate range missile 
for Arab countries in the Middle East and Iran. Iran has been considered 
one of the most significant discrepant strategic interests between Israel 
and India and is in strong contrast with the Indian friendly relations with 
Iran. Iran’s Islamic governments and its nuclear weapon capabilities were 
considered a strategic threat by Israel as well as a serious danger to the 
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stability of the Middle East. Israel has expressed its concern regularly 
about India's close ties with Teheran and the possibility of India's selling 
advanced technology and military equipment to Iran was brought up in 
official meetings between military representatives of the two countries. 
 
India’s intention of sustaining its high level of economic growth since 1991 
has required a high level of oil reserves. The lack of adequate energy 
resources, Arab oil and the demand for oil based products such as 
petrochemicals and fertilisers made the relationship between India and the 
Gulf countries an important factor in Indian foreign policy and energy in 
general as a discrepant strategic interest between Israel and India.  
 
The UN and NAM are good examples of discrepant strategic interests. 
Although India had no longer sponsored anti-Israeli UN resolutions after 
1992, it went on supporting the Palestinian cause at the UN General 
Assembly and committees while abstaining on the nuclear issue. Since the 
1990s, the NAM’s influence on Indian diplomacy has gradually lessened as 
India sought to reconstruct its foreign policy to meet the requirements of 
the post Cold War world. India started to focus on issues of concern for its 
national interests and Israel was a direct beneficiary of the change in 
India’s international orientation towards NAM, as traditionally the political 
dynamics in the organisation was unconditionally in favour of the Arab 
world as well as the Palestinian cause. Despite the new Indian approach 
towards the NAM and the fact that India made serious attempts to 
moderate NAM’s resolutions regarding Israel, India remained an active 
member of the Palestinian committee of the NAM and the movement has 
remained a discrepant strategic interest between the two countries. 
 
India has gradually emerged as an Asian regional force since 1994 with its 
“Look East” policy and has been able to utilise technology and expertise 
acquired in Israel in order to promote its trade and economic relations with 
Asia. Israel, on the other hand, which is still struggling for full international 
legitimacy in Asia, has realised that its relations with India could be 
instrumental to achieving this type of legitimacy as well as upgrading its 
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international status in Asia. In contrast with Asia, which is a common 
strategic interest between Israel and India, the Chinese-Israeli relations in 
general and their military cooperation in particular, were of concern to India 
and have been watched closely in terms of national security concerns. 
 
The Islamic and Arab worlds have been traditional discrepant strategic 
Interests between Israel and India. Traditionally, India has stressed its 
historic links with the Islamic world while trying to avoid excessive focus on 
Kashmir and its tensions with Pakistan. It has also tried to neutralise 
Pakistan and its ability to play the Islamic card. Since the middle of the 
1990s, India has regarded Israeli security and intelligence cooperation as a 
more valuable asset for dealing effectively with the Kashmir problem than 
the unfriendly attitudes of the Muslim countries. Subsequently, there has 
been a shift in the Indian foreign policy towards the Arab countries after the 
Gulf War when India perceived that it could serve its national interests 
better by having close relations with both Israel and the Arab world.  
 
There has been a shift in India’s foreign policy from a one-sided position in 
favour of the Arabs regarding their dispute with Israel, to a more balanced 
stance. Importantly, India recognised that it had to be able to do business 
with all sides in the Middle East without ignoring India’s economic and 
political interests in the region. Following the change in governments in 
India and the return to power of the INCP in May 2004, there was an 
improvement of its relations with the Islamic and the Arab world. 
 
The new UPA government has been eager to demonstrate that its ties with 
Israel would not affect its support for the Palestinian cause. The following 
aspects have influenced the Indian foreign policy regarding the Israeli 
Palestinian conflict:  
 
• The collapse of the Oslo process at Camp David. 
• The death of the Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat. 
• The end of the second Intifada (April 2003). 
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• The election of Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) as the new leader of the 
PA. 
• Failure to implement the Road-Map.  
 
Following the failure of the implementation of the Road-Map and the Israeli 
unilateral Disengagement Plan regarding the Gaza Strip and part of the 
North West Bank, the UPA government has taken a positive view of the 
Israeli Disengagement Plan. The condition was that it would only be the 
first stage in a comprehensive peace process that would lead to an 
independent viable Palestinian state and would encourage Israel to take 
steps to improve the Palestinian economy and revitalise the PA.   
 
In terms of the state and society level of analysis and the guiding 
parameters of the Israeli-Indian diplomacy, as far as the Indian political 
system has been concerned, it has gradually come to terms with the 
evolving relations between the two countries. Following the development of 
the official bilateral relations with Israel and the positive change in Israel’s 
image after 1992 in India, most of the political parties in India, while 
continuing their support of the Palestinian cause, realised the value of 
defence and military relations with Israel to India. The political powers have 
also realised that the success of the Indian foreign policy was dependent 
on the pace of India’s globalisation and its ability to strengthen its ties with 
the West and Israel as a modern technology-oriented economy, has 
become an important economic partner of India. The return to power of the 
INCP on 23 May 2004 closed a political circle as far as bilateral relations 
with Israel were concerned and some concerns were expressed in Israel 
about a possible change in India’s foreign policy towards Israel. However, 
military, economic and cultural relations have been maintained, although 
bilateral relations, especially in terms of high-level official visits, have 
cooled down. 
 
The MEA, as a civil service, has adjusted slowly to the change in the 
traditional Indian foreign policy towards Israel while expressing concern 
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whenever there were setbacks to the peace process with the Palestinians. 
Since 1999, the Indian MEA and the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs have 
held annual bilateral consultations and the MEA has gradually come to 
terms with the idea that close relations with both Israel and the Arab world 
serve India’s national interests best. Pressure groups have traditionally 
played a small role in the two countries as far as the formulation of foreign 
policy is concerned and have made no significant contribution to the 
evolving bilateral relations between the two counties with the exception of 
the Indian Muslim community in India and the US Jewish organisations.  
 
The US Jewish Lobby has played a significant role in the evolving bilateral 
relations between Israel and India, mainly because the Indian leaders have 
become increasingly convinced that the American Jewish Lobby provides a 
vital link of influence in American policy-making as well as in American 
finances and that it has a positive effect on the US’s disposition towards 
India. The pro-Israel and pro-India lobbyists have also worked together 
successfully and the Jewish-Indian alliance in the US has combined forces 
in electoral politics to get the upper hand over those whom they perceive to 
be antagonistic to both Israel and to India.  
 
On the other hand, the Indian Muslim community and the Indian-Muslim 
organisations, supported by India’s left wing parties and traditionalists in 
the elite of the INCP, have continued to object to the evolving Israeli-Indian 
relations. However, all governments have made it clear to them that 
bilateral relations with Israel in general and military cooperation in 
particular would continue. The new Indian UPA government has also been 
determined to maintain India’s friendly relations with Israel while continuing 
to improve its close relations with the Arab countries as well as its support 
of the Palestinian cause. In addition to the Indian Prime Ministers, as 
ultimate decision units, since 1998 the Indian National Security Advisors 
have proved to be key players as far as India's foreign policy towards Israel 
was concerned. 
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There has been an ongoing firm basis for a strategic affiliation between 
India and Israel, which concentrated on the convergence of the strategic 
interests of the two international players. In future, bilateral relations and 
cooperation between Israel and India ought to be diversified in terms of 
additional complementary fields of cooperation with an emphasis on 
“people to people” activities. Such bilateral cooperation, strengthened by 
joint and common interrelated strategic interests and supported by a 
peaceful solution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, has the potential to 
upgrade bilateral relations between Israel and India by influencing the 
parameters of the Indian oscillated diplomacy towards Israel. Importantly, 
these aspects can turn their bilateral relationship into a fruitful complex 
interdependence for the mutual benefit of both countries.124  
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Relations, 1998). 
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Chapter 7  
 
Conclusion 
 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
The focus of this research is on the analysis of the relations between Israel 
and India between 1948 and 2005 seen mainly from an Israeli perspective. It 
is envisaged that this research will contribute to the comprehensive knowledge 
of Israeli-Indian bilateral relations, the theory of international politics, the 
understanding of diplomacy as a tool for the implementation of foreign policy in 
general and to the diplomatic practice of bilateral relations between India and 
Israel in particular. 
 
7.2 Framework of the research 
 
 In order to gain insight into and develop a thorough understanding of the 
relations between Israel and India, this research, which is diachronic in nature, 
refers to the bilateral foreign relations between Israel and India within three 
specified timeframes. It also provides a descriptive analysis of Israeli-Indian 
relations and aims to clarify, in accordance with the research questions, the 
factors that have affected and effected Israeli-Indian relations. The timeframes 
refer to  the bilateral relations between the two countries before the 
establishment of diplomatic relations (from 1948 to 1991) including pre-
independence relations, the bilateral strategic change that paved the way for 
full diplomatic relations in 1992 and the evolving bilateral relations between 
India and Israel that followed (from 1992 to 2005). 
 
There is no single comprehensive theory that can be applied in the analysis of 
the complex set of Israeli-Indian relations between 1948 and 2005 and in the 
analysis of their pre-independence relations. Therefore, pertinent theories 
regarding international relations, models, relevant historical descriptions and 
narrative accounts are incorporated into an eclectic and coherent theoretical 
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framework in order to ensure better comprehension of the composite bilateral 
foreign relations between Israel and India. The framework helps to simplify 
and analyse the complexity of the Israeli-Indian relations, which are influenced 
by a web of diverse causal factors in terms of both external and internal 
variables in conjunction with contextual determinants. Two newly devised 
models applied in this research are combined with other complementary 
pertinent theories and models in the theoretical framework. Both new models 
are utilised as analytical tools with explanatory values, which help to provide a 
broader picture and a comprehensive understanding of the bilateral foreign 
relations between India and Israel and contribute to the theoretical field of 
international relations and diplomacy as well as to diplomatic practice. 
 
 
7.2.1  First timeframe (1948-1991) 
 
 
In the first timeframe, that covers the period from 1948 to 1991, bilateral 
foreign relations between India and Israel with special reference to the pre-
independence relations between the two countries, are analysed with the help 
of the Ultimate Decision Unit Model and the Levels of Analysis Model. The 
reference to the pre-independence relations of the two countries is an integral 
part of their bilateral relations, situated within the broader historical context of 
their complex relations. In addition, the factors that influenced the bilateral 
relations between the two countries up to 1991 and the specific effect they had 
on the bilateral relations between the two countries before diplomatic relations 
were established, are discussed.    
 
The dominant actors regarding India's historical relations with Israel are 
identified and analysed in terms of the ultimate decision unit that enabled the 
researcher to analyse entities and authorities, including leaders, within the 
Indian governments, which were important to the shaping of the Indian foreign 
policy towards the State of Israel. India's foreign policy towards Israel from 
1948 up to 1991 is analysed in terms of three levels of analysis, namely the 
international, state and society (national) and individual levels respectively. 
The international level is further divided into two types of relations, namely 
bilateral and multilateral relations. The three levels of analysis, in terms of the 
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units of analysis of India as a unitary actor in the international system, enable 
the identification, examination and analysis of the external and internal factors 
of India's historical relations with Israel up to 1991. In addition, they take the 
complexity level of the web of variables, the international environment, the 
political process and the contextual determinants into consideration.  
 
India was established in 1947 and the Republic of India recognised the State 
of Israel on 18 September 1950; however, the two countries only established 
full diplomatic relations on 29 January 1992. A historical description is 
provided of the relations between India and Israel and the Indian pro-Arab 
narrative, which accounted for its traditional foreign policy towards Israel up to 
the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries. This 
description presents the foundation, in terms of a historical database with 
extensive and in-depth  knowledge pertaining to this period up to 1991, for a 
dynamic analysis of the bilateral relations between India and Israel. Because 
of the importance and relevance of pre-independence relations regarding 
India's foreign policy towards the State of Israel, reference is made to the 
Indian pre-independence policy towards Palestine prior to Israel’s 
independence. This reference is a part of an implicit historical description used 
to explain the in-depth development of the Israeli-Indian bilateral relations.  
 
7.2.1.1 India's pre-independence attitude towards Palestine 
 
 
The main objective of the INCM, before 1947 as an ultimate decision unit, was 
to achieve independence. However, the major objectives of the Government of 
India after independence, led by its prime ministers as an ultimate decision 
unit, were the political consolidation of independence, the promotion of 
economic development and the pursuit of foreign policy goals that enhanced 
Indian national interests. 
   
In terms of the international level of analysis, it was essential to examine the 
factors that shaped the attitudes of the INCM leadership towards events in 
Palestine before 1947, although officially, India had no foreign policy prior to 
its achievement of independence. The Indian pro-Arab approach to the Arab-
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Israeli conflict stemmed from the strong ties between the INCM and the 
national liberation movements in the Arab countries of the Middle East. A 
feeling of solidarity existed in India and in the INCM in particular, during the 
first half of the twentieth century, regarding the Arabs’ liberation movements. 
Zionism, on the other hand, was identified with European colonialism and was 
not regarded as a national liberation movement. The fact that Zionism was 
supported by Western powers, in the first place by European governments 
such as Britain and later on by Western governments, particularly the US, was 
another reason for the INCM’s pro-Arab approach before the independence of 
Israel and pro-Arab and anti-Israeli approach after it.  
  
In terms of the state and society level of analysis, Mahatma Gandhi, as the 
leader of the INCM, made a clear distinction between the historical problem of 
the Jewish people as a prosecuted group and their search for a home and the 
way in which that problem could be resolved. According to him, the Jewish 
claim for an independent state as well as the Partition Plan in Palestine, 
clashed with the INCM’s political perception that a demand for a separate 
state, in India or in Palestine, should be opposed. Gandhi and the INCM 
leaders were consistent in their support of the idea of a secular state in India 
as well as in Palestine based upon territorial integrity and India, therefore, 
supported the establishment of one single state in Palestine based on federal 
principles. The presence of a very substantial minority of Muslims, whose 
sentiments and sympathies lay with their fellow Muslims in the Middle East, 
was also taken into political consideration by the INCM, which needed their 
active cooperation in the national struggle for independence.  
 
 
7.2.1.2  India's post-independence foreign policy towards Israel 
 
 
After independence, the Indian leadership, namely the prime ministers of India 
as an ultimate decision unit, shaped the attitude of India towards the State of 
Israel. In terms of the international level of analysis, India recognised the State 
of Israel and the political reality of Israel in1950, but its foreign policy towards 
Israel reflected its self-interest in the Middle East as well as its traditional 
sympathy with the Arabs. As a matter of fact, the non-existent diplomatic 
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relations were considered by India to be an  advantage within the international 
arena, particularly with reference to the Arab world and as far as Pakistan and 
the Kashmir conflict were concerned  as they  had become important items on 
India’s major foreign policy agenda. India was eager to enlist the neutrality of 
Arab countries while the possibility of the State of Israel playing a constructive 
role in assisting India to achieve its major national objectives was practically 
inconceivable.  
    
Israel was excluded from the Afro-Asian Conference at Bandung in 1955. At 
this stage, India considered Israel to be a colonial state that was linked to the 
colonial forces, against which national movements in Asia, including the INCP, 
had struggled in the past. The collaboration between Israel, England and 
France, previously two major colonial powers, during the Suez Canal crisis 
and the military operation against Egypt in 1956, only served to confirm India’s 
view of Israel as an outpost of Europe in the Middle East. In addition, India, as 
a secular state by virtue of its constitution, regarded Israel a theocratic state, 
as was also the case with Pakistan.   
 
The Israeli military assistance to India during its wars with China and Pakistan 
had no effect on the Indian foreign policy towards Israel or the bilateral 
relations between the two countries. The Six-Day War in 1967 added an 
entirely new dimension to the Indian anti-Israeli approach, namely a hardening 
of attitudes and strong condemnation combined with moral outrage regarding 
Israel’s actions, which was expressed in particularly strong terms by the Prime 
Minister, Indira Gandhi.  
 
The following factors strengthened the Indian pro-Arab policy: 
 
• The emergence of the OIC in 1969.  
• India’s strong economic interests in the Arab world, in particular the 
growing dependence of India on the Middle East energy sources.  
• The economic potential of the Arab market.  
• The importance of the trade routes in the Middle East to the West.  
• The Indian overseas workers in the Gulf countries. 
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In contrast, Israel was regarded as a small and insignificant country in   
economic terms as far as India was concerned. 
 
After the Arab-Israeli war in 1973 and the ensuing oil crisis, India expressed its 
support for Egypt and Syria, while intensifying its anti-Israeli rhetoric in the UN 
and also on other international forums. Two years later, in 1975, India officially 
recognised the PLO and was the sponsor of the UN General Assembly 
resolution that equated Zionism with racism. In March 1980, India granted full 
diplomatic recognition to the PLO. In June 1981, India denounced the Israeli 
air force attack on the Iraqi nuclear reactor and one year later, in the summer 
of 1982, it strongly condemned the Israeli Military Operations in Lebanon. In 
the same year, India expelled the Israeli Consul in Bombay after criticising the 
Indian government’s approach towards Israel in the Indian press. 
Subsequently, in November 1988, India was one of the first countries to 
recognise the State of Palestine. In December 1991, following the Madrid 
Conference, India supported the repeal of the UN General Assembly 
resolution that equated Zionism with racism and one month later, on 29 
January 1992, fully-fledged diplomatic relations were established between the 
two countries. 
 
In the multilateral arena, India’s hostile relations with Pakistan, the emergence 
of the Arab group in the International System and the UN in particular and the 
Arab states’ numerical asymmetry with Israel were important formative factors 
in India’s foreign policy. India expected political dividends from the Arab 
countries in the Indo-Pakistan conflict over Kashmir in return for its anti-Israeli 
foreign policy. India’s efforts, which included its anti-Israeli foreign policy in 
order to keep the Islamic factor as well as the Arab states from reinforcing 
Pakistan in the international arena, proved to be futile and Pakistan continued 
to propagate the Kashmir conflict as a pan-Islamic issue. However, the close 
relations between India and Egypt as well as India's relations with the Arab 
world in general and its economic relations with the Gulf countries in particular, 
ensured a moderate Arab stance regarding India in both the international 
arena and at conferences of the Arab heads of states. Although India was 
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disappointed by the Arab world’s stance, it did not change its staunch pro-Arab 
foreign policy.   
 
The rivalries between the superpowers during the Cold War affected South 
Asia and the Middle East adversely. Israel was identified with the Western 
powers while India gradually aligned itself with the Soviet side. In fact, Indian 
opposition to military blocs, its active membership of the NAM as well as its 
solidarity with the Afro-Asian countries’ criticism of the Western powers and 
the United States (US), brought India closer to the Eastern bloc in general and 
the Soviet Union in particular, and commensurate with their antagonistic 
attitude towards Israel at that time. New Delhi’s view was that the State of 
Israel was acting in concert with the Western powers and the US in particular, 
while India, on the other hand, had had close ties with the Soviet Union in 
particular since 1971 when an Indo-Soviet treaty of peace, friendship and 
cooperation was signed between the two countries. India had consistently 
sided with the Soviet Union against Israel in the international arena in general 
and international organisations as well as the NAM in particular. Furthermore, 
both countries pursued an anti-Israeli and pro-Arab foreign policy in terms of 
their long-term strategic interests. In fact, the absence of Indian economic and 
cultural ties with the US, the hostility of many Indian leaders towards it, the 
American aid to Pakistan and the Cold War prevented the US from playing a 
significant role in the South-Asian region. These factors also prevented the US 
from playing a constructive role in promoting bilateral relations between India 
and Israel.  
 
The decades after the Afro-Asian conference at Bandung in 1955, found India 
and China closer to the Arab world and both countries used anti-Israeli rhetoric 
on international forums. Significantly, India was a founder and prominent 
leader of the NAM and that had a direct effect on its pro-Arab and anti-Israeli 
foreign policy. Friendly relations were growing between India and Egypt; to the 
extent that personal friendships were forged between Prime Minister Nehru 
and President Nasser of Egypt and India aligned itself politically more and 
more with Egypt in the international arena. Traditionally, India attached a great 
deal of importance to the UN as an international forum and its history with this 
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organisation was comprehensive. This was reflected in India’s sponsoring of 
anti-Israeli resolutions as well as its consistent pro-Arab voting. 
 
In terms of the state and society level of analysis, regardless of India's anti-
Israel foreign policy, Indian opposition parties, academics, journalists and the 
Indian public opinion, called for the revision of the foreign policy towards 
Israel, claiming it would be in the interest of India as a nation. Undoubtedly, 
Israel’s military assistance to India during its wars with China and Pakistan as 
well as the Israeli victories in the Arab-Israeli wars and Israel’s advanced 
technology, were all factors that contributed to creating a more positive 
attitude towards Israel. In fact, many Indians felt a great deal of admiration for 
Israel in terms of its military, social, scientific and agricultural achievements 
and began to question India’s foreign policy towards Israel. The persistent 
anti-Israel and pro-Arab stance was also criticised by some opposition parties 
that urged the government to establish diplomatic relations with Israel, but to 
no avail. However, the only exceptions were in the form of relatively low-level 
intelligence collaboration, some quiet diplomacy via back channels and a low 
level of trade between the private sectors of both countries.   
 
In terms of the Individual Level of Analysis, Nehru’s pre-independence 
support of the Arabs was transformed, by the Indian leaders, into an anti-
Israeli doctrine based on his view of Israel as a product of Western 
imperialism. India’s foreign policy towards Israel became more restrictive after 
Nehru’s death and the Indian leaders that succeeded him, particularly his 
daughter Indira Gandhi, who was a staunch supporter of the Arab cause, 
continued with his pro-Arab and anti-Israeli policy, considered by them as part 
of Nehru’s legacy. Even leaders that had called for full diplomatic relations 
and closer relations with Israel, when they were still part of the opposition, 
continued the Indian anti-Israeli attitude of their predecessors when they 
became the heads of coalition governments. An incremental diplomatic 
change in the bilateral relations between India and Israel began when Prime 
Minister Rajiv Gandhi who was more open-minded to the West than his 
predecessors had been, came to power in 1984. However, because of his 
domestic political constraints and the negative international environment 
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regarding Israel, his efforts to change India’s foreign policy towards Israel 
were limited in scope.   
 
The Gulf War in 1991 during which Israel did not retaliate to attacks by Iraqi 
Scud missiles, and the Madrid conference that followed, significantly improved 
Israel’s position in the international system and was one of the important 
factors that paved the way to the breakthrough in Israeli-Indian relations. Until 
1991, India had never redefined its national interest in the Middle East in a 
selective way and this type of redefinition of its foreign policy was eventually 
done in 1991. The first significant signal indicating the onset of this redefinition 
was given in 1991, when India voted to repeal the General Assembly 
Resolution that equated Zionism with racism. India’s foreign policy towards 
Israel was actually a type of a fixed idea (idée fixe) based on the unassailable 
preconceived belief that there could be no diversion from Nehru’s foreign 
relations legacy and Mahatma Gandhi’s idealism. This preconceived belief 
was further reinforced and cemented by the conservative attitude of the 
Ministry of External Affairs together with their dogmatic diplomatic and 
traditionally anti-Israeli approach. It should also be noted that although India’s 
foreign policy towards Israel was negative it was  passive in nature. In terms of 
bilateral relations between 1948 and 1991, the nature of any interactions 
between the two countries was more reactive than initiatory; while India 
maintained a consistently pro-Arab foreign policy. 
 
Throughout the years up to 1991, the governments of India had overestimated 
the possible political response of the Indian Muslims regarding a change of 
Indian foreign policy towards Israel. Ironically, India did not take into 
consideration that at that time most of the Arab countries had full diplomatic 
relations with countries that maintained diplomatic relations with Israel. India 
continued with its dogmatic foreign policy towards Israel even after peace 
agreements had been signed between Israel and Egypt in 1978 and Israel, 
and Jordan in 1994.  
 
In addition,  India did not read the Arab world correctly with regard to their 
relations with Pakistan, as the Arab countries continued their support for 
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Pakistan despite the Indian pro-Arab and anti-Israeli foreign policy. India also 
failed to realise that establishing diplomatic relations with Israel could be a 
diplomatic tool that could be used to exert counter pressure against the Arab 
world in the case of Pakistan in general and the conflict over Kashmir in 
particular. Because of this misreading of the situation, India miscalculated the 
potential effect of its foreign policy regarding Israel by assuming that 
diplomatic relations with Israel would harm its international status in the 
Middle East as well as its relations with the Arab countries. India took this 
approach one step further by singling the State of Israel out for censure on 
moral and political grounds at international forums. 
   
India not only failed to re-assess and adjust its dogmatic foreign policy 
accordingly regarding  Israel until 1991 but also failed to realise the extent of 
the joint national interests between India and Israel and the potential for 
mutual cooperation between the two countries, particularly in areas such as 
agriculture, high technology transfer and arms sales. Moreover, India did not 
realise the full potential of the common strategic interests of the two countries 
in the multilateral arena and failed to see the potential of trilateral cooperation 
between India, Israel and other countries in general and with the US as a 
superpower in particular.   
 
India's pro-Arab foreign policy did not yield the expected political dividends in 
the Arab world or the international arena and prevented India from playing an 
active role in the Middle East. In addition, regional events and wars in the 
Middle East widened the existing gap between India and Israel even further. 
Despite the fact that an alternative foreign policy towards Israel could have 
been more rewarding in terms of India's national and strategic interests, this 
option was never given serious consideration before 1991. In fact, from the 
time of independence up to 1991, India never redefined its strategic interests 
in the Middle East and failed to adjust or reorient its dogmatic foreign policy 
towards Israel. 
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7.2.1.3 Israel's pre-Independence attitude towards India 
 
 
The development of the Israeli foreign policy towards India from 1948 to 1991 
is described as a political process in terms of a historical analysis, with the 
aim of answering the question regarding the specific factors that influenced 
Israel’s foreign policy towards India and the effect they had on the relations 
between the two countries prior to the establishment of diplomatic relations.. 
The historical description of the relations between Israel and India provides 
the foundation for a dynamic analysis of the bilateral relations between Israel 
and India, in terms of historical database accumulation and depth of 
knowledge, during the foregoing period up to 1991. Reference is also made to 
the Israeli pre-independence policy towards India, prior to India’s 
independence, because of the importance and relevance of Israel’s pre-
independence relations to its foreign policy towards the Republic of India.   
 
The dominant actors involved in Israel’s historical relations with India are 
identified and analysed in terms of the ultimate decision unit. They are the 
entities and authorities, including leaders, within the Israeli governments that 
contributed to the shaping of the Israeli foreign policy as well as the 
conducting of Israeli diplomacy towards India. Israel’s foreign policy towards 
India is analysed in terms of three levels of analysis, namely the international, 
state and society (national) and Individual levels respectively. The 
international level is further divided into two types of relations, namely bilateral 
and multilateral relations. The three levels of analysis, in terms of the units of 
analysis of Israel as a unitary actor in the international system, provide a 
conceptual basis for a historical in-depth description. These three levels of 
analysis enable the identification, examination and analysis of both the 
external and internal factors of Israel’s foreign policy towards India up to 1991 
while taking the complexity level of the web of variables, the political process 
in Israel and the contextual determinants into consideration.  
 
The main objective of the Jewish Agency before 1948 as the ultimate decision 
unit was to achieve a Jewish independent State in Palestine. The major 
objectives of the Government of Israel as the ultimate decision unit after 
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independence in 1948 were primarily the security of the State of Israel, the 
preservation of Israel's territorial integrity and its national identity. From the 
outset, India was consistently unsympathetic towards Zionism and according 
to the Indian record since 1922; it was obvious to the Jewish Agency in 
Palestine that pursuing the Zionist cause in India would be a daunting task.   
 
Before independence, the Jewish Agency, and after independence the State 
of Israel, came to terms and accepted that pursuance of diplomatic activities 
and information campaigns in India in particular, as well as changing India’s 
attitude regarding Zionism would undoubtedly be extremely complicated. They 
were fully aware of the challenging opening conditions and difficulties that 
faced them. The sporadic and limited attempts made before independence to 
influence the INCM and Indian leaders to change their strong pro-Arab 
approach, were all to no avail.    
 
After independence, the Israeli attempts to improve the bilateral relations 
between the two countries only served to strengthen the negative Israeli 
perceptions that predetermined the biased Indian foreign policy towards 
Israel. The lack of motivation to pursue the Zionist cause in India before 1948 
as well as the submissive Israeli foreign policy towards India between 1948 
and 1991, can be ascribed to a large number of reasons, constraining factors 
and circumstances. In terms of the international levels of analysis, the 
creation of the Jewish national homeland depended on Britain (by means of 
the Balfour Declaration and the British Mandate) and other leading Western 
powers of that time, which meant that the Zionist diplomatic efforts were 
concentrated in London, Geneva and New York. In fact, the world Jewry was 
predominantly Western and the funds for the Jewish resettlement in Palestine 
primarily came from Jews in Western countries, as did many potential 
immigrants at that stage, which was just after the Holocaust and the Second 
World War.   
 
The Jewish dependence on Britain for the creation of its national homeland 
dictated that the Jewish Agency could not take sides with India against Britain, 
as this would jeopardise its relations with Britain. No systematic effort was 
made by the Zionist Movement to establish contacts within the INCM despite 
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the fact that Israel, like India, had been under British rule. The Zionist 
Movement failed to convince the Indian nationalists that the Israeli nation was 
engaged in a struggle for independence no different to the one that the 
Indians or the other nations in Asia had undertaken. In fact, Zionism did not 
consider itself part of the historical process of a freedom struggle throughout 
Asia. Instead, it felt that its situation was unique, in the sense that its struggle 
was aimed at the revival of the Jewish nation in its ancient homeland. The 
Zionist leaders avoided identification with the anti-colonial nationalistic 
movements in Asia and the Zionist Movement, unlike the INCM, was not a 
member of the Organisation of International Congress against Imperialism. 
Consequently, no Zionist representative was ever found at the various anti- 
imperialist conferences during the 1920s and the 1930s and there was never 
any public pronouncement aligning Zionist goals with Asian nationalism. A 
further major concern of the Zionist leadership in Palestine regarding the 
struggle for independence in India, was the concern that Britain might fear 
that the troubles between the Jews and Arabs in Palestine could cause 
widespread disturbances among the Arabs throughout the Middle East and 
possibly also among the Muslims in India.  
 
The assumption of the Zionist Movement was that the Muslim community in 
India (consisting of over 95 million people before the Indo-Pakistani partition) 
was opposed to the Zionist Movement in Palestine and as a result, no serious 
attempt was made by the leaders of the Zionist Movement to establish 
contacts with the leadership of the Indian Muslim community. Consequently, 
the offer made by the Indian Muslim leader, Maulana Azad, to organise 
conciliation talks for a settlement in Palestine, was not taken seriously. 
Similarly, no attempt was made by the Jewish Agency to establish contacts 
with the Indian-Christian community, which unlike the Hindus was familiar with 
the Bible and the New Testament. Even the relations with the Indian Jewish 
community were limited and the budget allocation for the Jewish Agency’s 
local office in Bombay was small, mainly because of the low degree of 
importance attached to India by the Jewish leadership and the fact that the 
local office was not considered to be an effective channel for political lobbying 
in India. It is important to note that India was geographically remote in terms 
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of Palestine and there was a cultural as well as a religious gap between the 
Jewish and Indian nations. India lay on the periphery to the American-
European centred worldview of the Jewish leaders in Palestine and their 
knowledge of Indian heritage, culture, society and the Hindu religion in the 
Jewish community in Palestine was marginal. Similarly, the majority of Indian 
Hindus knew very little about Judaism and the Bible (namely the Old 
Testament).   
 
In terms of the individual level of analysis, as far as the Jewish leadership 
before independence was concerned, the most significant Indian leaders were 
Nehru and Mahatma Gandhi. However, despite the keen interest of the 
Jewish leaders in both of them, the sporadic meetings with Gandhi and Nehru 
as well as with other Indian leaders, were conducted by Jewish supporters of 
the Zionist cause and low ranking emissaries (contrary to the close relations 
between the Arab nationalist leaders and the Indian leaders).   
 
Gandhi was considered to be pro-Arab by the Israeli leaders and furthermore, 
as someone who lacked real understanding of Zionism. In fact, leaders such 
as Gandhi and Nehru were certainly not aware of the Jewish spiritual 
connection with the Holy Land however after the independence of Israel, they 
both considered the newly born state to be a theocratic state and as such 
analogous to Pakistan. Nevertheless, Gandhi and Nehru were held in great 
esteem by the Jews of Palestine and Nehru in particular, appealed to the 
predominantly socialist leadership of the Jewish Agency. Undeniably, the 
negative attitude displayed by these two Indian leaders towards Zionism, 
together with the failure to change their opinion regarding the Zionist cause, 
was frustrating for the Jewish leadership in Palestine. The understanding in 
Israel was that the Indian leaders in general and the leaders of the INCP in 
particular, were firmly committed to the traditional Indian pro-Arab and anti-
Israeli foreign policy. 
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7.2.1.4  Israel's post-independence foreign policy towards India 
 
 
After independence, the basic set of Israeli priorities included arms 
procurement; fundraising, Jewish immigration and political as well as 
economic support for the newly born Jewish State and India did not feature in 
this set of priorities. The perception in Israel in any case was that the Indian 
leaders in general and the leaders of the INCP in particular, were committed 
to the traditional Indian pro-Arab and anti-Israeli foreign policy.  
 
Based on the negative nature of the Indian foreign policy towards Israel, the 
prevailing assumption in Israel was that there was only a limited scope for any 
Israeli diplomatic initiative in India. Israeli diplomats were even instructed that 
issues such as transferring the Israeli Consulate to New Delhi or the question 
of diplomatic relations between the two countries should not be raised at all. 
Moreover, the Israeli assumption was strengthened by the limitations imposed 
on the Israeli Consulate activities in Bombay and the expulsion of the Israeli 
Consul from India in 1982.  
 
In terms of the international level of analysis, during the Cold War, Israel and 
India found themselves on different sides of the political spectrum. Following 
the Korean War from July 1950 onwards, Israel turned to the US with the aim 
of obtaining American patronage in the form of guarantees. India, on the other 
hand, was a prominent leader of the Non-Alignment Movement (NAM) and 
pursued its policy of non-alignment while developing close economic, military 
and diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union and consistently demonstrated 
an anti-Israeli foreign policy. In the context of the Cold War, Israel soon 
realised that the Americans had limited political power when it came to 
exerting pressure on and influencing India. Moreover, the Jewish American 
Organisations’ pressure on India, which was partly coordinated by Israel, 
regarding issues of importance to Israel, was not strong and was not focussed 
enough. This can be reinforced by the fact that when the American Jewish 
lobby exerted firm pressure on India concerning certain issues regarding 
Israel, the Indian response was favourable. American Jewish Organisations 
achieved remarkable success with issues such as: 
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• Prevention of the closure of the Israeli Consulate in Bombay. 
• Upgrading of the official rank of the diplomat in charge of the Consulate 
after the expulsion of Israeli Consul from India. 
• Extension of the jurisdiction of the Consulate. 
• Pressure applied to establish diplomatic relations with Israel. 
 
These successes offer clear proof that other previous interventions had not 
been forceful enough.  
 
The Israeli Arab wars in 1956, 1967, 1973 and 1982 caused the multilateral 
diplomacy of Israel to adopt a defensive mode with a low assessment of the 
potential influence of diplomacy in general and diplomacy in the multilateral 
arena in particular. India, on the other hand, was active in the international 
arena and constantly attacked Israel in the UN as well as the NAM on political 
and moral grounds, while campaigning for anti-Israel resolutions on 
international forums and giving its wholehearted support to the Arab cause.   
 
The Arab world represented a geographical and economic barrier between 
Israel and India specifically up to 1956 when the Tiran Straits and the Gulf of 
Akaba as well as the Suez Canal were closed by Egypt to Israeli shipping. 
Egypt’s refusal to allow Israeli shipping to pass through the Suez Canal and 
the closure of the Tiran Straits placed Israeli trade with Asia and India, at 
severe risk. This problem was partly solved after the Suez Canal Military 
Operations had opened the route to Asia for Israel. Nevertheless, the Israeli 
volume of trade with India remained low even after 1956, since India was not 
viewed as an important market for Israeli exports because of its socialist 
market and the fact that the Indian governmental sector was prohibited from 
having direct trade relations with Israel. On the other hand, the Indian 
economy depended on the Arab oil supply and Arab markets for Indian-made 
goods and a considerable number of Indians were employed in the Gulf 
countries. Israel realised that India's pro-Arab foreign policy was based on 
international, political and economic, interests and that India was totally 
committed to its pro-Arab traditional foreign policy. 
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The Israeli approach to the Indian Muslim community, including the attitude of 
the Israeli media and the public opinion in Israel, continued to be dogmatic 
and one-dimensional. Since its independence, Israel had experienced a 
negative attitude on the part of the Muslims in India towards it, whereas a 
special relationship appeared to exist between the Indian Muslim community 
and the Arab world. This perception was reinforced by the fact that the local 
Muslim community in India gradually became a significant political factor, to 
the INCP in particular, and as such, a potential reservoir of votes. In addition, 
India was deeply concerned about Pakistan’s plan to transform the conflict in 
Kashmir into a Pan-Islamic issue. Undoubtedly, diplomatic relations with Israel 
could have been useful for the Pakistani propaganda against India in the Arab 
world as well as the Muslim Indian population in India in general and the 
Muslim Indian population in Jammu-Kashmir in particular. 
 
In terms of bilateral relations, as part of the international level of analysis, the 
Israeli military support of India during the Indian wars with China and 
Pakistan, which was part of Israel’s arms diplomacy, did not yield the 
expected dividends. Contrary to Israeli expectations, it did not open any 
political doors to India or bring about any substantial improvement in the ties 
between the two countries other than some articles in the Indian press 
expressing their gratitude. Unlike diplomatic relations, economic relations with 
India had little value for Israel as India was an underdeveloped country and as 
far as Israel was concerned, the Israeli investments needed to make any 
political and economic impact on India, would have been enormous and out of 
all proportion to any potential benefits, it could receive. 
 
Israel failed to highlight the fact that it was maintaining fully-fledged diplomatic 
relations with Muslim countries and Arab states such as Egypt, which had 
traditionally maintained close relations with India and this important fact never 
appeared on the political agenda between the two countries. Israel also failed 
to convince India that it had overestimated the power of the Indian Muslim 
community as well as its expected response to diplomatic relations with Israel. 
This was proved by the fact that India’s recognition of Israel had not caused 
any violent protests in the Muslim community as well as the fact that they 
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reacted in a similar way when diplomatic relations between the two countries 
were subsequently established in 1992.   
 
In terms of the national and society level of analysis and the individual level of 
analysis, the left side of the Israeli political spectrum did feel that closer 
political friendship ties based on a socialist agenda and common national 
interests could be advantageous, but all the initiatives in this direction by the 
Israeli ministers and politicians proved to be futile. Until 1992, the change of 
governments in India as well as the coalition governments, including 
governments without the participation of the INCP, did not bring about any 
change in the Indian foreign policy towards Israel.  
 
There were Indian politicians, members of the academy, businesspersons, as 
well as members of the alumni of the Israeli International Cooperation 
Programme who could have been mobilised as a lobby group in India. 
Nevertheless, this option was never exercised by Israel partly because Israel 
had believed that pursuing its controversy with the Arabs within India would 
be a mistake and partly because of the Israeli concept that India was totally 
committed to its pro-Arab foreign policy. However, the few attempts that were 
made to mobilise the Israeli -Indian friendship associations in India in support 
of the promotion of diplomatic relations with Israel, did not bear any political 
fruit at all. In fact, the Israeli leaders, did not believe that it was possible to 
change India’s foreign policy and its negative attitude towards Israel because 
of international, political, ideological and economic reasons in general and 
India’s relations with the Islamic world in particular. 
 
The Israeli foreign policy towards India from the time of its independence up 
to the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1992 was one-dimensional and 
showed a lack of foresight as well as diplomatic creativity. The Israeli 
diplomatic efforts were based on the Israeli viewpoint that India was an anti-
Israeli, pro-Arab, non-cooperative and hypocritical state. The Israeli diplomacy 
towards India failed to create understanding of or sympathy for the Zionist 
cause and the prevailing diplomatic perception in Israel was that India 
remained committed to its biased pro-Arab and anti-Israeli foreign policy. This 
approach, as part of a centralised foreign policy making process, was 
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supported by the consensus among most of the political parties in Israel, the 
Knesset, including the Committee for Foreign  Affairs and Security, the Prime 
Minister's office, the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.   
 
As part of its foreign policy, Israel had to make a strategic decision regarding 
the sort of foreign policy and diplomacy to engage towards India and the 
decision was made to conduct a submissive foreign policy. It is important to 
understand this decision in terms of the prevailing international circumstances 
in the years between 1948 and 1991 in general and India’s anti-Israeli foreign 
policy towards Israel in particular. Israel realised that India would not change 
its entrenched negative foreign policy towards Israel prior to a complete and 
comprehensive peace process in the Middle East and would proceed with its 
traditional pro-Arab and anti-Israeli foreign policy. This conclusion was 
supported by the fact that India did not change its foreign policy towards Israel 
even after the peace agreements had been signed between Israel and Egypt 
and Jordan. 
 
In terms of bilateral relations as part of the international level of analysis, 
Israel made a crucial diplomatic mistake in March 1953 by insisting on 
reciprocity and by not opening an Israeli Embassy in New Delhi when it was 
still accepted by Nehru. However, even if such an embassy had been opened, 
India would probably have closed it after the Six-Day War, as was done by the 
Soviet Union, taking into consideration Indira Gandhi's staunch support of the 
Arab world and her anti-Israeli attitude. What could have been the 
consequence of opening an Israeli embassy in New Delhi in the 1950s 
remains obscure. However, there is no doubt, that the fact that Sharett, the 
first Israeli Minister of Foreign Affairs, insisted on the principle of reciprocity 
when the option of opening an Israeli embassy in India was introduced, made 
it easier for the Indian obstructionists to triumph. It is accepted by international 
political experts such as Michael Brecher, that in this particular case Israel 
lacked foresight and its conduct was characterised by a stolid formalism.  
 
This diplomatic mistake was corrected in 1992 when Israel having read the 
international mood correctly, insisted on nothing less than fully-fledged 
diplomatic relations between the two countries. The Israeli diplomacy vis-à-vis 
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India until 1992 was dogmatic, flawed and ineffective, whereas a different 
approach could have brought about substantial progress in the bilateral 
relations between the State of Israel and the Republic of India at a much 
earlier stage. What was needed at that time was a better awareness of the 
importance of India to Israel, a review of India with a vision of its role in future, 
the allocation of sufficient funds and an assertive political approach in the 
international arena. In addition, a creative type of diplomacy that involved the 
skilful use of American Jewish Organisations that could sway opinions in the 
political arenas was also needed.   
 
 
7.2.2 Second timeframe (February 1992) 
 
 
In the second timeframe, the change in bilateral relations between Israel and 
India in February 1992 and the establishment of diplomatic relations between 
the two countries are analysed in terms of the systemic change of the foreign 
policy process. For this purpose, the new Aggregative Model of Bilateral 
Foreign Relations Strategic Change is used as a key analysis model applied to 
the transformation of the Indian foreign policy regarding Israel, in addition to 
the ultimate decision unit and the levels of analysis models respectively. The 
model deals with the operational environment of the systemic foreign policy 
change process and is used as an analytical and explanatory tool in order to 
analyse the transformation of India’s foreign policy towards Israel in 1992. It is 
applied to international relations as a theoretical model that helps to explore 
and guide research concerning changes in bilateral relations. The Foreign 
Policy Change Decision Making Model is also utilised in this timeframe in 
order to achieve greater validity in this research. 
 
The transformation of the Indian foreign policy towards Israel and the 
establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries have been 
considered by India to be a strategic change and one of the most important 
steps in the history of  Indian diplomacy. By considering the large number of 
dependent variables, including their composite and comparative weight, the 
use of the Aggregative Model of Bilateral Relations Strategic Change 
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contributes to a better review and analysis of the systemic change process of 
the transformation of the Indian foreign policy towards Israel. The use of the 
Aggregative Model of Bilateral Foreign Relations Strategic Change as an 
analytical and explanatory tool enables the analysis of the multiple national 
defence-oriented factors that influence the systemic process of this foreign 
policy change together with contextual determinants. An additional model, 
Herman’s Model of Foreign Policy Change is used to ensure external validity 
in the analysis of the change of the Indian foreign policy towards Israel and to 
provide an additional angle to the Indian foreign policy change.   
 
 
7.2.2.1 Aggregative Model of Bilateral Relations Strategic Change 
 
 
Based on the Aggregative  Model, the formative determinants of the Indian 
foreign policy change, in terms of the pre-feasibility stage, which engendered 
the change process, were the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the 
Soviet Union as well as the emergence of the US as a sole superpower. The 
generating determinants, in terms of the framing and redefining stage, of the 
Indian foreign policy change towards Israel were the first Gulf War, the Madrid 
conference and the Israeli-Arab Middle East negotiations in general and the 
Palestinians in particular.   
 
The fundamental and national security oriented causative factors that 
influenced the Indian foreign policy change towards Israel are analysed in 
conjunction with contextual as well as situational change determinants that are 
divided into three levels of analysis.  
 
The first type is the international level of analysis, in which the following 
change factors pertaining to India’s national security are reviewed and 
analysed: 
 
• India’s military cooperation with Israel. 
• India's interest in intelligence operations with Israel. 
• Counter-terrorism cooperation. 
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• The Indian Ocean and nuclear power as a common strategic interest 
between the two countries. 
• The contribution of economic and foreign relations with Israel to India. 
 
In the field of multilateral relations, the analysis of India’s change of foreign 
policy towards Israel is dealt with in the Israeli context in the multilateral arena 
and is based on the review and evaluation of the following change factors 
pertaining to India’s national interests: 
 
• Indian geo-strategic interest in the Middle East.  
• Oil and energy as a key factor in India’s foreign policy.  
•  India and Central Asia.  
• India and Third World with emphasis on the NAM. 
• India as an acceptable international actor in the Middle East conflict. 
• India and the UN.  
• India and the US. 
• India and the American Jewish Organisations.  
• India and Russia. 
• India and the PRC.  
• India and world globalisation. 
• India and the Muslim world. 
• India and Pakistan. 
• India and the Arab world.  
• Indian Arab economic relations.  
• India’s relations with the PLO.  
 
The transformation of the Indian foreign policy towards Israel and the 
establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries in terms of the 
State and Society Level of Analysis are analysed by change determinants with 
an emphasis on Indian politics pertaining to Israel: 
 
• The traditional pro-Arab approach of the Indian MEA. 
• The Nehruvian tradition of pro-Arab foreign policy.  
• The INCP's traditional pro-Arab and anti-Israel foreign policy. 
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• The pro-Arab attitude of the Indian Muslim community and the Indian 
media. 
 
The transformation of the Indian policy towards Israel is also analysed by the 
individual level of analysis with reference to the leadership of India in 
convergence with the improvement of Israel’s international image after the first 
Gulf War and the inauguration of the Middle East peace process in October 
1991 as a contextual determinant. The analysis concentrates on Prime 
Minister Rajiv Gandhi and Prime Minister Narasimha Rao as the ultimate 
decision-makers of the transformation of the Indian foreign policy towards 
Israel.  
 
At the ripening stage of the Aggregative  Model of Bilateral Relations Strategic 
Change there were two contextual change determinants which served as 
accelerating determinants of the Indian foreign policy towards Israel. They 
were the Indian liberalisation as well as economic reforms that started in 1991 
and the re-establishment of diplomatic relations between Israel and the Soviet 
Union that took place in October 1991. At the focal point of change of the 
Indian foreign policy transformation, the fundamental factors were 
synchronised by three tune-up elements as contextual determinants:  
 
• The establishment of diplomatic relations between China and Israel 
occurred on 24 January 1992.   
• The opening of the third round of the Middle East peace talks in Moscow, 
which took place between 28 and 29 January 1992.   
• The official visit of Prime Minister Narasimha Rao to the US, to attend the 
UN Security Council in New York, which took place at the beginning of 
February 1992.  
 
The consolidation stage is characterised by the slow and gradual progression 
of the bilateral relations between India and Israel; during which three main 
impediments to the Indian foreign policy change towards Israel had to be 
addressed:  
 
• Arab states. 
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• The Indian Muslim community. 
• The INCP’s conservative politicians.  
 
The assimilation and implementation stage was set with the help of stabilising 
determinants:   
 
• The substantiation of the bilateral relations between India and Israel in 
particular, in fields such as military collaboration, counter-terrorism, 
agriculture, trade and high technology. 
• The willingness of the American Jewish organisations to cooperate with 
India.   
• Israel’s support of India at the UN on issues of special importance to India.   
• Israel’s invitation to India to take an active part in the Middle East peace 
process.  
 
 
7.2.3 Third timeframe (1992-2005) 
 
 
In the third timeframe, the evolving bilateral relations between Israel and India 
are analysed in the light of the ultimate decision unit theory and the  Levels of 
Analysis Model while using new the Oscillated Diplomacy Model as a key 
model of analysis of the evolving bilateral relations between the two countries. 
The model deals with diplomacy, oscillating between delimited opposite lines, 
which function as the guiding parameters of foreign policy, influenced by three 
types of national strategic interests, namely, joint strategic interests, common 
strategic interests and discrepant strategic interests. This model is used as an 
analytical and explanatory tool regarding the evolving bilateral relations 
between India and Israel from 1992 to 2005. It is applied as a theoretical 
model of international relations, which helps to explain operational diplomacy 
and to direct research pertaining to both bilateral foreign relations and 
diplomacy.  
   
Following the establishment of diplomatic relations between India and Israel, 
the bilateral relations between the two countries have become a cornerstone 
of their foreign policies, imbued  with a great deal of strategic importance for 
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both of them. The evolving bilateral relations between India and Israel from 
1992 to 2005 are analysed by the Oscillated Diplomacy Model.   
 
India’s foreign policy towards Israel as well as the bilateral relations between 
India and Israel has been strongly influenced by the political attitude of the 
Indian governments in power, which has affected the volume and direction of 
the Indian foreign policy towards Israel and the bilateral relations between the 
two countries. However, the implementation of India’s foreign policy towards 
Israel has been characterised by diplomatic vicissitudes in terms of convergent 
mutual national strategic interests. 
 
Since 1992, and even prior to that time, changes of governments in India have 
caused a great deal of concern in Israel and have had a direct impact on the 
bilateral relations between India and Israel, in terms of guiding parameters. 
These parameters have influenced the volume and direction of the Indian 
foreign policy towards Israel as well as the relations between the two 
countries. From a political level of analysis, the various governments in India 
since the 1990s have been characterised as coalition government types and 
since then, India has also moved from an ideological approach to a pragmatic 
attitude in its foreign policy.   
 
The Indian foreign policy towards Israel has acquired the backing of most 
participants in the political spectrum in India and most of the political parties 
have come to terms with India’s ties with Israel, realising its benefits and 
benefited India in general and the military field in particular. Nevertheless, 
there was consensus in Indian politics regarding the continuation of the 
support of the Palestinian cause and the need for friendly relations with the 
Arab world. The UPA government has re-introduced the Palestinian cause as 
a relevant factor influencing Israeli-Indian relations and as part of India’s new 
foreign policy and diplomatic activism. In addition, the Arab and the Gulf 
countries have become India’s political and economic partners. 
 
The political and economic importance of the Arab world and the Gulf 
countries combined with the traditional Indian empathy with the Palestinians 
and their quest for an Independent state, together with the political weight of 
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the Indian Muslim electorate, have influenced its foreign policy towards Israel 
as a guiding parameter. On the other hand, the Kargil crisis between India and 
Pakistan in 1999 and the terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament in December 
2001, expanded military collaboration between India and Israel and boosted 
the volume of arm sales between the two countries. In addition, it influenced 
India’s foreign policy towards Israel as a guiding parameter of foreign policy. 
September 11 2001 brought a new dimension to international counter-
terrorism and has improved collaboration in that field between the two 
countries, in particular during the tenure of the NDA governments. In addition, 
the volume of arms sales between Israel and India has reached a certain 
critical mass and the level of sophistication of the arms sales has increased as 
well. 
 
7.2.3.1 Oscillated Diplomacy Model  
 
The oscillation of the induced Indian diplomacy towards Israel as well as the 
diplomatic ties between India and Israel has been influenced, in terms of 
operational diplomacy, by convergent strategic interests influenced by three 
types of mutual national strategic interests. The convergent Israeli-Indian 
strategic interests are divided into three types of strategic interests, namely, 
joint strategic interests, common strategic interests and discrepant strategic 
interests. Joint strategic interests refer to the goals that the two states have 
pursued in order to maximise overlapping inter-related strategic interests in 
terms of strength and intensity, while the common strategic interests in terms 
of scope, refer to the goals that the two states have pursued in order to 
achieve complementary strategic interests. Discrepant strategic interests, on 
the other hand, refer to a third type of strategic interest, which has a negative 
and counteractive impact on bilateral power relations.  
 
India’s diplomatic activism since the 1990s has included its bilateral relations 
with Israel after India realised that such diplomatic ties are of strategic value to 
India in general and the Arab world in particular. India perceived that it could 
serve its national interests by having close relations with both Israel and the 
Arab world. After the establishment of diplomatic relations, India has moved 
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from an anti-Israeli and pro-Arab approach to a pragmatic one, which has 
resulted in a more balanced approach towards Israel, while maintaining its 
close relations with the Arab countries. Immediately after the establishment of 
diplomatic relations, Israel realised the potential of the ties between the two 
countries and a number of initial steps were taken by Israel in order to further 
the mutual convergent strategic interests between Israel and India. These 
steps were high-level official visits, dialogue with foreign ministries and 
bilateral agreements in addition to the Israeli international cooperation 
programme, which has been an integral part of the Israeli Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and has contributed significantly to the improvement of the Israeli 
image in India. 
 
7.2.3.2  Joint strategic interests 
 
 
The joint strategic interests between India and Israel have included military 
cooperation in particular, which includes arms sales, the transfer of military 
technology, joint weapon development, the joint production and marketing of 
military equipment, which have made India the third largest importer of Israeli 
arms after Turkey and China. Counter-terrorism has been another joint 
strategic interest and is based on the perception that Islamic fundamentalism 
and terrorism, particularly after September 11, have become a mutual concern 
for Israel and India. The joint strategic concern regarding radical Islamism at 
home and in neighbouring countries has also increased intelligence 
cooperation between Israel and India.   
 
Space cooperation has been another joint strategic interest between Israel 
and India and a space cooperation agreement has been signed between the 
space agencies of the two countries. India on the other hand, has expressed 
its interest in the Israeli Arrow 2 anti-ballistic missile system. The prevention of 
nuclear technology leaks and nuclear policy coordination has been a joint 
strategic interest for both countries, as they did not sign the NPT and 
considering the fact that Pakistan’s nuclear potential can constitute a threat to 
both countries, especially if Pakistan were taken over by Islamic extremist 
forces. Since the middle 1990s, India has been Israel’s largest trading partner 
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in Asia after China and Hong Kong. The amount of economic cooperation 
between the two countries has risen steadily, including joint industrial ventures 
that concentrate on science and high technology, related to the opening up of 
the Indian economy to the West and to globalisation. Israel, which has enjoyed 
free trade agreements with the US and the European Union and India, that 
was a signatory to the ASEAN-India framework agreement on comprehensive 
economic cooperation, have both realised that joint economic activities could 
work for their mutual benefit.   
 
7.2.3.3 Common strategic interests 
 
Cultural ties between Israel and India have become a common strategic 
interest in order to reach the civil society and the elite in both countries. In fact, 
cultural ties between the two countries have become markedly stronger since 
1992 and reached a peak in 1997 when Israel celebrated India’s 50th year of 
independence with the Shalom India Festival. India reciprocated one year later 
by organising cultural events throughout Israel as part of the celebration of the 
50 years of Israeli independence.   
 
Relations with the superpowers and the US in particular, have become a 
common strategic interest for both India and Israel. After September 11, there 
was a growing understanding in India as well as in Israel, that trilateral Indian-
American-Israeli cooperation is likely to produce considerable benefits for all 
parties concerned. In fact, the Indian leadership has become increasingly 
convinced that the American Jewish Lobby provides a vital link of influence in 
US policy- making as well as in American finance and they believe that this 
relationship can have a positive effect on the US’s attitude towards India. In 
fact, the US Jewish Lobby has played a significant role in the development of 
bilateral relations between Israel and India. The pro-Israel and pro-Indian 
lobbyists have worked together successfully and the Jewish-Indian alliance in 
the US has combined forces in electoral politics in order to defeat those whom 
they perceive to be antagonistic to both Israel and to India.  
 
India has gradually emerged as an Asian regional power since 1994 with its 
“Look East” policy. India has been able to utilise the technology and expertise 
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acquired in Israel in order to promote its trade and economic relations with 
Asia. Israel, on the other hand, that has had a continuous struggle to gain full 
international legitimacy in Asia, has found that its relations with India can be 
an important stepping stone to achieving this type of legitimacy as well as 
upgrading its international status in Asia. 
 
The Central Asian region has been an area of common strategic interest for 
India and Israel as well as an extended strategic neighbourhood. Both 
countries have sold military equipment to the Central Asian countries, have 
had economic interests in the region including the field of energy and have 
tried to limit the influence of Iran and Saudi Arabia as agents for radical 
Islamisation. India and Israel have been identified as significant players in the 
region considering the high level of involvement and competition with Russia, 
the US, China, Pakistan, Iran, Saudi Arabia and Turkey. However, Israel, India 
and Russia have shared counter religious terrorism as a common interest in 
Central Asia.  
 
Pakistan has been another common strategic interest between India and 
Israel. The Kargil crisis between Indian and Pakistan in 1999 expanded the 
military cooperation significantly between India and Israel and increased the 
volume of arms sales between them. India and Israel have also exchanged 
intelligence information on Islamic terrorist groups and Israel has helped India 
to fight terrorism in Kashmir by providing logistical support. Certainly, the 
Pakistani nuclear ability, which has been of concern to the two countries, 
constitutes a mutual security challenge, including issues such as, intelligence 
cooperation. Israel has been particularly concerned about the seepage of 
nuclear technology either with the authorisation of the government of Pakistan 
or as a rogue operation and that Pakistan would become a supplier of 
intermediate range missiles to Arab countries in the Middle East and Iran.  
 
The geo-strategic location has been a common strategic interest of India and 
Israel. The two countries have been located strategically on the flanks of a 
number of Muslim countries and have a strategic interest in securing the sea-
lanes to the Straits of Mallaca. Maintaining the security of the Indian Ocean 
has been another common strategic interest. The Indian Ocean has been an 
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important geo-strategic location as far as India’s strategic interest is 
concerned, while the Indian Ocean has been a key sea-lane to Asia for Israel 
and for its trade to the continent. Further areas of common interest are 
trilateral cooperation in the field of energy as well as industrial cooperation 
such as cooperation regarding diamond processing and trilateral joint military 
cooperation.  
 
7.2.3.4 Discrepant strategic interests 
 
 
The phenomenon of Israeli and Indian relations with the UN is a good example 
of the discrepant strategic interest regarding the two countries. Although India 
has not sponsored any anti-Israeli UN resolutions since 1992, it has continued 
supporting the Palestinian cause at the UN General Assembly and UN 
committees, although abstaining on the nuclear issue. 
 
The NAM is another example of a discrepant strategic interest between the 
two countries. Since the 1990s, the NAM’s influence on Indian diplomacy has 
decreased steadily, as India has sought to reconstruct its foreign policy to 
meet the requirements of the post Cold War world. India started to focus on 
issues concerned with its national interests and Israel was a direct beneficiary 
of the change in the Indian international orientation towards the NAM. 
Traditionally, the political dynamics in the organisation have been 
unconditionally in favour of the Arab world as well as the Palestinian cause. 
Despite the new Indian approach towards the NAM and the fact that India has 
made serious attempts to moderate the NAM’s resolutions against Israel, India 
has remained an active member of the Palestine committee of the NAM and 
the movement has remained a discrepant strategic interest between the two 
countries. 
 
Iran’s Islamic governments are often regarded as fanatic and its nuclear 
capability has been considered a strategic threat by Israel and an existential 
danger to the state of Israel as well as a serious danger to the stability of the 
Middle East. Israel’s attitude towards Iran has been in stark contrast with 
India’s friendly relations with Iran and Israel has frequently expressed its 
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concern about India's close ties with Teheran and the possibility of India 
selling advanced technology and military equipment to Iran. On the other 
hand, the Chinese-Israeli relations in general and their military cooperation in 
particular, were of concern to India and have been watched closely as a 
national security concern representing a discrepant strategic interest between 
India and Israel.   
 
India’s intention of sustaining its high level of economic growth since 1991 has 
required vast oil and energy reserves. The lack of adequate energy resources, 
Arab oil and demand for oil- based products such as petrochemicals and 
fertilisers have made the relationship between India and the Gulf countries an 
important factor in India’s foreign policy and as a result,  also a discrepant 
strategic interest between India and Israel. Traditionally, the Islamic and Arab 
worlds have been a discrepant strategic Interest between India and Israel. In 
addition, India has traditionally stressed its historic links with the Islamic world 
while trying to avoid the excessive focus on Kashmir and its tensions with 
Pakistan, as well as trying to neutralise Pakistan and its ability to play the 
Islam card.   
 
Since the middle 1990s, India has regarded Israeli military and intelligence 
cooperation as a more valuable asset for dealing effectively with the Kashmir 
problem than the unfriendly attitude of the Muslim countries. In particular, 
there was a shift in the Indian foreign policy after the Gulf War when India 
perceived that it could serve its national interests better by having close 
relations with both Israel and the Arab world.  
 
In fact, there has been a shift in India’s foreign policy from a one-sided position 
in favour of the Arabs in their dispute with Israel, to a more balanced stance. 
India realised that doing business with all the protagonists in the Middle East 
on the one hand, without ignoring India’s economic and political interests in 
the region on the other hand, has been the most beneficial course of action for 
its national strategic interests. Following the change of government in India 
and the return to power of the INCP in May 2004, there was an improvement 
in its relations with the Islamic and the Arab worlds. The UPA government has 
been eager to demonstrate that its ties with Israel would not affect its support 
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of the Palestinian cause. In January 2005, Ambassador Chinmay Gharekhan 
was appointed as a special envoy of the Indian Prime Minister to the Middle 
East (West Asia) as an expression of the new Indian government’s intention to 
improve its relationship with the Arab world. It also wanted to be portrayed as 
a staunch supporter of the Palestinian cause as well as the Palestinian quest 
for an independent state.   
 
The following factors have influenced the Indian foreign policy regarding the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict: 
 
• The collapse of the Oslo process at Camp David. 
• The death of the Palestinian leader, Yasser Arafat.  
• The end of the second Intifada. 
•  The election of Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) as the new leader of the 
Palestinian Authority (PA). 
• The failure of the implementation of the Road-Map. 
 
Following the failure of the implementation of the Road-Map and the Israeli 
unilateral Disengagement Plan from the Gaza Strip and part of the North West 
Bank, the UPA government regarded the Israeli Disengagement Plan in a 
positive light. The condition was that it would only be part of the first stage of a 
comprehensive peace process that would lead to an independent and viable 
Palestinian state and would encourage Israel to take steps to improve the 
Palestinian economy and revitalise the Palestinian Authority.   
 
In terms of the state and society level of analysis and as far as the Indian 
political system has been concerned, the Indian political system has gradually 
come to terms with the evolving relations between the two countries. This has 
followed the build- up of official bilateral relations with Israel and the positive 
change of image that Israel has undergone after 1992 in India. Most of the 
political parties in India, while continuing their support of the Palestinian cause, 
realised the benefits and advantages of the defence and military relations of 
India with Israel. The Indian political system has also realised that the success 
of the foreign policy and economy were dependent on the pace of India’s 
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globalisation and its ability to strengthen its ties with the West as well as Israel. 
Significantly, Israel with its modern technologically oriented economy has 
become an important economic partner of India, with specific emphasis on the 
transfer of expertise and advanced technology in general and agro-technology 
in particular. The return to power of the INCP on 23 May 2004 completed a 
political circle as far as the bilateral relations with Israel were concerned. 
Some concern was expressed in Israel about the possibility of a negative 
change in India’s foreign policy towards Israel. However, military, economic 
and cultural relations have been maintained, even though there have been 
fewer Indian high-level official visits. 
 
The Indian MEA, as a civil service, has adjusted slowly to the change in the 
traditional foreign policy towards Israel, although it did express concern 
whenever there were setbacks in the peace process with the Palestinians. 
Since 1999, the Indian MEA and the Israeli MFA have held annual bilateral 
consultations and the MEA has gradually come to terms with the idea that 
close relations with both Israel and the Arab world serve India’s national 
interests. Following the return to power of the INCP, there was a shift in Indian 
diplomacy, which focussed on India’s traditional ties with the Palestinians as 
well as its will to improve relations with the Arab world but without undermining 
the Israeli-Indian relations. The new Indian UPA government has been 
determined to maintain India’s friendly relations with Israel, while continuing to 
improve its close relations with the Arab countries as well as its support of the 
Palestinian cause.   
 
Pressure groups have traditionally played a minor role in the two countries’ 
politics as far as the formulation of foreign policy is concerned and have made 
no significant contribution to influencing the evolving bilateral relations 
between the two counties, with the exception of the American Jewish 
organisations and the Indian Muslim community. The Indian Muslim 
community and the Indian-Muslim organisations, supported by India’s left wing 
parties and traditionalists in the elite of the INCP, have continued to object to 
the growing Israeli-Indian relations. However, all governments as well as their 
National Security Advisors who have played a key role in promoting the 
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bilateral relations between the two countries, including the new Indian UPA 
government, have made it clear that the bilateral relations with Israel in 
general and the military cooperation in particular, would continue.   
 
7.3  Summation 
 
In essence, the transformation of the Indian foreign policy towards Israel and 
the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries have been 
considered by India to be one of the most important steps in Indian history. 
The importance of those changes and of the establishment of diplomatic 
relations with Israel, were described in an exhaustive manner by the former 
Foreign Secretary of the Indian Ministry of External Affairs, J.N. Dixit 
(1996:315), points out that he considered the establishment of relations with 
Israel and South Africa as the most significant among developments in India’s 
foreign policy. 
The Israeli foreign policy towards India since gaining independence up to the 
establishment of diplomatic relations, showed a lack of foresight as well as a 
lack of creativity. Moreover, the sporadic Israeli diplomatic efforts vis-à-vis 
India, were found to be fruitless. Israel’s approach towards India ran the gamut 
from expectancy to hope, disappointment, dismay, anger and finally 
indifference, until 1992 when the situation changed. Up to that time, Israel had 
considered India to be a hypocritical state, which remained aloof and non-
cooperative and the prevailing Israeli diplomatic assumption was that India 
was firmly committed to its pro-Arab and anti-Israeli partial foreign policy.  
If Israel had made certain creative diplomatic steps earlier on, it could have led 
to positive changes in the bilateral relations between the State of Israel and 
the Republic of India. A greater awareness of the importance of India, coupled 
with a visionary insight and allocating sufficient funds for the improvement of 
relations, would all have been beneficial for this purpose. Further changes that 
would have helped to improve the bilateral relations even sooner would have 
been adopting an assertive approach in collaboration with a more target-
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oriented US Jewish lobby. In other words, Israel did not succeed in making 
use of creative diplomacy in its dealings with India. 
Following the establishment of diplomatic relations between India and Israel, 
the bilateral relations between the two countries have become a cornerstone 
of their foreign policies, imbued with strategic importance for both of them. 
India’s diplomatic activism since the 1990s has included its bilateral relations 
with Israel after India realised that such diplomatic ties are of strategic value to 
India and It has moved from an anti-Israeli and pro-Arab approach to a 
pragmatic one, which included development of military connections as well as 
promotion of commercial ties. Israel realised the potential of the ties between 
the two countries and a number of initial steps were taken by Israel in order to 
further the mutual convergent strategic interests between Israel and India. 
 
Despite the slowdown in the Israeli-Indian bilateral relations since 2004, Israel 
considers its bilateral relations with India to be the cornerstone of its foreign 
policy. The ongoing strong and strategic affiliation between Israel and India is 
based on the convergence of strategic interests of the two international 
actors. However, it is felt that the bilateral relations and cooperation between 
the two countries ought to be diversified by means of additional 
complementary fields of activities and by emphasising “people to people” 
activities. Such cooperation, if supported by a peaceful solution to the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict, has the potential to upgrade the bilateral relations 
between India and Israel and can contribute to the establishment of multi- 
facetted bilateral relations. In fact, it can turn the Israeli-Indian relationship into 
a fruitful complex of interdependent relations for the mutual benefit of both 
countries. Little research has been done on the change process of bilateral 
relations in terms of a micro level analysis of a complex web of variables that 
influence such a type of international processes as well as the impact of their 
comparative weight. Therefore, further research on the advantages of 
combining international relations theories with diplomatic practice in foreign 
policy change and additional research on the informal dimensions of 
transformation of foreign policy are recommended. This research can 
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contribute to a better understanding of international relations theory, 
international politics, foreign policy change process and diplomatic practice.  
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ACMI  - Air Combat Maneuvering Instrumentation 
ACHDUT HAAVODA – The Party of Unity of Labour 
ADL - Anti Defamation League 
AEC - Atomic Energy Commission  
AIPAC - America Israel Political Action Committee  
AJC - American Jewish Committee  
ALH - Advanced Light Helicopters 
ARF - ASEAN Regional Forum  
ARO-Asian Relations Organisation 
ASEAN – Association of South East Asian Nations 
AWACS  - Airborne Warning and Control Systems  
BJP  - Bharatiya Janata Party 
BOI - Bank of India  
CARs - Central Asian Republics  
CII - Confederation of Indian Industry  
COIJI- Central Organisation of Indian Jews in Israel 
COMIFORM - Conference of the Communist Parties  
CPI - Communist Party of India 
CPI-M - Communist Party of India Marxist  
CTBT - Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty  
DRDO  - Indian Defense Research and Development Organization 
DSIR - Department of Scientific and Industrial Research 
EU – European Union  
FTA - Free Trade Agreement  
GDP- Gross Domestic Product 
HAL - Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. 
HISTADRUTH - General Federation of Workers of Israel 
IAEA - International Atomic Energy Agency 
IAF  - Indian Air Force  
IAI  - Israeli Aircraft Industry  
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IARI  - Indian Agricultural Research Institute  
IB - Investigation Bureau  
ICJ - International Court of Justice  
IDF - Israeli Defense Forces  
IDSA - Institute for Defense Studies and Analysis 
IFS  - Indian Foreign Service   
IIF - International Islamic Front 
IIRDIC -Israel Industrial, Research and Development Initiative Cooperation  
IMF - International Monetary Fund  
IMI  - Israel’s Military Industries 
IMDP - Integrated Missiles Development Program   
INCM - Indian National Congress Movement  
INCP - Indian National Congress Party 
IPU - Inter Parliamentary Union 
ISRO  - Indian Space Research Organization 
IT – Information Technology 
ITPO - Indian Trade Promotion Organization  
JDP  - Janata Dal party   
JWG - Joint Working Group 
KNESSET - The Israeli Parliament  
LCA - Light Combat Aircraft  
LIC  - Low Intensity Conflict  
LIKUD – The Union Party  
LOC - Line of Control 
LTTE  - Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam 
MAARACH - The Alignment Party 
MASHAV - Israel’s International Development Cooperation Program 
MAPAI – The Party of Workers of the Land of Israel 
MAPAM– The Party of the United Workers 
MEA – Ministry of External Affairs  
MFA - Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
MFN - Most Favoured Nation  
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MOSSAD- Agency for Intelligence and Special Operations 
MOU - Memorandum of understanding  
NAM – Non- Aligned Movement  
NDA - National Democratic Alliance  
NGO – Non- Governmental Organisations  
NMD - National Missile Defense  
NPT - Non-Proliferation Treaty  
NSA - National Security Advisor  
NSG - National Security Guards 
OIC - Organisation of the Islamic Conference  
OPEC – Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries 
PA - Palestinian Authority 
PLO-Palestine Liberation Organisation 
PNC - Palestine National Council   
PRC- People’s Republic of China 
PSLV  - Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle 
RAFAEL - Israel’s Weapon Development Authority 
RAFI – The Party of the List of Israeli Workers  
RAW - Research and Analysis Wing  
RPV  - Remotely Piloted Vehicles 
SAAG- South Asia Analysis Group 
SCI - Shipping Corporation of India 
SHABAK - Israeli Security Service 
TAC  - Treaty of Amity and Cooperation  
TECHINT - Technical Intelligence  
UAR –United Arab Republic 
UAV  - Unmanned Aerial Vehicle  
UF - United Front  
UN-United Nations 
UNEF - United Nation's Emergency Force 
UNIFIL  - United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon   
UNO-United Nations Organisation 
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UNSCOP - United Nations Special Committee on Palestine  
UPA - United Progressive Alliance  
US- United States 
USINPAC - US  – India Political Action Committee  
USO-United Socialist Organisation 
WHO - World Health Organisation  
WJC - World Jewish Congress  
WZO - World Zionist Organisation  
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Appendix 1 
 
List of Prime Ministers of India 1947-1996 
 
1. Jawaharlal Nehru      15/8/1947-27/51964              - Congress Party               
2. Gulzari Lal Nanda     27/5/1964-9/6/1964 
(acting)   
- Congress Party                                    
3. Lal Bahadur    
Shastri   
9/6/1964-11/1/1966               - Congress Party 
4. Gulzari Lal Nanda    11/1/1966-
24/1/1966(acting) 
- Congress Party 
5. Indira Gandhi        24/1/1966-24/3/1977             - Congress (o) Party     
6. Morarji Desai       24/3/1977-28/7/1979              - Janata Party 
7. Charan Singh       28/7/1979-14/1/1980              - Janata Party 
8. Indira Gandhi       14/1/1980-31/10/1984            - Congress (I) Party 
9. Rajiv Gandhi       31/10/1984-2/12/1989            - Congress (I) Party 
1  10. Vishwanath 
Pratap Singh       
2/12/1989-10/11/1990                                
 - Janata Dal Party                                                                           
(NF-National Front) 
11. Chandra Shekhar    10/11/1990-21/6/1991                                                                                                    - Samajwadi
Janata Dal Party 
12. P.V. Narasimha   
Rao  
21/6/1991-16/5/1996             - Congress (I) Party 
 
 
 
* Source: Kapur, Harish. (1994) India's foreign policy 1947-92: Shadows and substance, 
Sage publications, New Delhi, India. 
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Appendix 2 
List of Governments of Israel 1948-1992 
 
1. May 13 1948 – March 7 1949 – Provisional Government 
Prime Minister – David Ben Gurion ,   Foreign Minister – Moshe Sharett 
2. March 7 1949 – October 30 1950 – First Government 
Prime Minister - David Ben Gurion,   Foreign Minister – Moshe Sharett 
3. October 30 1950 – October 8 1951 – Second Government 
Prime Minister - David Ben Gurion,   Foreign Minister – Moshe Sharett 
4. October  8 1951  - December 23 1952 – Third Government 
Prime Minister - David Ben Gurion,   Foreign Minister – Moshe Sharett 
5.  December 23 1952 – January 26 1954 – Fourth Government 
Prime Minister - David Ben Gurion,   Foreign Minister – Moshe Sharett 
6.  January 26 1954 – June 29 1955 – Fifth Government,   
Prime Minister – Moshe Sharett Foreign Minister – Moshe Sharett 
7. June 29 1955 – November 3 1955 – Sixth Government,   
Prime Minister – Moshe Sharett Foreign Minister – Moshe Sharett 
8. November 3 1955 – January 7 1958 – Seventh Government 
Prime Minister - David Ben Gurion,   Foreign Minister – Golda Meir 
9. January 7 1958 – December 17 1959 – Eighth Government 
Prime Minister - David Ben Gurion,   Foreign Minister – Golda Meir 
10. December 17 1959 – 2 November 1961 – Ninth Government 
Prime Minister - David Ben Gurion,   Foreign Minister – Golda Meir 
11.November 2 1961 – June 26 1963 - Tenth Government 
Prime Minister - David Ben Gurion,   Foreign Minister – Golda Meir 
12. June 26 1963 – December 23 1964 – Eleventh Government 
Prime Minister – Levi Eshkol,   Foreign Minister – Golda Meir 
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13. December 23 1964 – January 12 1966  - Twelfth Government 
Prime Minister – Levi Eshkol,   Foreign Minister – Golda Meir 
14. January 12 1966 – March 17 1969  - Thirteenth Government 
Prime Minister – Levi Eshkol ,  Foreign Minister – Abba Eban 
15. March 17 1969 – December 15 1969 – Fourteenth Government 
Prime Minister – Golda Meir,   Foreign Minister – Abba Eban 
16. December 15 1969 – March 10 1974 – Fifteenth Government 
Prime Minister – Golda Meir,   Foreign Minister – Abba Eban 
17. March 10 1974 – June 3 1974 – Sixteenth Government 
Prime Minister – Golda Meir,   Foreign Minister – Abba Eban 
18. June 3 1974 – June 20 1977 – Seventeenth Government 
Prime Minister – Yitzhak Rabin Foreign Minister – Yigal Allon 
19. June 20 1977  - August 5 1981 – Eighteenth Government 
Prime Minister – Menahem Begin, Foreign Minister – Moshe Dayan (until 
1979) Yitzhak Shamir (from 1980) 
20. August 5 1981 – October 10 1983 – Nineteenth Government 
Prime Minister – Menahem Begin, Foreign Minister – Yitzhak Shamir 
21. October 10 1983 – September 13 1984 – Twentieth Government,  
Prime Minister – Yitzhak Shamir, Foreign Minister – Yitzhak Shamir 
22. September 13 1984 – October 20 1986 – Twenty First Government 
Prime Minister – Shimon Peres, Foreign Minister – Yitzhak Shamir 
23. October 20 1986 – December 22 1988 – Twenty Second Government 
Prime Minister – Yitzhak Shamir, Foreign Minister – Shimon Peres 
24. December 22 1988 – June 11 1990– Twenty Third Government 
Prime Minister – Yitzhak Shamir Foreign Minister – Moshe Arens 
25. June 11 1990 – July 13 1992 – Twenty Fourth Government 
Prime Minister – Yitzhak Shamir, Foreign Minister – David Levi 
* Source: Rolef, S. Hattis. (1993) Political dictionary of the State of Israel, The Jerusalem 
Publishing House, Jerusalem, Israel. 
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 Appendix 3 
 
Israeli- Indian Bilateral Agreements. 
 
• Memorandum of understanding on economic cooperation, 
!7/05/1993. 
• Agreement on cooperation in the field of tourism, 18/05/1993  
• Cultural agreement; 18/05/1993. 
• Agreement between the government of Israel and the 
government of India for cooperation in the field of agriculture, 
24/12/1993. 
• Air transport agreement, 04/04/1994 (the agreement is 
amended by a memorandum of understanding of 4/10/1994). 
• Agreement between the government of the republic of India 
and the government of the state of Israel concerning 
cooperation in the field of telecommunications and posts; 
29/11/1994. 
• Agreement on trade and economic cooperation, 21/12/1994. 
• Agreement between the government of Israel and the 
government of India for the promotion and protection of 
investments, 29/01/1996. 
• Bilateral agreement regarding mutual assistance and 
cooperation in customs matters between Israel and India, 
29/01/1996. 
• Convention for the avoidance of double taxation and for the 
prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income 
and on capital, 29/01/1996.  
• Agreement on technical cooperation between the government 
of Israel and the government of India, 30/12/1996  
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• Umbrella agreement between Israel and India on the 
development of cooperation in the field of industrial and 
technological research and development research and 
development, 30/12/1996. 
• Agreement between the Israeli space agency and the Indian 
space research organisation for cooperation on the peaceful 
use of outer space, 28/10/2002. 
• Agreement between the government of the state of Israel and 
the government of the republic of India on exemption of visa 
requirements for holders of diplomatic, service and official 
passports, 09/09/2003. 
• Agreement between the government of the state of Israel and 
the government of the republic of India on cooperation in the 
field of medicine, 09/09/2003. 
• Agreement between the government of the state of Israel and 
the government of the republic of India on cooperation in the 
field of protection of the environment, 09/09/2003. 
• Programme for cultural and educational cooperation and 
exchange program on cooperation in the field of education, 
09/09/2003. 
• Memorandum of understanding on industrial research and 
development initiative, 30/05/2005. 
* The information is compiled from the MFA's official web site: http://www.mfa.gov.il 
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